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Abstract
The central topic of this investigation is power in community care
accommodation for adults with learning difficulties. Specifically, it undertakes a
qualitative psychological investigation into how people living in such accommodation
experience power acting upon them, how they relate to themselves as subjects, and
what problems they experience with these issues. In addressing these questions, the
research draws upon the work of Michel Foucault. Crucially, Foucault (e.g. 1983,
1993), in his later life, understood his work as comprising three inter-related domains
of critical enquiry — into truth, power and ethics. It is these three domains that are
drawn upon in this research to examine how people talk about their situation. The
research thus aims to build up a picture of how people living in care become objects
of knowledge, how they are situated in specific power relationships in their homes,
and how they understand their own identity and relate to themselves as subjects. This
represents a much more detailed investigation into the situation of people living in
community care than can be found in the existing literature, and in particular it moves
beyond concerns for normalisation or quality of life.
The research proceeded through a qualitative discursive analysis of individual
accounts of life in community care accommodation. Seventeen interviews were
conducted with people who were living in such accommodation, or who had lived
there previously. The aim of the interviews followed interpretative phenomenological
analysis (IPA) (Smith, Jarman & Osborn, 1999) in attempting to explore and
understand participants' experiences of life in care. The accounts produced from the
interviews were analysed using a combination of IPA and an adaptation of a post-
structuralist approach to discourse analysis (Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor &
Tindall, 1994) based around Foucault's three domains of critical inquiry.
Through these analyses, a number of themes (recurring topics in the
interviews that related to the domains of analysis) emerged from participants'
accounts. The interviews showed, firstly, an awareness of processes of observation
and assessment by a specific, usually only vaguely-referenced, group of people. There
was a lack of understanding or detailed knowledge of these processes, but there was
an awareness that they make available negative ways of thinking about people
deemed to have learning difficulties and specific decisions and judgements about
their care needs. Also, the interviews revealed a set of power relationships in which
residents of the homes are conceptually divided from the staff. These power
relationships are manifest in such things as residents having prohibitions and
imperatives imposed on their conduct, being subject to the decisions of the staff, and
being subject to reprimands and punishments for certain types of behaviour. What
emerged from the analysis of participants' discussion of these themes were areas of
disagreement and resistance to their positions in power relationships. It was noted that
participants were not passively positioned by power, but actively related to
themselves as "liberal", self-expressing and self-determining subjects. This self-
relationship clashed with their position in differential power relationships, and created
problems that they experienced with their lives in care and with their self-identity.
The crucial findings, then, are that care residents' lives are characterised by
differential power relationships in which they occupy a subordinate "place" in their
homes, and that they struggle with this position and experience problems with it in
relation to their own self-understanding. The research thus demonstrates the
importance of attending to individuals' accounts of their own situation, producing a
close reading of what they say, and placing this within the context of the breadth of
Foucault's work, and in particular, his work on ethics and self-relationships.
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Chapter 1 — Introduction
For a large part of the last century, it was commonly thought that people with
learning difficulties should be segregated in large, hospital-like institutions (DHSS,
1971). More recently, though, there has been a move to what has been termed
"community care". This aimed to make care accommodation as 'homelike as possible'
(DHSS, 1971) and to judge such accommodation according to 'whether or not it
improves a person's quality of life' (Social Services Committee, 1990; p.vi) and
whether it fulfils personal potential and needs for privacy.
This move is generally seen as a positive one, and, when the comparison is
made to many of the older, isolated, asylum-like hospitals that it has replaced, it is
easy to see why. However, this is not to say that all possible problems have been
dissolved. This research project sets out to examine how people with learning
difficulties who live, or have lived, in special, community-based accommodation
experience power relationships in these institutions. This will be addressed by
carrying out interviews with adults with learning difficulties who live in community
care accommodation with a view to exploring how they understand their relationships
to the environment in which they live, the care they receive, other people in the care
environment (especially the people who administer the care homes), and themselves
as recipients of care. An analysis will then be made which will aim to draw out from
these accounts how these issues embody particular forms of power and subjectivity,
and how people are interacting with them.
This is a research question that has emerged from a reading of the works of the
French post-structuralist philosopher, Michel Foucault. Foucault's thought radically
reconceptualised how we think about power. Power, in this thinking, is no longer seen
merely as a repressive force that commands obedience to a set of rules, but as a
complex system dynamically linked to knowledge (Foucault, 1980a, 1981a). The basic
argument that runs through this thesis is that the orientation to power offered in
Foucault's work offers a productive way of exploring its operations in care
environments, of finding new ways of evaluating care services, and of listening to the
people who use them. We will learn about this in more detail in due course, but a
simple introduction will help us in understanding how this thought influenced the
research question, and how it will drive the research itself.
As with a number of thinkers in French philosophy of science, Foucault saw
knowledge not as something which we amass unproblematically merely by observing
and learning about naturally-occurring phenomena, but as a production of particular
ways of thinking about the world, as something which apprehends the world in
specific ways and in so doing brings things into being as possible objects of thought.
Foucault's contention was that connected to the process of bringing objects into being
in specific systems of knowledge were forms of power. The ways in which things
emerge as specific objects of thought make available particular ways of thinking about
them and acting upon them, and these constitute power relationships. So, for instance,
the way in which learning difficulties emerges as a particular object is dynamically
connected to the sorts of decisions that can be made about those who are thought to
have learning difficulties, what interventions are appropriate to be made into their
lives, what treatment they need, and so on. Depending upon how aspects of people's
characteristics are thought about in specific systems of knowledge like psychology,
different sorts of intervention become available into their lives. Different institutional
interventions and social relationships become appropriate depending upon how these
things become thought about. Hence, power is productive of a whole set of
possibilities for understanding and dealing with people, and a whole set of social
relationships based upon these issues. Additionally, the way in which these things
exist as objects of knowledge, says Foucault, affects how people can understand and
relate to themselves, how their conduct might be seen as applicable to particular
imperatives and interdictions. So, if an aspect of mental functioning becomes
knowable as a disability of some sort, this will have consequences for those deemed to
have this disability. This knowledge locates within them an identity as disabled
subjects, as individuals who are somehow conceptually divided from those who are
"normal", with particular relationships to people who care for them, to institutions in
which they live, to ways in which they should conduct themselves, to the relationships
they should have with others and with themselves, and so on.
A number of possible approaches to the study of power and subjectivity might
be suggested by Foucault's work. However, as we shall see, one of the things which
Foucault influences us to attend to is the danger of making decisions about other
people's situation for them. Thus, as McNay (1994) points out, studies of institutions
undertaken from the point of view of those who are their subjects are long overdue.
This study, then, is based around exploring issues of power and subjectivity with
people who live in care accommodation by talking to them about their lives in care.
So, to state it more specifically, the research questions that drive this thesis are:
• What forms of power do individuals living in community care accommodation for
adults with learning difficulties experience as acting upon them?
• How do they relate to themselves as subjects in relation to it?
• How does this constitute problems for them in their lives?
These questions will be addressed by using a form of discourse analysis based
upon a series of semi-structured interviews with people who live, or have recently
lived, in residential care accommodation due to being deemed to have learning
difficulties. These interviews will aim to explore the relevant issues with them and to
find out how they relate to questions of power and subjectivity in their care
environment. The analysis will involve, then, moving from the accounts generated in
the interviews to examining how people deemed to have learning difficulties
recognise themselves as situated in particular relationships of power in the institutions
in which they live. That is, how particular interventions and particular forms of
authority act upon them, how their relationships with other people are structured, how
specific institutions deal with them in particular ways, how they interact with and
experience these issues, how they relate to an identity as a person with learning
difficulties and how, in light of this, they understand and relate to themselves and their
own conduct. The emphasis is on the question of how people understand, experience
and interact with these issues in their lives, what effects these issues have for them.
The following chapter of this thesis, then, will elaborate in much greater detail
upon Foucault's work, and show more clearly how it has influenced the research
question and informed the approach being taken. This work was a lot more complex
that the impression of it given above allows for, and the exposition of it in Chapter
Two will provide a much better understanding of how the research question emerged,
and why it is seen as important to ask.
An additional key question of this thesis will be how Foucault's works can be
useful to psychology in terms of elaborating a new approach to analysing discourse
which can examine Foucauldian issues in individuals' discourse. Chapter Three will
thus deal with issues that are relevant to our position with respect to psychology. It
will elaborate challenges that have emerged from both inside and outside the
discipline to a conception of it as a natural scientific enterprise. It will show how new
ideas have been presented which resonate with some of Foucault's thinking in that
they see psychological knowledge not as unproblematically discovered by scientific
method, but as discursively constituted and dependent upon particular ways of
theorising the psychological self and the social world it inhabits. A number of
approaches to the study of discourse which have emerged as a result of these
criticisms will be reviewed, and their potential usefulness to this study evaluated.
With all of these issues taken into consideration, an approach to the analysis of
discourse will be formulated that will be tailored to undertaking the specific analysis
required by this research.
Chapter Four will move onto the area of learning difficulties, discussing the
main perspectives that have influenced how it has been understood in recent years.
This will begin by examining the plethora of terms which have emerged for talking
about what is now generally referred to as "learning difficulties", and will then move
on to examine the ways in which it has been defined in different fields at different
times. Of course, these are not seen as "natural" concepts, but, in a Foucauldian vein,
as constructions of particular systems of knowledge. The chapter will then examine
the dominant concepts which influence how learning difficulties is thought about and
how care interventions should proceed. Finally, we will examine the types of care
accommodation that exist for people deemed to have learning difficulties, especially
charting the ideals and services connected to the move towards community care.
Next, Chapter Five will critically assess the ideals that have led to the
emergence of new forms of care and accommodation, identifying some problems and
some areas concerning power which have not been addressed. The impact of
Foucault's ideas about power on how these services are to be conceived will be of
central concern here. The chapter will then examine the contemporary body of
research around the study of disability which sees it as primarily a function of the
organisation of social structures in society, consider how this fits in with the
Foucauldian ideas which are being considered, and ascertain whether there is a gap for
a new, Foucauldian style of research in this area.
Having set out the position taken by this thesis, then, and examined the
relevant literature, Chapter Six deals with questions of methodology. This entails
setting out the nature of the interviews to be used, addressing ethical concerns
connected to the process of interviewing, setting out how interviews will be
transcribed and analysed, and detailing how all of these concerns were combined to
form a method for addressing the research question.
The following two chapters comprise the analyses themselves. Chapter Seven
begins the analysis by examining the forms of power that are evidenced in the
research interviews. This will begin to picture the ways in which the research
participants are situated in particular power relationships with specific others, how
they relate to particular forms of authority, and how this affects their lives. Chapter
Eight will carry these analyses forward, and examine in greater detail how the
participants themselves interact with issues of power and subjectivity. It will consider
how they relate to themselves as certain types of subject, how they orient in their
accounts to the forms of power which operate upon them and the authority to which
they are subject, and how they might be acting to resist particular forms of power and
particular subject positions.
The final chapter will tie together all of the points made in order to reach a
conclusion. Points to be considered here will be whether, given the way in which
people experience and interact with power in their lives, there are grounds for
challenging the ways in which power operates in the situations being studied, and, if
so, what is to be done as a consequence. This chapter will also critically reflect upon
the position taken in the thesis as a whole, and upon the analyses made in particular,
identifying any potential problems which might be raised in objection to them. It will
also consider how the thesis makes a new contribution to knowledge, and outline why
this is important. Finally, it will consider all of the points made in order to arrive at a
position to consider what should be done, what action is appropriate in addressing any
problems which have been identified.
Some brief points on conventions
Before moving on to examine Foucault's work and thus begin the research in
earnest, two points need to made concerning some conventions which will be used
throughout this thesis in order to avoid confusion at a later time.
Firstly, as will probably already have been noticed, first person pronouns,
especially the pronoun "we", will be used in setting out and considering the research
position. It is more in keeping with the tradition of scientific endeavour that such
pronoun use is strictly avoided, and a passive, third-person voice adopted. However, it
is for precisely these reasons that the decision to talk about what "we" are doing that
this decision was made. Instead of hiding the researcher's agency through 'academic
straight-talk' (Kvale, 1992), then, this draws attention to the unavoidable role taken in
creating and presenting the research.
Also, a few words should be said about the use of inverted commas. A single
inverted comma will be used to open and close quotations. In addition to this,
though, we shall be using double inverted commas ("...") at some points. This is not
to indicate a citation, but to draw attention to the problematic nature of some of the
terms we shall be using, to flag explicitly their status as representing constructed
knowledge which has problematic links to power in the interpretations and actions
they render available.
With these points taken care of, we can now move onto to deal with the task of
examining Foucault's work, and showing how it has led to the forming of the research
question which drives this project.
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Chapter 2: The Relevance of Michel Foucault
Michel Foucault was arguably the most important intellectual of the latter half
of the twentieth century in terms of both the breadth and the magnitude of the impact
he has made. It has been said that his works 'represent the most important
contemporary effort both to develop a method for the study of human beings and to
diagnose the current situation of our society' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; p.xiii).
These works have influenced a multitude of other writers and philosophers. Most
particularly, and most significantly for this project, they have been influential in
challenging received wisdom across the social sciences - in studies of sociology (e.g.
Fox, 1993; Dean, 1994), nursing (e.g. Henderson, 1994), dentistry (e.g. Nettleton,
1991), medicine (e.g. Armstrong, 1993; Jones & Porter, 1994a), health promotion
(e.g. Duncan & Cribb, 1996; Coveney, 1998), politics and economics (e.g. Rose &
Miller, 1992; Tully, 1999), organisational studies (e.g. Burrell, 1988; Bevir, 1999),
special education (e.g. Allan, 1996; Copeland, 1997, 1999), disability studies (e.g.
Chadwick, 1996; Hughes & Patterson, 1997) and, not least, psychology (e.g.
Henriques et al., 1984; Rose, 1985; Parker, 1992). This has been far from a simple
osmosis of ideas from one thinker to others, however. On the contrary, Foucault was a
notoriously paradoxical and difficult thinker, and the receptions given to his work
reflect this, ranging from unqualified acceptance through cautious application to
outright condemnation. Foucault was not a thinker whose works can
unproblematically be slotted into existing paradigms; indeed they seem to demand
'special interpretative efforts even for those well equipped to understand them'
(Gutting, 1994; p.1).
As we said in the previous chapter, this research sets out, through a series of
semi-structured interviews with people living in care accommodation exploring their
situation, to address the question of how they experience and interact with issues of
power and subjectivity. The importance of an understanding of Foucault's work in
undertaking this task cannot be overestimated. He is the central figure in this area, his
works make available a whole new way of thinking about issues of power,
subjectivity, and forms of self-understanding, and they are central to this thesis — they
have influenced the very types of questions which are asked (both in terms of research
questions and interview questions), the assumptions which are made, the evaluation of
the literature, the approach to knowledge, the analysis of data, and the conclusions
made. It is vital, therefore, to give comprehensive consideration to his works. The
purpose of this chapter, then, is to provide an overview of the insights provided in his
work, and to show how these affect how we think about "learning difficulties" and
care environments and the questions we might ask about power and subjectivity in
relation to them. By the end of the chapter, then, we will have clarified firstly how all
of this provides a position from which our research question becomes pertinent, and
secondly the sorts of thing to which we need to attend in participants' accounts of
their situation which emerge from interviews with them. These considerations will
then be drawn out in subsequent chapters with respect to how Foucault's works fit in
with developments in psychology, how they might influence a new approach to
discourse analysis suitable for analysing individuals' accounts of their situation with
respect to power and subjectivity, and how they influence our assessment of policies
and research surrounding learning difficulties.
This will not necessarily be a straightforward task. Foucault's thought was
varied, unusual, and changing — it changed in its terrain and its tone over his life. His
work thus seems to refuse to be considered as a coherent oeuvre. Indeed, Foucault
explicitly rejected the category of "Author" under whose name a body of texts could
be unified into a coherent totality, and expressed a desire to remain effectively
anonymous in his work (e.g. Foucault, 1972, 1979a, 1997c). For Foucault, the
challenge of thinking lay in 'the process of developing a position and not solely in
defending it' (Cook, 1993; p.1; see also Foucault, 1980b). Foucault's "oeuvre", in
fact, comprises a number of specific works, each with its own set of problems, tone
and application, and it is often difficult to relate any one of his works to any other — he
himself hardly ever referred back to his earlier works except to criticise their quality
(Gutting, 1994).
With these difficulties in mind, this chapter will attempt to provide the
necessary introduction to "Michel Foucault". It comprises two parts. The first will
provide a summary of his works. For the sake of brevity and coherence this part will
(not unproblematically, it is admitted) be further broken down into four sections: a
brief overview of Foucault's critical ethos; a section on his early work, in which he
studied the history of systems of knowledge and discourse (Foucault, 1972, 1987a,
1965, 1973, 1970); his middle period, in which he turned his attention to the operation
and effects of power and subjectification (Foucault, 1977a, 1979b, 1981a, 1982); and,
finally, his late period, in which he became concerned with practices of self-formation
(Foucault, 1986, 198Th, 199Th, 1997d). The second part will go on to examine some
of the criticisms that have been levelled at Foucault's work. It will be concluded that
Foucault's work is best seen as providing a number of "tools" for research which are
useful in addressing our present study. Subsequent chapters will then detail how this
fits in with developments in psychology, the impact of it on policies and service
provisions around learning difficulties, and how all of these considerations suggest an
approach for addressing the research question of this thesis. Throughout the chapter,
also, after each area of Foucault's work has been discussed, its relevance to thinking
about learning difficulties and to the research question we are addressing will be
considered. These issues will be raised periodically throughout the chapter and again
at the end, although they will be dealt with in more detail in subsequent chapters,
when a fuller consideration has been given to other work relevant to this thesis.
2.1 Foucault's works
2.1.1 Background: Problematics and the 'History of the Present'
Despite the difficulties with analysing Foucault's corpus as a coherent oeuvre,
over the course of his life he did provide clues as to the presence of a general critical
outlook which had driven his varying analyses (e.g. Foucault, 1983, 1989c, 1989d,
199Th, 1997d). A number of times he characterised his work as being, in various
guises, a series of historical inquiries which constitute the 'history of the present' (e.g.
Foucault, 197Th, 1979b, 1989e), and his critical task as being to 'diagnose our
present' (Foucault, 1989f). Later on, he was to expand upon this and connect it to a
'history of problems' (Foucault, 1989c). The type of histories that Foucault conducted
aim not at understanding the past in terms of the present, but proceed from the basis of
a set of circumstances in our present to ask 'What is our actuality, what is happening
around us, what is our present?' This invokes a critical orientation towards the
contingency and specificity of 'games of truth' (Foucault, 199Th) to which we relate
as subjects, constitute ourselves and our systems of knowledge, and formulate
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problems for our thought. For example, how, why, and in what way madness became
a problem for the modern world, and why it became an important one (Foucault,
1989c). This, then, is:
a movement of critical analysis in which one tries to see how the different solutions to a
problem have been constructed; but also how these solutions result from a specific form of
problematisation
(Foucault, 1989d; p.422)
Allied to this history of problems is the project of discovering the systems of
thought and the forms of rationality which are connected with particular
problematisations, and of performing an 'analysis of ourselves' (Foucault, 1997a) as
beings who are historically constituted in relation to them — questioning 'the
relationships between our thought and our practices' (Foucault, 1988a; p.14 .5-6). An
example is the analysis of the conditions and the context in which certain kinds of
suffering or behaviour, such as delirium or persecution, become `problematized as an
illness' (Foucault, 1989d), as something which has to be cured in a specific type of
institution under specific conditions, and of how the subject is constituted in relation
to these discourses of mental health and illness:
What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he
perceives himself to be mad, when he considers himself to be [and] when he judges
and punishes himself as a criminal?
(Foucault, 1987b; p.7)
This 'critical ontology of ourselves' Foucault (1997a) says:
must be considered not.., as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of
knowledge... it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which
the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.
(p.319)
Foucault identified three domains of this historical ontology: the domain of
truth through which we are constituted as subjects of knowledge, that of power in
which we are constituted as subjects acting on others and acted upon in particular
regulated ways by others, and that of ethics 'through which we constitute ourselves as
moral agents' (Foucault, 1997f; 262). These three domains — truth, power and ethics —
are irreducible to one another, and none stands in a position of primacy or causality to
the others. Foucault, towards the end of his life, conceptualised his work as
concentrating, at different times, on the analysis of each of these domains (Foucault,
1993). The earliest period of his work he characterised as focusing on the domain of
truth in which individuals are constituted as subjects and objects of knowledge. It is
this period which will be examined first.
2.1.2 Archaeology, Madness and the Human Sciences
Perhaps the easiest way to understand Foucault's thinking during this early
period is first to examine his general methodological approach: "archaeology". This is
an historical method opposed to traditional histories which examine developments
over long periods with the aim of identifying 'the progress of consciousness, or the
teleology of reason, or the evolution of human thought' (Foucault, 1972; p.8).
Discontinuities and ruptures rather than progress and evolution become key concepts
for archaeology. The purpose (simply put) is to examine these ruptures, to search for
the processes by which scientific disciplines are demarcated and gain a function of
truth, and the ways in which disciplines, objects, concepts, and the enunciations and
"reasonable" statements which can be made in relation to them undergo
transformations and appear and disappear from the discursive field at particular times.
A central question posed by archaeology is that of the formation of objects —
how particular objects come to take a place in a particular system of knowledge or
discourse of truth. Foucault takes the example of psychopathological discourse to
illustrate this. The objects with which psychopathology deals, he observes, are very
numerous, they are 'mostly very new, but also very precarious, subject to change and,
in some cases, to rapid disappearance' (ibid.; p.40). Is it possible, he wondered, to
discover the rules to which such appearances and disappearances are subject, and the
system by which these objects are 'juxtaposed and placed in succession to form the
fragmented field... of psychopathology?' (ibid.; p.41).
The solution to these questions lies in mapping the emergences of these
objects and discourses, the means by which a field such as psychopathology defines
and delimits its domain so that it can speak about its objects, and the means by which
its objects are differentiated and specified. This still leaves a problem, however, since
it must be stressed that there are no 'objects, fully formed and armed, that the
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discourse of psychopathology has then merely to list, classify, name' (ibid.; p.42). It
would be wrong to see 'discourses as a place where previously established objects are
laid one after another like words on a page' (ibid.; p.42-3).
The project is not, for instance, to reconstitute what madness itself might be,
'in that form in which it first presented itself to some primitive, fundamental...
experience' (ibid.; p.47) and was then twisted by the play of discourses. The question
is not to neutralise discourse, to discover what is behind it. Foucault, rather, wanted to
dispense with "things" conceived as somehow exterior to discourse, and instead
examine how objects emerged and were organised, selected, transformed, and put into
demarcated fields in discourse. For example, this represents the difference between
attempting to uncover the "truth" of criminality-as-pathology that was lying in wait
(outside of discourse) for its discovery by medicine or psychiatry and its incorporation
into their fields, and asking how criminality, at a certain time and subject to certain
rules and certain orderings, could become an object of medical or psychiatric
expertise.
For Foucault, then, discourse is not 'a mere intersection of things and words'
(ibid.; p.48), but is subject to rules and practices which define the ordering of objects.
This reveals a new and different task:
that consists of not — of no longer — treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying
elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form
the objects of which they speak'
(ibid.; p.49; emphasis added)
Thus, it is possible to see how Foucault's early investigations examined the
discursive formation of objects and of fields of true discourse surrounding them, the
disciplines that can apprehend and examine them, and the rules for the production of
true statements concerning them. In his earliest books, Foucault (1987a) analysed how
certain forms of deviant behaviour became, at a particular time, characterisable as
"mental illness," constructed and amenable to study by the field of psychology, and
how it could be demonstrated that, at different times, what it meant to be "mad" and
to talk of "madness" was qualitatively different to what it means in the modem period,
that it was informed by different conceptions and was constituted as a problem in very
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different ways (Foucault, 1965). One of the points raised by this analysis is that it is
not correct to view the modern conception as "the truth" which has refuted the false
conceptions of a less advanced age. Both the modern psychiatric conception of
madness and the definition of it in the Classical Age are productions. The truth of the
former did not supplant the latter and allow us to see its naïveté — both are the result
of apprehending a particular phenomenon in a specific system of knowledge which
existed at the time. There is no teleology in these historical analyses — the attempt is
made to maintain the same critical distance from our present knowledge as we would
from that of an age that we have conceptually left behind.
This leads us to perhaps the most difficult work of Foucault's early period, The
Order of Things (Foucault, 1970). This work is concerned with the emergence of the
sciences which take the human being as their subject and object of knowledge. In it
'Foucault goes as far as it is possible to go in arguing that discourse maketh the man,
not man the discourse' (Sturrock, 1998; p.68). In this book, Foucault (1970) argues
that 'man [sic] is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed
for human knowledge' (p.386). "Man," and the knowledge that we have of "him,"
belong to a production which emerged with the human sciences which took "him" as
their object. To understand the conditions of this emergence, we have to analyse the
episteme of those human sciences — the manner in which things are understood,
ordered and arranged so that a science of them becomes possible. The human
sciences, then, are to be seen not as deciphering reality, but representing it in a way
which makes their enterprise possible. These epistemes, these `ordering[s] of things'
(ibid.), constitute the very basis of a particular science or philosophy, its conditions of
possibility. Our conception of "man" is linked to this ordering, such that Foucault
claims that a different ordering of knowledge would lead this figure of "man" which
we understand today to disappear 'like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea'
(ibid.; p.38'7).
For Foucault, then, the existence of the human subject as a possible object of
knowledge is not taken for granted as the a priori basis of a possible science. Rather,
the process by which s/he is constituted as such is recognised as a contingent
production of a historically-situated 'will to knowledge' (Foucault, 1997e) which can
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be exposed by use of the "archaeological" method. Importantly for our research, this
leads us to the realisation that "learning difficulties" were not 'lying in wait'
(Foucault, 1972) outside of discourse for their apprehension by those disciplines
which were destined to discover them, to decipher them, and know their truth.
Foucault's work here incites us to recognise "learning difficulties" not as an essential
"condition" about which we can unproblematically amass knowledge, but as an object
constituted by discourses, the shifts and ruptures of which have led to our current
understanding. The way in which aspects of "mental ability" are constituted as a
particular type of problem attached to specific forms of knowledge give rise to what
we understand as "learning difficulties," and the "person with learning difficulties" is,
then, him/herself realised as a knowable subject through these discourses.
This unsettling of the concept of an essential human subject imbued with the
capacity to know and decipher the world, and the emphasis on the importance of a
regulated, contingent and ordered discourse constituting "reasonable" statements,
leads to an inevitable collision with questions of determinism and agency. In response
to the accusation that his insistence on discursive formations constituting the domain
of what is reasonably sayable equates to a form of linguistic determinism in which
individuals are mere puppets of discourse, Foucault responds that the effects of
discourse of which he writes 'are not so much limitations imposed on the initiative of
subjects as the field in which that initiative is articulated' (Foucault, 1972; p.209).
This problem of freedom, agency, autonomy (one might, prematurely, say
"power" here), knowledge and discourse is an important one, and one with which
Foucault was to become increasingly concerned. After having invested so much time
in "archaeological" analysis, Foucault began to wonder about, and even to criticise,
his earlier work. He began to believe that he had conflated two important concepts and
therefore proposed an inadequate response (Foucault, 1989b). These two concepts
were the facts of discourse and the mechanisms of power (see, for example, Foucault,
1981b). Foucault began to move toward the second of his domains of historical
analysis, and asked of his earlier work, 'what else was it that I was talking about.., but
power?' (Foucault, 1980a; p.115). He thus turned his attention away from analysing
the conditions of possibility of particular systems of knowledge, and began a series of
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works arguing that such systems of knowledge and discourse have an essential and
dynamic link with the operation of power. It is to this body of work that we now turn.
2.1.3 Genealogy, power and knowledge
Introduction to power
Foucault radically redefines what is meant by power, and in this redefinition
lies the key to connecting it to the questions of knowledge with which he was earlier
interested. Foucault contrasts his conception of power with traditional conceptions of
it. He argues that it is a limited view that sees, on the one side of power, a law, and an
apparatus for its enforcement, which merely lays down prohibitions, and, on the other
side, a subject whose only choices are to obey or to face the consequences of
disobedience. Similarly limited is the conception of a particular individual or group
owning the entire apparatus of power — Power with a capital 'P' (Foucault, 1983,
1989g) — such that they can wield it, according to their whims, over a powerless and
oppressed group. It is Foucault's aim to break free of this representation, to 'construct
an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code' (Foucault,
1981a; p.90) or bases itself on the concept of a sovereign atop a pyramid of power. He
argues, in contrast, that power would be very fragile if it only repressed, 'if it worked
only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression' (Foucault,
1980c; p.59). Power also has a productive function. It might be conceptualised as an
entire 'productive network' (Foucault, 1980a) running through society. In order to
understand this apparent oxymoron of "productive power", we need to understand
how, for Foucault, systems of knowledge are dynamically and intrinsically linked with
relations of power.
As has been evident, the study of systems of knowledge which produce "true"
discourse is central to Foucault's work, and he began to realise that the accumulation
of knowledge cannot be dissociated from mechanisms of power (Foucault, 1991a). In
order to understand this, it is necessary to abandon a whole way of thinking which
imagines that knowledge can exist only where power is suspended, 'that knowledge
can only develop outside its injunctions.., and its interests' (Foucault, 1979b: 27).
Rather, power and knowledge are mutually co-constitutive; they 'directly imply one
another' such that:
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there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge,
nor any knowledge which does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations
(ibid.; p.27)
Systems of knowledge make themselves available to, and become implicit in, power
relations. This power-knowledge determines and constitutes what is attended to, what
is desirable to be done, how people and fields of objects are to be understood, related
to, organised and controlled. Thus, for example, the knowledge that is gathered of
human behaviour can be understood in terms of, and distributed around, a norm or an
ideal of desirability. It therefore makes possible power relations which centre around
monitoring and assessing a population, and aim at identifying, disciplining and
correcting deviant individuals within it. Similarly, a power whose aim is to normalise
or discipline produces and makes useful systems of knowledge which are useful in
attaining this objective. There is thus a constant and reciprocal articulation 'of power
on knowledge and of knowledge on power' (Foucault, 1989h; p.51). Systems of
knowledge constitute power relations, 'and the exercise of power itself creates and
causes to emerge new objects of knowledge' (ibid.; p.51).
These "power relations" are relations between people, which always take place
in a particular context. An important term to understand here is "dispositif' (usually
translated, somewhat unsatisfactorily, as "apparatus"). This terms picks out:
a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements,
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions.
(Foucault, 1980d; 194)
It also includes the systems of relations that can be established between these
elements, and their objective. This whole range of elements, applications and effects
of power-knowledge constitutes the context in which human relations take place. All
societies both produce and limit the ways in which interactions and relationships
operate and by which they strive to act upon the conduct of others, and these are
intricately tied up with systems of knowledge which define and give properties to
objects, practices, individuals, psychological characteristics, "society" and so on.
Power produces more than knowledge and systems of social apparatus for its
application, however. Foucault (1980c) notes that it doesn't 'obey the Hegelian form
of the dialectic' (p.56), in that there is not a vital and original will belonging to a
'sovereign, founding subject' (Foucault, 1988c), which stands opposite its antithesis
of a power which constrains and limits it. Power produces knowledge, desire and
forms of relations, but it also produces subjects. It 'produces the very form of the
subject, it produces what makes up the subject' (Foucault, 1989i; p.158). None of
these things is any longer to be seen as the production of a presupposed knowing
subject. The individual is not some 'elementary nucleus' (Foucault, 19801) onto which
power fastens. It is, instead:
one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses,
certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals
(ibid.; p.98)
The individual does not stand face-to-face with power, it is already one of its effects.
Power produces the identities to which people are tied and by which they understand
themselves, it produces the positions from which subjects act with respect to
themselves and others (Foucault, 1982). Power thus 'brings into play relations
between individuals... [it] designates relationships' (ibid.; p.217). In terms of relative
subject positions which define people, the systems of social apparatus to which they
relate, and the production and limitation of the ways in which people act upon one
another's conduct, power reaches 'right down into the depths of society' (Foucault,
1979b; p.27), and defines 'numerous points of confrontation and struggle' (ibid.;
p.27). All relations take place in the context of these forms of power-knowledge.
'Every human relation is [therefore] to some degree a power relation' (Foucault,
1988b; p.168).
In modem societies, therefore, power 'becomes a machinery that no one owns'
(Foucault, 1980e; p.156). However, this is far from saying that everyone thus occupies
the same position in this "machinery" of power — in fact, 'certain positions
preponderate and permit an effect of supremacy to be produced' (ibid.; p.156). For
this reason, Foucault (1980g) chose the military terms "tactics" and "strategy" to
discuss the characteristics of power relations. Systems of power-knowledge make
available "tactics" which can be organised and directed in the service of a dominant
strategy for directing a particular style of conduct in a particular way. Thus
subjugation, subservience or disadvantage may well be effects of power. However,
whilst it is important to recognise that power, in its operations and effects, can tend
towards these forms, they must not be taken as the initial point of analysis, the centre
around which power is distributed and exercised (Foucault, 1980b, 1981a). Similarly,
refusing to proceed from the initial question 'Who then has power and what has he in
mind?' (Foucault, 1980f; p.97) does not preclude the realisation that certain strategies
to which power is amenable can have advantageous effects for one group and
deleterious effects for another — it merely recognises that no group presides over and
controls the whole apparatus of power. Power relations make available tactics which
can act for or against the dominant strategies into which they coalesce — innumerable
points of confrontation and resistance are immanent with them.
Resistance is also a key concept in this re-figuring of power. Power relations
generally take the form of an 'open, more-or-less co-ordinated (in the event, no doubt,
ill-co-ordinated) cluster of relations' (Foucault, 1980d; p.199) in which, although
there is no outside, one is not trapped (Foucault, 1980b). There thus needs to be a
distinction made between "relations of power" and "states of domination" — both of
which are not synonymous in Foucault's thinking. Relations of power are said to exist
precisely to the extent that they represent the possibility of a strategic confrontation
and struggle against those modes of action which attempt to direct one's conduct
(Foucault, 1997b). States of domination, in which there is no chance of resistance and
in which one's conduct can be forcefully and absolutely controlled, are no longer
power relations. Power relations act upon acting subjects. In contrast, violence acts
directly and destructively upon things; it forces, breaks or destroys them. This is not to
say that power relations never use violence in their operation, merely that it should not
be taken as the basic principle of the nature of power (Foucault, 1982). Power
relations contain within them the possibility of forms of resistance — 'there are no
relations of power without resistances' (Foucault, 1980b; p.142). Even power which is
co-ordinated into an almost hegemonic rigidity is apt to provoke (often violent)
resistances. Resistance emerges from those very points from which power emerges.
Discourses are tactically 'polyvalent' (Foucault, 1981a) — those same discourses and
systems of knowledge which are tactically amenable to a dominant strategy which
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aims to govern a particular mode of conduct can also be tactically appropriated against
that very strategy. So, whilst it may not be possible to stand outside of a system of
power/knowledge which designates one's very interactions and relations, it is possible
to resist a particular strategy of power relations that determines one's conduct in a
particular manner (Foucault, 1982; see Simons, 1995 for an elaboration of this). At the
same time, however, it must be realised 'in a great many cases, power relations are
fixed in such as way that they are perpetually asymmetrical' (Foucault, 1997b; p.292),
and in such cases there is only an 'extremely limited' margin for action, freedom or
resistance.
Foucault conducted two important studies (Discipline and Punish, and The
History of Sexuality Volume One) examining the forms that power relations have
taken, at particular times, in relation to specific forms of knowledge and rationality.
These are important works for illustrating Foucault's concept of power, and for
highlighting the nature of specific forms of power which began to emerge in modern
societies.
Foucault termed his methodology for these projects "genealogy." This is a
'meticulous and patiently documentary' analysis (Foucault, 1977a) which, moving
away from archaeology's focus on the history of thought and true statements, centres
on the history of practices and institutions. It undermines traditional grand narratives
of a 'linear development' of practices which can be traced from an origin and
reconstructed through history, and recognises that the truth by which our practices, our
institutions and our selves have been constituted itself has a history. Foucault's
(1979b) first genealogical study, Discipline and Punish, took as its object of study the
practices — discipline — and institutions — prisons — which emerged in industrial
societies as part of an economy of power which took as its aim the correction of
deviant behaviour in the social body.
Discipline and Surveillance
The study opens by juxtaposing descriptions of two very different styles of
punishment: a gruesomely-portrayed public torture, and a time-table of activities for
prisoners. Less than a century separates the two accounts. Foucault notes that the
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differences between them are not just in the accepted mode or method of punishment,
but that 'they each define a certain penal style' (Foucault, 1979b; p.7), and the move
from one to the other took place in the context of a redistribution of the 'entire
economy of punishment' (ibid.; p.7). Foucault rejected the simple assumption which
has often been made that the disappearance of the public spectacle of torture was part
of a 'process of humanization' in punishment, a series of quantitative changes (less
pain, more kindness, less cruelty, more humanity). In fact, there is a change in
objective of the punitive operation. The penality which had addressed itself to the
body and its pains began to lay hold of something else. It was replaced by a
punishment that acts in depth on 'the thoughts, the will, the inclinations' (ibid.; p.16) -
the "soul".
In this emerging economy, the substance of what was punishable changed.
Passions, maladjustments, effects of environment or heredity all entered into
consideration. Aggressivity became punishable and not just aggression, perversions
and not just rape, drives and desires and not just murders, and so on. What emerges is
'knowledge of the criminal, one's estimation of him, what is known about the
relations between him, his past and his crime, and what might be expected of him in
the future' (ibid.; p.18: emphasis added). Thus medicine, criminology and psychiatry
come to have a place in the courts. Penalties aimed not only to punish an offence, but
to alter criminal tendencies, to supervise and neutralise the dangerousness within the
criminal (Foucault, 1979b, 1988d). The soul of the condemned is judged as well as the
crime itself. Offences become inscribed in a 'field of objects susceptible of scientific
knowledge' (Foucault, 1979b; p.18), and punishment comes to have a hold not only
over offences, but also over individuals - what they are and what they may be. It is no
longer sufficient simply to establish whether a punishable act has been committed, it
must be ascertained not only what the act is and who committed it, but where in
him/her it originated, what its causal processes were (Foucault, 1988d). Assessment,
diagnosis, and prognosis enter into judgement. A sentence carries with it 'an
assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normalization'
(Foucault, 1979b; p.21). Through changes in punishment, one can map 'a whole new
system of truth' (ibid.; p.23; emphasis added) consisting of recently created objects, a
new corpus of knowledge, based around the normality or deviance which resides
within people's psyche.
A new economy of power emerged, in which the body was at issue (in respect
to its liberty, confinement, circulation, etc.) even if it was no longer to be physically
harmed. The body becomes:
directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they
invest it, mark it, train it... force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs
(ibid.; p.25)
A new corpus of knowledge centres around the body, which is more than a knowledge
of its functioning; it is that which allows it to be appropriated and invested in power
relations in particular ways. The criminal was no longer identified as the enemy of the
sovereign, but as a 'dangerous individual' (Foucault, 1988d). So, what also emerges is
the need to know the criminal as an individual according to certain criteria — the
scientific objectification of knowledge of individuals enters into consideration. Power
thus began to aim no longer simply at shaping or training the body, but at placing it in
a machinery of power which would produce "docile" and "useful" bodies.
Discipline began to concern itself with the distribution of bodies in space and
time. The ideal was to distribute bodies in spaces that designated their activity, made
them useful, and made it possible to fix and locate them in a system. Rhythms of
behaviour became important — certain activities to take place according to a set cycle,
with each moment made useful, and the actions of bodies in a controlled timetable
made into a new form of knowledge. This power which exerts a hold on the body and
aims to make it useful and docile, Foucault (1979b) terms `bio-power'. Bio-power
prescribes movements of bodies, it imposes exercises on them, and it arranges
"tactics" for their use. The schema for this form of power came to be projected over
the whole social body.
As well as exerting a hold of power over bodies, discipline also "makes"
individuals. 'It is the specific technique of a power which regards individuals both as
object and as instruments of its exercise' (ibid.; p.170). It achieves this through a
perpetual observation, a continued surveillance to which discipline can be linked;
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through a system of normalising judgement that measures individuals according to a
rule of proper conduct and desirable abilities, it makes individuals specifically
knowable by ranking them against the totality and operates punishments for deviance
and rewards for good performance; and through the production of classifications,
categories, and averages against which individuals can be examined and be thus made
into a subject of normalising power. It is the whole and the individual's place within it
which becomes important.
Foucault argues that these forms of power began to operate not only in the
prison, but that disciplinary and carceral systems extended into the whole social body.
Schools, hospitals, army barracks, asylums, workshops, and so on all functioned in
similar ways, using similar disciplinary techniques. This is because the forms of
power-knowledge Foucault analysed did not just construct prisons, they turned
everyone into individualised and potentially punishable subjects who were the objects
of particular forms of power and knowledge across the social body. This system made
it possible to instigate a 'universal reign of the normative' in which each individual
'subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements'
(ibid.; p.304).
Discipline and Punish, then, illustrates the principles for Foucault's analytics
of power. It shows that the systems of knowledge that exist around human beings, that
bring certain aspects of them into being, are dynamically linked to forms of power that
make them useful, which through them take a hold of these aspects. It shows how
certain dispositifs arise in the application of this power, how they provide means of
exercising it. It shows how, through the operation of this power-knowledge nexus,
subjects are created, and knowledge about them is called forth and marshalled. It
highlights the relationships between knowledge and practice which allow people to be
thought of as normal, criminal or delinquent, as having criminality within them; how
these relationships lead to the body being seized by power in particular mechanisms
and techniques for observing, measuring and normalising its conduct; and how people
are led to relate to themselves and others as beings of particular sorts, with particular
natures, and amenable to specific power relations.
Foucault's (1981a, 1986, 1987b) next major project was a series of books on
sexuality. Our attention now turns to the first of these.
Sexuality and confession
Foucault (1981a) began here by questioning the popular discourse about sex in
Western culture, one which believes that sex was in a state of happy freedom until the
Victorian period, when it suddenly became taboo and underwent a thorough
repression from which we are still struggling to escape. Why, Foucault wondered,
have we problematised our sexuality in this way? Why is it that we still believe that
we are paying the price for an earlier age which condemned sex to silence such that
the demand for sexual freedom becomes an honourable political cause? He does not
ask "why have we been repressed for so long?" but 'why do we say, with so much
passion and so much resentment against our recent past, and against ourselves, that we
are repressed?' (ibid.; p.8).
Foucault does not counter this discourse of repression by constructing
diametrically opposed arguments which show it to be mistaken. He does not make the
counter-claim that sex has never been prohibited or masked. Rather, he aims to put
this "repressive hypothesis" back into 'a general economy of discourses on sex in
modern societies' (ibid.; p.11). The object, in short, is to 'define the regime of power-
knowledge that sustains the discourse on human sexuality.., the way in which sex is
"put into words" (ibid.; p.11) and subject to 'polymorphous techniques of power'.
Foucault argues that, far from being characterised primarily by repression, sex was put
into discourse in the Victorian period more than at any time previously. Instances of
discursive production may have as one of their functions the administering of silences,
and techniques of power sometimes have effects of prohibition, but what is important
to note is that there has been an incitement to discourse around sex which has, among
other effects, constituted what one might call a science of sexuality.
Foucault identifies, then, not repression but a 'veritable discursive explosion'
around sex which began in the seventeenth century. There was a proliferation of
incitements to speak about sex, and of agencies to hear it spoken about. Sex was
transformed into a discourse whose continued examination and telling became a
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general rule for everyone. The boundaries of what could be said about sex were
enlarged. Sex became discursively transformed, not merely to be condemned or
tolerated, but as something to be managed and administered. Sexuality was
problematised such that it became an object of analysis and a target of intervention.
Through this problematisation was formed 'a whole grid of observations regarding
sex' (ibid.; p.26) around which knowledge could be gathered and interventions
planned.
There were numerous centres around which discourses of sexuality were
produced: medicine, with its nervous disorders; psychiatry, whose initial concerns
were with excess, masturbation and frustration; criminal justice, which defined
indecencies, perversions and types of abnormal behaviour as crimes of varying sorts.
Rather, then, than there being a uniform concern to hide sex, or a prudishness of
language around it, what characterises the last three centuries is:
the wide dispersion of devices that were invented for speaking about it, for having it be
spoken about, for inducing it to speak of itself, for listening, recording, transcribing, and
redistributing what is said about it.
(ibid.; p.34)
These discourses and systems of knowledge, by virtue of their fixing
sexualities, imposing an incitement to discourse around them, and defining problems
and abnormalities, made sex amenable to operations of power. Sexuality entered into
the realm of scientific discourse which aimed to speak its truth, allowing the power to
manage the sexuality of the population to be grounded in "truth." This "truth" of
sexuality becomes something that everyone is obliged to seek out and recognise in
themselves. The confession marks the heart of these 'procedures of individualisation
by power' (ibid.; p.58) around sex. The act of confessing the truth of one's sexuality
involves recognising and relating to oneself as if one were a sexual subject of a
particular sort. Actions, thoughts, desires, all are given a function of truth which one
must interrogate and recognise in oneself. One is thus tied to a sexual subjectivity
which is linked to norms of scientific regularity. Sex is examined, confessed,
interpreted, medicalised. Instead of a refusal to recognise sex, then, we can identify
the 'operation of an entire machinery for producing true discourses concerning it'
(ibid.; p.69; emphasis added), for placing it in an ordered system of knowledge,
connected to an obligation to tell the truth about it, and linked with strategies of power
which manage, administer and correct it.
Sexuality is not a stubborn drive, a natural force which is simply constrained
by power. As Foucault has said, power is not merely repressive even where it may
have prohibitive functions. Power is productive. In this case, it can be seen that
sexuality as we recognise it is created in regimes of power-knowledge which invest it
with a meaning and a truth. In this operation, individuals are also created as sexual
subjects, obliged to examine and recognise the truth, and possible problems, of their
own sexualities, and tied to this truth by the act of confession. Sexuality, in short,
becomes a 'dense transfer point for relations of power' (ibid.; p.103).
Summaiy and Implications
In Foucault's thinking, power and knowledge form a knot which cannot be
untied. This knot designates relationships which allow, to varying extents and in
varying contexts, one to act on the actions of others or to resist one's action being
acted upon. It brings into being the very categories of action and aspects of self upon
which power has a hold, the modes of operation which power can take and the social
apparatus (dispositifs) for its operation. It constitutes subject positions by which
people are tied to an identity or "truth" about themselves and from which people relate
to themselves and others in particular ways. Forms of power-knowledge thus permeate
the whole social body.
This has enormous relevance for the way learning difficulties and care
institutions are understood — and thus for this research and the questions it poses.
These points tie into the research questions posed by this project. Again, these ask
what forms of power individuals living in community care accommodation
experience, how they relate to themselves as subjects in relation to it, and how this
constitutes problems for them. As we have said, we shall address these questions
through a series of semi-structured interviews with people living in community care
accommodation designed to explore their relationships to their environment, other
people and themselves, and to draw out of these interviews the forms of power that
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affect people, the forms of subjectivity imposed upon them, and their own interactions
and relationships to these issues.
What we have seen in this chapter so far clarifies how we might examine these
issues in people's accounts of their lives in care. These points illustrate what we mean
when we talk about "power". We can see how it is important to attend to how people
in care accommodation are affected by power as a productive system, as something
which constitutes them as individuals objectified by particular discourses of
knowledge and thus created as subjects amenable to particular forms of organisation.
This is an important deviation from conventional accounts of power that see it as a
wholly repressive mechanism constraining the agency of an essential subject, and a
whole new set of questions thus become possible.
The systems of knowledge and power around learning difficulty can now be
questioned. It becomes possible to question how power positions people as subjects
around whom a series of observations, judgements, decisions, imperatives,
prohibitions, and relationships with others become possible; how they become
amenable to particular institutional interventions; how certain forms of behaviour
become appropriate or proscribed and their conduct directed and acted upon in line
with particular ideals. It leads us to question how the forms of knowledge that are
brought into being about people — observing them and gaining of knowledge of their
characteristics and abilities — are linked to particular ways that they are thought about,
and led to think about themselves. It influences us to examine the forms of social
apparatus (dispositifs)— institutions, regulations, laws, administrative measures, moral
propositions, etc. — by which decisions about people are made, to which they relate in
particular ways, and in the context of which they have particular relationships. It
encourages us to interrogate the existence of 'systems of differentiation' (Foucault,
1982) which permit people to act on the actions of others in certain ways —
differentiations in status or privilege, and the 'dividing practices' which conceptually
divide people from one another in terms of the categories they inhabit and the ways
this links to ways of acting upon people's conduct and having their own conduct acted
upon. It is also important to consider how people relate to one another as mentally
competent or "subnormal", how they are tied to and obliged to recognise in
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themselves a "truth" and an identity relating to having "learning difficulties", and the
consequences this has for them in terms of what it costs for them to tell the truth about
themselves in relation to it (Foucault, 1989j). In short, we are asking how power
creates people in care as subjects to be understood in certain ways, amenable to
certain forms of organisation, and invested in certain types of relationship with others.
All of these are issues with which our research is thus concerned. We are not,
though, of course, analysing the same sorts of texts that Foucault did. Where he
examined historical texts to examine the emergence of certain forms of knowledge
and their links to power, we are looking at individuals' accounts of their lives which
emerge from interviews with them. Therefore, whilst we can see the significance of
Foucault's work on power/knowledge for the questions we are asking, we are not
looking for a "Foucauldian method" that we can duplicate. We are looking, rather, to
discover, from how people talk about their situation, the forms of power that affect
them. The exact forms that power might take in a specific situation cannot be known
in advance. Foucault (1991a) points out that his analyses were of specific and local
phenomena. We cannot use his specific findings about the forms of power in, say, the
emergence of prisons, as a starting point for analysing care environments. Rather, his
theorisations about power as a productive system linked to knowledge and forms of
subjectification form a starting point from which to examine individuals' accounts of
their lives in care. Effects of power, as Foucault says, are everywhere, but we are
interested here in how they operate in relation to a specific group of people in a
specific situation. The points covered here show what sorts of thing might be looked
for in people's accounts when we talk about examining power and subjectivity. We
are led to ask how people's accounts of their lives embody certain subject positions,
how they are positioned as subjects, how and according to what rationality they are
situated in relationships with others that constitute power, how aspects of their
conduct become amenable to certain types of direction, how judgements, decisions
and interventions into their lives are made available with respect to them, and so on.
This considers a lot more than would an approach based around conventional notions
of power as a merely repressive force which coerces and forces people.
Also important in our research, however, is the manner in which people relate
to themselves as subjects. It is these relationships of self to self — 'ethical'
relationships (e.g. Foucault, 1987b, 1997f) — to which Foucault turned his attention in
his final years.
2.1.4 Governmentality, ethics and "technologies of the self"
Towards the end of his life, Foucault again criticised his earlier work. He
looked back on it and claimed that he had placed too much emphasis on questions of
dominatory forms of power that control and shape people's conduct, and not enough
on 'the interaction between oneself and others, and... the mode of action that an
individual exercises upon himself' (Foucault, 1997d; p.225). His work on
govemmentality (Foucault, 1988a, 1991b) charts the move towards the final corner of
the Toucaultian triangle' (Dean, 1994), ethics.
Foucault identified, in the eighteenth century, a movement away from an 'art
of government' and towards a 'political science.' This move constitutes a complex
political economy of knowledge about the population and concerns itself no longer
with government as the link between state or sovereign and territory, but with the
economics, demographics, productivity, health, and well-being of the population
(Foucault, 1991b). In this way, the "population" as we understand it is brought into
being as an object of forms of knowledge (mortality rates, birth rates, employment
levels, rates of disease, levels of education and literacy, domestic products, and so on)
and a target for forms of government. Foucault identified here a 'historical change in
the relations between power and individuals' (Foucault, 1988a; p.156). Government
began to deal with individuals not just as subjects of law, but as 'working, trading,
living beings,' and people were led to recognise themselves as a society, as 'part of a
social entity.'
Intervention into people's lives began to aim to maximise the happiness,
strength and productivity of the collectivity. Foucault (1982) referred to this as
'pastoral power,' in which the well-being of the population in the state replaces the
concern for spiritual salvation that existed in the Christian pastorate. The officials of
this form of power multiplied so that institutions such as the family became as much
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tied up in its operation as the medical profession or the police. It is important to
recognise, however, that these proliferating "officials" of governance were
complemented by "self-government," the way in which people relate to themselves in
an active fashion. When people are governed in this sense, they are not forced or
coerced, rather it is a matter of their aligning their activities and practices with the
ends with which government - with the very broad meaning given to it here - is
concerned.
These processes, by which individuals constitute themselves as moral agents,
were the focus of concern for the last of Foucault's (1986, 1987b) published books. In
these works, he began to wonder how 'the development of diverse fields of
knowledge... the establishment of a set of rules and norms' (Foucault, 1987b; p.3),
with which he had earlier been concerned in their links with power, could be linked to
'changes in the way individuals were led to assign meaning and value to their
conduct' (ibid.; p.4) in a moral sense. Basically, he asked how it is that individuals
come to recognise themselves as subjects of a "sexuality," how an "experience"
through which individuals recognise themselves as "sexual" subjects is constituted.
He therefore aimed to carry out:
[a] history of the experience of sexuality, where experience is understood as the
correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in
a particular culture.
(ibid.; p.4)
Foucault (1981a) had already outlined the importance of breaking with a
tradition that sees sexuality as a constant, natural drive which has been manifested in
history by the different forms of repression to which it is subject. This tradition must
also be rejected in order to speak about sexuality as an historical experience. To speak
of sexuality in this way requires the analysis of three inter-relating axes that constitute
it:
(1) the formation of sciences (savoirs) that refer to it, (2) the systems of power that
regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to
recognise themselves as subjects of this sexuality.
(Foucault, 19871); p.4)
The tools for analysing the first two axes had been developed in Foucault's
earlier work. The problem remained, however, of how to study 'the modes according
to which individuals are given to recognise themselves as sexual subjects' (ibid.; p.5).
A new genealogy was needed for this, one which would 'look for the forms and
modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognises
himself qua subject' (ibid.; p.6) — to study the games of truth which surround the
relation of self to self and with the forming of oneself as a subject.
This is not the same thing as looking for a history of interdictions which have
shaped the experience of sexuality by defining its limits. The experience of sexuality
is linked to an ethical concern which is not 'always directly tied to a system of
interdictions' (ibid.; p.10). The question is much broader than that: 'the interdiction is
one thing, the moral problematization is another' (ibid.; p.10). The question that
guided Foucault's inquiry into sexuality, then, was, 'how, why, and in what forms was
sexuality constituted as a moral domain?' (ibid.; p.10). Why was there an ethical
concern? Why were there these series of "problematisations" of what one is and what
one does in relation to sexuality?
Foucault (1987b; 1993; 1997b; 1997d) links these problematisations to forms
of practice which he calls 'arts of existence,' 'techniques of the self,' or 'technologies
of the self. These terms define:
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of
conduct, but also seek to transform themselves.., and to make their life into an oeuvre that
carries certain values and meets certain stylistic criteria.
(Foucault, 1987b; p.10-11)
Studying these practices is a matter of analysing:
the problematizations through which being offers itself to be... thought - and the practices
on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.
(ibid.; p.11; original emphasis)
For this, Foucault argued that a whole redefinition of the field of inquiry was called
for. Instead of searching out the basic interdictions and prohibitions that surrounded
sexual austerity throughout the ages, he believed it was necessary
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to locate the areas of experience and the forms in which sexual behavior was
problematised, becoming an object of concern, an element for reflection, and a material
for stylization.
(ibid.; p.24)
An initial problem with this study is setting out the objects one is studying. In
this case, there is a concern with "morality," which is somewhat ambiguous.
"Morality" refers to 'a set of values and rules of action' (ibid.; p.25), imposed by
various agencies, that individuals are expected or encouraged to follow. Such rules
can be 'set forth in a coherent doctrine' (ibid.; p.25) or they can be 'transmitted in a
diffuse manner' such that they do not constitute so much a 'systematic ensemble' as a
'complex interplay of elements that counterbalance and correct one another' (ibid.;
p.25). This sense of the term, Foucault designates as a "moral code." However, this is
not the only meaning that is possible of "morality" - it also refers to the actual
behaviour of individuals in relation to a moral code, 'the manner in which they
comply more or less fully with a standard of conduct' (ibid.; p.25), the way in which
people conduct themselves in reference to system of prescriptions and interdictions
which operates in their culture. This Foucault calls "the morality of behaviours."
In addition to these concerns, however there is another crucial one: 'the
manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject' (ibid.; p.26) acting in
reference to a code. In reference to a code which concerns itself with certain actions,
there are different ways 'to "conduct oneself' morally,' to become an ethical subject.
Foucault (1986; 1987b; 1993; 1997d; 1997f) identifies four dimensions to this ethical
conduct.
Firstly, there is 'the determination of ethical substance' (Foucault, 1987b;
p.26) — the aspects of oneself which are concerned with a particular moral conduct
(Foucault, 1997f). For example, moral conduct could take hold of desires, feelings, or
particular behaviours or practices. Secondly, there is the 'mode of subjectification'
(Foucault, 1987b; p.27) - the ways in which people are 'incited to recognise their
moral obligations' (Foucault, 1997f p.264). Does one identify with a set of ethical
actions because, for example, one is a member of a certain group, because one
believes in a certain spiritual or religious tradition, because of incitements of law, or
because it is identified as the right way to live? The third consideration is the 'forms
of elaboration, of ethical work' (Foucault, 1987b; p.27) — 'the means by which we can
change ourselves' (Foucault, 1997f; p.265) in order to become ethical subjects. What
is required to transform oneself? Is it through learning, by renouncing pleasures,
through deciphering and mastering one's actions? Finally, there is the `telos' of this
action - the aim of ethical work, the 'kind of being to which we aspire when we
behave in a moral way' (Foucault, 1997f; p.265). What is aimed for? Mastery of the
self, leaving behind a beautiful existence, liberty, immortality?
So, moral actions refer to a "moral code," which calls for the forming of
oneself as an ethical subject, and this self-formation in turn relies on "modes of
subjectivation" or "practices of the self" These elements can never entirely be
dissociated. The emphasis may be on different aspects at different times and in
different places — in one form, the observation of the moral code may be the most
important element, in others, elements of the code may be relatively flexible, with the
emphasis instead on the style of ethical formation, the practices of the self, the style of
the relationship one has with oneself. Foucault notes that moral codes around
sexuality in the West, from antiquity to the modern day, tend to revolve around a very
limited number of simple principles — the codifications and interdictions are relatively
stable. On the other hand, he argues, 'there is a whole rich and complex field of
historicity' (Foucault, 1987b; p.32) in the way in which individuals are compelled to
recognise themselves as ethical subjects of sexual conduct. His project in the latter
volumes of the History of Sexuality, then, involved analysing a number of
"prescriptive texts" (those that aim to suggest rules of conduct, that offer rules,
opinions and advice on how to behave "as one should", that allow individuals to
question their own conduct, to observe and shape it) in order to trace how these forms
of ethical subjectivation have been defined and transformed at different times.
This emphasis on modes of self-formation and the activity of individuals in
their own subjectification represented a significant move for Foucault, one which was
no longer subject to criticisms which had dogged his earlier work that he was
proposing 'the "hyperdetermination" of the subject' (Dean, 1994), and which could
take account of 'the diversity of processes of self-formation' (Dean, 1994; p.155).
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Foucault (1997d) believed that his concept of "governmentality" linked his concerned
for practices of domination and power with his concern with self-formation. Dean
(1994) highlights the importance of this as the contact point between practices which
treat people as particular types of subjects, authorities which aim to shape their
conduct, and techniques of self-government in which individuals seek to know,
understand and act upon themselves. He re-reads some of Foucault's earlier works in
the context of his later ones to argue that the modern self-governing subject (with
choices and rights) and the "docile and useful" individual sought by disciplinary
practices 'are reciprocal conditions of one another' (ibid.; p.157). In order to analyse
the formation of subjects, Dean (1994) argues, we need an account of how authorities
seek to direct individuals' conduct allied with an account of the ways in which
individuals act upon themselves. He proposes that the values of welfare and care
which are central to modern societies are bound to a difficult relationship that exists
'between the individualising and totalising dimensions of government' (ibid.; p.162)
that act to construct human beings both as 'autonomous agents' and as 'clients to be
administered.' In modern societies, he says, the free individual is 'constituted by...
governmental techniques as both a self-governing citizen and an object of fostering,
welfare and care' (ibid.; p.166; emphasis added). He goes on to argue that such
techniques "swarm" the social body of modem societies, and are present in an
intensified form in institutions which observe and aim to shape the conduct or make-
up of their subjects.
The concept of governmentality has featured centrally in the work of a number
of other theorists, notably Rose (e.g. 1990; 1992; 1996), Nettleton (1994) and Petersen
(1994). Rose (e.g. 1990) has been expressly concerned with the proliferation of
"expert" authorities on the human "soul" and its governance in the twentieth century.
These "experts," through the "psy-" disciplines, produce systems of knowledge about
human beings and their psychological make-up, their psyches. Rose argues that:
psychology has.., participated in reshaping the practices of those who exercise authority
over others... It has invented what one might call the therapies of normality.., the
pedagogies of self-fulfilment.., which translate the enigmatic desires and dissatisfactions
of the individual into precise ways of inspecting oneself, accounting for oneself, and
working upon oneself in order to realize one's potential, gain happiness, and exercise
one's autonomy... enabling humans to live as free individuals by subordinating themselves
to a form of therapeutic authority: to live as an autonomous individual, you must learn
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new techniques for understanding and practising upon yourself... through these
transformations, we have "invented ourselves"
(Rose, 1996; p.17)
These forms of "expert" knowledge and authority therefore come to constitute
"technologies of the self' in that they shape how individuals think about, understand,
and act upon themselves. 'Individuals come to construe, decipher and act upon
themselves' (Rose, 1992; p.144) in relation to what is desirable or undesirable
according to these knowledges and technologies. This is a process into which
individuals themselves are recruited, in which they actively participate.
So, whilst there is an important aspect of individual agency and an active self-
constitution implied here, these "practices of the self' by which people observe, act
upon and shape their own conduct 'are nevertheless not something invented by the
individual' (Foucault, 1997b; p.291), they are 'models' which exist in a culture and
which are suggested, proposed and imposed upon individuals. It is not a matter of
one's own 'pure creative energies' (Bevir, 1999) allowing one to "make" oneself in a
way which involves unfettered autonomy, but of the constitution of a field of practices
through which one's agency and initiative are articulated (see Foucault, 1972).
This is well illustrated by a number of writings on the subject of health
promotion (Nettleton, 1994; Petersen, 1994; Coveney, 1998). Coveney (1998), for
example, argues that modem forms of health promotion can be seen as 'a form of
government which is productive in the sense that it produces modem subjects: it
defines empirically what it is to be healthy' (p.462), and it "supervises" the proper
routes to health in a manner which establishes individuals' relationships to themselves
as beings with a particular form of freedom, particular sets of choices, and particular
indexes of action to be performed upon themselves. In this mode of government,
individuals are led to make "informed" choices about, for example, their diets —
choices informed by expert knowledge and consciousness-raising of "problems"
around certain issues. What is thus required is 'a self-reflective, self-regulating
individual with the correct concern for themselves' (ibid.; p. 464) - an individual who
will "self-problematise" and respond to this effectively. Particular forms of freedom
and choice-making which are highly valued in the West are thus bound from their
-35-
inception with the language of expertise. Nettleton (1994) points out also that this is
not to say that forms of power connected to expertise mould people into rigid and
unchanging forms which can be confidently predicted. Foucault's theories of
government and ethics, indeed, explicitly allow for the possibility of resistance to
those resources which constitute "practices of the self," and for a range of reactions to
them which is not narrowly constrained by a moral code — these governmental
technologies are multiple and heterogeneous in any case, and not unified and
monolithic (Dean, 1994). These "practices" or "technologies" bring into being ways
of thinking about, relating to and modifying one's self, they constitute the very self
that one thinks in particular ways, but they do not systematically control people's self-
relationship or their conduct.
Once again, it is clear that Foucault's thinking has enormous relevance for the
study of learning difficulties and for the asking of our research question. We have
already seen, then, how the work covered so far alters conventional notions of
"power" and influences us to ask new questions. It influences us to question how
people with learning difficulties become objects of specific systems of knowledge
relating to mental capacities, and how a field of possibility emerges against which
certain ways of understanding, organising, assessing and acting upon them exist, what
sort of relationships they are situated in, what sorts of subject positions they are led to,
and so on. These domains of truth and power relate to the parts of our research
question which ask what forms of power people in community care accommodation
experience. However, also important is that part of the research question which asks
how people in this situation relate to themselves, and how these factors might
constitute problems with which they engage. As Dean (1994) points out, it is
important to be able to account not only for how individuals' conduct is directed in
particular regulated ways, but also, allied to this, to account for how individuals
understand and act upon themselves and their own conduct. Indeed, this is an
important domain for the concerns of psychology, centring as it does around
individuals' own interactions with a set of forces which act upon them. It is here that
Foucault's critical ontology of ethics and technologies of the self has an important
influence.
Here, then, we have the resources to question the ways in which people
deemed to have learning difficulties are incited to constitute themselves as beings with
certain rights, responsibilities and needs, how they might draw upon heterogeneous
ethical technologies in self-formation and self-accounting, how they align themselves
with or resist moral injunctions and prescriptions, how their "condition" is
coextensive with certain "ways to live" and how this is dealt with, and so on. Again,
we should say that these are not concerns which only have an effect on people with
learning difficulties. These are issues which affect everyone; there is no "non-
position" or place of ultimate freedom in which certain privileged people exist outside
of the play of forces which constitute forms of power/knowledge and forms of ethical
technology which allow them to relate to themselves in certain ways and to perform
action upon their own lives and conduct in line with certain ideals. Again, though, we
are interested specifically in how these factors are at work in the specific situation of
community care accommodation and how the people living in it interact with them.
This final piece in the Foucauldian jigsaw allows us to realise that people are
not passive objects, moulded and controlled by power and institutions, but that they
actively interact with forms of power with aim to control their conduct (although this
is not to say that they will be ultimately successful in escaping power), and display
their own agency in processes of relating to themselves as beings of a certain sort
(although this is not to say that the technologies they use in this are of their own
making). The important points for our research with people with learning difficulties
and their experience of community care, then, are the strategies and technologies
which weigh upon them and attach certain costs to telling the truth about themselves
as "people with learning difficulties" (Foucault, 1983, 1989j, 1997b), and the parts
they themselves play in accepting or resisting these processes, how they draw upon
particular technologies in relating to themselves as particular types of being and
attaching meaning, value and a moral weight to their own lives and conduct.
2.1.5 Summary
Foucault's thinking invites a radical departure from traditional categories and
assumptions, and it leads us to ask novel questions about power and subjectivity. In
the context of learning difficulties, it turns much of the work that has been done on its
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head — as will be seen more clearly in the following chapters. The very notion of
"learning difficulties" itself becomes problematic. The person "with difficulties"
comes to be recognised not as an unproblematic and pre-existing entity, but as realised
through the discourses of medicine, psychology and social administration — as Dyson
(1987a) points out, for instance, these discourses individualise specific "problems"
and draw attention away from the role of societal factors in their creation. The
institutions and forms of care and social provision which exist for "people with
learning difficulties" are no longer seen simply as attempts to find the best solution to
a social or individual problem. Instead, the very forms of problematisation of a
"mental deficiency" are themselves questioned in their links with particular forms of
knowledge and power. The manner in which people are put into institutions, have
their conduct examined and managed, and are led to understand themselves as
"mentally disabled" in particular ways, all become the object of a critical analysis
which unsettles the naturalness of that which defines us as subjects (Foucault, 1982,
1983), and which unsettles our 'ready assumptions about the naturalness of our...
institutions' (Bevir, 1999; p.356).
In relation to the specific set of questions which drive this research — What
forms of power do individuals living in community care accommodation for adults
with learning difficulties experience as acting upon them? How do they relate to
themselves as subjects in relation to it? How does this constitute problems for them in
their lives? — we have seen how Foucault's three domains of critical ontology (truth,
power, ethics) intersect with them, and provide a philosophical underpinning for
addressing them. However, we have also said that we are examining individuals'
accounts of their own lives in care institutions, and not the same sorts of text as
Foucault did in his analyses, and that we are therefore not looking for a "Foucauldian
methodology" which we can transpose to psychology. We will need, then, to consider
the ideas seen here alongside developments in discourse analysis and psychology, and
to devise an approach for performing an analysis of individuals' accounts suitable for
addressing our research question.
Before we can undertake this, however, we must first consider a number of
objections which have been raised with Foucault's work, and to consider how these
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might affect our application of them. It has already been commented that, despite their
widespread application, Foucault's works have by no means been unconditionally
accepted by everyone in the social sciences. Numerous problems with his theories
have been suggested, and many people see them as not merely inaccurate, but actively
dangerous. In devising an application of these ideas for this thesis, then, it is necessary
to examine and engage with these criticisms.
2.2 Foucault's critics and the implications they raise
The sense in which Foucault's work functions as criticism has long been a source of
puzzlement to his readers... His apparently neutral accounts of techniques of power lead
to complaints that he is normatively confused or that he deprives himself of any basis for
criticism of the social phenomena he describes.
(Patton, 1989: 260)
Although the criticisms which have been made of Foucault's work have been
many and varied, the most cogent and telling ones (and the ones most relevant to this
thesis) can be considered under two broad headings: those which claim that Foucault's
work lacks any normative basis for evaluating social structures and practices, and
those which argue that there exists in his corpus such a degree of confusion as to
whether the individual is determined by power or has the potential to escape all such
determination that it is fatally inconsistent. Each of these will be considered briefly
here. It will be argued that, although it is possible to find fault with Foucault's work, it
is also possible, and, in fact, more constructive, to make a reading of it which extends
the promise of radical and trenchant critical study.
Foucault's style in his written works is one of the initial causes of criticism.
Habermas (1986), for instance, argues that Foucault's writing style embodies 'the
almost serene scientific reserve of the scholar striving for objectivity' (p.103) which
does not sit easily with a politically motivated study. Taylor (1989) similarly finds
difficulty with it, arguing that it 'merely obfuscates... [It] has the effect of making the
position look deeper and less challengeable than it really is' (p.277). These objections
to a perceived neutral writing-style, however, are just the tip of an iceberg of a whole
series of criticisms about the lack of a clear normative framework in Foucault's work.
Fraser (1989), for instance, takes Foucault to task for failing to ask the question of
what makes power legitimate or illegitimate. She argues that there is no route from
such a 'suspension of the question of the legitimacy' (ibid.; p.28) of power to the sort
of engaged critiques he seems to want to carry out. This, she claims, leaves Foucault
no grounds for believing that struggle is preferable to submission or for arguing why
domination ought to be resisted. 'Only with the introduction of normative notions of
some kind,' (ibid.; p.29) she says, could Foucault begin to deal with these issues.
Others have made similar complaints. Haberrnas (1987), for instance, criticises
Foucault for abstaining 'from the question of whether some discourse and power
formations could be more legitimate than others' (p.282), claiming that this position
robs him of any reason for resisting 'this all-pervasive power circulating in the
bloodstream of.. modern society' (p.284). Taylor (1986) similarly argues that
Foucault seems concerned to bring particular 'evils' to light, but always distances
himself from the proposal of anything which could — or should — be done to overcome
them. Haber (1994) thus contends that Foucault's project, which prevaricates on the
issue of justifying objection or resistance, cannot be incorporated in any way into an
oppositional programme which could promote effective change of social structures or
practices, nor can it be a catalyst for resistance.
In considering the impact of these criticisms, it must be recognised that
Foucault's position was indeed nihilistic in the sense that he refused to create
supreme values (Gliicksmann, 1992). In fact, he once commented that he believed that
the existence of any form of universal morality to which everyone must submit would
be 'catastrophic' (Foucault, 1988e). Consequently, he consistently refused to elaborate
any philosophical justification for resistance or to formulate a programme of what
needs to be done (Foucault, 1977c, 1981c, 1988f, 1989k, 1991a). Whilst this has been
a source of consternation and condemnation from some readers, others have invited us
to consider this problem differently. Simons (1995), for example, agrees that one does
not have to be particularly selective in one's reading of Foucault to portray him as a
thinker who evades any question of what can or should be done in the face of systems
of power. He contends, though, that this is not the fatal problem that some critics
make it out to be. Indeed, he claims that problems arise precisely when philosophy is
charged with 'the task of determining which practices of power and resistance are
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legitimate' (Simons, 1995; p.115). What happens, for instance, to those people who
are unable to articulate philosophically their reasons for resistance? When such an
ideal is seen as a prerequisite for challenging social systems, those who are unable or
hesitant to engage with it are degraded and marginalised (see Dyson, 1987a).
Certainly it appears that Foucault was aware of difficulties such as this. He
refused to write in a polemical style because he believed it to be ineffectual (Foucault,
1977d, 1997b), and, more importantly, he refused to propose a programme of action
or to state explicitly what must be resisted because he believed that there are inherent
dangers when an intellectual presumes to undertake such a task:
I'm not convinced that intellectuals - starting from their bookish, academic, and erudite
investigations — can point to the essential problems of the society in which they live.
(Foucault, 1991a; p.151)
On the contrary, he believed there is, in fact, a certain indignity in intellectuals and
academics presuming to speak for others (Foucault, 1977e), as well as the danger that
whatever programme they propose might potentially itself become an instrument of
repression (Foucault, 1988f). Consequently, Foucault's project did not merely stop
short of proposing programmes of action because of a flaw in his thinking, its
conscious aim was to bring it about that certain people, particularly people whose task
it is to administer or manage institutions:
no longer know what to do, so that acts, gestures, discourses, which up until then had
seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult... This effect is intentional.
(Foucault, 1989k; p.285; emphasis added)
He intended for his works actively to 'shut the mouths of prophets and legislators: all
those who speak for others and above others' (Foucault, 1991a; p.159; original
emphasis) without himself speaking for people in proposing what needs to be done on
their behalf.
In point of fact, Foucault did tend to make some sorts of normative judgements
about forms of power. He preferred `agonic' (cited in Simons, 1995) forms of power —
those that are flexible enough to allow for creative and continued resistance, and
which contain as little domination as possible. Thus, although Foucault does say that
power must not be understood as being necessarily something which is bad in itself,
he also makes it clear that it is always 'dangerous' (Foucault, 19971). This means that
there is always something to do, and that Foucault's position leads therefore 'not to
apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism' (ibid.; p.256). Simons (1995) has
developed this position using the metaphor (adapted from Milan Kundera) of "poles"
of lightness and heaviness in Foucault's work. He identifies two different 'moods' in
Foucault's work. In his 'oppositional mood,' Foucault is 'a prophet of entrapment'
who seems to indicate that power is insurmountably constraining and that we cannot
escape our subjection. In his 'affirmative mood,' on the other hand, he seems more
disposed towards theorising an escape from all limitations through the power of self-
formation. On the whole (but not always), he says, 'Foucault resists the magnetism of
these two poles, riding the tension by adopting unstable positions between them'
(ibid.; p.3).
In Foucault's work, then, we can see a tension between totally constraining
limits and totally limitless freedom. Some limitations are necessary, since they define
what we are and what we can do. In terms of subjectification, for instance, 'the subject
is indebted to limits.., for the possibility of being anyone at all' (ibid.; p.4), for having
an identity and the capacity to act as a person. Life without limits would thus be
'unbearably light,' as there would be nothing to define us as subjects of any sort. On
the other hand, though, is 'unbearable heaviness,' in which people are very rigidly
subjected with no possibility of self-definition. Foucault's 'middle course,' Simons
argues, sees the subject as 'neither totally subjected nor entirely self-defining' (ibid.;
p.4). Simons thus contends that it is possible to see in Foucault's work an engaged
political concern which, whilst it does not hold out the possibility of a world devoid of
power, aims to work with the limits that both define and constrain us 'to prevent the
solidification of strategic relations into patterns of domination by maintaining the
openness of agonistic relations' (ibid.; p.4).
This, however, is not the universal principle that those who condemn Foucault
as a nihilist seem to want. It does not follow logically from his philosophical
postulates, nor does it provide a general rule for making confident, consistent and
absolute normative decisions about any and all social systems and practices. For
Foucault, these are not problems to be solved by a universal philosophical or logical
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principle which must be invoked in order to justify resistance; they are problems 'for
all those on whom power is exercised to their detriment' (Foucault, 1977e; p.216), for
all those who find their situation in some way 'intolerable'. So, just as Foucault
(1989k) says that 'the problem of the prisons isn't one for the "social workers" but
one for the prisoners' (p.285), we can see that the problem of learning difficulties is
not one for social scientists or philosophers, but one for those deemed to have learning
difficulties. The problem is in what they struggle with, in what they find "intolerable,"
and the role of the academic is not to elucidate the universal principle which will
justify what they should be resisting, but to work with them on their problems.
We can thus see Foucault's work — and that which draws upon it — as
searching for the fragility of systems of thought and foundational categories around
which power coalesces, and as collaborating with those who struggle with such
systems rather than formulating a programme for them. Connected to this is
Foucault's (1981a) assertion that power is tolerated 'only on the condition that it mask
a substantial part of itself... [that] its success is proportional to its ability to hide its
own mechanisms' (p.86). His dispassionate analyses of the characteristics of power,
then, can perhaps better be seen as attempts to unmask its mechanisms and operations,
and this can then be seen as itself a political act that by its very nature weakens the
foundations upon which power bases itself (Foucault, 1989k, 1991a).
Our task in this thesis, then, must not be to make judgements about people's
situations and what should be done to, for or by them, but to bring to light the ways
that they experience power and subjectification acting upon them, and how they
interact with this. This is a form of analysis which problematises without imposing
solutions upon people. That is, it aims to bring to light issues of power, subjectivity
and ethics — and the problems that people experience with them — which were
previously unseen, to bring them onto the agenda as issues to be considered in the
situations being examined, and to make ways of acting upon and conceptualising
people which previously had seemed to be natural, unproblematic and fixed in
advance become instead objects for critical thought (see Foucault, 1991a). Through
this process, it may be hoped that room may be found to work through the problems
facing people with them, and for them to work through them themselves. It is for this
reason that it is important to undertake an analysis of power and subjectivity from the
point-of-view of those affected by these forces, in order to formulate an idea of what
problems they themselves might be experiencing. This, then, is not merely an
avoidance of issues of critically-motivated decisions stemming from a theoretical
inability to make them, but a conscious, politically-motivated aim which recognises
the need to problematise issues of power and subjectivity without imposing new ones
upon people through a temptation to speak for them about their situation.
Also to be considered here are those criticisms of Foucault which claim that
his thinking was fatally inconsistent, contradictory or flawed. Particularly vocal on
this point has been Nicholas Fox (1997, 1998). He picks up on some of the issues
detailed above to argue that there is a glaring inconsistency between Foucault's
'ontology of the body' and his 'ontology of the self (Fox, 1997, 1998). In analysing
the ontology of the body as a target for forms of bio-power, Fox claims that Foucault
characterises power as essentially determining, as constraining and limiting by acting
upon the body. On the other hand, he says, when Foucault turns to an ontology of the
self, he seems to take the opposite point of view, and emphasises the manner in which
individuals are no longer characterised as 'docile bodies,' but as living, reflexive
beings capable of taking an active role in their own self-formation. Fox (1997, 1998)
sees this as undermining Foucault's earlier position, and he claims that where an over-
emphasis on determinism permeated his earlier work, an over-emphasis on agency
pervades his later studies. Much has been made of the reading of determinism in
Foucault's middle-period writings. Habermas (1987) for instance objects that Foucault
'raises "power" to a basic transcendental-historicist concept' (p.254) which cannot, in
fact, explain as much about society and human interactions as it would like to believe
(see also Taylor, 1986). Similarly, Fox (1997) argues that this is a model which
'cannot analyse the conditions under which resistance to power becomes possible,
why some people resist and others do not' (p.41).
In response to these concerns, it should be noted that Foucault (1993, 1997d)
was aware that some of his middle-period writings could be read as overly
deterministic. Towards the end of his life, he looked back on his work as comprising a
critical ontology of three modes by which people become subjects — truth, power and
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ethics. Although he was occasionally critical of his earlier work, he also appeared to
re-categorise parts of it to fit into this framework (e.g. Foucault, 1989c, 1989d, 1989j,
1993, 19970. So, although it is possible to read a selection of Foucault's works as
representing a deterministic or essential picture of power — as, for example, Wickham
(1986) has done — this is perhaps too hastily dismissive. The possibility also exists of
recognising that Foucault developed his position as he pushed different ways of
thinking to their limits (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). For instance, he came to believe
that power was not his 'fundamental problem' (Foucault, 1997b; emphasis added), but
that it merely served well as an instrument for analysing 'the relationship between the
subject and truth' (ibid.; p.290) in particular situations. Basically, this point boils
down to the fact that 'Foucault can be read either generously or in a way which is
niggardly' (Rochlitz, in Armstrong, 1992; p.344). There are some compelling factors
in support of a generous reading. Firstly is the fact that Foucault never intended his
works to be seen as 'dogmatic assertions that are to be taken or left en bloc' (Foucault,
1989k; p.275). He was explicitly opposed to the idea that his name would represent a
heading under which all of his works could be understood. He intended, rather, for his
works 'to be taken as "propositions", "game openings" where those who may be
interested are invited to join in' (ibid.; p.275). So, instead of being concerned to be
faithful to "Foucault" or, by careful reading, to discern the "real" Foucault who will
provide the "correct" interpretation of his oeuvre, his works can more productively be
seen as 'tool-kits' or 'gadgets' which one is free to transform and to use in different
ways (Foucault, 1980b, 1980g, 1989h, 19891). If it is then commented that one is
being unfaithful to "Foucault", 'that is of absolutely no interest' (Foucault, 1989h;
p.54) so long as the work one does functions, so long as it proves useful in opening up
a new perspective on a particular area (Foucault, 1977e, 1989m).
Hence, we have been developing a position based upon Foucault's three
domains of critical ontology which will be useful in examining how people's accounts
of their situation in community care accommodation illustrate how they are
experiencing and interacting with forces of truth, power and ethics in their lives.
Despite the availability of negative readings of Foucault, we have identified the
potential for a productive use of his work in a critical study of power and subjectivity.
This is not by any means a simple matter of duplicating Foucault's methods, or of
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remaining "faithful" to his work. The task that faces us is that of assessing how the
issues which Foucault raises can be incorporated into a form of psychological
discourse analysis suitable for working with individuals' own accounts of their
situation in addressing our specific research questions. In some ways, then, it could be
said that as well as "using" Foucault, this thesis also aims to move beyond his work,
and of finding ways of productively using it in another form of study. First, however,
we shall summarise the position taken in this chapter.
2.3 Conclusion
Foucault's vast corpus of work provides a number of "tools" for potential
analyses of learning difficulties and the social situations surrounding it. Possible
studies could, for instance, centre around an archaeology of the shifting systems of
knowledge which have constituted learning difficulties in different discursive fields,
and the forms of problematisation which have been connected with these systems.
One could perform a genealogical analysis of the emergence and development of
institutions which have confined people, and of the ideals which transformed the
economy of power around them. One could study prescriptive texts to analyse how
different forms of problematisation of learning difficulty have been connected to
moral imperatives and ethical technologies, and so on. The study in this thesis,
however, is interested specifically in the ways that individuals deemed to have
learning difficulties who have experienced life in institutions or special
accommodation talk about their own situations. This thesis is not concerned with
doing "Foucauldian research", but with finding, within Foucault's work, a set of ideas
that will be useful in addressing our research question in relation to how people
themselves talk about their lives in care accommodation.
We have seen, then, that Foucault's work can be seen as comprising three
domains of critical ontology which tie in with the concerns of our research question,
and begin to clarify what we are looking for in people's accounts of their situation in
care, what we mean when we talk of "power" and "subjectivity" and people's
relationships to them.
We saw, then, how Foucault's critical ontologies of truth and power intersect
to show the importance of attending to power as a productive system. We are asking
questions not about a wholly repressive mechanism which suppresses an essential,
free subjectivity, but about how power/knowledge objectifies people and positions
them as subjects of whom certain forms of power take hold. We are led to ask how
people's accounts of their lives embody certain subject positions, how they are
positioned as subjects, how and according to what rationality they are situated in
relationships with others which constitute power, how specific aspects of their
conduct become amenable to direction, how forms of observation and judgements,
decisions and interventions into their lives are made available with respect to them,
and so on — in short, how people are constituted as subjects amenable to certain forms
of organisation and certain relationships. These points relate to our asking what forms
of power people experience as acting upon them. Foucault's ethical domain of
analysis influences us to attend also to how individuals actively take up positions in
relation to these issues, how they recognise themselves as certain types of subjects.
This leads us to examine the concepts of self-hood that people draw upon in relating
to their situation, the ways that they relate to themselves, assign meaning and value to
their conduct, and how they direct their conduct in line with particular ideals. This ties
in with research questions which ask how people relate to themselves as subjects, and
how they might experience problems thrown up by their situation.
Power, for Foucault, is everywhere: there is no essential subject existing
outside of forms of power/knowledge, and there are no forms of self-relationships
separate from those technologies which bring concepts of self-hood and ethical ideals
into being. Everyone, and every human relationship exists in relation to forms of
power/knowledge, subjectivity, and ethical technologies. We are interested, however,
in how these factors operate specifically in the situation of community care, and with
how the people living in care experience and interact with them — the purpose of the
interviews to be carried out is to explore these issues with them, and to draw out the
salient points in the analysis. Our emphasis is on how people themselves understand
and relate to these issues and these situations.
We are interested, then, in how the accounts of people living in care
accommodation, gleaned through an interview process designed to explore their
relationships to their environment, other people and themselves, indicate how they are
situated in particular power relationships, how they are objectified by particular
discourses which make them amenable to certain operations of power, how they are
led to relate to themselves as subjects of varying sorts, and how they interact with
these issues and form relationships to themselves, their conduct and their environment
in respect of them. This is an important study in a number of respects. As Foucault
argued (1982) institutional situations can present a privileged point for the analysis of
power relations, and, as has been argued elsewhere (McNay, 1994), a Foucauldian-
style study of institutions starting from the point-of-view of those who are their
subjects (as opposed to the examination of historical texts which indicate their
emergence and ontology) is long overdue, and can be instrumental in beginning to
analyse power in a way that overcomes the deterministic tendencies which were
highlighted in several criticisms of his work (including his own) by forcing the
examination of how people are not only positioned by these forces, but also how they
are interacting with them actively in their lives. Also, as we shall see in subsequent
chapters, these ideas lead us to address a previously neglected set of concerns about
care accommodation which will allow us to think about it in different ways — they lead
us to new set of possible questions concerning the situation of people living in care.
As we have said, this study also recognises the importance of highlighting the
problems that people experience in relation to power and subjectivity — the cost they
have for them — and of the importance of these problems being worked through with
the people involved rather than deciding what their problems are from a more
detached position and deciding what needs to be done on their behalf. It is here that
the task of unmasking and problematising the operation and effects of forms of power
and subjectivity without handing down decisions about them becomes an important
one — one that contains the possibility of opening up the room to work through the
problems facing people with them, and for them to work through them themselves.
We now have a clearer picture of the questions this study will address, and of
the issues to which we are called to attend. What remains to be done, then, is to
consider precisely how these realisations can be used by a psychological study, what
impact they have on our understanding of what such a study would be like, what it can
and cannot achieve, what the methods for data collection and analysis should be, and
how this fits in with other developments in research and practice around learning
difficulties and in the social sciences in general — how, in short, Foucault's vast and
occasionally problematic corpus of work can be made useful in the study of power and
subjectivity in people's accounts of their own situations. These tasks will be
undertaken in due course. Firstly, we shall examine developments in psychology and
discourse analysis, consider how Foucault's works fit in with these, and begin to
formulate an approach to interviewing and analysis appropriate for addressing our
research question. Following this, we shall turn our attention to literature and policy
issues surrounding learning difficulties to assess how this study fits in with
developments in this area, and to begin to set out the ways in which it is unique and
addresses important, but neglected questions.
Chapter 3: Psychology: Paradigmatic and Methodological Issues
As was clear in the previous chapter, the work of Michel Foucault turns much
conventional academic inquiry on its head. Before we consider how this affects our
reading of issues surrounding learning difficulties and research methodology, we must
consider how this research fits in with psychology. Foucault's work has had a major
impact on a number of theories in psychology. This chapter will examine these, and
consider how a Foucauldian-influenced approach might be taken further and feed into
an approach to analysing discourse.
There are also, however, a number of other (often related) critical forces acting
on the discipline which must be considered. The impact of Foucault's work here will
be seen as the chapter unfolds, but we must start with an understanding of the
contemporary position in psychology. Smith, Harre & Van Langenhove (1995) sum
up the current position of psychology in the following quotation:
Psychology is in a state of flux. There appears to be an unprecedented degree of
questioning about the nature of the subject, the boundaries of the discipline and what new
ways of conducting psychological enquiry are available... Much of the discussion can be
seen to revolve around theoretical and conceptual foundations.
(p.1)
As this suggests, a growing number of voices challenge what might be considered to
be the mainstream conceptions of psychology. Psychology traditionally models itself
on the natural sciences. There is a history of concerns for achieving ever more
accurate operationalisation, quantification, measurement and prediction of mental
functioning. As Danziger (1990) states:
Most psychologists have been taught to characterize their own scientific activity in terms
of a framework that is derived from nineteenth-century physical science. They see
themselves as individual investigators who seek to accumulate facts about some aspect of
nature by the use of appropriate hypotheses and techniques. When they describe the
historical development of their field they are apt to do so in much the same terms,
representing it as a succession of individual contributors who accumulated "findings" on
the basis of progressively refined hypotheses and increasingly sophisticated
instrumentation.
(p.1-2)
Numerous criticisms of this conceptualisation of psychology have arisen from
a variety of philosophical positions. In the midst of the "crisis" (e.g. Parker, 1989a;
Parker & Shotter, 1990) in social psychology of the 1970s, for instance, authors such
as Harre (e.g. 1979; Harre & Secord, 1972) and Shotter (e.g. 1975) criticised the
reductionist, positivist nature of experimental psychology. They argued that the
reduction of aspects of human behaviour and the social world to discretely measurable
variables ready for experimental study and statistical analysis was flawed since it set
out to study people by treating them as mechanisms whose workings could be
discovered rather than as human beings (Harre & Secord, 1972). More recently,
criticisms have emerged from a wider-ranging set of "crises" connected with 'the very
character of the conduct of Western intellectual life' (Parker & Shotter, 1990; p.1).
Challenges stemming from speech act theory and analytic philosophy, the sociology of
scientific knowledge, conversation analysis, feminism, semiology, postmodernism and
post-structuralism (not least Foucauldian post-structuralism), and so on, have
challenged not only the conception of human beings in psychology, but also the
validity of claims to scientificity, the rhetorical nature of psychological writing, the
social effects of psychological research and knowledge, and even the construction and
status of knowledge itself.
As a consequence of these challenges, psychology is now commonly talked of
as being divided into quantitative and qualitative camps — those who adhere to
positivistic, scientific forms of psychology and experimental methods, and those who
advocate a more qualitative, interpretative approach. However, setting qualitative
methods in diametric opposition to quantitative approaches is a poor way of
understanding the complexity of the issues at stake, and loses sight of much of value
of the approaches lumped under the label of "qualitative methods" (Banister, Burman,
Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 1994). Hiles (1999, 2000) observes that it is common for
discussion of different approaches to psychology to conflate considerations of
methods of data collection and analytic technique under the heading of "(qualitative)
methods" whilst neglecting consideration of paradigmatic assumptions. Quantitative
research is not defined merely by the nature of its data. There is more to consider than
the process of measurement and statistical analysis, and the same applies to qualitative
approaches. This chapter will be more concerned with analytic approaches and
paradigmatic assumptions rather than methods for collecting data (which will be
rather more straightforward and will be dealt with in the methodology chapter). So,
whilst this research will be positioned broadly within the field of what is often simply
described as "qualitative methods", there is more to consider than this implies.
With these points in mind, the aims of this chapter can be set out. First, a brief
account of traditional, natural science-modelled approaches to psychology will be
presented. The chapter will then follow the argument of Parker and Shotter (1990) that
there are a number of deeply-rooted issues to do with the conduct of the whole of
intellectual life which merit consideration, and which problematise the positivistic
basis of experimental psychology. These issues will be discussed under the headings
of "the logic of scientific inquiry", "language, representation and psychology's
subject", and "critical psychology: relativism versus action". Each of these areas raises
serious considerations for how psychological research is to be undertaken, a number
of which coincide with considerations which are raised by Foucault's thinking. The
chapter will then detail some of the new approaches emerging from consideration of
these issues, assessing the degree to which they address them, how they relate to the
points Foucault raises, and how suitable they are for this research. Finally, these issues
will be weighed up, and the approach that this research project will take will be
described — an approach that will aim to adapt the ways of conducting research which
exist in psychology, along with the important issues raised by Foucault's work, to the
specific concerns of the research question which drives this project.
First, our attention turns to the assumptions and practices of "mainstream",
experimental psychology.
3.1 Psychology as an experimental science
Despite the wide degree of questioning of theoretical underpinnings which has
been described, and a concern, in the mainstream of psychology, with moving study
out of the laboratory and into more "ecologically valid" settings, 'the same positivistic
logic and empiricist impulse which were at the heart of behaviourist experimentation
are still central to the way psychological inquiry is conceived and conducted' (Smith
et al., 1995; p.2). Gergen (1992) identifies four key presumptions which underlie this
positivistic approach: the belief in a basic subject matter, universal properties,
empirical method, and progressive research.
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Firstly, there is a belief in an objectively knowable basic subject matter. In
experimental psychology, this subject matter is taken to be the human individual, with
the belief that each individual is endowed with the cognitive apparatus to perceive and
react to the world without the influence of any other actors or social factors (Danziger,
1990). Edwards and Potter (1992) call his idea that individuals' cognitive processes
play the central role in shaping their perceptions and actions "cognitivism". Social as
well as cognitive psychology subscribes to this "cognitivist" view, such that social
psychology becomes:
the study of social cognition, of how individuals perceive, categorize, interpret the social
world, represent it mentally, make inferences about it, explain it causally, such that the
social lives of individuals flow from how they perceive, hypothesize or reason about each
other.
(ibid.; p.13)
These ideals led to the analogy of a computer-like processor conceptually defining the
matter upon which psychology performs its studies — as if the brain were a processor
of information in the head (Bruner, 1990; Hari* 1995; Harre & Steams, 1995). With
this analogy in place, psychology can study particular aspects of this processing
mechanism — most notably in social psychology, these centre around notions of
'cognition, attitudes, prejudice and aggression' (Gergen, 1998; p.149) existing as
mental paraphernalia inside the head to be isolated and studied in experimental
situations. Allied to this conception of individuals as psychology's subject matter is
the theory that, through experimental study, universal psychological laws concerning
them can be discovered:
[Psychological] theory consists of universal psychological.., laws that are logically
derived from a few assumptions and definitions concerning the basic nature of the realm
being investigated... Moreover, these laws must have been empirically confirmed by
means of carefully controlled experimentation. The resulting theory and laws permit
precise prediction about events that are remote in space and time
(Richardson & Powers, 1997; p.267)
This brings us to the issue of how these universal psychological laws are to be
discovered, and thus to the third underpinning assumption of psychology that Gergen
(1992) discusses — a belief in empirical methods. These methods aim to isolate
conceptually the individual from his/her social context such that the researcher can
establish 'empirical associations between separate individual and environmental
"variables" and "factors" (Danziger, 1990; p.187). Aspects of human psychology are
operationalised into measurable variables — for example, "prejudice" or "attitudes"
can be operationalised by having subjects fill in relevant psychological questionnaires,
"memory" can be operationalised by measuring recall of words or numbers under
particular conditions, "arousal" can (apparently) be operationalised by measuring 'the
delay and persistence of urination' (Parker, 1989a; p.18), and so on. It is then possible
to test hypotheses concerning these variables in a replicable experimental situation,
often studying the effect that the manipulation of an independent variable has on an
observed dependent variable (Foster & Parker, 1995). The "facts" that are discovered
through this experimental process are held to arise independently of interpretative
processes (Banister et al., 1994), and so to be objective and uncontaminated by values
and generalisable to different subjects and across different situational contexts. Thus,
psychological research is imagined to be progressive in that the accumulation of
"objective" data about "real" aspects of psychological functioning move psychological
knowledge towards an ever-closer correspondence to "the truth" (Parker, 1989a,
1992).
As has been made clear, scientific, positivistic approaches to psychology have
been subject to a number of challenges from a number of directions. These criticisms
tie in with those crises in intellectual life of which Parker and Shotter (1990) write;
crises which cover much of the same terrain with which Foucault was concerned — the
status of knowledge; language, representation and discourse; and questions of power,
and the constitution of subjectivities and identities. It is to these crises that we now
turn.
3.2 Critical Issues
The logic of scientific inquily
Two key theoretical underpinnings of psychology as a scientific enterprise are
the notions of an objectively-knowable reality, and the progress of knowledge towards
an ever-closer correspondence to "the truth". As Parker (1989a) comments, the notion
of the progress of knowledge is itself a historically and culturally specific one — 'there
is nothing "true" about it' (p.12). The fragility of ideas of objective knowledge and
progress towards truth is well illustrated by arguments from the philosophy of science,
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particularly the work of Karl Popper (1980), Thomas Kuhn (1970), and Paul
Feyerabend (1975).
The problem of the definite verification of scientific knowledge has plagued
those seeking absolute certainty since David Hume pointed out that just because the
sun rose yesterday and this morning does not mean that there is a logical reason to
believe that it will certainly do so tomorrow. Arguments for knowledge based on the
observation of an indefinite number of regularities of a phenomenon are based on
induction, and could never result in logically certain verifications of scientific laws
(Raphael, 1998). Popper (1980) proposed that this problem should be approached in
another way. He argued that scientific theories are never inductively proved, and that
absolute verification is impossible. He proposed that scientific inquiry should be
guided by the principle of 'falsification'. This principle holds that science should
proceed not by attempts to verify theories, but to falsi6) them. While theories cannot
be verified by any number of observations, Popper argued, they can be falsified or
disproved by a single disconfirming observation. Popper therefore believed that
hypotheses come first, with the aim of scientific investigation then being to attempt to
falsify these hypotheses. Scientists acting in good faith should test their own
hypotheses as rigorously as possible and attempt to disprove them. For Popper,
scientific theories are precisely those that can potentially be falsified, and the mark of
plausibility of theories lies in their ability to withstand repeated attempts to disprove
them. As more theories are discarded through disproof, and better theories (those
more able to withstand falsification) take their place, scientific theory should,
according to Popper, progress towards an ever-closer approximation to reality. Popper
(1986) was adamant that the social as well as the natural sciences should follow this
method of investigation.
Although extremely influential, Popper's arguments are not without their
detractors. Perhaps foremost in note amongst these is Thomas Kuhn. For Kuhn
(1970), the problem with notions like falsification is that they fail to acknowledge that
scientific investigation takes place against a background set of beliefs and theories,
that it works within a particular 'paradigm.' Hypotheses do not simply emerge from
nowhere. Rather, the set of possible hypotheses is determined by categories of
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thinking that emerge from existing theories. This realisation unsettles the Popperian
belief that hypotheses come first, and that increasingly reliable theories emerge from
sets of hypotheses which withstand repeated attempts to falsify them. Even more
radically, Kuhn argued that there is not necessarily a logical reason for the 'shifts' in
paradigms that occur in the sciences from time to time. Conventional belief holds that
shifts in perspective in science are due to an accumulation of objective facts which
force thinking to adapt and progress to ever-closer approximations to the truth.
Contrary to this, Kuhn argued that in practice the success and failure of scientific
paradigms is more dependent on argumentation, rhetoric, and political manoeuvrings
between competing, partisan camps, to the extent that often the only way a particular
paradigm shift can come about is when the old guard, the entrenched defenders of a
paradigm, either retire or expire.
These sorts of criticisms of a positivist philosophy of science become even
more radical and challenging in the work of Paul Feyerabend. Feyerabend (1975)
argued that since no coherent set of methodological rules could come close to
explaining the complexity inherent in the history of the sciences, and since any
notions of proof or disproof are unavoidably bound up with background assumptions
which are themselves not subject to proof, there can be no logical reason to privilege
scientific beliefs and assertions over those from other areas, including such derided
belief-systems as voodoo. He thus contended that, when it comes to judging
knowledge-claims or devising methodological approaches for studying phenomena,
'anything goes,' and that preferences for one style of approach over others is as much
dependent on the subjective beliefs and wishes of the practitioners of science as it is
on the logical correctness of one set of assumptions. The common lauding of scientific
inquiry as a privileged route to knowledge, then, is seen in Feyerabend's account as
the result of rhetorical processes which assume and present the scientific method as
superior to others without ever actuallyproving that this is so.
These concerns with the elusiveness of objective knowledge, and the presence
of unacknowledged subjective judgements, rhetoric and unexamined assumptions in
scientific enterprise have important implications for how psychology is to be
conceived. They connect with arguments that psychological investigation must be
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recognised as 'very much a social practice' (Danziger, 1990), and that psychology's
concern with attaining scientific status is a rhetorical one, serving to privilege its
judgements — that is, to legitimate the conclusions it puts forward and at the same time
to denigrate competing knowledge-claims as unscientific (e.g. Gergen, 1989; Visker,
1995). Parker and Shotter (1990) argue that we must realise the degree to which
psychology is 'textually constituted':
could it be that our scientifically acquired knowledge of the world and ourselves is not
determined by our and the world's "natures" to anything like the degree we have believed
(and hoped) in the past; and that instead our knowledge is influenced by the "ways", the
literary and textual means, we use in formulating our concerns?
(ibid.; p.2)
The abandonment of the idea that psychological texts can unproblematically
and objectively present "real" facts which have been "discovered" about the
psychological apparatus in people's heads has led a number of commentators in
psychology to perform "deconstructive" analyses of how such texts are organised to
produce the rhetorical effect of truthful plausibility. Deconstruction, a term borrowed
from literary theory, is used in psychology to denote a critical approach which
assumes that psychological properties, categories of persons, and "discoveries" about
them are not natural or objectively-obtained "facts", but are given substance in the
organisation of those very texts which discuss them. It aims, therefore, critically to
pick apart the discursive formations and textual effects which have produced and
made "truthful" psychological "discoveries" and conclusions (see, for example,
Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin, & Stowell-Smith, 1995; Burman, 1998). For
example, Stringer (1990) has analysed how social psychology textbooks account for
contradictions in the discipline and delineate a definitive field of inquiry with which
social psychologists are concerned; Squire (1990) has shown how the coherence and
credibility of accounts of psychological discoveries are products of particular narrative
styles which engage the reader rather than of the discoveries themselves; Billig (1998)
argues that psychological writing should be seen as a literary genre with its own
specific conventions, focusing particularly on how the subjects of experiments are
presented in ways which allow particular conclusions to be drawn about them;
Soyland (1994) has shown that psychological investigations and writings are
organised around a set of key metaphors, and that their treatment of the idea of
rhetoric, which constructs it as something which can be banished from "good
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scientific practice", is itself a rhetorical device (what he calls the 'rhetoric of anti-
rhetoric'); and so on.
The realisation that the production of psychological texts is not a neutral
activity that unproblematically represents objectively-discovered facts, and that
scientific inquiry takes place against a background of ill-examined assumptions which
are held in place by rhetorical manoeuvrings is a radical and unsettling one for
traditional approaches to psychology which view it as a scientific enterprise. We have
seen how it leads us to problematise the truth-claims made by the discipline.
However, there are more problems that this realisation forces us to consider. If the
illusion of "truthfulness" is to be seen as a textual product, and if objective, value- and
rhetoric-free, generalisable knowledge is as elusive as has been made out, then we are
led to ask what is the nature of reality itself, and what is the status of the terms with
which we believe we are referring to that reality? This connects us with another set of
those "crises" in modern western intellectual life to which Parker and Shotter (1990)
refer, a set of crises which will in turn connect us back to a number of concerns which
Foucault raised, and which will further radicalise our conception of what psychology
is, and what it can be. This set of crises concerns reality, representation, language, and
subjectivity.
Language, Representation and Psychology's Subject
In order to address the question of reality and representation, we initially return
to the philosophy of science; this time to French philosophy of science and the work
of Georges Canguilhem (1989). French philosophy of science has long based itself, in
contrast to both phenomenology (the philosophy of experience) and logical
positivism, on the "philosophy of concept", which emphasises the role of conceptual
interpretation — interpretation which is, unavoidably, based within particular systems
of concepts and ways of thinking — in producing and reflecting on knowledge
(Foucault, 1989a). For example, Canguilhem (1989) demonstrated that concepts of
normality and pathology through which biological and medical science operate are not
scientifically determined categories, but value-laden concepts connected to economic
and political imperatives that emerge from particular ways of thinking. Changing
concepts and ways of thinking are thus involved in the process of producing "true"
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ways of doing science. Canguilhem's work influences us to realise that 'error is not
eliminated by the muffled force of a truth which gradually emerges from the shadow,
but by the formation of a new way of "speaking true" (Foucault, 1989a; p.15).
Here, then, truth (not just plausibility or the illusion of truthfulness, but "truth"
itself) becomes not merely an unobtainable ideal, but a production of particular ways
of speaking, a function which exists within particular modes of conceptual
interpretation. As might be expected, Canguilhem's thought was an important
influence on Foucault's concerns with how "discourses of truth" produce subjects,
objects, fields of inquiry, and relationships of power (e.g. Foucault 1983; 1989a) — his
insight that discourses 'form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1972; p.49)
and produce 'effects of truth,' ways of "speaking true" (Foucault, 1980a).
These questions about the role of language and discourse in structuring our
perceptions and "constructing" truth and what we think of as reality have important
implications for psychology. "Constructionist" approaches in the discipline have
prompted the realisation that language cannot be understood as referring to pre-
existing entities, that it does not simply mirror objects which already exist in the
world, but is involved in the construction of reality — of objects of thought, and of
categories which are used to interpret them (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Burr, 1995;
Gergen, 1992, 1994, 1999): 'the process of signification itself gives shape to the
reality it implicates' (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & WaLkerdine, 1984; p.99).
This thinking challenges the assumption that representations can be judged for their
degree of fit with some independent external reality (Parker, 1989a). Constructionist
theories are concerned with how what is taken to be real is socially constructed (e.g.
Burr, 1995; Sampson, 1998; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999). The idea of a pre-
discursive reality is thus made problematic in that a process of social construction
does not simply "happen to" a pre-given or ready-made object: 'in order to refer to
any extra-discursive object there must inevitably be a prior and hence discursive
delimitation of what is taken as an object in the first place' (Sampson, 1998; p.29).
Therefore, insofar 'as the extra-discursive is delimited, it is formed by the very
discourse from which it seeks to free itself' (Butler, 1993; cited in Sampson, 1998;
p.29). The idea of a world independent of language and discourse is thus itself seen as
a function of a particular discourse (Edwards, 1991, 1997).
A number of theories in psychology, therefore, have abandoned the ideal of
capturing a "true" or definite meaning, arguing instead that any attempt to move
beyond discursive or textual representations to find a true picture of events is doomed,
'for the study of the outside [of discourse] is a reading which is given meaning by a
context' (Parker, 1989a; p.57, original emphasis). The objects with which psychology
deals, such as capacities, profiles, attitudes, and so on are no longer seen as 'things
hiding inside the person which a psychologist can then "discover",' but as 'created by
the language that is used to describe them' (Burman & Parker, 1993; p.1). The very
categories that we use to understand ourselves are thus not "natural kinds" 'that exist
in a real world outside the framework of our investigative and intellectual practices'
(Danziger, 1990; p.196), but are created in discourse (Burman & Parker, 1993; Parker,
1992, 1997).
There are obvious parallels between the constructionist thinking in psychology
which has been described and Foucault's thinking which sees discourses as forming
the objects of which they speak, as bringing aspects of the world into being as
"thinkable" in particular ways. Indeed, Foucault has been an important influence on a
number of theorists in psychology (e.g. Henriques et al., 1984; Parker, 1989a, 1989b,
1992, 1995, 1999a; Rose, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1996; Sampson, 1990; Richer, 1992;
Potter, 1996; Bayer, 1998; Gergen, 1999; etc.). Sampson (1990), for instance, draws
on Foucault's work to argue that psychology produces knowledge which constitutes
realities about people and is linked to projects of social management. He contends that
Freudian psychoanalysis did not so much uncover the essential inner secrets of the
human psyche, as 'furnish the individual with inner secrets that play a part in
justifying certain kinds of social practices designed to manage those secret impulses'
(Sampson, 1990; p.122), and extends this to argue that:
social psychologists have provided their own set of internal personal qualities — attitudes,
beliefs, values, personality types... and so forth — which are helpfully understood as
discoveries that constitute the shape of personal reality.
(ibid.; p.122)
This realisation not only problematises the reality of psychology's referents by
drawing attention to their discursive constitution, it also questions the very notion of
the individual in the discipline. As has been mentioned, the mainstream of psychology
is wedded to the idea of individualism which holds that each individual is a
'potentially autonomous' (Parker, 1990), unitary, bounded entity endowed with the
cognitive apparatus to perceive and react to the world without the influence of any
other actors, and potentially separable in conceptual terms from social factors.
Danziger (1990) refers to this as the 'Robinson Crusoe myth,' positing as it does the
possibility of studying an isolated individual whose characteristics exist independently
of any social involvement. These issues have been dealt with in depth by Julian
Henriques and his co-authors (Henriques et al., 1984, 1998) and Nikolas Rose (1985,
1989, 1990, 1996).
Just as Foucault argued that systems of power-knowledge are productive of
individuals and subjectivities, Henriques et al. (1984) argue that:
psychology is productive... It regulates, classifies and administers; it produces those
regulative devices which form us as objects of child development, schooling, welfare
agencies, medicine, multicultural education, personnel practices, and so forth... it
constitutes subjectivities as well as objects.
(P.1)
Henriques et al. (1984) contend that in order to understand this, it is necessary to
move beyond the 'reductive account of subjectivity' which psychology adheres to by
virtue of its belief in an individual who is conceptually separable from "society". This
belief is not "natural", but is itself constructed in particular ways of thinking. The
problems involved with this perspective emerge especially clearly when we consider
those areas of psychology which attempt to account for processes of socialisation —
the ways in which individuals become social, the means by which culture (for
example in terms of gender and sex roles) is transmitted to them. Such theories
assume the existence of a pre-given individual, conceptualised essentially as an
information processing system, and 'the external world, whether it be external objects
or people, is seen as information to be processed' (ibid.; p.19). The object of interest
for psychology thus becomes those mechanisms which process information from the
outside world. However, Henriques et al. (ibid.) point out that:
None of these questions can be addressed while psychology brackets off content into the
domain of the social and defines it as outside the boundaries of its theories, to fall within
the domain of sociology, for example. In socialization theory it is implicitly assumed that,
if they are added together, the ideas of psychology and sociology will produce a full
explanation... In fact for psychology they are two different kinds of theoretical objects
produced in different discourses, destined to bypass each other.
(ibid.; p.20)
This implicit individual-society dualism means that traditional psychological
concepts rely on the notion of a 'core presocial individual' which always ends up
being rapidly reduced to the biological. This makes it impossible for such a
psychology 'to theorize the individual in a radically social way' (ibid.; p.21). These
problems cannot be addressed unless the terms of the individual-society dualism are
reconceptualised such that neither one has status of a pre-given category, and we
stress 'the relational character of their mutual effects' (ibid.; p.21).
Henriques et al. highlight the importance of Foucault's work in transcending
this set of problems. Foucault's approach allows us to deconstruct the 'monolithic,
unitary character' of the social domain and link it to a 'multiple and contradictory
subject.' It also encourages us to realise that each term of the couple individual-
society is the effect of 'a production to be specified, rather than.., the pregiven object
of the human sciences' (ibid.; p.100), and that social scientific knowledge is
connected to practices of administration, and produces our very conceptualisation of
the individual — it constitutes individuals in a number of sites, such as the school, the
hospital, the workplace, and so on. Foucault's genealogical approach allows the
subject to be seen as a production constituted in numerous practices, discourses and
modes of subjectivity. It thus becomes important to consider 'the different subject
positions and the different power relations played out' in these practices (ibid.; p.117):
The experience of having more or less power in different social practices — that is the
experience of contradictions in subjective positionings — can be tied to what is sometimes
called "contradictory subject positions". It is not a concept that fits into psychology's
notion of the individual. Indeed, it is a key concept in the deconstruction of the
psychological notion of the subject. It cannot be usefully worked on outside an approach
which starts not from the unitary subject, or even a power-knowledge couple, but from a
triad: power-knowledge-subject.
(ibid.; p.118; emphasis added)
The possibilities for reconceptualising psychology offered by Foucault's
genealogy are further illustrated in the work of Nikolas Rose. Rose is concerned with
the role psychological knowledge plays in constituting systems of govenunentality
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and ethical self-relationships. His thesis is summarised by his contention that all
sciences bearing the prefix "psy-" are part of a system that has 'made it possible to
invent programmes for the technical management of the human soul' (1985; p.137).
Taking up Foucault's concern with how governmentality is connected to systems of
knowledge, Rose (1990) contends that the psychological sciences have played a key
role in the processes by which 'the human subject has entered into the webs of
government' (p.8). In keeping with the points discussed above, this does not work by
somehow operating on an essential, pre-given individual, but by constituting
particular forms of individuality and subjectivity in particular ways: the "psy-"
disciplines play 'a fundamental part in "making up" the kinds of persons that we take
ourselves to be' (Rose, 1996; p.10).
The psychological sciences, Rose argues, have played a central role in
'providing the devices by which human capacities could be turned into information
about which calculations could be made' and action taken (1989; p.121). The
production of knowledge, vocabularies and calculative processes relating to people's
subjectivities and mental capacities goes hand-in-hand with the development of
techniques by which action can be taken upon the objects of this calculation.
Psychology has not only constituted new forms of knowledge and new means of
assessment, it has also 'made possible a form of rational regulation of individuality'
(ibid.; p.121). Aspects of the individual are created as objects in a system of
knowledge through which particular personal attributes become "knowable" and
describable such that judgements can be made about them — judgements structured
around 'coincidences and difference from values deemed normal' (ibid.; p.124). The
discourses of the psy-sciences, then, are not merely representations of a pre-existing
subjectivity, they are directly constitutive of a field of objects relating to subjectivity
and of the knowledge that we have of them (Rose, 1996). Changes in the ways in
which knowledge about individuals is produced and accumulated are therefore
'simultaneously transformations in the cognitive and conceptual universe... [which]
make the individual practicable and thinkable' (Rose, 1989; p.129-130). Psychology
has thus also played a role in transforming the practices by which authority can be
exercised over people and by which people relate to themselves:
As objects of a certain regime of knowledge, we have become possible subjects for a
certain system of power, amenable to being calculated about, having things done to us,
and doing things to ourselves in the service of our individuality.
(ibid.; p.130)
To draw attention to the fact that the self, and all that we associate with it, is
invented is not the same as saying that we are thus the victims of a collective delusion
or deception. There is no ahistorical, transcendental subjectivity hidden beneath the
constructions. Rather, this "invention" 'constitutes our truth' (Rose, 1996). The lack
of a repressed, basic essence of individuality which can be liberated does not,
however, lessen the critical impact of this thinking. Indeed, the realisation that our
psychological subjectivities, with all their concomitant "abnormalities", are not
"natural" at all but are the products of particular systems of knowledge suggests a
novel form of critical inquiry about the nature of the modern self and the values
accorded to it, an inquiry which will 'open up our contemporary regime of the self to
critical thought' (ibid.; p.2), that will aim to:
destabilize and denaturalize that regime of the self which today seems inescapable, to
elucidate the burdens imposed, the illusions entailed, the acts of domination and self-
mastery that are the counterpart of the capacities and liberties that make up the
contemporary individual.
(ibid.; p.2)
This critical move connects us to the final set of "crises" of intellectual life with
which we will be dealing — criticism and resistance.
Critical psychology: relativism versus action.
As has been discussed, a key aspect of the move away from positivist, natural
science-modelled research in the social sciences has been the abandonment of the idea
that research can produce objective knowledge as long as those involved in its
production maintain a rigorous commitment to value-neutrality. Hammersley (2000),
whilst acknowledging that 'wilful' and 'motivated' bias does exist, argues that this
move has lamentably led to concerns with propaganda and bias taking a more central
role in social research than the production of knowledge. Others, however, have
argued that any pretence to value-neutrality is disingenuous, that social scientific
activity is shaped by social concerns as well as evidence (Dyson, 2000), and that it is
neither possible nor desirable for research to be free from any effects (e.g. Parker,
1999b). Far from being value-neutral, research is a social activity which does not
merely 'address or discover the objects of its inquiry, but... begins to create them from
the first moment of identification of a topic' (Clough & Barton, 1995; p.2). The basic
assumptions made about the research participants, the topic to be investigated, and
appropriate methodological and ethical approaches affect how research is undertaken,
how research participants are treated, what questions are asked, and what conclusions
are drawn. It is important to interrogate the effects which the research has, and the
extent to which its basic assumptions and conclusions support a status quo in which
particular groups are marginalised (e.g. Gillman, Swain & Heyman, 1997; Barton,
1997, 1998; Moore, Beazley & Maelaer, 1998). A good deal of research has been
accused of reinforcing unacceptable definitions and concepts of marginal groups, and
limits the possibilities for challenging unwanted and stifling social polices and
practices, and that new approaches are thus called for (e.g. Lather, 1986; Oliver, 1992;
Maguire, 1996; Shakespeare, 1996; Humphries, 1997).
These concerns are mirrored in the development of a "critical psychology"
(e.g. Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997a, Parker, 1999c). Psychology's pretensions to value-
neutrality have been especially effectively punctured by feminist thinking. Theorists
such as Haraway (1989), Hollway (1989) and Nicolson (1995) have argued that
psychology is structured and carried out in a way that marginalises and pathologises
women. Nicolson (1995) points out that the very ideal of setting out to exclude such
considerations as 'social context and the structural/power relations between
individuals as inherent bias' (p.123) necessarily reduces scientific psychology to
complicity with a patriarchal order. Similar points could be made for a wide range of
groups studied by psychology, such as disabled people, mental health patients,
minority ethnic or cultural groups, and so on. Prilleltensky (1999) argues that
psychologists must 'seek to obtain knowledge that is sensitive to the personal,
political, and cultural contexts in which data are gathered and interpreted' (p.103),
rather than attempting to rule out such concerns by pursuing "neutral" research. Part
of the agenda of a critical psychology must, therefore, be to demonstrate that the
choices made in psychological research are never free from values and assumptions,
and the question, "Is psychologists' work morally defensible?" must become a central
one (Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997b).
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Parker (1999c) argues that critical psychology must focus on four key issues.
Firstly, it must examine how psychology as a discipline privileges its own accounts
and how its dominant accounts operate 'in the service of power.' Secondly, it must
study how psychology is culturally and historically constructed, and how alternative
varieties of it support or resist the assumptions of, and the inherent power issues
within, mainstream accounts. Thirdly, it needs to be aware of how psychology works
across society to regulate people and to encourage them to regulate themselves.
Finally, it must explore how the knowledge produced by psychology is bound up with
everyday assumptions about mental functioning which people use to make sense of
themselves. All of these issues have been implicit to some extent in the process of
deconstructing the assumptions upon which scientific psychology is based. The third
and fourth issues will also strongly tie into the analysis which is to be undertaken of
the accounts of our research participants, as will be seen. Before considering an
appropriate analytic approach, however, there remains one more critical issue to deal
with: the tension between value-relativism and criticism. It is, then, within this broad
framework of psychology that this research is situated.
A key problem for those who believe in constructionism is its removal of the
foundations not only of the mainstream psychology which they want to resist, but also
of any justification for action, change or critique. Burman (1990) thus argues that
deconstruction, despite its usefulness in critiquing dominant discourses and relations
of power, ultimately fails as a political tool since it is fundamentally proscriptive — it
deconstructs not only dominant discourses but also any bases that might be put
forward for an oppositional politics. She therefore calls deconstruction a 'sharp and
dangerous tool.' This issue of how one 'who espouses social (linguistic)
constructionism [can] avoid slipping into relativism' (Harre, 1998; p.xi) is the subject
of an important debate in areas of psychology influenced by constructionist thinking
(Parker, 1998a; Nightingale & Cromby, 1999). Burr (1998) summarises the key
tension in the debate:
Without some notion of truth or reality, how can we justify advocating one view of the
world over another, and one way of organizing life over another? Can we avoid moral
relativism if we take a relativistic stance as academics? Do we need to take some form of
realist stance in order to make these justifications?... If the answer is that we must build
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back into our theorizing some notion of a reality which underpins social and psychological
phenomena, then what kind of reality is this? What kinds of things do we want to give the
status of "real" to and what does this mean?
(p.14)
Opposed to the problem of value-neutrality on the one hand, then, is the danger of
reifying particular concepts and practices on the other (Parker, 1998b). Willig (1998,
1999) argues that this fear of slipping into reification means that many discourse
analysts, whilst happy to perform deconstructive analyses, stop short of taking or
recommending any form of action which might be suggested by such analyses. Parker
(1999b) points out, however, that the kind of work we are interesting it doing here
cannot be undertaken in good faith without addressing the possibility of developing
some form of 'counter-practice' or action.
A number of positions are emerging in the social constructionist field which
propose frameworks for overcoming these sorts of problems. For example, Edwards,
Ashmore and Potter (1995) position relativism as the only possible resolution of this
debate, arguing that attempts to introduce realism rely upon using representations and
discursive performances as rhetorical devices which, due to their status as
representations, cannot be proof for a realist position. Opposed to this is a 'critical
realist' approach (e.g. Willig, 1999), drawing on the writings of Bhaskar to propose
that 'social constructions are grounded within, yet not directly reflective of, social
structures' (p.44) and that, since they are caught up in such material structures, they
can evidence ways in which people are disadvantaged by them, and aim to find ways
to work through this and to change such structures. Others argue that social
constructionism focuses too exclusively on language and must also take account of
embodiment (those aspects of the body which exist independently of texts which may
inscribe it) and materiality (the physicality around which constructions are formed),
and of the person as an experiencing being (e.g. Burr, 1999; Cromby & Nightingale,
1999).
It is, however, not our aim here to "solve" this debate, but merely to be aware
of the positions and problems it sets out and to address these issues in relation to this
particular piece of research — as Harr& (1998) points out, these questions will, in any
case, not be solved by resolutions 'good in all circumstances and for all occasions'
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(p.xi), but that they must be dealt with 'in different ways in different contexts' (p.xi).
It would not be desirable here to get side-tracked into a lengthy debate on these issues.
The important task is to examine how these issues are relevant to this thesis, and to
examine its position in relation to them.
Potential problems for "Foucauldian" research in carrying out an effective
critical analysis were discussed in the previous chapter. The points raised there also
have import for the issues we are confronted with here. It has been said, then, that for
this research project, which is concerned with the accounts of people living in a
particular kind of institution, the impetus for criticism and change is located in what
people struggle with, in areas where they experience power as problematic. Of course,
this is itself a reading of people's accounts based on a particular interpretative process
(which is, in turn, based on a particular philosophical position). As Parker (1999b)
points out, social and psychological reality is 'always already interpreted' and guided
by 'implicit theories of self and the world,' and one cannot escape this by merely
believing oneself to be accessing an immediate experience of an essential subject or
an absolute reality. The theoretical concern here resonates what has been called the
'psychology of visibility' (Brown & Pujol with Curt, 1998), in that we are not
interested in a "truth" lying outside of discursive formations, but with how regimes of
truth, forms of rationality and systems of knowledge themselves bring things into
being, make them visible, and constitute them as particular kinds of problems with
which people struggle. These factors, however, can be said to be true for the people
who engage with them.
This realisation is reflected in our concern to examine power in care from the
point of view of those who are its subjects, of asking in the research questions how
people experience power and actively relate to themselves, and how they might
experience problems connected to these factors. The critical orientation of the
research thus lies in looking for tensions within individuals' discourse and ways they
interact with the issues in question. We are not looking for grand solutions to
problems which are then supposed to taken up by people outside of academia, and we
can clearly not, given the points we have gone over, use an academic criterion of
validity or what is "really" happening in order to impose "solutions" upon the very
people who are engaging with particular situations.
The readings that are made in this project, then, are not taken
unproblematically as a final position for formulating programmes for resistance which
people are then to be expected to follow. As has been seen, Foucault's work teaches
us that the power represented by a libertarian academic formulating (albeit in good
faith) "what is to be done" is in itself 'dangerous' (Foucault, 1991a, 19970. So, rather
than trying to avoid one of the horns of the realism/value-relativism dilemma at the
risk of skewering ourselves on the other, we can more productively reconceptualise
this problem by undertaking a critically-oriented analysis whose concern becomes
what is true for the people in a specific situation, what the costs of this truth are
(Foucault, 1983, 1989j, 1997b), and the potential of the research to open up the space
in which people can work through their own problems around these issues (rather than
setting out a programme of action for them). Hence, the problems of a relativist
position which paralyses any form of action or critique do not apply here. This
approach is not the same as the avoidance of action which some writers see as an
endemic problem in social constructionist work (e.g. Burr, 1999), but it is still
cognisant of the problem Foucault pointed out with work which aims to impose
solutions to the problems of other people. Additionally, far from exorcising the
experiencing individual from consideration here (cf. Burr, 1999; Cromby &
Nightingale, 1999), the manner in which people experience relations of power and
forms of subjectivity which may be imposed upon them, and their activity in forming
relationships to themselves becomes of central importance. This, however, is not the
same as merely pointing out people's own experience to them, or of unproblematically
taking accounts "at face value" (Parker, 1999b) The approach taken here influences
what sorts of questions are asked, and it also brings to our attention particular aspects
of people's environment and their situation in power relationships and forms of
subjectification which would not be seen in other approaches. We are, then, moving
beyond individual accounts to show how they contain evidence of positions relating to
power, subjectivity and ethical self-relationships, and further highlighting the ways
that people interact with these issues and relate to their situation in ways of which they
may not be aware. This is unavoidably an interpretative process, one that recognises
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the importance of developing a theory that can productively comprehend accounts and
open up new areas to debate (Foucault, 1977e, 1989m) without imposing final
solutions on the people involved. As Parker (1992) comments, discourse analysis in
this respect should become a form of research in which new critical thought becomes
possible and new spaces are made available for 'manoeuvre and resistance.'
With these issues in mind, we must set out an analytic approach which takes
on board the ideas that we have been working with and addresses our research
questions. The first step here is to examine those approaches which have emerged in
psychology for analysing discourse.
3.3 Responses - Approaches to the Analysis of Discourse
A number of positions have emerged within psychology which, to varying
degrees, address the issues outlined above and focus their inquiries on language and
discourse. These diverse orientations are roughly unified by a 'common attention to
the significance and structuring effects of language... [and] are associated with
interpretative and reflexive styles of analysis' (Burman & Parker, 1993; p.3), although
the conceptions of such "structuring effects" and the styles of analysis vary
considerably across each approach. Five of the key approaches will be identified and
critically assessed before we go on to formulate an approach which will address the
key issues discussed in this and the previous chapter, and which will adequately
address the concerns of the research question. First, we will examine the key approach
which emerged from the "crisis" (Parker, 1989a) in social psychology in the 1970s.
The "crisis" in psychology and the ethogenic paradigm
Parker and Shotter (1990) write that in the mid-1970s, 'social psychology
appeared to be in the midst of a resolvable crisis' (p.1). One of the central issues
giving rise to this crisis was the conceptualisation of human subjects in psychology.
The key complaint was that experimental psychology had at its core 'the concept of
the passive person... [who is a] mere spectator of the reactions which he or she emits
when subject to the effect of some environmental contingency' (Harr& 1995; p.14.5).
This conceptualisation of the "passive person" led authors such as Harre and Secord
(1972) to argue that 'any spontaneity or generative power' of people is lost, and that a
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science based around such a conceptualisation displays 'the most naive form of
determinism' (p.31). The ethogenic "new paradigm" which emerged from this crisis
therefore aimed to treat human behaviour as meaningful and as involving active
agents (Van Langenhove, 1995), and to be 'both scientific and sensitive to the sense
that people construct in their everyday lives' (Banister et al., 1994; p.93). The routes
into, through, and out of this "crisis" have been well documented in Parker (1989a),
and so there is little point in a detailed discussion of them being provided here.
However, since some important points are raised by them, a brief overview will be
helpful before turning attention onto other approaches.
The ethogenic paradigm held that human actions are 'organised in the
expressive context of a culture' (Parker, 1989a; p.21), which gives them meaning and
structures how we think about them. People act, and understand the actions of others,
in terms of this expressive order, and hence the social worlds in which people act are
'held together by "rules" (ibid.; p.22). The ethogenic paradigm, therefore, aimed to
discover and elaborate the organisation of the social worlds in which people act and
which organise meaning for them. The theory was that, just as speakers of a language
know whether a sentence is grammatical or not, so social actors know which acts are
acceptable, and that, since this "social competence" will be reflected in the
descriptions which people give of their understandings of actions and situations, it
will be possible to 'identify the nature of specific actions by using the actor's
accounts' (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; p.57). The analysis of these accounts will then
'reveal features of people's social competence' (ibid.; p.57). The ethogenic project
thus aimed to arrive at a picture of the underlying structure of the social world that
people inhabit by piecing together the glimpses of it which are garnered through
individuals' accounts (Banister et al., 1994).
The ethogenic new paradigm, however, failed to address a number of key
issues (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Parker 1989a; Parker & Shotter, 1990), and it is
now 'all but burnt out' (Banister et al., 1994). It has been criticised for erroneously
seeing social worlds as closed systems and meaning as fixed and static and, perhaps
more importantly, for failing to see "ordinary language" itself as a structuring effect
with links to power relations (Parker, 1989a) and for its image of the human
individual. On this last point, Parker (1990) comments that:
unfortunately, it was not good enough calling for people to be treated as if they were
human beings... when the dominant image of the human being was the traditional
individual of liberal western political thought... [which sees people as] potentially
undivided beings.
(p.95)
This structuralist-influenced approach is subject to many of the same
criticisms which prompted a move beyond structuralism in the 1960s and 1970s. The
problems with such structuralist thinking are exposed by returning to our earlier
concern with concepts of the individual and the social, and by posing the questions
'who is the structure for?' (See, for instance, Easthope, 1988) and 'where is the
subject?' (See Young, 1981). The free-standing and complete social structure which is
posited 'must correspond to an equally self-sustaining subject' who is 'free-standing
and transcendental' in relation to it (Easthope, 1988; p.33). In ethogenics the subject
acts meaningfully according to a structured system of social rules, but this conception
of the subject is partial and problematic. The subject who "acts meaningfully" and
"follows rules" is somehow prior to, and outside of, the structure which is supposed to
direct his/her behaviour — the subject is a choosing subject, itself prior to construction
and selecting elements from a structure in its "social performance". This problematic
conception is allied to the problem already discussed of a pre-social subject supposed
to possess particular sorts of mental apparatus — in this case, the ability to select
discursive elements and to make correct choices. This concept accounts for the
problems identified by Parker (1989a, 1990), that ethogenics unproblematically
reproduces a culturally specific conception of the human subject at its core, and that it
cannot account for the problem of power in the constitution of subjects.
Harre, one of the key proponents of the ethogenic paradigm, has more recently
espoused a 'discursive psychology' (e.g. Harre, 1995; Harre & Stearns, 1995). It is to
this, termed here (for reasons that will become clear) "grammatical indexicality",
which we now turn.
Grammatical indexicality
Although the emphasis in Harre's later writings is on "discourse", they still
retain a strong degree of structuralist influence (although it is also possible to see an
influence from analytic philosophy, especially Wittgenstein, in his work). The
psychology which he proposes is 'the study of active people, singly or in groups,
using material and symbolic tools to accomplish all sorts of projects according to local
standards of correctness' (Harre, 1995; p.144).
Language use is central to the model of psychology proposed. It can, it is
argued, even serve 'as a model or analogue for the study of other non-linguistic
phenomena' (Harre & Steams, 1995; p.2). So, for example, in studying the emotions,
it is contended that 'emotion displays and feelings are functionally equivalent to those
linguistic performances we call "speech acts" (ibid.; p.2). Thus, non-linguistic
phenomena which psychology is interested in studying are believed to be subject to
the same semantic and syntactical rules found in (structural) linguistics and,
potentially, able to be studied by the means of substituting non-linguistic units for the
relevant linguistic ones (Harre, 1995). Language, in this view, also has the function of
commenting upon and understanding (making sense of) other things which have been
done, said or experienced. For example, 'we use the descriptive terms of an emotion
vocabulary of ordinary languages for the classification of locally recognized emotions'
(ibid.; p.151). Therefore, 'the taxonomy of emotions that is being employed in a
particular culture can be extracted from a study of the way the local vocabulary is
used' (ibid.; p.152). By studying this vocabulary, we can arrive at the set of rules
which express the local standards of correctness for understanding, feeling, displaying
and talking about emotions.
Malhaiisler and Harre (1990) similarly argue that concepts of self depend on
the local grammar of 'person-referential terms, particularly pronouns' and that `to use
pronouns correctly, one must deploy one's philosophical theories of what one is as
well as one's knowledge of the social relations in which one stands' (p.16). The sorts
of people we take ourselves to be, and the ways in which we attribute praise or blame
and so on will, therefore, 'depend on the grammar of our language' (ibid.; p.18).
Personal pronouns are thus held to be indexical signs tying people, through the
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grammar of particular pronoun systems, to the social force and responsibilities of
speaking as a person in a particular community (Han-e, 1995).
Once again, the problems with this view are clear from the perspective this
thesis takes. Despite the use of the term "discourse", the emphasis here remains on the
lexical, rule-governed level of language use. Hence we are back, effectively, with the
structuralist distinctions of langue and parole, competence and performance. Study of,
say, emotional performances (paroles) is believed to lead us to the underlying
governing system (langue). The langu.e is, again, a self-contained, complete structure
determining what can be said about emotions, how they can be displayed, and so on.
The relationship of the individual to this determining structure is as problematic as in
ethogenics. The constitution of the individual is again untheorised, as is his/her
(presumably innate) ability and desire to perform in a socially and linguistically
correct manner. As Foucault, Rose, Parker and others have shown, the constitution of
the subject, and of psychological phenomena, social practices, means of self-
understanding, and so on, takes place (and is contested) at the discursive level in a
multiple and contradictory social domain, in diverse systems of knowledge linked to
power, rather than simply at the structural or lexical level in a monolithic system of
rules. Harre's approach leaves no room for theorising the constitution of subjectivities
in complex and diverse systems of knowledge linked to power — a constitution which
cannot explained merely by appeals to the indexicalities of a grammatical system.
Interpretative repertoires
Discourse analysis as outlined by Potter, Wetherell and Edwards (e.g. Potter &
Wetherell, 1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; Edwards, 1997) takes a
different view of the definition and functions of discourse. Its concerns are
summarised in two key questions: 'how are descriptions produced so that they will be
treated as factual?' and 'how are these factual descriptions put together in ways that
allow them to perform particular actions?' (Potter, 1996; p.1). In understanding why
these are important questions, we must examine the properties which discourse is held
to have in this perspective.
This approach sees discourse in terms of its 'action orientation' or the
'interactional work' that it does (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Descriptions that people
give of events are:
examined in the context of their of their occurrence as situated and occasioned
constructions whose precise nature makes sense, to participants and analysts alike, in
terms of the social actions those descriptions accomplish.
(ibid.; p.2-3)
Discourse is seen as a tool for achieving certain social goals in specific social
situations. Potter and Wetherell (1987) distance their approach from concerns with
discovering social or linguistic rules which operate in specific situations, in favour of
seeing things such as the concept of rules or the understandings that people have of
social situations as resources which they use creatively in accomplishing social goals.
They contend that people 'use their language to do things' (ibid.; p.32; original
emphasis), to achieve social goals, which the analyst can read from the context of
their talk. People use language `to construct versions of the social world' (ibid.; p.33;
original emphasis) and these versions vary according to the goal being pursued. For
instance, the use of "factual" accounts is seen not as the reflection of people orienting
to unproblematic facts, but as a discursive strategy designed to achieve social goals
through the appearance of talk having 'facticity' (Potter, 1996).
The accounts that people build in pursuing social goals are constructed out of
'pre-existing linguistic resources' (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; p.33) from which
elements are actively selected. These accounts also construct reality in that social
interaction is based around people and events which are experienced 'in terms of [the]
specific linguistic versions' (ibid.; p.34) built from these resources. These "resources"
are given the name 'interpretative repertoires' (ibid.) and taken to be:
broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled
around metaphors or vivid images... the building-blocks used for manufacturing versions
of actions, self and social structures in talk. They are available resources for making
evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions.
(Potter & Wetherell, 1995; p.89)
These repertoires are available for anyone in a society to draw upon, and it is argued
that people use different repertoires at different times to suit the needs at hand, the
goals pursued, and the particular situational context encountered.
The analyses which this discursive psychology makes centre around issues of
the construction of facts and versions of reality in people's everyday talk. The concern
is not with "what actually happened" as compared to what is said, but with how
accounts are constructed to achieve credibility, to bring about the impression of
"telling it like it is" (Edwards & Potter, 1992), and how this is linked to the pursuit of
social goals such as managing accountability, attributing blame, making or rebutting
accusations, making excuses, achieving the appearance of neutrality, and so on. For
example, Edwards and Potter (1992) analyse memory not in terms of its accuracy in
recalling "facts", but in terms of its relation to 'communicative actions and interests'
(p.16) such that remembering is seen as discursive activity in which, out of the
available linguistic resources:
versions of mind, of thought and error, inference and reason, are constructed and implied
in order to bolster or undermine versions of events, to accuse or criticize, blame or excuse,
and so on.
(p. 1 6)
Although this approach takes account of the construction of aspects of the
social world with which people interact in complex systems of discourse, there are
still problems that must be addressed. There are two key troublesome areas. First,
again, is the problem of the conception and place of the individual subject, and second
is the problem of accounting for the 'systematic and coercive nature of discourse'
(Parker, 1989a; p.148). These problems inter-link in a fundamental way that hinders
this form of discursive psychology in making penetrative or critical analyses. The
individual is, again, conceptually separate from, and prior to, the effects that language
is supposed to have. At the heart of the theory is an individual with desires and goals
who uses discourse to accomplish these goals, who chooses elements from
"interpretative repertoires" and rhetorically constructs utterances. What is missing is
any theorisation about how individual subjectivities, or goals and desires, are
themselves constituted in particular systems of knowledge. Foucault showed that it is
erroneous to assume that the subject is conceptually separable from the processes of
its constitution, and that desire and modes of self-understanding are not ontologically
essential objects, but are themselves produced in systems of knowledge linked to
power. This is not to say that people are determined or moulded by power and
subjectifying technologies, but that we must recognise that the positions they speak
and act from are inextricably tied up with these forces. This relates to the second
problem: that this form of discourse analysis does not locate its analyses in a system
of wider discursive and social practices, and is therefore unable to make critical
analyses of effects of power (Parker, 1989a, 1997, 1999b). The analysis centres
around how discursive work and truth construction are done in particular instances of
talk and writing without linking them to any wider system than that of "interpretative
repertoires" or rhetorical means of talking that are available for use by anyone. These
universally available repertoires cannot account for the effects of truth of particular
discursive systems, nor for the fact that truth itself has particular effects in terms of
subjectification, self-understanding, power-relations and so on.
Foucault's writings illustrate this well. It is instructive, for instance, to imagine
what his analysis of the emergence of disciplinary power would look like if it was
restricted to analysing how the texts he examined drew on particular interpretative
repertoires to construct "facticity". Foucault's contribution showed that the production
of forms of truth and the emergence of systems of knowledge are dynamically linked
to power relationships, the constitution of subjectivities, and modes of self-
understanding. Subjectivities are not merely worked up moment-by-moment in a
particular interaction, but are constituted, ascribed, and contested in relation to
systems of knowledge that bring them into being. "Delinquency", for instance, is not
merely one available interpretative repertoire; it is a production of knowledge which
constitutes the very way in which we think of subjectivity in relation to deviancy and
punishment. Similarly, "learning difficulty" cannot be understood merely as an
interpretative repertoire or a piece of rhetoric; it is a production of a particular field of
knowledge with links to specific institutions, practices, and interventions into people's
lives, and also to particular forms of subjectivity, to those very subject positions from
which people speak and act. The self does not exist, ontologically pure, prior to these
constitutions such that it can select from repertoires in the rational pursuit of a
particular social goal, but emerges as an object for consideration precisely in such
constitutions.
The bringing into being of subjectivities is linked to power not only in the
ways it makes available to others for acting upon the individual's conduct or the social
and institutional practices that they bring forth, but also as a force of truth within the
subject. Foucault's key question here was 'how much does it cost the subject to be
able to tell the truth about itself?' (1989j; p.355). To take examples from Foucault's
analyses, for instance, how much does it cost the subject as delinquent or
mad(wo)man or pervert to be able to tell the truth about itself, to relate to the truth of
their "condition" that they are obliged to recognise in themselves, and how do people
struggle with this cost? Effects of truth and subjectification, cannot be understood
merely in terms of interpretative repertoires, discursive work or social goals. They are
part of a wider system of discursive and social practices which cannot be
encompassed by theorising them as worked up moment-by-moment in particular
instances of talk or writing. Even if a person can draw on competing discourses to
resist the operation of particular forms of power, there is no outside of such
constitutive systems in which ontologically pure, choosing subjects exist. The "goals"
to which people orient in their discursive activity similarly cannot be conceived
outside systems of power/knowledge which constitute specific forms of action as
appropriate or desirable in particular situations. Discursive psychology's inability to
engage with these realisations is, therefore, from the position taken here, a fatal
weakness.
The self that "does" discursive "work" in this theory is, in fact, brought into
existence as a self of a particular sort in those very systems which it is supposed to be
"using" in doing that work, as are the "goals" or "desires" to which such discursive
"work" is oriented. It is not to be doubted that discourse is used to accomplish certain
things. There are clearly, for instance, frequent points of contention which are argued
over and resolved in talk, over such issues as what happened at a particular time, who
should be "blamed", whether a particular excuse is considered valid, and so on.
However, such thinking cannot be maintained outside of a theory which considers the
connection of such discourses both to subjectivities and forms of self-understanding,
and to wider systems of knowledge and power which constitute those very ideas of
self, blame, excusing, goals, desires, actions, and so on.
There are two other approaches to analysing discourse to consider which, in
different ways, resonate with the position we are taking and the questions we are
posing: interpretative phenomenological analysis, and post-structuralist discourse
analysis.
Interpretative phenomenological analysis
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (EPA) is an approach to discourse
analysis which has at its core the belief that people have a natural propensity for self-
reflection, and the consonant aim of tapping into this propensity by encouraging
research participants to 'tell their own story, in their own words, about the topic under
investigation' (Smith, Flowers & Osborn, 1997; p.68). It calls itself
"phenomenological" because it is not concerned with producing objective statements
about objects or events, but with interpreting the individual's 'personal perception or
account of an object or event' (Smith, Jarman & Osborn, 1999; p.218), in order to be
able to adopt, as far as possible, an "insider's perspective" (Conrad, 1987; cited in
Smith et al., 1997). It is recognised, however that the researcher cannot
unproblematically directly or completely access an individual's "inner reality". Such
access 'depends on, and is complicated by, the researcher's own conceptions' (Smith
et al., 1999; p.219), in fact it is held that these conceptions are actually required in
order to make sense of an individual's personal world 'through a process of
interpretative activity' (ibid.; p.219).
Smith and his co-authors (Smith et al., 1997, 1999) highlight the importance of
distinguishing their approach from discourse analysis as described above. Both
discourse analysis and IPA recognise the importance of qualitative analysis and
language. However, discourse analysis (or at least the version espoused by Potter,
Wetherell, Edwards, and so on) is 'sceptical of the possibility of mapping verbal
reports on to underlying cognitions' (ibid.; p.70) and concentrates on treating
discursive accounts as behaviours in their own right and analysing the work performed
in talk. IPA, by contrast, 'is concerned with cognitions, that is, with understanding
what the particular respondent thinks or believes about the topic under discussion'
(ibid.; p.70). Whilst recognising that the thinking of research participants cannot be
transparently read from interview transcripts, IPA aims to engage in an analytic
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process of building up a picture of what that thinking is like. IPA, then, is based on the
premise that people think about things, such as their bodies or social situation, and
their relationship to them, and that what they say about them 'in some way relates to
those thoughts' (Smith et al., 1997; p.71). Analysis entails identifying themes in
transcripts that capture the 'essential quality' (Smith et al., 1999) of people's accounts,
and writing them into a narrative account structured around interesting or essential
things interpreted from the accounts which the readership needs to know.
This is a useful approach for this research in that, in contrast to those seen
earlier, it puts a concern for understanding the experience of research participants on
the agenda of discursive research. A central concern of this thesis is with how people
themselves experience and understand their situation, how their accounts of their
experience evidence relations of power and forms of subjectivity, and how they
actively draw upon ethical concepts in relating to themselves and their conduct.
Processes in which the individual comes actively to understand him/herself, to act on
his/her own conduct, and to resist particular forms of power — process which include
an experiential component, an experience of oneself as a self of a particular sort — are
central to Foucault's later works which have played a central role in shaping this
research. Additionally, the perspective of the individual is important because it allows
us to begin to formulate a picture of what problems they are facing in their
interactions with power, and what costs are attached to their being tied to a particular
identity and subjectivity. When analysing how power affects people in a specific
situation, without some notion of how individuals themselves experience and interact
with their situation, we risk falling back into an analysis of power which is detached
from their concerns, which tends towards a deterministic reading of power, and makes
judgements about people's situation for and above them (see McNay, 1994).
However, a major weakness of IPA for this research is that it overlooks the
existence of discourses at any level beyond individuals' articulation of them, and thus
cannot take account of the constitution of power in the discourses it examines, nor the
existence of forms of subjectivity that are implied by them. A crucial point made by
Foucault, Rose, Parker, Henriques and his co-authors, and so on, is that the individual
does not stand in a dialectical opposition to forces which act merely to constrain its
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primal agency; s/he is constituted in those very processes. As Simons (1995) points
out, we are indebted to some form of constitution to have an identity, to act as a
particular type of being. Desires, goals, identities, power, means of assigning moral
value and meaning to behaviour, basically all of those things that we are interested in,
are constituted in a complex system of discursive and social practices and systems of
knowledge which exist at a wider level than the individual him/herself.
So, the ways that people experience a situation are tied up with the position
from which they understand themselves, other people with whom they interact, and
their own conduct in terms of what is appropriate, what meaning and value certain
forms of conduct have for them, and so on. Whilst we are interested in analysing
individuals' accounts of their situation and their experiences, it is crucial to connect
this to questions of power, subjectivity and ethics. That is, to question how people's
accounts reflect not only their experiences, but issues of power, subjectivity and
ethical technologies which inevitably underlie them and against which they take place.
We are not seeking to banish any notion of the experiencing individual from our
analyses, but to approach this in a way that no longer blurs the issue of the subject's
existence in relation to wider discursive and social practices. This is, as we have said,
not to be taken as a deterministic stance in which people are mere puppets of wider
discursive forces, but more of considering the constitution of the field against which
their experience takes place (see Foucault, 1972).
These points bring us onto the last approach to analysing discourse, drawing
on post-structuralist (particularly Foucauldian) thinking.
Post-structuralist approaches
The need for an approach in psychology that analyses discourse in relation to
the formation of systems of knowledge, and the effects of knowledge in terms of
bringing into being power relationships, selves and modes of self-understanding has
been argued for throughout this chapter. Writers such as Henriques and his co-authors
(Henriques et al., 1984, 1998) and Rose (e.g. 1990, 1996) have, as has been discussed,
analysed how psychology as a system of knowledge is linked to projects of social
management and techniques of self-formation. Others, notably Parker (e.g. 1992,
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1996, 1999a), have considered how discourse analysis might be carried out so that it
can take account of the relationship of discourse to subject positions and power.
In line with many of the criticisms made of other approaches, Parker argues
that care must be taken not to fall into the trap of assuming an undivided "self'
existing "underneath" discourse, and that analysis must connect to wider issues of
social relations and recognise that discourse locates people in subject positions,
positioning them in relations of power that often pull in different directions (Parker,
1997, 1999a; Burman & Parker, 1993). Whilst arguing that there can be no set method
to follow in carrying out discourse analysis, Parker (1992) provides a number of
useful criteria for identifying and analysing discourse. He draws on Henriques et al.'s
(1984) Foucauldian-derived definition of discourse as a regulated system which
delimits 'the sayable', without implying a closure. In other words, 'discourses delimit
what can be said, whilst providing the spaces — the concepts, metaphors, analogies —
for making new statements' (Henriques et al., 1984; p.106). Every discourse, in this
view, is 'inscribed in relation to other practices of production of discourse,' every
discourse is locked in 'an intricate web' of discursive and material practices
(Henriques et al., 1984; p.106).
Amongst the realisations made is the fact that discourses contain subjects, that
they make available space for particular types of self, and address people in specific
ways. Also important is the recognition that discourses support particular institutions,
that they reproduce power relations, and that they have 'ideological effects' in
producing certain relationships and effects which marginalise or oppress particular
groups (Parker, 1992). Discourse analysis is carried out with these points in mind, and
involves attempting to discover the objects contained within texts (and how they are
constructed), what subjects (with particular rights and responsibilities) they contain
and address, and the versions of the social world and social relationships thus
presented. Through this process, it is possible to identify the discourses which are
structuring the text (Banister et al., 1994; Parker, 1996).
An illustrative example appears in Banister et al. (1994) and Parker (1996).
Here, the text to be analysed appears on a tube of children's toothpaste. By examining
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the objects in the text, the subjects that relate to them, and the implied rights and
responsibilities of these subjects, the analysis arrives at a picture of the versions of the
social world existing in the text that comprise specific networks of relationships, and
forms of rationality for people acting in particular ways, and for particular actions
which need to be performed upon them or which they are obliged to perform upon
themselves. In the example given, this relates to the subject position of "parent" who
is addressed in the text on the toothpaste tube, 'through the index "your child"
(Banister et al., 1994), and inscribed with certain responsibilities towards their child
vis-A-vis dental care, supervision and teaching. Relating to the position of "parent" is
that of "professional", a category of person setting out proper practice and regulating
treatment and intake of the toothpaste, and whose advice parents are led to follow.
The parent is thus addressed 'in alliance with the "professional'. Hence particular
versions of the social world, social relationships, and rationalities of action are built
up:
The instructions require the reader to behave in a rational way. They are worded in such a
way as to presume that the reader is in permanent charge of a child... They call for
agreement with the idea that the child develops in a particular way up to a particular
point.., and they also assume that the reader is willing to consult professionals about the
health of the child
(ibid.; p.99)
A number of relationships are brought into being here that map onto discourses
identified in the analysis: 'rationalist' (in which authority is recognised and its advice
acted upon), 'familial' (in which "ownership" of a child runs alongside concerns with
supervision and care), `developmental-educational' (in which the child progresses
through stages, each requiring different forms of parental action, up to a certain age),
and 'medical' (in which concerns with hygiene are linked to the other concerns).
These sorts of analysis can then be extended to consider how the discourses identified
operate 'to naturalize the things they refer to' (ibid.; p.102-3), how they are connected
to institutions, and how they are related to other discourses linked to power.
This style of analysis shares many concerns with the position taken in this
thesis. However, there are important issues to be addressed in relation to it. The
fundamental issue to be dealt with here is indicated by the type of text (the children's
toothpaste instructions) which has served as an illustration. This is the type of text that
Foucault (1987b) calls 'prescriptive texts,' those that aim to suggest rules of conduct,
that offer rules, opinions and advice on how to behave "as one should", and that allow
individuals to question their own conduct, to observe and shape it in line with
particular ideals. The analysis outlined is particularly effective in analysing such texts,
and in identifying the subjects addressed, the versions of the social world brought into
being, and the forms of rational action made available in them.
However, this thesis is concerned not with prescriptive texts, but with people's
accounts of their experience. As Burman and Parker (1993) point out, different types
of text work in different ways — they emerge and are read according to their form and
context. It would be misguided to believe that one approach to discourse analysis
could be applied to all types of text. Also, we must recognise the importance of
understanding how people themselves experience and struggle with the issues and
formulating a picture of the problems facing them. Although there is a large degree of
overlap between the approach seen here and our own concerns, we must tailor an
approach which can address the issues we are concerned with in the specific type of
text (individuals' accounts) we are examining. This research is not methodologically
oriented, it is problem-oriented, and the analytic approach must be tailored to suit the
problem rather than vice-versa.
3.4 Analytic approach — and some problems with discourse analysis
As has been noted, this research cannot use a "Foucauldian" methodology. We
are not approaching the same sorts of texts, nor asking the same sorts of questions of
them. We are not dealing with prescriptive texts to be analysed in terms of the
rationalities, relationships and versions of the social world implied or brought forth. In
effect, an approach is needed that moves beyond Foucault's work, which concentrated
largely on power in terms of its role in the emergence of institutions of control such as
prisons, asylums and hospitals (see Delanty, 1997), and that can study the discourse of
individuals in relation to power and subjectivity.
The texts that we are concerned with emerge from a specific context of
people's understandings, experiences, self-relationships, actions, resistances, and so
on. These texts are co-produced by researcher and participants in the process of
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exploring with people their thoughts and experiences. All of the aspects of discourse
we are concerned with — the links of knowledge to power, subjectification and
subjectivity, resistances, and techniques of the self — emerge in participants' accounts
from this context, through a process of interaction with which they are actively
engaged. Discursive complexes and systems of power/knowledge do not determine
people's reactions to particular situations. Discursive productions set out a field of
possibility in which people think and act, in which objects for thought emerge, but
they do not impose a strict set of limitations which bind understanding and action
within a set of narrowly definable parameters. In analysing the accounts people give of
their situation, therefore, we are dealing not only with systems of knowledge and
discursive productions that set out a field of objects, subjects, problems, actions and
so on, but also the way that people experience and interact with these productions. An
interpretative framework is called for, then, which can take account not only of
discursive complexes and systems of power/knowledge but also of the interaction that
people experience with such complexes — the way that they relate to subject positions
and relations of power, the ethical work they perform on their own conduct, their
concept of their own subjectivity, the manner in which they present themselves as
certain types of being, and so on.
The approach to analysing individuals' accounts in this research, then, is in
some ways similar to EPA in its aims to explore with people their thoughts and
experiences of their lives in care accommodation. It is similar also, however, to the
post-structuralist approaches examined (Banister et al., 1994; Parker, 1996), in its
attempts to discover, in people's accounts, the versions of the social world which are
referenced, in terms of the forms of knowledge that take a hold of people, and the
ways that they are positioned by operations of power and subjectification. It is also
important to consider how people interact with these forces, how they align or struggle
with them, how they draw upon ethical technologies in assigning meaning and value
to their lives and their conduct, and how they might experience problems attached to
these issues.
In orienting to this approach, we must consider how it fits in with our research
questions. Again, these seek to uncover the forms of power that participants
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experience as acting upon them, the ways that they relate to themselves as subjects in
relation to it, and how they experience problems connected to these issues. As has
been noted, these questions tie in with Foucault's three domains of critical ontology —
truth, power and ethics — in terms of what is meant by "power" and "subjects" and
what issues concerning people's interactions with these factors are to be explored. We
have noted especially the importance of the ethical domain in its attention to people's
role in governing their own conduct, and to technologies that allow them actively to
relate to themselves, and to understand their conduct in terms of its meaning and its
value. It is through an engagement with how people themselves experience and relate
to their situations that this emerges, and this is something which has not hitherto been
attended to in psychology.
In addressing the research questions, then, we need to connect individuals'
reports of their experiences of care to an analysis based around Foucault's domains of
ontology. As we saw in the previous chapter, these domains influence us to attend to
how people's accounts of their lives embody certain subject positions; relationships
with others which constitute power; forms of observation, judgements, decisions and
interventions into their lives made available with respect to them; and the positions
people actively take up in relation to these issues, their recognition of themselves as
certain types of subjects.
This leads us to ask a number of questions of the texts produced in the
interviews. Firstly, in relation to the domain of truth, we need to draw out how aspects
of people's character or abilities in the accounts exist as objects of knowledge, and to
examine the consequences of their being rendered knowable according to specific
discourses. How do certain characteristics of people exist as things about which
judgements can be made? Secondly, in relation to power, we must examine how,
connected to this, people are situated in power relationships. This will involve
identifying their relationships with other people, and how certain ways of acting and
being acted upon become appropriate, and examining the possible judgements,
decisions, and interventions which exist around them. Thirdly, in relation to ethics, we
seek to identify the discourses and concepts that people draw upon in relating to
themselves and their environment. Also, alongside this aspect of the analysis, we will
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aim to take all of these issues together to build an overall picture of how people orient
towards forms of power and subjectivity and their relationships to themselves and
others, and how they might struggle with them. These do not represent separate, or
potentially separable, analyses, but are, rather, aspects of this one form of analysis,
each of which impacts on the others.
As has been said, these are issues which affect everyone. There is no "non-
position" or place of ultimate freedom in which essential agency can have free reign.
We are all indebted to forms of constitution in systems of power, subjectivity and
ethics for the possibility of acting as a particular type of person, of having a position
from which actions and relationships become meaningful. Our task, though, is to
identify the workings of these forces and people's interactions with them in a specific
situation — that of people living in community care accommodation. Through this, we
can build an account that will address our research questions. The aspects of the
analysis based around the domains of truth and power address the first of our research
questions: what forms of power do individuals living in community care
accommodation for adults with learning difficulties experience as acting upon them?
The aspect of analysis based around the domain of ethics is pertinent to the next
research question: how do they relate to themselves as subjects in relation to this
power? A consideration of these issues together will also allow us to answer the final
research question: how do these issues constitute problems for people in their lives?
This reading cannot be made from anything that people say. In order to have
suitable texts for analysis, as we have said, we must explore the relevant issues in
depth with the people in question, discuss their thoughts and experiences about their
lives in care, and their relationships to the care environment. This will be undertaken
through semi-structured interviews. More will be said on the subject of interviewing
in Chapter Six. Discourse analysis is a notoriously difficult approach to describe
methodically (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Parker, 1992; etc.) — Banister et al. (1994),
for instance, comment that an initial stage of analysis is to 'free associate to the text.'
It is not an approach that lends itself easily to step-by-step descriptions. The
significance of the approach may not be totally clear until it is seen "in action" in the
analyses themselves. Despite this, also in Chapter Six, the attempt will be made to
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provide a description of the process of applying the above analysis so that the
approach taken here will be potentially replicable. Our next task, however, is to move
on to examine some problems which have been noted with discourse analysis, and to
situate this project in relation to them.
Burman and Parker (1993), for instance, outline thirty-two problems with
discourse analysis. However, there is not the space to discuss each one of these here.
We will, then, focus here on a few of these problems which have the greatest
relevance for the points we are seeking to make in our research, and consider how
they affect the approach we have taken. Especially relevant to this research are those
problems that revolve around the question of the analysis of power. It is said that
discourse analysis often neglects social relationships, that it focuses on identifying
rhetorical linguistic devices without moving on to a consideration of how social
relationships are produced and transformed in language. Related to this is the
complaint that discourse analysis often tends towards abstraction to such a degree that
the analysis has little significance for the lives of the participants. The analysis
undertaken here, however, is interested explicitly in the forms of social relationships
revealed in the discourse of its participants, and in how people themselves interact
with, resist and utilise particular discursive positions in relation to these relationships
in their own lives.
Also, it is argued that discourse analysis has reductionist tendencies in that it
tends to reduce its analyses either to 'voluntarism,' in which there is an over-emphasis
on the agency of people freely manipulating discourses, or, on the other hand, to a
'mechanistic' explanation that sees discourses as 'tectonic plates' whose clashes leave
no room for agency (Burman & Parker, 1993). Even where discourse analysis takes on
board some of Foucault's thinking about power, it tends to become trapped in a
conception of it as 'an intangible and inescapable condition of subjectivity' (ibid.; p.
168), a viewpoint which tends to usher in a kind of fatalism in which there seems to
be no point in challenging the order of things. These problems mirror the problems
that we saw in the previous chapter that some critics have highlighted with Foucault's
work. We have made the point, though, that power and subjectification do not
determine people's interactions or conduct, but, rather, constitute forces with which
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they interact in particular ways. This, though, is not the same as saying that they do
not have any effects. Coupled with this is the realisation that power is not necessarily
bad in and of itself, but that it is always 'dangerous' (Foucault, 1997f), that it can lead
to situations in which social relationships and institutional interventions leave little
room for manoeuvre and resistance, and that people can thus experience them as
problematic. Just because power is everywhere does not mean that it is not possible to
resist particular operations and effects of power that direct one's conduct in specific
ways (Foucault, 1981a). This, then, should not lead to apathy or fatalism, but to the
realisation that, in the face of this "danger", there is always something to be done,
always challenges to be made and positions to be opened up to critique (Foucault,
1997f). This research is oriented to just such a set of goals — to opening up our area of
concern to new types of thought.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen a number of developments in psychology which
challenge its status as a natural-science-modelled discipline, and focus attention, in
one way or another, on its discursively-constituted nature. This research fits in
particularly with the concerns that Parker (1999c) sets out for a 'critical psychology.'
We saw also that there are a number of orientations to psychology which draw upon
the work of Foucault. One of the purposes of this chapter has been to carry this
application of Foucault forward, and to apply it to the study of individuals' accounts
of their lives.
Despite the emergence of a variety of discourse analytic approaches in
psychology, some of which overlap with our concerns, none exists which can
adequately address our research questions. The approach of this research draws upon
IPA in its focus on exploring with people their thoughts and experiences about their
situation, and also upon forms of post-structuralist analysis demonstrated in Banister
et al. (1994) and Parker (1996) in its moving beyond individuals' accounts to examine
the versions of the social world which are referenced in them, and to analyse this in
line with Foucault's three domains of critical ontology — truth, power and ethics. The
domain of ethics, which is frequently overlooked in applications of Foucault to the
social sciences, is of central importance to a study such as this one. This domain
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connects the concern for highlighting the existence of mechanisms of power and
forms of subjectification to that of the individual's understanding, interaction, and
relationship to them, and it is from such a concern that we can begin to formulate a
picture of the problems which are facing people.
One important area remains to be considered before moving on to discuss our
methods of data collection and analysis, and to conduct our analyses themselves. This
project aims to understand power and people's interactions with it in community care
accommodation for people with learning difficulties. We must turn our attention next,
then, to the area of learning difficulties itself, and consider what it is taken to mean,
what forms of social policy and institutions surround it, and the literature and research
related to it. We must begin to situate our research in relation to this field. The
following two chapters will undertake this task.
Chapter 4: Learning Difficulties: Perspectives, Issues and Services
The previous chapters detailed the importance of Foucault's work, and showed
how it affects our understanding of power and subjectivity, and of contemporary
issues in psychology in general and discourse analysis in particular. The next step,
then, is to clarify the area in which the research question is specifically situated — the
situation of people with learning difficulties living in community care residential
accommodation. We must consider what is meant by "learning difficulties", the
policies, interventions and institutions which have emerged around it, how these
issues have been addressed in the literature, and how the points we have made affect
our understanding of, and approach to, these questions. This undertaking will be the
task of this and the following chapter, beginning here by looking at the ways in which
"learning difficulty" is conceptualised and the institutions and policies which exist
around it.
It is a far from simple task to define once and for all what learning difficulties
means, what it refers to, and how it is conceived; it is a confused and contested
concept. Although a brief definition was given in Chapter One, it was mentioned
there, and emphasised more strongly in Chapter Two, that this was problematic, and
that there are a number of issues to be explored which lead us to question
fundamentally the basis upon which it exists. This will become clearer in this chapter
and the one that follows it.
It has been said that there has, over the last four decades, 'been a sea change in
how we talk about people with mental retardation [or learning difficulties] and a true
paradigm shill in how we think about them' (Edgerton, 1994; p.i). Since the notion of
forms of mental deficiency of some sort appeared as a "problem" to be socially
engineered, there have been huge changes in how it has been termed, conceived,
applied and measured. Debates have raged about what should be done with people
who fall the "wrong" side of the "normal-subnormal" divide in intelligence. These
debates have covered such issues as whether people deemed to have learning
difficulties should be segregated, sterilised, normalised or integrated into the
mainstream, whether or not they are qualitatively different from the rest of humanity,
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how much care they need, how much input it is appropriate for them to have into the
care that they receive and the services they use, to what end care services should be
geared (see, for example, Clarke & Clarke, 1991), and so on. Different disciplines and
areas of jurisdiction have often held different, and sometimes competing, ideas about
how learning difficulty is to be defined and managed (see, for example, Wallace &
McLoughlin, 1979), based upon different ways in which it is talked about and
understood. Where, not so long ago, segregation was the norm for people labelled
"mentally handicapped" (Campaign for the Mentally Handicapped, 1974a), the last
two decades have seen a large-scale move to forms of service and care which (ideally
at least) avoid, as far as possible, forms of segregation (see, for example, Paterson,
1986).
As, for instance, Gillman, Heyman and Swain (2000) point out, work such as
Foucault's influences us to ask serious questions about the "facts" surrounding
learning difficulties and to focus attention upon how it is constructed as a particular
phenomenon. As we touched on in the previous chapters, it is no longer appropriate
for us to conceive of learning difficulties merely as something which has been
"discovered" by psychological and medical sciences; rather, it is important to realise
that it is constructed as a specific object in the discourses of these sciences. Allied to
this realisation is another one: that the way in which this object is constructed, the way
in which "learning difficulties" emerges in particular fields of knowledge as a
particular "problem", is intrinsically linked to the ways in which it affects people, the
interventions and power issues that come into being around it, the ways in which
people's become "knowable" and objectified according to new standards of
"normality" surrounding abilities and behaviour, and so on. It should be borne in
mind, then, that we are not dealing with mere "facts", but with formations of
knowledge which are linked to different ways of objectifying people, rendering them
knowable according to certain criteria, problematising their existence in particular
ways, and making them amenable to particular interventions into their lives connected
to this problematisation. This is not to be interpreted as saying that there is "nothing"
behind the concept of learning difficulties, but that the ways that it emerges as an
object of thought are linked to the ways that people are taken hold of by particular
operations of power and subjectifying technologies.
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The aim of this chapter is not to provide a complete history of this area, nor to
subject it to a "Foucauldian" analysis as such, but to highlight the main issues
pertinent to the social and academic background into which this research fits.
Although it should be borne in mind that there are a number of potential problems
with the ways in which "learning difficulty" is created an object of thought and the
way it is linked through this to certain institutional and social practices, critical
comment is largely withheld until the next chapter. This chapter, then, is divided into
three parts, each with a distinct purpose. The first part deals with the terms and
definitions that have held sway, at different times and in different disciplines, for what
will be called here "learning difficulties". The second part examines conceptual
developments which have affected how learning difficulty is thought about, and what
is therefore taken to be an appropriate manner of managing it. The third part outlines
how these issues have fed into changes in social policy and care provision. The
chapter that follows will then proceed critically to review both these developments
and the relevant research that has been undertaken in relation to them. The first task,
then, is to clarify what is meant by "learning difficulty" and how it is identified.
4.1 Changing Definitions
The attempt to trace the major developments in the field of learning difficulty
is somewhat confused by the fact that different names have been used to refer to it at
different times, in different places and by different groups. Clearly, the aim of these
terms is to indicate some perceived deficit in intellectual ability and performance — a
deficit considered (by whatever criteria) to be severe enough to warrant special
consideration and intervention by the educational, health and social services. It should
be re-emphasised here, before we go onto to examine issues of terminology, that the
terms in question should not be seen as unproblematically referring to an essential
phenomenon which pre-exists the ways of talking about it which we are examining,
but that they are instrumental in constructing a specific "problem" in particular ways —
issues which will have an impact on how people deemed to have learning difficulties
will become subject to particular interventions into their lives. These issues have been
dealt with in different ways in different parts of the world. In this chapter, we will be
concentrating on these issues from the perspective of the U.K.
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Terms used to refer to learning difficulty
The terms used in this field are remarkably unstable, with names supplanting
one another very quickly (Levine & Langness, 1986; Ryan, 1987). Sinason remarks
that 'no human group has been forced to change its name so frequently' (1992; p.39)
as people with learning difficulties, and she traces the use of more than forty terms for
forms of mental deficiency from the fifteenth century to the modem day. She is also
somewhat sceptical of the drive to find non-stigmatising terms, arguing that it is
'doing a grave disservice to past pioneers to point contemptuously to their chosen
terms' and that 'within another five years the process of euphemism will already be
affecting their chosen terms.' (ibid.; p.40). However, others have argued that terms
linked to the idea of some form of mental deficiency are 'particularly prone to carry a
strong evaluative component' (Shanley, 1986; p.1) and that many previously used
terms are now associated with such negative connotations that they are no longer
considered suitable for use by professionals. Numerous writers have shown that labels
have a dramatic effect both in terms of being damaging to the people who are
designated by them (Amans & Darbyshire, 1989; Taylor and Bogdan, 1989; Eayrs,
Ellis & Jones, 1993; Harris, 1995; Brechin, 1999), and in terms of how they influence
the ways in which labelled individuals are thought about and managed, and what
aspects of them are attended to (Wolfensberger & Thomas, 1983; Bogdan & Taylor,
1989).
Anyone surveying the literature relevant to learning difficulties will be struck
by the plethora of terms in the field — "mental subnormality", "mental handicap",
"educationally sub-normal", "special needs", "learning disabilities", and so on. This is
indicative of a heterogeneity of forces which have been acting upon learning difficulty
as a concept. It is difficult to distil a clear linear progression from one term or
definition to another. What was developing with respect to learning difficulty in one
field (say, medicine) may not have been directly related to what was happening in
another (say, education), and it is unclear what effects developments in one field may
have had upon others. Each of these bodies of knowledge has, then, over time,
brought a specific phenomenon into being in different ways. However, it is beyond the
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scope of this project to trace thoroughly the development of these conceptual objects
or to undertake an archaeology of their emergence; what is important is to provide
some background for understanding the current situation and to situate this research
within it.
For a large part of this century, the statutory term in the U.K. for describing
what is now generally called "learning difficulties" was "mental deficiency" or
"subnormality" (see Mental Deficiency Act 1913). In 1971, the term "mental
handicap" (not to be confused with mental illness) began to be used in government
social services reports (e.g. DHSS, 1971), although "subnormality" remained the legal
term (Malin, Race & Jones, 1980). Although the terms it replaced did not fade from
use altogether, "mental handicap" was, for some time, considered the most suitable
term by many (see e.g. CMH, 1974b; Croft, Bicknell & Hollins, 1985; Ryan, 1987;
Sinason, 1992).
Some important changes began to take place, also, with a growing tendency to
move away from defined categories of handicap, and focus upon an assessment of
"needs". In education, for example, concepts shifted to focus on 'special educational
needs' (Department of Education and Science, 1978) and on the provisions that were
needed. Similarly, in employment practice, 'special training needs' (Meager & Honey,
1993) began to be defined rather than specific disabilities. Although these do not
relate directly to adults' general situation (being centred on developmental issues and
specific work issues respectively), these moves are indicative of changes that began to
take place across the "mental handicap" field — and the idea of "learning difficulties"
and its associated "needs" rather than "handicap" began to take hold. Once again new
terminology came into general use, both in professional discourse and in the literature.
'Learning disabilities' (e.g. Aylward, Davis & Scott, 1992; MENCAP, 1998) or
'learning difficulties' (e.g. Segal & Varma, 1991; O'Hara & Sperlinger, 1997)
gradually became recognised as the preferred terms, although "mental handicap" is
still often used (Sperlinger, 1997; see for example,. Social Services Inspectorate,
1992). To avoid possible confusion here, it should also be noted that in other parts of
the world, other terms do also frequently appear in the literature (Langness & Levine,
1986; Sinason, 1992; Kavale & Forness, 1995; Sperlinger, 1997; etc.).
-95-
Of course, it should be clear from the points that were raised in the previous
chapters that we cannot imagine that this variation in terminology merely represents
different aspects of the same essential "condition" or the progression of understanding
towards its essential truth, but that it reflects instead the constitution of this truth, the
construction of a particular concept in different bodies of knowledge, each of which
has varying effects in terms of the ways in which it takes hold of and objectifies
people, and the interventions and social and institutional policies which are brought
into being around it.
With these points in mind, the terms "learning difficulties" and "people with
learning difficulties" will be used in this study. There are problems with these labels,
not least the confusion caused by the fact that learning difficulty can either be specific
(referring to dyslexia, for instance) or general (as it replaces terms such as "mental
handicap") (Social Services Inspectorate, 1992). More importantly, writers such as
Dyson (1987a), Brechin (1999) and Goodley (2001) raise the point that these labels
focus attention on problems which the individual him/herself has (the individual has
learning difficulties, they are situated within him/her), and fail to draw attention to the
epistemological constitution of "learning difficulties" or focus on problems which
might exist at a societal level which affect certain people's lives and create problems
for them. However, despite this objection, "learning difficulty" does seem the most
appropriate term to use since, despite the presence of other extant terms, it has been
identified as the label most preferred by "people with learning difficulties" (Amans &
Darbyshire, 1989; Simons, 1992; Dawson & Whittaker, 1993; Sutcliffe & Simons,
1993; Harris, 1995), and the one which elicits the most positive responses from the
general population in terms of being seen as less stigmatising and not indicating a
limiting of basic rights or abilities (Eayrs, Ellis & Jones, 1993).
Definitions of learning difficulty
Now that we have addressed the problem of terminology, the next question to
be confronted is that of the definition of what is called "learning difficulty". It was
stated above that the concept of learning difficulties (or whatever other term is used)
refers to some perceived deficit in intellectual ability and performance which is
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deemed to require special provision and management. This opening definition was
deliberately vague, because there is a debate surrounding the question of how learning
difficulties are to be defined and identified of similar intensity to that concerning
which label is appropriate to refer to them — a government paper went so far as to state
that 'there is no generally accepted definition of mental handicap' (Department of the
Environment Audit Inspectorate, 1983; p.1), and Edgerton (1967) comments that
'what mental retardation is called.., is far less variable than what mental retardation is'
(p.2; original emphasis).
As with terminology, conceptions of learning difficulty differ not only over
time, but also across the disciplines which seek to govern and manage it (again, we
will be focusing here on the U.K. situation). Clarke and Clarke (1991), for instance,
note that its description is possible at many different levels (chromosomal,
biochemical, skeletal and behavioural, for instance), and that this 'may serve a number
of different functions ranging from research to clinical or educational practice' (p.22).
Ryan (1987) points out, though, that among these disciplines, medicine and medical-
based models have been dominant to a much greater extent than warranted by the
actual medical needs associated with learning difficulty. This is backed up by
Simpson's (1999) analysis of the treatment of learning difficulty over the last two
hundred years. Simpson argues that the discourse surrounding learning difficulty in
this time has 'basically involved the manipulation of three elements (intelligence,
behaviour and the organic and functional impairment of the body)' (ibid.; p.148). He
cites Seguin's studies based on an organic aetiology and a regime of physiological
treatment as a watershed in this kind of thinking. Following this came the pathological
identification of classifications of 'idiocy' (ibid., 1999) and medical experimentation
on institutionalised subjects. The next important step came with the establishment of
the intelligence test in the then young discipline of psychology. Simpson suggests that
Binet, the founder of intelligence testing, saw his project as complementary to
medicine, and he extended his research to include the pathological classification of
institutional populations. As has been stated, it is not within the scope of this project
to undertake an archaeology of "learning difficulty" as an object of thought; however,
the work outlined here has had a profound influence on the ways in which current
definitions have been brought into being.
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It is from these beginnings that the modern treatment of learning difficulty
became established, and the IQ scale has occupied a central place. Up until the 1950s,
the IQ score was the primary way of assessing what was considered to be a cognitive
flaw or an intellectual deficit. Through intelligence testing, the extent and nature of
this flaw could be discovered and expressed on a linear scale, and services could be
ascribed accordingly. For instance, the British Psychological Society and the World
Health Organisation interpreted "subnormality" as being an IQ below 70 (Shanley,
1986). However, problems began to be acknowledged with this approach. People with
the same IQ scores, it was argued, might have very different needs and competencies
(Aylward, Davis & Scott, 1992), and the IQ test assessed skills so far removed from
situations which people with learning difficulties experienced difficulty with in their
lives as to be almost meaningless in their application (Clarke & Clarke, 1991).
Attention then began to focus on intellectual skills, personal and social competencies
and interactions with the environment (Clarke & Clarke, 1991; Egderton, 1994). One
of the major alternatives along these lines has been the adaptive behaviour scale. This
scale is far less precise than IQ, but takes into account the skills required for day-to-
day living, and is therefore considered more appropriate for assessing service needs.
The scale consists of two parts. The first part measures specific abilities such as
independence in eating, toilet use, cleanliness and dressing, ability to cope with
money, and so on. The second part is concerned with maladaptive behaviour such as
violence, anti-social or rebellious behaviour, withdrawal, self-abuse, odd mannerisms
and sexual aberrance (Shanley, 1986). The resulting measurements are then used,
often in conjunction with an IQ score, to make decisions about mental and social
competence and requirement for services.
However, the IQ test still retained a central place in identifying learning
difficulty. So, for instance, although the DHSS (1971) report Better Services for the
Mentally Handicapped argued that 'often mental handicap entails no more than slow
and restricted development,' (p.2), it goes on to say that mental handicap can be
identified by a score on the IQ test of below 70 (although it does still distinguish this
definition from anything that would determine service needs).
There was soon a shift away from considering psychological deficits and a turn
towards consideration of the nature and degree of social, health, educational, legal and
environmental supports that people would need (Sperlinger, 1997). The Educational
Act 1981 was one of the first indications of this. As has been mentioned, it conceived
of specific 'needs' rather than classes of "handicap." Although this document focused
specifically upon children in a school environment, this was an early indication that
the central point in the area of learning difficulties in general was to become the kind
of provision required, not the nature of a specific "handicap". This is not without its
complications, however. For instance, it has been commented that ideas of needs
which emerged were 'so broad and all encompassing as to be almost meaningless'
(Education, Science and Arts Committee, 1987; p.37), and it is not clear whether the
intention was to replace the category "mental handicap" (defined by subnormal
intellectual functioning) with the much broader "learning difficulty," (as defined in the
1981 Act) or whether "people with a mental handicap" are merely one definite
category of people who also happen to fall under the "learning difficulties" banner
(Social Services Inspectorate, 1992).
A number of fields concerned with "learning difficulty" began to focus their
ideals upon needs for supports and services rather some deficit determined by low IQ
or adaptive behaviour scores. For instance, legal definitions of it, began differ
according to their purpose (Sperlinger, 1997; see also the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984, and the Mental Health Act 1983), and definitions for nursing
became based on the amount of dependence individuals show and the amount of
nursing attention they need. On this last score, the West Midlands Regional Health
Authority define learning difficulty according to the 'disabilities in day-to-day life'
(cited in Ford, 1996; p.57) it causes. This definition distinguishes between "mild",
"moderate", "severe" and "profound" difficulties according to the degree of
independence in self-care, language skills, mobility and ability to do practical work
(Ford, 1996).
So, although there are moves away from conceiving of learning difficulty
solely on the basis of some form of mental deficiency indicated by a low score on the
IQ test, confusion remains, and people are likely to be defined differently, with
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different degrees of difficulty, in different situations. The influence of the IQ test
remains strong as well. For instance, MENCAP, the UK's largest charity organisation
for people with learning difficulties, and a group responsible for running numerous
residential care homes and other schemes, recently defined 'profound,' 'moderate and
severe' and 'mild' 'learning disability' as being 'roughly equivalent' to IQ scores of
under 20, 50 and 70 respectively (MENCAP, 1998), although there was also a rather
vague indication that other 'intellectual abilities and social skills' (p.1) are usually
taken into account as well.
Summaty
Despite the debates surrounding the area, "learning difficulties" seems to be
the most recent and the most appropriate term for use in this area. Although it is not
easy to find a consensual definition of what "learning difficulty" is taken to be, it is
generally seen to represent an assumed deficit in intellectual and cognitive functioning
of a degree that is deemed likely to require some form of special provisions and
interventions. There is a trend, though, for definitions to focus less on the
identification and measurement of a form of deficit and to look more towards
definitions which centre around required provisions in specific areas.
Also, we must note that "learning difficulty" has been brought into being in
different ways in different fields and at different times. We are not interested here in
assessing the "correctness" of each of these emergences of it as an object of thought,
but, rather, to show how it is conceived of, what it is taken to mean. We should also,
though, make the point here that these definitions are not "natural" or inevitable, but
are the result of a particular social "problem" being apprehended by a particular
discipline at a particular time (so, for example, in the field of education, it became
defined in terms of "special educational needs" or "educational subnormality"), and
that they are linked to fields of possibility for thought about, and action upon, those
people who become labelled as having "learning difficulties" — particular definitions
which apprehend this as a particular type of "problem" make available a particular set
of "solutions", whether they be special educational provision or placing people in
institutions so that their lives can be supervised and managed.
So, again we should emphasise that this is a form of knowledge linked to
particular operations of power and to particular forms of subjectification — and,
similarly, forms of power which aim to "correct" or supervise those with particular
"difficulties" rely upon forms of knowledge which allow for their identification and
assessment. The diagnosis of someone as "having learning difficulties" is based upon
more than the "discovery" of a "condition" within them, but is dynamically connected
to the ways in which such "difficulties" emerged in a specific system of knowledge as
a "problem" to be dealt with in specific ways. This "condition" is, in effect,
constructed by those discourses which speak of it as a specific type of problem. This is
an important realisation which influences us to ask questions about the effect this
form of objectification has upon people and how they interact with it. As has been
made clear, this forms a central part of our research question. In identifying the people
with whom we are to conduct our research, then, we are not concerned with what the
"reality" of learning difficulties that people "have" is, but with the ways that people
who have been deemed to have learning difficulties experience their lives in care with
respect to issues of power and subjectivity.
The next issue to address here is that of the concepts and attitudes in this area,
including how they have changed over the years, how they fit in with service
provisions, and how the points which we have been raising in this and previous
chapters influence us to understand them.
4.2 Changing concepts and attitudes
The changes and debates in the terminology and definition of learning
difficulty are indicative of the 'paradigm shift' in the field which Edgerton writes
about (1994; p.i). Voices have been raised which challenge the received wisdom in the
field. The ways in which people with learning difficulties are classified and conceived,
the attitudes towards them in the academy, social services and amongst the "non-
disabled" population, and their treatment by employers, policy makers, researchers,
institutions and service providers have all been criticised.
Conceptions of people deemed to have learning difficulties, and attitudes
towards them, have changed significantly throughout the ages, according to which
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system of knowledge is dominant in understanding them. So, for instance, the non-
human "changelings", sent by fairies or the devil, of the middle ages became, via
other mystical or religious conceptions, in the nineteenth century, "idiots", medically
examined and pathologically classified (Ryan, 1987). In recent years, however, there
have been vociferous criticisms of the ways in which learning difficulty has come to
be understood, with arguments being propounded that systems of classification and
professional regulation themselves are marginalising and dis-empowering (e.g.
Edgerton, 1986; Oliver, 1993a; Clough & Barton, 1995; Swain, 1995; Simpson, 1998;
Gillman, Heyman & Swain, 2000; Goodley, 2001).
Normalisation
The dominant model for understanding the experiences of people with learning
difficulties, for almost the last forty years, the normalisation principle. This model has
had a major impact on the development of services for people with learning
difficulties over the past three decades (Robinson, 1989; Emerson, 1992; Tyne, 1992),
and a considerable influence amongst the sector of social scientists and social workers
keen to improve the situation of people with learning difficulties (Chappell, 1997,
Walmsley, 1997, 2001). The normalisation principle originated in Scandinavia over
thirty years ago (Nirje, 1969, 1970; Bank-Mikkelsen, 1969, 1980), when it was said to
embody the aim that, in the design and operation of services, people with learning
difficulties should enjoy 'patterns and conditions of everyday living which are as close
as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of society' (Nirje, 1969;
p.181). It is now, however, most associated with the reworking of it by Wolf
Wolfensberger in North America (Robinson, 1989), who states it, simply, as being the
'the use of culturally valued means in order to enable, establish and/or maintain
valued social roles for people' (Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1989; p.211).
In Scandinavia in the 1960s, the principle of normalisation was characterised
by the drive to make as normal as possible the places in which people with learning
difficulties lived, the education they received, the places where they worked and the
jobs they did, their leisure time and activities, and their human rights as enshrined in
law. It called for a move away from the special treatment which people with learning
difficulties received and from seeing them as a special category to be protected and
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institutionalised — their everyday lives should be as close as possible to people without
learning difficulties (Bank-Mikkelsen, 1980). Hence, the early definitions were based
on a model of rights, and of ensuring that people with learning difficulties enjoyed the
same rights, freedoms, choices and quality of life as non-disabled people (Emerson,
1992).
In the 1970s and 1980s, Wolfensberger reconceptualised normalisation for a
North American context and situated it as a major principle in sociology (Emerson,
1992). Wolfensberger (1972, 1980a, 1980b) argued that the concepts of role
expectancy, deviancy and public perception should be central concepts in
normalisation theory. This reflects his concern that a number of groups in society
(people with learning difficulties especially) have social roles that are devalued. Their
role expectancy — the place in society that they are expected to fill and the contribution
they are deemed capable of making — reflects negative ways of thinking about them
that construct them as deviants. That is, they become negatively valued by 'that
segment of society that constitutes the majority or holds norm-defining power'
(Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1989; p.211), and these negative perceptions affect how
they are treated.
Returning to Wolfensberger's brief statement of the defmition of
normalisation, it should be note that he emphasised 'culturally valued means' and
'valued social roles' (ibid.). Upon these two factors is the normalisation principle
predicated. 'Valued social roles' is further broken down into 'social image' and
'personal competencies' (Wolfensberger, 1983). "Personal competencies" refers to
such things as being able to access normal community services, being able to integrate
with valued social circles, pursuing valued and fulfilling interactions and activities,
having normal personal possessions, and so on. "Social image" refers to the
appearance of the setting in which people live, the rights and abilities people are
credited with, their language and symbols of dress and personal appearance, and so on
(ibid.). These factors affect how people are perceived, and the role expectations that
are therefore placed upon them, and these role expectations, especially where
negative, tend to produce behaviour that reinforces them (Wolfensberger, 1972).
Devalued groups tend to be cast into general negative roles such as 'subhuman, a
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menace, an object of dread, a diseased organism, an object of ridicule, an object of
pity, an eternal child, and a holy innocent' (ibid.; p.16), and these social expectations
have the effect of usually making the devalued individual live up 'or down'
(Wolfensberger & Thomas, 1983) to them.
So, the perceptions of people with learning difficulties are argued to have
specific effects. As devalued individuals, they tend to be badly treated and accorded
less esteem and status than non-disabled people, they often suffer social rejection and
are generally treated in ways that tend to diminish their dignity, competence, self-
esteem and so on (Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1989). This negative treatment, the
argument goes, takes on the form which expresses devalued groups' negative
conceptualisation. For instance, the physical fittings in hospitals for people with
learning difficulties reflect their conceptualisation as somehow subhuman in that they
tend to consist of walls and floors made of indestructible materials, unbreakable glass,
heavy-duty furniture, shielded light fittings, soundproofing, televisions in protected
recesses, and so on (Wolfensberger, 1972). Similarly, people with learning difficulties
may be dressed unsuitably for their age group, reflecting their conceptualisation as
eternal children, and they are apt to be given children's toys and even called "boys" or
"girls" (Wolfenberger, 1980a). Finally, the manner of this negative treatment has a
determinate effect on how people subsequently behave so that, for example, people
may actually take on childish mannerisms and speech (Wolfensberger & Tullman,
1989). In 1984, Capitol People First (an advocacy organisation in the United States)
coined the term 'The Retarding Environment' (Rosenberg, 1994) to describe exactly
such effects. This represents the fact that for most people who live in institutions for
learning difficulties, their only role models are other people who 'have learned how to
act retarded' (Rosenberg, 1994; p.177; see also Edgerton, 1986; Swain, 1989).
Normalisation therefore calls for the integration of devalued individuals into
society so that they can live in normal housing, have normal jobs and education and
engage in a positive way with activities which are socially valued — the emphasis is on
giving people a positive social role, enhancing their personal competencies so that
they can act in a valued way which will not attract contempt, and bolstering their
social image so that they are perceived by others as valued individuals with positive
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roles (Wolfensberger, 1983; Wolfensberger & Thomas, 1983). 'Culturally valued
means' (Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1989) are required to enable this, the aim being:
to obtain services from generic agencies which serve the general public, rather than from
speciality agencies which serve only or primarily groups of individuals perceived as
deviant.
(Wolfensberger, 1972; p.45)
This includes such things as night-school classes, apprenticeships, on-job training and
so on, as opposed to job therapy, invented and unnecessary work, or game-playing.
This, it is argued, will help to transfer the appropriate valued images and will, in the
treatment of people as valued individuals, elicit competent behaviour, habits, skills
and relationships.
Normalisation, then, implies action on three levels. Firstly, on the individual
person in eliciting positive and useful behaviour and social competencies, and
presenting, labelling and interpreting people in a way which will create positive roles
for them — emphasising similarities rather than differences. Secondly, on the level of
primary and secondary social systems — that is, using such positively valued systems
as schools, work and normal community services, and ensuring that these systems are
perceived as valued. Finally, there is action on a societal level, including such things
as the entire school system, laws and rights, and combating negative social stereotypes
(Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1989). In this respect, normalisation aims to combat the
problems of segregation and social rejection experienced by people with learning
difficulties and to ensure that they have as normal and as valued a life as is possible.
Normalisation generated considerable debate in the field of learning
difficulties (Brown & Smith, 1992a), but it has been taken up enthusiastically by
groups campaigning for the rights of people with learning difficulty (e.g. Campaign
for the Mentally Handicapped, 1972; King's Fund Centre, 1980), with one of the most
influential of such campaigns, the "Ordinary Life" movement, taking up an explicit
position on it by stating its goal as being:
to see mentally handicapped people in the mainstream of life, living in ordinary houses in
ordinary streets, with the same range of choices as any citizen, and mixing as equals with
the other, and mostly not handicapped members of their own community.
(King's Fund Centre, 1980; p.1)
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In fact, normalisation has been a major factor in creating changes in thinking about
services and in public policy to such an extent that Tyne (1992) comments that 'there
is seldom a post advertised in services for people with learning difficulties that does
not claim adherence to normalisation' (p.44), and Wolfensberger has proposed a
systems of measurement by which the quality of services (at least as far as they meet
the ideals of normalisation) can be determined and shortcomings identified
(Wolfensberger & Thomas, 1983).
Quality of life
Allied to the goals of normalisation and closely linked to concerns that have
been raised about the detrimental effects of services on the lives of people with
learning difficulties is the concept of "quality of life" (e.g. Landesman, 1986; Goode,
1994a). The way in which people with learning difficulties live their lives, and the
quality of their lives have slowly become a central concern (Edgerton, 1994). Simply
put, quality of life (QOL) can be said to concern 'the discrepancy between a person's
achieved and unmet needs and desires' (Brown, Brown & Bayer, 1994). This involves
subjective, perceived and objective assessments of an individual's life, and it includes
the extent to which s/he can exert control over his/her own life. Although it is difficult
to come up with a consensual, generally accepted definition of what QOL is (Goode,
1994b), it is generally measured by the filling out of questionnaires which attempt to
address all the relevant issues surrounding living and accommodation, activities and
leisure, health, family and friends, self-image, work, help received and desired, and
general life satisfaction. This is coupled with objective assessments of skill
attainment, the environment in which people live, the level of social and physical
integration, leisure activities, support systems, and income and material possessions
(Brown, Brown & Bayer, 1994). QOL thus becomes another measure by which the
suitability of services can be determined which reflects a shift in thinking about
learning difficulty.
Summary
There is a trend in concepts, attitudes and ideals surrounding people deemed to
have learning difficulties towards aiming to provide them with "normal" lives and
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"normal" social roles, and ensuring that they exhibit signs of satisfaction with their
lives in their respective environments. Whilst these might be seen as positive goals, it
must also be commented that they do not unproblematically address all of the issues
which are important in looking at the situation of individuals in special
accommodation. It is possible, for instance, to be placed in a "normal" environment
with all of the factors supposed to enhance quality of life and yet still leave
unaddressed issues of power relationships and subjectivity that position people.
Additionally, there is no questioning here of how people themselves relate to ideals
like "normality" or being framed as "having learning difficulties". Without an
examination of how people are positioned by, and interact with, these forces, many
aspects of people's lives, which they might experience as problematic, are overlooked.
It is necessary, also, to examine the positions which people are speaking from, the
power relationships which exist in their environments, and how they are interacting
with, challenging or resisting particular positions in which they find themselves. This
challenge will be expanded upon in the following chapter, but it should be borne in
mind at this point, as we move on to examine the services which surround people with
learning difficulties.
4.3 Changing Ideals and Services
In line with the changes in thinking which have been outlined, and allied to the
growth of the parents' movement in learning difficulties, human rights movements,
the publicising of scandals from segregated care institutions, and work such as
Goffman's (1968) highlighting the negative effects of institutional living (Tyne, 1992;
Sperlinger, 1997), services and provisions for people with learning difficulties have
also been undergoing major changes over the last three decades. It is to these changes
that our attention must now turn.
Services for people with learning difficulties have reflected the dominant ways
of thinking about them at the time. Often, since forms of mental deficiency were
identified as social problems, such services have been 'influenced by moral panics'
(Means & Smith, 1998) about people deemed to be in some way mentally deficient —
panics about the effect they would have on the general population, about their role in
causing social unrest and crime, and even about the dangers of them damaging the
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genetic stock of populations. For a large part of the twentieth century, even, it was
thought best that those people with learning difficulties who, for whatever reason,
could not be looked after in their own homes should be segregated from the rest of
society in hospital-like institutions, or "colonies" as they were often called (DHSS,
1971; p.11) — reflecting the central place a medical governance of learning difficulty
held at the time (Wolfensberger, 1980a; Ryan, 1987). These institutions were
generally isolated from population centres and usually functioned as closed, self-
sufficient communities. This was considered the best environment for people with
even very mild learning difficulties to receive care (DHSS, 1971).
Community Care
More recently, however, policy has been determined by a concern with
providing "community care." This term first appeared in the 1954-7 Royal
Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency (Oliver & Barnes, 1998), but
the prospect of it can perhaps be traced back to 1913, when the Mental Deficiency Act
set out provisions for care to be provided outside of hospitals (Morris, 1993a). More
decisive action came in 1961 when the then Minister of Health announced the aim to
halve the number of beds in mental hospitals over the 14 years to 1975 (ibid.). Since
this time, debate has been rife over such issues as how much such aims have to do
with cost as opposed to moral considerations, how much community alternatives have
benefited users, and even what "community care" actually means (e.g. Beresford,
1993; Collins, 1995, Ward, 1995; Sperlinger, 1997). Numerous writers have
commented both on the broad and ambiguous meaning of the term "community care"
itself (e.g. Bayley, 1973; DHSS, 1981; Dalley, 1989; Sinason, 1992; Morris, 1993a;
Oliver & Barnes, 1998), and its use as a powerful piece of rhetoric (e.g. Potter &
Collie, 1989; Pereira, 1997; Means & Smith, 1998):
To the politician, 'community care' is a useful piece of rhetoric; the sociologist, it is a
stick to beat institutional care with; to the civil servant, it is a cheap alternative to
institutional care [...] to the visionary, it is a dream of the new society where people really
do care; to social services departments, it a nightmare of heightened public expectation
and inadequate resources to meet them.
(Jones, Brown & Bradshaw, 1983; cited in Morris, 1993a; p4)
Nevertheless, community care has been government policy for nearly forty
years, with varying degrees of emphasis on state and family or private provision, and
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it is difficult to separate out, with any degree of certainty, the cost motivations from
the moral justifications (Morris, 1993a). An important turning point came in the early
1970s, with the publication of Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped (DHSS,
1971) and the beginning of a wave of reforms (Bogdan & Taylor, 1987).
Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped criticised institutions for their
size and isolation, their outdated and unsuitable buildings (with little or outdated
sanitation and heating), overcrowding, lack of privacy, poor living standards and
understaffing. It set out the following principles for services:
Each handicapped person should live with his [sic] own family as long as this does not
impose an undue burden on them... if he has to leave home for a foster home, residential
home or hospital... links with his own family should normally be maintained... When a
handicapped person has to leave his family home... the substitute home should be as
homelike as possible, even if it is also a hospital. It should provide sympathetic and
constant human relationships.
(DHSS, 1971; p.9; emphasis added)
Hence, the tone for community care was set. Although in 1981, a DHSS report noted
confusion in the way community care reforms were being implemented, arguing that a
definitive description of its aims was elusive and that different objectives had been
given prominence at different times and by different groups, the aim of providing a
'homelike' service to go alongside the ideal of moving people out of hospitals where
possible had been identified.
Some concrete changes in policy began to take hold around this time. A
weakening of the medicalisation of learning difficulties was seen. This is not to say,
however, that the implementation of community and integrational policies was
regarded as unproblematically positive. The Audit Commission (1986) noted that,
fifteen years on from the DHSS's (1971) landmark report, 'care in the community
[was] far from being a reality in many places' (p.2) and that there was a danger that
private residential care would become entrenched and hamper the move to other forms
of community care. Policy makers in general could not agree about what represented
good community care (Means & Smith, 1998), and the policy seemed to be in some
confusion. Another landmark came as growing pressure for further reforms in
community care provision from groups such as MENCAP, and not least from the
King's Fund Centre's (1980) adoption of the principles of normalisation to campaign
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for change, culminated in the Department of Health commissioning Sir Roy Griffiths
(1988) to examine the options for the future of community care.
Griffiths (1988) began by stating that 'if community care means anything, it is
that responsibility is placed as near to the individual and his [sic] carers as possible'
(p.viii). He went on to propose that local authorities should identify individuals' needs
and, 'taking full account of personal preferences... design packages of care best suited
to enabling the consumer to live as normal a life as possible' . 1 ). The ideals set out,
then, emphasised consumer choice over care services, and individually designed care
which would further the objective of allowing people to live a normal life.
These suggestions were incorporated into the government White Paper Caring
for People (Department of Health, 1990), and the 1990 NHS and Community Care
Act. These documents saw the government set out firm proposals for the future of
community care. The aim was taken up to give people the maximum amount of
independence and control over their care and to enable them to lead as full and
independent lives as possible (ibid.). The concept of quality of life was also imported
into policy considerations, with the recognition that:
quality of service can perhaps most simply be judged by whether or not it improves a
person's quality of life.., the fulfilment of a person's potential, personal privacy and
dignity.
(Social Services Committee, 1990; p.vi)
Significantly, special priorities were also made for people with learning
difficulties, with the recognition that 'the needs of most handicapped people, even
those whose handicap is severe, are largely for social rather than health care.'
(Department of Health, 1990; p.12). Finally, then, learning difficulty became de-
medicalised, and the emphasis, concretely enshrined in policy, turned to needs for
support rather than medical pathology, and medical care for people with learning
difficulties became normalised — the primary provider of health care for them came to
be the GP (Sperlinger, 1997), as it is for the general population.
Another issue which must be discussed with respect to the changing ideals of
service provision is empowerment. This is set down as an explicit value (Social
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Services Inspectorate, 1992) comprising the ideal that people who use care services
are accorded their status as full citizens, exercising the same rights and choices
concerning their lives as anyone else would expect. Hence, services should aim to
work in a way which accords people value, which ensures that they have the
opportunity to make informed choices about their care and the ways in which they
spend their time, and that alternatives which are made available to them are the least
restrictive of their freedom and individuality as is possible (Social Services
Inspectorate, 1992; Beresford, 1993; Means & Smith, 1998). These translate into the
proposed means of voice, rights, and the choice of services by which people can be
empowered (Means & Smith, 1998). This means that people should be able to
exercise choice by leaving services with which they are not happy, that they have a
'voice' over the structure of services which are offered and a role in advising care
providers about how to develop empowering practices, and that their 'rights' (to
freedom, choice, equality and so on) will be enshrined in the ideals of any service
offered (ibid.).
Closely allied to ideals of empowerment is the growing practice of advocacy
work for and by people with learning difficulties. Definitions of advocacy revolve
around the ideal of speaking on behalf of individuals or groups with disabilities:
Advocacy involves a person(s), either an individual or group with disabilities or their
representative, pressing their case with influential others, about situations which affect
them directly or, and more usually, trying to prevent proposed changes which will leave
them worse off.
(Brandon, 1995; p.1)
To advocate is to speak on behalf of, and to facilitate change for, another person or
persons.
(O'Brien & Sang, 1984; cited in Crawley, 1990; p.95)
Advocacy means to speak and act, persuasively or forcefully, on behalf of someone's
rights and interests, whether these are your own or someone else's.
(Clare, 1990; p.9)
Three distinct types of advocacy have been defined: citizen, legal and self advocacy
(Williams & Shoultz, 1982; Clare, 1990; Brandon, 1995; Garner & Sandow, 1995).
Citizen advocacy is the 'voluntary involvement of a member of the public in the life
of a disabled person' (Clare, 1990; p.9) with a view to speaking out on their behalf
and representing them in situations in which they find it difficult to represent
themselves. Legal advocacy involves a volunteer helping a person with learning
difficulties with his/her legal and financial affairs to guard against possible
exploitation. Self-advocacy is perhaps the most important of the three. Ward (1995)
cites it as the most important recent development in the lives of people with learning
difficulties. The aims and definitions of self-advocacy vary subtly depending on the
source, but they all centre, to a greater or lesser extent, on an ideal of helping people
with learning difficulties to have a useful voice in their own affairs (Campaign for the
Mentally Handicapped, 1984; Kennedy & Killis, 1986; Amans & Darbyshire, 1989;
Crawley, 1983, 1990; Simons, 1992; Dowson & Whittaker, 1993; Sutcliffe & Simons,
1993). Self-advocacy is about people with learning difficulties being able to express
their thoughts and 'speak from the real experience of their daily lives' (Williams &
Schoultz, 1982; p.95). Hence, Flynn and Ward (1991) define the self-advocacy
movement as:
an international and changing network of individuals and groups who have acquired
voices through the negotiations of their daily lives and their introduction of non-disabled
people to a picture of the world in which they want to live.
(p.130)
The act of speaking up for oneself, then, aims to accomplish a number of goals
based around improving people's lives. These include representing the interests of
people with learning difficulties, expressing one's thoughts and problems, teaching
others to listen to people with learning difficulties, simply having a safe environment
in which to talk to people freely, self-development (increasing one's confidence and
communication skills), involvement in a new and supportive social network and
receiving support, discussing community living, improving services, talking over
problems and finding solutions, and instigating wider changes such as changes in
labels (Simons, 1992; Flynn & Ward, 1991; Sutcliffe & Simons, 1993; Sanderson,
1995).
Advocacy also involves being taught to make decisions, knowing one's rights,
identifying causes of suffering or unhappiness, learning the appropriate channels for
taking action or making complaints, taking a role in monitoring and evaluating
services and even challenging the philosophies by which services are run (Williams &
Shoultz, 1982; Wertheimer, 1987; Flynn & Ward, 1991; Brandon, 1995). These goals
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are pursued in a number of self-advocacy groups around the U.K. and in other
countries. These groups vary in their nature from being totally autonomous, a division
of a professional organisation such as MENCAP, based in service systems such as day
care centres, or in coalition with groups for other disabled people (Crawley, 1990).
The New Services
So, community care policy, having evolved alongside changing conceptions
and pressure from advocacy groups, and despite initial confusions, came to represent
the ideal of a normal life for people with learning difficulties — one in which they can
control the care services they receive, and in which they have the opportunity to live
in normal residential settings, integrated into the community in a way which improves
their quality of life. This is backed up by the normalisation of service provision —
educational authorities looking after education, social services for social care and
support, and GPs for health care. The question which must now be asked, then, is:
what actual effects have this policy change had on existing services, what new
services are available, and how far are the ideals set out realised? This research is, as
we have said many times, based around the experiences of people living in community
care residential accommodation. We need, then, to have a clearer picture of what this
means.
The process of closing the old long-stay, 'cradle-to-grave' (Bicknell, 1985)
hospitals has been underway for some time. Emerson & Hatton (1994) write that
between 1980 and 1993, 26,000 people were moved out of mental handicap hospitals.
There have, however, been debates concerning what is the most suitable alternative to
hospital services. 'Initial developments focused on the establishment of purpose built
20-24 place "locally-based hospital" or "community" units to serve a defined
geographical area' (Emerson & Hatton, 1994; p.3). In line with the developing ideals
of community care, however, this focus shifted to providing staff support where
appropriate to people living in smaller groups in housing that is as ordinary as
possible, and to placing the user of the service at the very centre of the planning and
organisation of care (Brown & Wistow, 1990; Emerson & Hatton, 1994; Jahoda &
Cattermole, 1995).
The main provisions of residential care for those not living in their own homes
are now hostels, group homes and supported housing, although, as stated in Caring
for People (Department of Health, 1990), it is still considered policy that some of
those designated as more severely disabled, or as having health difficulties, will be
housed in nursing homes or hospitals. As a rule, community residential care
institutions tend to use ordinary housing which is in normal streets and therefore
appears an integrated part of the local community — the ideal is that such housing
should be seen more as a home than an institution (Means & Smith, 1998). Hostels
generally consist of single bedrooms and communal dining, lounge, toilet and bathing
facilities; usually there is a small number of staff, some of whom live in (Malin, Race
& Jones, 1980; Paterson, 1986). Supported living aims to separate housing from
support and to allow service users to choose where they want to live and with whom
(if anybody), to hold their own lease, control their own money and decide their level
of support. The emphasis is on informal support and building relationships rather than
a supervisory style of care (Kinsella & Ward, 1993; Ward, 1995) — usually realised by
setting aside a row of adjacent homes for people with learning difficulties with
supervision for the group by a separately-housed warden (Paterson, 1986). Group
homes, or residential homes, tend to be houses in suburban streets with live-in staff,
where the residents are involved in a kind of semi-communal living. Newer group
homes tend to be small in size, generally housing less than six residents (Sinson,
1995), but many older homes still in use are often much larger, with sometimes in
excess of twenty residents (Sinson, 1993). These are only general characteristics, as
homes differ widely in their actual properties (Emerson & Hatton, 1994; Sinson,
1995; Means & Smith, 1998). This shift in residential provision is backed up by
ancillary services such as supported employment, in which workshops and transitional
employment schemes aim to gear people with learning difficulties towards work, with
the aim that they will be able to progress to "normal" employment over time (Beyer,
1995).
It should be said at this stage that this research will concentrate on exploring
issues of power and subjectivity specifically in community care group homes. That is,
in those homes, in the community, which are nominally for people with learning
difficulties, have live-in staff, and in which a group of residents are involved in a kind
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of semi-communal living. The research participants are selected on the basis of their
having recent experience of living in such a home (i.e. either currently living in one,
or having lived in one a year or less before the interview took place). Whilst this
covers only one type of community care accommodation, then, it does provide a
definable situation to examine, and a definable group with whom to conduct research.
Given the variations which we have seen in the way that learning difficulties is
conceptualised and treated, this is important in lending coherence to the research.
Also important to consider is the literature which evaluates the success of the
new community care services. Since this research is concerned with finding new ways
to understand people's experiences and interactions with power and subjectivity in
care accommodation, it is important to be aware of existing literature which deals with
these places in order to situate our research in relation to it.
The Success of the New Services
The new residential and support services for people with learning difficulties
are built on ideals of empowering people to make choices in their lives, about their
care and about where they live, and to live as normal and fulfilled lives as possible. As
Bogdan and Taylor (1987) point out, it would take a cynical outlook indeed to
imagine that conditions have not improved considerably for people with learning
difficulties over the last thirty years since the major reforms began, but, even so, many
of the positive aims and the hopes that people held for care and services have not been
effectively achieved (Bogdan & Taylor, 1987; Ward, 1989, 1993; Booth, Simons &
Booth, 1990; People First, 1993; Emerson & Hatton, 1994; Collins, 1995; Means &
Smith, 1998).
The first thing to note is that, although many people have successfully moved
out of hospitals and into the community, this move has often been poorly managed,
ill-co-ordinated and under-funded (Ward, 1995), with a large number of people facing
difficulty in moving out (Collins, 1995), and provision often being poorly managed
and funded, or even unavailable for some of those who do (Beresford, 1993; Ward,
1995). Emerson and Hatton's (1994) review of research into the nature of community-
based care concluded that, in general, people moving from long-stay hospitals to
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smaller community care units could expect an improvement in a number of areas of
their lives. Amongst these is an improved material standard of living, a higher degree
of reported satisfaction with life, more opportunities to use their skills and to develop
new ones, spending less time engaged in stereotyped behaviour, having more choice
in their daily routine, and having more contacts with other people. However, they also
pointed out that there are still problems. Not least that the research has concluded that
people in community care are still relatively very poor, generally have only limited
choice over major life decisions such as who they are to live with and who they will
receive support from, and have more limited everyday choice than their non-disabled
counterparts (Emerson & Hatton, 1994).
Perhaps the major problem that has been identified is that institutional trends
and institutional philosophy still tends to permeate community care housing provision
(Collins, 1995; Ward, 1995; Means & Smith, 1998), limiting the independence that
residents might otherwise enjoy (Sinson, 1995), and Emerson and Hatton (1994)
comment that 'community-based services vary widely in terms of their quality' (p.iii)
even to the extent that sometimes life in them is little different from life in a hospital.
Booth, Simons and Booth (1990), for instance, argue that many of the criticisms
which led to the drive to close mental handicap hospitals are also relevant for most
hostels in which people with learning difficulties live, and these also apply in some
ways to other forms of residential care (Bogdan & Taylor, 1987; Ward, 1995; Means
& Smith, 1998).
This set of criticisms, then, focuses on how well the goals associated with
community care have been achieved. As Walmsley (2001) argues, there is a general
tendency for work into this area explicitly or implicitly to take on the ideals of
normalisation in evaluating and criticising community care services. As we have seen
throughout this thesis so far, this piece of research draws upon thinking which allows
us to ask more complex questions about the care environment and people's
relationships and experiences in respect of it. In the following chapter, we will go on
to draw out some problems with the position of normalisation, and begin to illustrate
how this research will go beyond it.
4.4 Conclusion
The 'sea change' in learning difficulties which Edgerton (1994) mentions has
encompassed terminology, definitions, concepts, ideals for services, and services
themselves. In general, there has been a move away from viewing learning difficulty
as a quantifiable "handicap" or individual pathology requiring management and
provision in special and often segregated services. The principle of normalisation,
emphasising the aim of creating as a normal a life as possible, has been the major
stimulus for change. The emphasis in learning difficulty has thus come to centre on
what can be achieved if people are given the opportunity to live a normal, community-
based and valued life rather a segregated, isolated and service-managed one. Changes
in conceptions of disability and learning difficulty have been contemporaneous with
changes in how people are treated by the available services. Services have changed to
emphasise integration rather than segregation, and moves from large, isolated
hospitals to smaller, ordinary housing in the community have been underway for some
years. Concerns have been raised that the move out of hospitals is too slow, too poorly
funded or supported, or that new services do not do enough to move away from an
institutional philosophy. On the whole, however, the aims and ideals of the new
philosophies and services have been welcomed and supported even if their
implementation has not, and the ideals of normalisation are generally seen as an
evaluative yardstick for evaluating the success of these services (Walmsley, 2001).
It has also been pointed out, however, that "learning difficulty" is not
something whose "true" nature has been "discovered", but, rather, that it is a concept
which is brought into being in specific fields of knowledge which create it as a
problem in specific ways, identifiable through specific tests, and amenable to specific
interventions. So, the ways in which this concept emerges as an object of knowledge
are linked to specific ways in which people are defined as "having learning
difficulties" — something which has an impact not only upon the social and
institutional interventions to which they become amenable, but also on the types of
power relationships in which they are situated with specific others, and on how they
understand and relate to themselves as particular kinds of being.
The basic purpose of this chapter, then, has been to set out the current position
which exists in terms of how learning difficulties are generally thought about, and the
care services which exist around them. We have thus identified the specific situation
around which this research is carried out — community care group homes situated in
community settings with live-in staff. We also began to hint here at some limitations
and problems with the ideals by which such homes are generally evaluated. That is, it
was commented that the ideals of normalisation and QOL overlook much of
importance with respect to these environments in which people live. Whilst it cannot
be seen as a negative move that services take on the ideals of voice, rights and
empowerment with respect to service users, it must also be said that, as a consequence
of this focus, there is much that is not engaged with in terms of the points we have
been engaging with in the previous chapters — in terms of how particular concepts
objectify people as particular types of being, situate them in particular relationships
with others and make particular interventions into their lives and means of assessing
their conduct appropriate in relation to them. These points will be carried forward into
the next chapter, where the implications of these positions will be more thoroughly
critically assessed, and related to the writings and research which exist around them.
We will then be able to see more clearly why the research question which drives this
research is an important one to ask, and what it can add to the current position.
Chapter 5: Learning Difficulties, Services and Research: Critical Evaluation
The previous chapter highlighted a major change in the ways in which learning
difficulty has been talked about, identified, conceived and managed. Long-stay
hospitals are no longer the default provision for people with learning difficulty.
Instead, criticisms of existing care and changing concepts of learning difficulty have
led to the ideal of providing services for people in community settings (e.g. Dailey,
1989; Morris, 1993b; Ward, 1995; Emerson & Hatton, 1994; Means & Smith, 1998).
These moves have largely been welcomed, and criticism has tended to focus on how
far ideals of promoting voice, independence, choice and empowerment in care have
been realised. However, the point was also made that these changes reflect different
ways in which "learning difficulty" has existed as an object of knowledge, and that the
ways in which it is brought into being in this respect are linked to a variety of other
issues, such as what interventions become possible, how it becomes a technology
through which people can become objectified, and how it makes available
interventions into people's lives which constitute specific power relationships. This
chapter sets out to provide an alternative position — one that interrogates the relevant
developments from the perspective we have been setting out. The purpose of the first
part of the chapter, then, will be to question the ideals which normalisation and the
new forms of care are based upon, and to set out the reasons that a new analysis of
care settings working from the position we are setting up is timely in this area. The
second part outlines the development of a "social model of disability", a framework
for understanding disability which aims to focus on how people are "disabled" by
social factors rather than on a particular impairment residing within the individual.
Here, we will also assess the implications this model has had for research in disability•
studies generally, critically examine how issues of identity, subjectivity and labelling
have been researched in disability and learning difficulty, and detail the significance
all of this has for the study to be undertaken.
5.1 New Service Ideals: Deconstruction and Critique
It is possible to identify a shortcoming in ideals and services and in the
literature which has grown up around them in three main areas. Firstly, we saw a
frequent emphasis given to issues of "voice" and "empowerment" in ideals for, and
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criticisms of, care organisation. Such a position is in danger of missing much of
import if it merely reflects a neo-liberal conception of power. Without a consideration
of how "voice" reflects people's situation in power relationships and how it comes
from a particular subjected position, we end up with a position which merely assumes
that if one is able to express one's dissatisfactions, then power imbalances can be
redressed and the speaker empowered. Secondly, this concern indicates, and is backed
up by, a notion of a pre-given, coherent, bounded subject with particular properties
which exist around ideals of normalisation. This brings us onto the third point that,
since the ideals of normalisation hold sway, and despite the professed concern for
"empowerment", there is very little research about how people living in care
experience power, how power affects them.
"Voice" and "empowerment"
The emphasis on "voice" and "empowerment" is evident both in service
ideals, which aim to give users "a say" or "a choice" in their care, but also in
criticisms of care services in the literature. Such criticisms tend to centre wholly
around the success or failure of services to "empower" their users or to centre care
around them (e.g. Dailey, 1989; Beresford, 1993; Morris, 1993b; Sinson, 1995; Means
& Smith, 1998), the failure to provide a means for service users to make their voice
heard (e.g. Simons, 1995; Ward, 1995), or even the need for attempts to locate and
interpret a "voice" for this purpose in non-verbal behaviour (e.g. Crimmins, 1994;
Myers, 1995). Indeed, the whole purpose of advocacy is to help people to have a
"voice", or to have someone to "speak out" on their behalf This position reflects the
modern ideal of "voice" being taken to provide a privileged access to, or expression
of, the "self', with the presence of a voice taken to represent a total, 'living presence',
and therefore the expression of an authentic self, in a particular situation (Derrida,
1976). As Den-ida (1976) points out, this is a traditional orientation to language,
meaning, truth and self which has characterised Western thinking since antiquity. This
orientation, though, has been challenged by deconstructive and post-structuralist
thinking, such that Derrida sees it to be 'the master illusion of Western thought'
(Sampson, 1989).
The traditional position as regards "voice" is also characterised by Habermas'
(1984) notion of an 'ideal speech community,' in which communication is respectful,
and agreement unforced, between people of equal standing. According to this
conception, then, concrete social situations can be measured for how closely they
approximate to this ideal situation. The aim of approaching the ideal thus becomes
embodied in administrative and political legislation which aims to minimise those
factors which detract from it — notably in protecting or expressing people's 'rights' (as
can be seen in, for example, Williams & Schoultz, 1982; Campaign for the Mentally
Handicapped, 1984; Brandon, 1995). This can quite clearly be seen in the attempts to
find a non-derogatory (and therefore non-disempowering) label and to move away
from a conception of learning difficulty governed by medical judgements and focusing
on a pathological condition, towards one which emphasises abilities and similarities,
rather than differences which might place people with learning difficulty in a
powerless position. It can be seen in the shift towards normalisation which aims to put
individuals in "normal" positions, moving towards the ideal community in which they
will have an equal footing, equal status, and an equal voice with non-disabled people,
at which point, presumably, their special problems will disappear. It can be seen in
policies and services which embody these ideals and find ways of "giving a say" to
people, or "empowering" them by changing services' structures to redress power
imbalances.
This type of thinking is criticised by Nikolas Rose (1996), who, as we have
seen, draws on Foucault to challenge conventional notions of freedom as equating to
the unconstrained expression of an autonomous self:
human beings must interpret their past, and dream their future, as outcomes of personal
choices made or choices still to make yet within a narrow range of possibilities whose
restrictions are hard to discern because they form the horizon of what is thinkable. Their
choices are, in turn, seen as realization of the attributes of the choosing self— expressions
of personality — and reflect back upon the individual who has made them. The practice of
freedom appears only as the possibility of the maximum self-fulfilment of the active and
autonomous individual.
. 1 7)
Rose thus argues that conceptualising freedom based on notions such as those
discussed here — of freedom from restrictions on expressing the authentic, autonomous
self— means that people are not merely free to choose, but they are 'obliged to be free'
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(Rose, 1990, 1996) in understanding and recognising themselves as selves of a
particular type and acting accordingly. This type of thinking, which, explicitly or
implicitly, holds the full presence of the person, as identified by their voice, to be its
goal, permeates the area discussed so far.
Foucault's work gives some useful critical inputs into this area. In stark
contrast to Habermas' ideal of a perfect speech community, Foucault (1980f) contends
that 'power is always "already there", that one is never outside it' (p.141). He
therefore believes that Habermas' position is utopian:
The idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of truth
to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian to me. This
is precisely a failure to see that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, that
we have to break free of. I do not believe that society can exist without power relations...
The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of completely transparent
communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the
morality, the ethos, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games with as
little domination as possible.
(Foucault, 1998; p.298)
For Foucault, the "voice" of the individual which is prized so highly in the discourses
of modern care practices must itself come from a subjected position, a position which
exists in a specific orientation to particular relations of power and particular ethical
technologies. Additionally, power is not something which exists in such a way that it
can be easily "given" to an oppressed group. It does not exist in packages that can be
handed over, taken or exchanged as necessary; it exists in relations between people, in
social structures, and in systems of knowledge — often in very subtle ways. The ideal,
then, is not to put one's faith in "transparent communication", but to undertake an
analytics of power, knowledge and subjectivity in a particular situation — an analytics
which will include the issue of how "voices" are themselves indications and
expressions of subjected identities and relations of power. This issue of power will be
returned to shortly, but there are other aspects of the discourses around care and
normalisation to consider first.
Individuals and Socialisation
Alongside these issues of voice and empowerment in the ideals around care
goes the notion of a pre-given individual with a particular 'potential' (see, for
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example, Social Services Committee, 1990) which is also mirrored in the possibility
of attaining 'valued social roles' (Wolfensberger, 1983) or a particular level of quality
of life (Goode, 1994a). Inherent in this thinking is the idea that every person has a
particular potential within him/her, and that often this potential is hampered by
oppressive social conditions. Hence the idea that changing the relevant social
conditions can allow individuals to realise their innate potential, take on their rightful,
valued place in society, or be evaluated as enjoying an acceptable quality of life. Here,
it is not the idea of individual potential per se, nor the examining of social influences
which is the problem, but it is the manner in which these factors are conceptualised
and presented. Another point for critique is opened up by this realisation. Firstly, there
is the question of the theory of the individual subject. This requires one to situate the
thinking that is being discussed here in the context of 'individual-society dualism'
(Henriques et al., 1984). As we have seen already, Henriques et al. (1984) comment
with respect to approaches to developmental psychology that, despite the forcing of
the study of individuals up against the social world in this area:
the terms of individual-society dualism are themselves retained in the way in which the
problem of social formations is posed. Whether they are used implicitly or explicitly, this
retention inevitably constrains the theorizing of their relationship... The two entities are
still thought of as antithetical, as exclusive (though interacting), as separable and even
pulling in opposite directions.
(p.14-15)
Something similar might be said about the line of thinking which has led to the
development of services in learning difficulties and in the literature which evaluates
them. There is here also a conceptual distinction between the individual and the forces
of socialisation. Socialisation is a conceptually separable force to that of the potential
of the individual, and the former can enable or prevent the latter being fulfilled. As we
have seen, this is a problematic conception which misses the insights which
Foucault's work provides us with in relation to issues of power and subjectivity. In
Wolfensberger's normalisation theory, there is a definite conceptual division between
individual and society. Social conditions determine the individual's self-concept and
behaviour, and the presentation of the individual in turn determines the social
responses to him/her and thus the conditions which s/he will experience. Hence the
need for normalisation to break this cycle and lead to a positive presentation of
individuals and a consequent ameliorating of their social circumstances — the
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replacement of a negative cycle with a positive one. At first glance, this might not
seem such a problematic position, and the presence of individuals' innate properties in
the theory may not be immediately obvious. However, when this is examined more
closely, problems do begin to emerge. For instance, as a result of confusions arising
from the relative status of individual and society in the theory, Wolfensberger (1980a)
has been forced into a position of situating normalisation squarely within a notion of
individual potential:
Overzealous proponents [of normalisation] are commonly guilty of the assumption that
handicapped people are not handicapped, that retarded people are not retarded, and that
every handicapped person could do and be almost anything if only provided sufficient role
expectancy and opportunity.
(p.9'7)
Implicit in normalisation theory, then, is the notion of a pregiven individual with
specific potentialities which is socially formed primarily in relation to specific social
structures. The making of this point should not be misinterpreted as our taking on the
extreme (and untenable) position that nothing that could be described as "handicap" or
"disability" exists, nor should we wish to deny the presence of disabling effects
stemming from social situations. However, the way in which this problem is posed
leaves the process of internalisation or socialisation untheorised, and the question of
what is internalised — aspects of the social domain — and how we know what is
internalised unanswered (cf. Henriques et al., 1984; pp. 14-22). Hence we come to a
particular paradox upon closer examination of the theories involved. The notion of a
pre-given subject with certain potentialities is implicit but unstated. However, the
hidden nature of this subject leads to possible conclusions that must be co-opted
because of their unviability, namely that socialisation and role expectancy have an all-
encompassing effect to the extent that any disability is conceptually non-existent.
Attempts to resolve this problem then rely on asserting the existence of the subject-
with-potentials which exists prior to socialisation. The existence of this subject,
however, is so problematic for the theory that, to circumvent the possibility of it
gaining precedence over the social, it is even reasserted in an implicit way, by means
of a statement of what the theory cannot claim rather than an explicit picture of the
subject which is to be socialised. This has parallels to the problems Henriques et al.
(1984) note in their study of theories of subjectivities which are predicated upon either
the assumed properties of a pre-given biological entity or some aspect of the social:
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Whilst we should avoid founding a theory of subjectivity on a taken-for-granted biological
origin, we cannot construct a position which altogether denies biology any effects.
(p.21)
Similarly, normalisation theory becomes stuck between its own constructions of the
individual and the social — whose constructed nature it is then unable to acknowledge.
This situation can persist because:
certain norms have become so much part of our common-sense view of reality that we
have been able to forget that they are the result of a production: that they have become
naturalized as indisputably biological or social.
(ibid.; p.22)
Therefore, the construction of disability or difference in normalisation theory is not
acknowledged as such — it is taken to be an indisputable part of reality. For instance,
Szivos (1992) points out that, in normalisation theory, 'nowhere is disability spoken
of as something which could be valued or accepted in its own right.., it is rooted in a
hostility to and denial of "differentness",' (p.126) and hence its application can trap
people in an eternal cycle of "passing" as normal or dealing with stigma. Despite its
professed concern with social problems of disability, then, normalisation cannot offer
a contested production on which to base its aims. It therefore ends up essentialising a
negative conception of difference as its key problem, set up in opposition to the
desired goal of normality, which it is then unable to move beyond. This is a
consequence of the theory's inability to attend to its own constructed positions
stemming from its difficulty with the problems relating to individual-society dualism
which we have been discussing.
Another taken-for-granted production upon which normalisation, and the
ideals for care which draw upon it, founders is that of a unified self, and the
contradictions this creates for the notion of 'roles' in normalisation. Again, the work
of Henriques et al. (1984) is important in understanding the significance of this. Roles
are a central concept in normalisation, having a key influence on individuals'
attitudes, self-concept, self-esteem, personality and behaviour, and thus shaping
societal responses to them. Henriques et al. (1984), however, note that role theory
reproduces the same type of dualism that has been discussed already, but it shifts its
terrain so that 'the external has been welded onto the internal' (p.23). It assumes the
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existence of an internal, individual, fixed, core personality or self which takes on roles
and responds accordingly. These roles can be added, removed or altered according to
particular circumstances — in this case by intervention and the application of
normalisation goals. Hence, "individual" and "social" have been transposed into
"personality" (or "self') and "roles" (ibid.). Thus, similar problems can be noted.
Again, there are assumed and untheorised properties attached to a unitary social
influence (the "role") and to a unitary core essence (the "self'). Again also, the
process of interaction is unproblematised — what exactly are these unitary roles, and
how can they be so easily conceptually separated from other social factors? What is
the process by which they are taken up to affect a core self in a particular way? As
long as these problems, raised by a theory which is situated within an under-theorised
dualistic framework, are unacknowledged, a coherent social theory of individuals will
remain elusive (cf. Henriques et al., 1984; pp.23-5, on Mead and Harre).
Here, we follow Henriques et al. (1984) in arguing that the work of Foucault is
key for overcoming many of the problems with this type of social theory. His writings,
they claim, 'help deconstruct the monolithic, unitary character of power and the social
domain which has characterised... social theory' (ibid.; p.92). The problem of the
notion of a unified subject existing prior to social influences or "subjectification" and
its constitution by the social is certainly a recurring theme in Foucault's work (e.g.
1979b, 1981a, 1982). It has been identified as a problem of special significance in his
work by several writers (e.g. Butler, 1990; Dean, 1994; Sawicki, 1994; Ransom,
1998). John Ransom (1998), for instance, orients Foucault's work in opposition to
'vitalist' readings of power which rely upon a notion of an essential or vital "nature"
which is constrained by forms of power. Ransom (1998) points out that Foucault's
work is radical and makes available so many trenchant insights precisely because it
moves beyond such a conception. As has been discussed, in Foucault's work, the
notion of a prior, essential subject is anathema — it makes no sense to posit a social
theory on a notion of a core self as conceptually separate from, and having primacy
over, those forms of power/knowledge which constitute it.
The individual.., is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is... one of its prime effects. The
individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent which it is
that effect, it is the element of its articulation.
(Foucault, 1980f; p.98)
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It must be remembered that power does not act against the essence of a pre-
given subject, silencing its authentic voice and negating its potentials. Power is not
just repressive and prohibitory, it is also productive. It produces the very subjected
positions from which people act and speak, the relationships in which they are situated
with others, interventions which become applicable to them, and so on. So, instead of
basing a theory, implicitly or explicitly, on the notion of a transcendental subject:
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to
say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject... which
can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc.,
without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to
the field of event or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.
(Foucault, 1980a; p.117)
Again, then, an analysis is indicated which will be able to move beyond these
conceptions, take account of the constituted nature of the subject, and hence analyse
how individuals are situated in a nexus of power relations which constitute their
subjectivity as well as weighing on their conduct. It is, as we have seen, just such an
analysis which our research undertakes with respect to people's lives in community
care accommodation.
To summarise, then, we have seen here how the notion of voice and
empowerment are problematic if they do not take into consideration the position with
respect to power and subjectivity that "voice" originates from. Normalisation, for all
its endeavour to be a truly social theory of the individual pits social influence against
the individual and roles against the core self. It makes the attempt to take other things
than voice into account, but, because it is not alert to its own exclusions, it ends up in
a theoretical quagmire and fails to transcend these problems, becoming stuck on a
problematic notion of difference. It too, ends up implicitly based on an idea of a pre-
given subject or, more specifically, a core subject-with-potentials (although this is an
idea which endangers the theory to the extent that it cannot be forcefully stated).
Foucault's contribution to critical theory enables us to become aware of these
dilemmas and to begin to construct an analysis that can move beyond them, and it is
such an analysis that we aim to undertake in this research.
-127-
There is something, however, which must be stated here lest any
misunderstandings arise. The deconstructive moves which have been made here
around notions of "voice", "empowerment", normalisation and their effects on care
should not be taken to undermine the contributions that these ideals have made to the
lives of people with learning difficulties. This is not intended as a criticism of self-
advocacy nor of movements to de-institutionalise care provision and provide a
"normal" alternative. Given how the situation surrounding care has changed since
such movements came into being, it would be somewhat crass to imagine that they do
not comprise an important input into the debate around care service provision. The
aim, rather, has been to show how a particular conception of individuality, or
selfhood, and social influences limits the ways in which provision is examined and
assessed. Just as Parker et al. (1995) point out that the choosing of 'friendly
euphemisms' for "learning difficulties" will not in itself overcome the 'traditional
oppositions that constitute the field of psychopathology' (p.2), so an ideal based
around "voice" or simple notions of empowerment or normalisation will not in itself
be enough to overcome all of the negative effects of power in a care environment.
What we are drawing attention to most importantly, then, is a gap in the
literature in this area. The main point is that the theories we have been looking at
leave no room for analysing the ways in which forms of power and subjectivity are
constituted in specific systems of knowledge. It must be recognised in order to carry
out an analysis of these issues that the positions people speak from are positions
which exist in relation to particular aspects of human life which are brought into being
in such systems. These include ideals of "normality" and "difference" themselves —
"normality" is not a neutral and essential term, but is itself a reflection of particular
ways in which the human subject becomes thinkable in relation to specific ideals
(such as intellectual ability). As such, any analysis must take into account how
"normality" and "difference" themselves constitute specific ideals to which people
relate in specific ways. The goal, then, is to miry the ideals which gave rise to the
movements discussed forward, and to demonstrate that it is possible to formulate an
approach which successfully transcends these problems, and hence to provide a new
form of critique.
Power in Care Settings
This new approach which drives our research, then, is one which incorporates
the work of Foucault to examine the workings of power in more depth. Power and
empowerment are much thornier and more complex issues than indicated by critiques
which centre around how far care lives up to normalisation criteria or confers
independence, or how successful self-advocacy groups are at giving people a voice
and empowering choice (e.g. Crawley, 1990; Flynn & Ward, 1991; Stalker, 1997). As
has been pointed out in this chapter and others, Foucault's work takes into account
how power functions as a disciplinary and normalising force in social apparatuses,
how the conduct of individuals is governed by a complex and heterogeneous set of
forces, how particular subject positions are brought into being in relation to these
forces, and how the individual him/herself is an effect of power.
Given this concern, there are two researchers whose work merits closer
attention — Ewing Go 	 nan and Richard Servian. Goffman (1968) is perhaps most
renowned for his work detailing the social situation of people living in 'total
institutions.' His work in this area was one of the major inputs into the scandals
around institutional living which led to pressure to find an alternative. He defined a
'total institution' as:
a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off
from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed,
formally administered round of life.
(Goffman, 1968; p1!)
He concentrated predominantly on mental hospitals, and aimed to demonstrate the
various ways in which such institutions administer the lives of their inmates, how
inmates are treated by the staff, and the strategies with which they respond in order to
survive. The potential similarities such a study might have with the research
undertaken here are obvious. Therefore, a number of points of divergence will be
identified. The first is, of course, that whilst (as has been detailed in the critical
literature) many community care services persist with institutional models and
philosophies in some ways, few could be described as 'total' institutions, since
typically, work (where performed) is done elsewhere (often a day centre), provisions
for leisure are usually made outside the care setting, and restrictions on entering and
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leaving the physical setting of care are generally less restricted. Additionally,
Goffman's work is based on participant observation rather than the accounts of
individuals, and tends to be based on highly visible observations.
The most significant difference, however, is the very fact that Goffman's work
in this area divides into an analysis of administration of lives (in which he includes
such things as discipline, organised activities, communal mealtimes, 'mortification' of
the self-identity which existed prior to incarceration, and so on) and inmates responses
to them (such as taking on particular new self-identities to replaced the 'mortified'
one, orienting oneself to the institution in a certain way to make life more bearable,
partaking in an unusual inmate world with its own codes of conduct and rituals,
'working the system,' gaining and guarding petty privileges, demeaning oneself to
staff for such privileges, and so on). It is not, of course, unreasonable to assert that
individuals respond to new situations in a variety of ways, and the analysis Goffman
makes of how self-identities change upon entering an institution are informative.
However, the area we are seeking to examine in this research has a different focus.
Goffman's research was not about power and subjectivity as we have been
conceptualising them. As has been said, Goffman's research focused on how people
react to severely constraining forces inside 'total institutions.' The points we have
been making, however, show that issues of power, identity and subjectivity are often
embodied in quite subtle ways which would be missed by this sort of analysis. Power
does not just exist where it is explicitly observable, it is not an issue only in the face
of clearly constraining forces, nor is it limited to the type found in 'total institutions.'
Given the insights we have gained from Foucault's work, it is possible to see that
power not only constrains people and forces them to adopt certain 'strategies' in the
face of it, but also how it is productive of particular forms of relationships, and of
particular subjectivities and modes of self-understanding. These are issues which
Goffman's study does not make room for, and awareness of them allows the study of
these factors in a variety of settings, and for examination of the more subtle ways that
they work outside of 'total' institutions.
Also significant is the work of Richard Servian (1996). Servian has recognised
the importance of a Foucauldian approach for studying power in community care. He
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carried out a study looking at different perceptions of power from the point of view of
care users, managers and carers, using a Foucault-influenced conception of power as
one part of his analysis — the 'fourth dimension' of power. He took the important step
of recognising all of the people in his study as able, in some ways, to take an active
part in the relations of power which they experience, arguing that power is not
necessarily oppressive. He was also rightly sceptical of 'grand solutions' or
administrative answers to issues of empowerment.
Servian's project is timely in attempting to apply some of Foucault's ideas to a
study of power in care. However, there are a number of problems with his approach.
Despite his professed interest in how Foucault reconceptualises power, and how
people are produced as subjects by systems of power, he seems badly to
misunderstand much of what Foucault had to say. This is illustrated when he outlines
what he conceives of as a problem with Foucault's view of power, 'with people
tending to be seen as victims, their actions heavily determined by some, mainly
invisible outside interest, rather than being seen as active participants' (Servian, 1996;
p.21). As has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, readings of Foucault which tend
to see determinism in some of his middle-period writings are not that uncommon —
indeed Foucault (1993) himself has hinted that perhaps he occasionally concentrated
too much on restrictive aspects of power in that period. However, as Ransom (1998)
has pointed out, such a reading loses many of the most trenchant of Foucault's
insights, and we have seen in earlier chapters the importance of Foucault's ethical
work in understanding how people relate to themselves, assign meaning and value to
their conduct, and direct their conduct in line with certain ideals. However,
empowerment, as defined for Servian's (1996) study simply means 'that through
having power individuals can at least partly meet their own "needs" (p.7).
This conception informs Servian's whole approach. So, he asks questions such
as 'what needs must be met for people to be empowered?', and judges empowerment
insofar as it represents 'moves toward autonomy' (ibid.; p.8). As a consequence of
this, Servian's study focuses on the explicit perceptions of power which individuals
have — how they 'perceive their power position, their use of power, and how they
perceive power affecting them' (ibid.; p.33; emphasis added). There is a tension here
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between, on the one hand, seeing power as 'insidious,' and, on the other, locating an
analysis of power in the declared perceptions of individuals and in their explicit
attempts to assert some form of power. Clearly, since Foucault's reconceptualisation
of power is complex and rather esoteric, studying how people report that they perceive
power will not be likely to generate information consistent with a Foucauldian
approach.
It is these problems that lead Servian to limited conclusions. For instance, he
claims that empowerment (or positive uses of power) for care users can be seen in
'individual assertion... challenging behaviour... [and] membership of advisory groups'
(ibid.; p.39), whilst negative or disempowering aspects of power are 'individual
assertion eve response)... challenging behaviour eve response)... [and] non-
participation in groups' (ibid.; p.39). Further, he claims that users can be empowered
by 'enabling workers [and] some group meetings' (ibid.; p.41) and disempowered by
'workers not listening... [and] petty rules in residential and day support' (ibid.; p.41).
He concludes that the Foucauldian conception of power sheds light mainly on
disciplinary power — how 'ideological influences cast a climate of fear over the ability
of all stakeholders to challenge the status quo' (ibid.; p.46) — and that carers and
managers are more powerful than care users. Servian's misunderstanding of some of
the main aspects of Foucault's work is compounded here by his lack of a method for
applying a Foucauldian analysis. Despite his stated interest in 'what kind of subject is
produced' (Digeser, 1992; cited in Servian, 1996; p.20), examination of this is
missing from his study, and he concludes merely that power restrains people and
produces a 'climate of fear' which prevents them from challenging the status quo.
Despite Servian's recognition of Foucault as important to a study of power in a
care setting, his missing of Foucault's key points mean that he is only able to draw
limited and rather simple conclusions. His analyses centre around simple and explicit
aspects of power. Thus, he is able to analyse power only as it constrains and limits, as
it prevents people from meeting their own needs, and instils in them a fear of
challenging the status quo. This, however, is precisely the limited conception of power
which Foucault challenged. Hence, Servian's method finds no room for an analysis of
subjectivities, of how people become subjects of institutions and systems of
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knowledge, how people are deemed to have certain identities and how they engage
with or resist them, and hence how their interactions with institutions, other people
and themselves, in a variety of often subtle ways, embody and reflect issues of power
and resistance. It is just this sort of analysis that our research undertakes, adapting, as
we have seen, Foucault's three domains of critical ontology to discover how the
accounts that people give of their relationships to care environments evidence their
interactions with these issues. This is not the same as examining how people perceive
power, as in Servian's study, but analysing how their accounts of their situation both
implicitly and explicitly reflect the specific relationships they are placed in, the forms
of institutional organisation they are subject to, the subjectivities they are led to
recognise to recognise in themselves, and so on.
Summary
The dominant ways of understanding learning difficulties and care services
lead to a limited critique. There is no analysis of power in care settings that
successfully moves beyond conventional notions of power and empowerment or
analyses how individuals themselves are effects of power, how they are subjectified,
and how they interact with these forces. An analysis based on a careful and rigorous
application of Foucault's ideas to community care is therefore overdue in this area. It
is this gap that our research seeks to fill.
There still, however, remain some points to consider which were not dealt
with above. Normalisation theory, for instance, has been criticised by others in various
ways. Robinson (1989) contends that normalisation inherently discriminates against
people who cannot achieve normal living and does nothing to alleviate their situation.
Brown and Smith (1992b) and Ferns (1992) argue that it needs to consider issues of
ethnicity and gender and what "difference" means in this context. A number of
authors have also questioned the implicit conformity to "normal" cultural ideals in
normalisation and contended that, to overcome this problem, the theory needs to
become situated within a challenge to the structure of services, the role of
professionals, the presence of disabling barriers, and the very process of stigmatising
difference (e.g. Ryan, 1987; Brown & Smith, 1989; Szivos, 1992; Brown &
Walmsley, 1997; Chappell, 1997; Walmsley, 1997; Simpson, 1998). Similarly,
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Goodley (1997, 1998) and Aspis (1997) have called for the understanding and
appraisal of self-advocacy to take place in a wider framework than that of structural
inadequacies stifling voice and choice. They argue for the consideration of legal and
political issues (Aspis, 1997), conceptualisations of learning difficulty as a social
issue (Goodley, 1997), and how advisors' conceptual orientation to learning difficulty
influences their interactions with advocates (Goodley, 1998). However, despite these
emerging voices (of which more will seen shortly), Walmsley (2001) contends that
research and thinking in this area continues to be dominated by the ideals of
normalisation, especially by its concerns to provide valued social roles. These
comments do, though, begin to orient normalisation and its ideals more in line with
what has been called the 'social model of disability' (e.g. Oliver, 1986, 1989; Makin,
1995; Finkelstein & Stuart, 1996; Albrecht, 1997). This model has been an important
development in the field of disability both in changing its conceptualisation and
influencing research. It is therefore to this model and the research and thinking which
has emerged from it that our attention must now turn.
5.2 The social model of disability and related research
There have recently been numerous voices raised in protest at the way that
disabled people are treated in modern society, and the excluded and marginal place
they occupy within it. Arguments have been put forward that disabled people have
been systematically subjected to discrimination, prejudice and exclusion from full
participation in society (e.g. Finkelstein, 1980; Stone, 1984; Barnes, 1990, 1997a;
Morris, 1991, 1993b; Albrecht, 1992; Oliver & Campbell, 1996; Davis, 1997a; Means
& Smith, 1998). There now exists a growing multitude of voices which challenge both
the material and social aspects of this marginalisation and oppression and the
conceptual basis upon which it rests. Disabled writers and academics have themselves
begun to question the very ways in which disability is conceived, and to challenge the
positivist theories which dominate its treatment in the medical sciences (e.g.
Shakespeare & Watson, 1997; Oliver, 1998; Oliver & Barnes, 1998).
Oliver (1990) argues that the way in which disability is conceived will
determine how attitudes and behaviour are oriented towards it, and this represents a
problem since the dominant meanings surrounding disability are ones of tragedy and
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of disabled people as victims. This is what he calls the 'personal tragedy theory' of
disability (Oliver, 1986, 1990, 1996), and it is one of the main underpinnings of the
'individual model' from which most understandings of disability arise. The individual
model sees the problems of disability as residing wholly in the individual and as
resulting from physical or mental limitations. This perspective has been
overwhelmingly historically dominant and has shaped the ways that disability is seen
by psychology and medicine.
The individual model relies on definitions of disability, such as that by the
World Health Organisation, which are based on disease-like conceptions. Such
definitions draw on the notion of "normal" function or activity and define disability as
a deviation from that, as an inability to perform normally in some way as the result of
a limiting impairment (Oliver, 1990; Abberley, 1997). Implicit in this definition are
connotations of deficit, deficiency, imperfection or deviation from a desired norm
(Abberley, 1997). Hence, medical interventions in the lives disabled people tend to
propose treatments for the "handicap" or the individual's "problem" without any real
consideration of how these interventions affect the economy or quality of life of the
individual involved — rehabilitation is ruthlessly pursued (French, 1993; Oliver, 1996).
Oliver (1990) claims that this is a direct result of the tendency to view disability as an
individual problem:
As long as the environment consists of social roles that are considered to be normal, the
inability of the individual to live up to the requirements of these roles put him or her in a
disadvantaged position and thus creates a handicap. In this way the medical approach is
conserved since changes must be brought to bear on the individual rather than the
environment.
(p.4)
Thus, medical and social services are based upon individualised and medicalised
conceptions of disability and are designed by non-disabled people, giving disabled
people little or no control over processes which affect their lives (Oliver, 1990;
Abberley, 1993).
In contrast to this perspective is the "social model" of disability, which rejects
the individualising assumptions outlined above, and instead argues that the problems
of disability need to be located in society. The structure of society as it discriminates
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against disabled people — whether in poor access to buildings, inadequate housing,
poor services, social or employment discrimination, inadequate public transport,
segregationist policies in education, and so on — is highlighted as the central issue. To
reflect this, the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation have proposed a
modified definition of impairment and disability to counter the individual-modelled
ones which have dominated understanding previously:
Impairment: lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organ or
mechanism of the body; and
Disability: the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social
structure organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical
impairments and thus excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social
activities. Physical disability is therefore a particular form of social oppression.
(UPIAS, 1976, cited in Swain & Cameron, 1999; p.69)
The causes of disability thus become located in forms of social organisation and the
social origins of impairment (both as a concept and in respect of their being caused by
disadvantaged social conditions). This has led a number of writers to challenge how
disability is conceived and represented, how it is researched, and how it is dealt with
in legal and social policy (e.g. Gunn, 1989; Finkelstein & French, 1993; Oliver,
1993b; Zarb, 1992, 1997; Barton, 1997; Bruggemann & Fredal, 1999).
Research based on the social model tends to focus on how the environment
disables people by limiting their choices or mobility, or situating them in a
disadvantaged or disempowered position (e.g. Barnes, 1990; French, 1993), how
disabled people are negatively represented in the media and charity publicity (e.g.
Barnes, 1992; Hevey, 1992, 1993; Shakespeare, 1994, 1999; Philpot, 1995; Vlachou,
1995; Pointon & Davies, 1997), how social policy proceeds from particular
individualised conceptions of disability (Campbell 8.z. Oliver, 1996; Davis, 1997b;
Oliver & Barnes, 1998), and how disability is socially and discursively produced, and
the issues this raises for identity (e.g. Liggett, 1988; Casling, 1993; Marks, 1994;
Chadwick, 1996; Davis, 1997a; Corker & French, 1999a; Hughes, 1999).
One thing which is strikingly obvious when reviewing the social model
literature is that considerations of learning difficulty are generally conspicuously
absent. Oliver (1990) notes that the emphasis in the social model is on social
-136-
restriction rather than medical or social scientific categories and hence there is no
reason why learning difficulties should not be included. Despite this, however, the
emphasis is almost universally on "the body" or notions of "able-bodiedness" as
opposed to impairment — with learning difficulties usually left out (Goodley, 1997;
Walmsley, 2001). So, whilst the emphasis in most areas of disability has shifted to
focus on the social conditions which disable people, learning difficulties still tends to
be regarded primarily as a function of physiological impairments (Chappell, 1998;
Chappell, Goodley & Lawthom, 2000; Gillman, et al., 2000; Goodley, 2001). It has
been suggested that this lack is due to the general neglect of learning difficulties in
sociological (Chappell, 1997; Walmsley, 1997) and psychological (Hatton, Hastings
& Vetere, 1999) research generally. However, there have been moves towards
conceptualising learning difficulties as a social and cultural phenomenon (e.g.
Edgerton, 1986; Langness & Levine, 1986; Chappell, 1997; Walmsley, 1997;
Goodley, 2001) which fits in with the social model. These points will be explored
below.
Research
The main area of research to be considered here are those that draw upon the
social model, criticise it, or aim to move beyond both it and normalisation — and
especially that which uses Foucault to do so.
The very conception of the social model of disability has been challenged by a
number of writers for squaring its emphasis exclusively on social causes of disability,
such that the individual, and his/her body, is banished from the theory (see, for
example, Crow, 1992; Shakespeare, 1992; Parker, 1993; Read, 1998; Corker &
French, 19991); Marks, 1999; Williams, 1999). Read (1998), for instance, argues that
the social model is theoretically dubious and leads to overstated conclusions, and that,
although it has been useful in challenging a number of oppressive practices based on
the pathologisation of disabled people, it is not able to provide 'a full and adequate
explanation of the experience of disability' (Read, 1998;.  p.288; see also Low, 1993,
1996; Bury, 1996; Crow 1996; Williams, 1996). Read (1998) contends, then, that the
focus of the social model exclusively on external factors is simplistic and reductionist,
and does not give credit to 'the complexity of the relationships and interactions
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between individuals and the social structures within they find themselves' (p.288),
and that it disregards those disabled people who 'perceive their impairments as very
significant and not in every respect, overwhelmingly positive aspects of their personal
experience' (p.289). Despite the undoubted use over the years of harsh treatments
being endured by disabled people in the name of a narrow conception of normality, it
does not follow, she contends, that the body and impairments should be totally
removed from discussion.
In a similar vein, Marks (1999) has redefined disability as 'the complex
relationship between the environment, body and psyche, which serves to exclude
certain people from being full participants in interpersonal, social, cultural, economic
and political affairs' (p. 611), and she argues that medicine addresses an observable
pathology as the subject of its inquiry and practice rather than the person. Drawing on
Foucault, she argues that 'the medical gaze... constitutes the patient as a docile and
passive body, rather than a reflexive subject' (Marks, 1999; p.612), but, she says, the
social model also has little interest in subjective experience as it banishes concern for
the individual from its discourse. In response to these kinds of problems, Goodley
(2001) has called for an approach which recognises the nature of impairment (not just
disability) as social and not as representing "facts" about a definitely identifiable
shortcoming within an individual. Such an approach would also realise that the
manner in which impairments are brought into being make available particular ways
of conceptualising and labelling people's behaviour and introduce the possibility of
extending diagnoses into diverse areas of people's lives and conduct. Such an
approach must, Goodley (2001) argues, also take a critical approach to the 'discursive
and material formations' upon which ideas of normality, abnormality and impairment
are founded. This, then, represents an approach which has at its core markedly similar
concerns to those which have shaped our discussion of these areas thus far. We have,
though, taken here a greater interest in Foucauldian ideas relating to power and
subjectivity in formulating the questions which drive the research, and this brings us
onto our next consideration — how Foucault's work is beginning to have an impact in
the area of disability in general and learning difficulties specifically.
A number of writers have recognised the importance of Foucault for
transcending the problems with conceptions of disability which we have been
discussing (e.g. Copeland, 1997, 1999; Hogan, 1999; Priestley, 1999; Reindal, 1999)
— although many of these uses are quite superficial and do not resolve much. There are
a few, however, which merit closer attention. Hughes and Paterson (1997), for
example, draw heavily upon Foucault's ideas about the body and the objectifying gaze
to argue that the social model's banishment of the individual and the body from its
theorising makes the error of ceding the body to medical discourse. They cite Foucault
to indicate how the body is a problematic site for the inscription and contestation of
power and knowledge. The exclusive emphasis on social influences therefore
'consigns the bodily aspects of disability to a reactionary and oppressive discursive
space' (Hughes & Paterson, 1997; p.328). They conclude that the body must be
recognised as constituted by bio-power, and that this must be a central consideration
for if we are to challenge the right of medical discourse to name and pathologise
bodies into particular genera and determine status and needs accordingly.
Foucault is also invoked as a source of solutions to shortcomings in disability
theories by Liggett (1988) and Chadwick (1996). Chadwick (1996) uses Foucault's
work on power/knowledge and governmentality to suggest how disability, and
especially disability discrimination, might better be understood. He argues that the
question of what constitutes disability — especially in terms of deciding where
discrimination begins and ends — is itself a question of governance. The systems of
knowledge surrounding disability identify it as something to be governed in a
particular way. The place of disability in systems of discourse determines who has the
right to make professionals pronouncements on it, what are acceptable ways of
understanding and socially managing it, and what then will count as an individual or
social problem. Chadwick (1996) uses this as a springboard to argue that the social
model does not go far enough in its assertions, and that Foucault's work should be
used to examine how power/knowledge reaches deep within people and shapes
identities and the meanings attached to them, and thus to help people to question the
dominant meanings around disability and find space to change how disability is
governed. Liggett (1988) similarly draws upon Foucault's ideas to argue that labels of
disability, and the systems of knowledge they represent, 'participate in the
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maintenance of relations of dominance' (Liggett, 1988; p.265) and should be studied
accordingly. She contends that, just as Foucault has shown how delinquents are
encouraged to discipline themselves, so we should ask how the opposition between
disability and normality functions to create people as disabled. She therefore calls for
a Foucauldian-style 'interpretative approach to the politics of disability' (p.273) which
would focus on the practices that manage identities and attempt to understand the
systems of knowledge that produce disability, with the aim of helping people to upset
conventional notions of what it means to be disabled.
Specifically in relation to learning difficulties, Gillman, Swain and Heyman
(1997) make a similar argument in contending that the 'tyranny of professional
discourses' (p.675) leads to the privileging of information which acts to pathologise
people, to the detriment of information which would be more useful to the individual
him/herself. This objectification of people in professional discourses is useful for
controlling and managing people, and, therefore, concerned professionals would better
serve people with learning difficulties by 'critically evaluating and deconstructing
their assessment and intervention models and procedures' (p.691). Although not
explicitly drawing on Foucault, Dyson (1987b) illustrates something along these lines
in performing an analysis of doctor-parent interactions which suggest that assessments
of children's educational needs have functions different from those explicitly stated,
and that they serve not so much to identify and meet "needs", but to justify decisions
which have already been made by professionals about these needs, and thus to justify
particular forms of intervention which have already been ascribed. Gillman et al.
(2000) also make the point that forms of diagnosis attached to learning difficulties
bring forth particular forms of pathology which are not "natural", but are connected to
the forms of objectification connected to the diagnosis, and that this has consequences
in terms of constructing 'careers as patients and cases' which people become tied to as
a result.
This research has gone some way to illustrating what is to be gained from a
Foucauldian approach to disability. However, there is still much work to be done.
There is little indication in these studies, for example, of what a Foucauldian study
would look like, what it would be based on, and how it would be carried out. It is not
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indicated how the body might be examined as a site of power, how the process of
people upsetting conventional notions of disability would take place, nor how the
relationships that people have to systems of power/knowledge might be studied.
Whilst these studies discuss power and knowledge as regards understandings and
representations of disability, how individuals themselves actually experience and
relate to these systems and how they constitute subjectivities which people might
recognise or contest is omitted. Furthermore, all of these studies focus on discursive
relationships and general conceptions of disability in systems of knowledge. Whilst
these are important issues, the analysis of power from the point-of-view of those who
experience it is omitted. So, nothing is asked about how social apparatuses act to
manage people with learning difficulties, how they actually govern the individuals in
them, and how subjectivities are formed and contested in the context of them. This is
an aspect of Foucault's philosophy which is so central, that it is even said to
characterise his whole oeuvre (Deleuze, 1992), and so clearly its omission is an
oversight which merits consideration.
Allan (1996, 1998) has used a Foucauldian analysis in the context of children
with "special needs" attending mainstream schools. She proposes that a research
strategy based around several of Foucault's concepts can move understanding beyond
simplistic notions of integration and examine the discourses of special educational
needs according to which children are included or excluded from the mainstream. The
aim of her analysis is to 'help us to understand the experiences of children with SEN
[special educational needs] in mainstream schools, by developing an analytical
framework which allows the informal and formal discourses which have constructed
children with SEN to speak' (Allan, 1996; p.231). Allan (1998) recognises that,
although Foucault was generally 'something of a global theorist,' a Foucauldian
analysis of institutions starting from an internal standpoint — one that can account for
what actually happens — is long overdue. She thus undertakes an analysis of the
situation of children with special educational needs in mainstream classrooms. Her
analysis examines how mainstream pupils, from how they talk about SEN pupils,
exercise a regime of `mini-governmentality' (ibid.) around their SEN peers, how they
are involved in the production of informal discourses which construct SEN in the
classroom, and how they thus come to act as kinds of 'gatekeepers' to inclusion in
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schools. She also goes on to analyse SEN pupils' 'technologies of the self (ibid.),
arguing that pupils frequently transgress out of the identities that others construct for
them.
Aside from the fact that it is examining a different situation, Allan's research
here shares many concerns with our own. However, there are key differences. For
Allan, evidence of power in educational settings with SEN pupils is evidenced by how
mainstream pupils seem to be governing their inclusion and engaging in pedagogic
strategies towards them in this respect, and SEN pupils are said to the engaging in
technologies of the self when they transgress out of the identities which mainstream
pupils and teachers construct for them. Our research, however, is concerned with how
people themselves experience and relate to power and subjectivity. We are not
examining power in relation to people in care homes through how other people talk
about them and construct them in informal discourses, but, as we have said, with how
what they themselves say about their situation and their relationship to the care
environment indicates the forms of knowledge which are constructing them, the
differential relationships in which they are situated, the forms of intervention and
action to which they become amenable, the subject positions to which they are tied,
the ethical technologies which they draw upon in relating to themselves and assigning
meaning and value to their conduct, and how they interact with these issues in
particular ways. It is people's own experiences of power and subjectivity in which we
are interested, and this can only be properly examined through their own accounts,
rather than the accounts of other people with respect to them. It is through this sort of
analysis that we can begin to formulate a picture of people's experience of power, and
of the problems that might be facing in respect of it. This is not to say that Allan's
analyses are somehow incorrect or inappropriate, merely that our own, whilst sharing
a number of general concerns, has a different focus.
5.3 Conclusion
We have seen in this chapter that there are numerous aspects of power which
the ideals of community care leave no room to consider. We do not wish to undermine
the positive steps that have been made in terms of moving away from isolated and
oppressive hospital-like institutions, but the mistake must not be made that we can
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conclude that power is no longer an issue, nor that the new ideals eradicate the
workings of power and all potential problems attached to it. Conventional
considerations of empowerment are limited in that they are implicitly based on a
troublesome and untheorised conception of an authentic self potentially
uncontaminated by power and able to realise itself fully in an empowered voice. An
important realisation here is that someone's "Voice" is not only to be seen as a
laudable end in its own right, but also as signifying or articulating a subjected
relationship to systems of power. Additionally, the normalisation principle which has
had such a major effect is based on reasoning which is stuck between problematic
constructions of the individual and the social, and ends up problematising difference
and thus missing much of potential significance.
Criticisms of community care provision for people with learning difficulties
are, as has been shown, widespread, but they tend to be based around an acceptance of
these new ideals, centring as they do around limited conceptions of voice and
empowerment, lack of choice or control over the packages of care offered or the staff
involved, the lack of progress towards the implementation of normalisation goals,
quality of life, adequate funding or integration (see Walmsley, 2001). From a
Foucauldian perspective, power cannot be so simply conceptualised, nor can its
effects be so simply negated. Despite an important move by Servian (1996) in
recognising the potential importance of a Foucault-influenced analysis in producing a
deeper understanding of power in care settings, there is no research which actually
applies his ideas satisfactorily to this task. We have argued, then, that research is
called for which will examine how power works not just by weighing on people as a
repressive, prohibitory force determining their conduct, but also how it is productive
of relationships between people, interventions which become possible into people's
lives, the constitution of particular subjectivities, and the formation of technologies
which lead people to form particular self-relationships and to understand their own
conduct in specific ways. It is precisely this gap that this thesis aims to fill in the
context of residential community care settings.
This research seeks to fill this gap through adapting Foucault's work to
address the question: 'What forms of power do individuals living in community care
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accommodation for adults with learning difficulties experience as acting upon them?
How do they relate to themselves as subjects in relation to it? How does this constitute
problems for them in their lives?' As we have seen throughout this thesis so far, this is
a question that aims to discover more about power than that allowed for in the rather
limited, conventional conceptions of it which are commonly held. It is thus influenced
by Foucault's work, conceived as three domains of critical analysis, in its aims to
undertake a deeper examination of power and subjectivity, and individuals'
interactions and experiences with them. It has also been argued that it is important to
undertake such an analysis from the point-of-view of those people who are affected by
power, and that in so doing, it is possible to build up a picture of the problems and
costs that they attached to particular forms of power and subjectivity without falling
into the trap of reconstituting power by making decisions about their situation for
them.
As we saw, then, this will involve a process of exploring people's experiences
and thoughts relating to their situation in care through conducting semi-structured
interviews with them. Although there are a number of different groups whose
experiences of care it would be important to address (e.g. those still in large, isolated
hospitals, those in sheltered housing, those in hostels, those who use day centres,
those who have home-cue, and so on), this study focuses specifically on those people
who have had recent experience (i.e. still being there, or having left no more than one
year prior to the interview) of living in community care residential group homes —
those situated in community settings, shared with other residents, and with live-in
staff. Given the problems with identifying an essential common feature of "people
with learning difficulties" or of different types of care environment, this is important
in lending a degree of coherence to the investigation, and in providing an identifiable
situation to be investigated.
The analysis itself, as we said in Chapter Three, is a form of discourse analysis
situated broadly within a critical psychological framework. Although the work to be
done has broad similarities to existing forms of discourse analysis ([PA and post-
structuralist analysis), none of these is entirely suited to addressing our research
question. This research is thus also closely connected to the question of how
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psychology can accommodate a Foucauldian approach to people's accounts of their
situations. The analysis we need to undertake asks a number of questions of the
accounts it examines — questions influenced by Foucault's three domains of analysis.
We need to examine, then, how certain aspects of people exist as things about which
judgements can be made; how they are thus made into subjects of certain forms of
action which become appropriate with respect to them; how, related to this, they are
situated in differential relationships with others; how they recognise their being tied to
a particular subjective identity connected to particular rights and imperatives; how
certain aspects of their conduct are directed according to certain forms of rationality;
how they draw upon specific discourses and concepts in relating to themselves and
their environment, and how this allows them to assign meaning and value to their
conduct; and, finally, how people interact with these issues, and how they might
experience certain aspects of them as problematic.
This form of analysis, then, moves beyond the simplistic and problematic
conceptions of voice, empowerment and normalisation upon which examinations and
evaluations of care services generally rely. By recognising that the individual subject
is always already an effect of specific power relations, that power cannot be identified
merely by seeking out ways in which people have their essential agency repressed and
constrained, and that even concepts of "normality" themselves are not natural and
neutral categories, but the result of specific forms of knowledge making the human
individual thinkable in particular ways, this approach holds the promise of enabling a
new, and deeper understanding of how power and subjectivity affect people, and how
they themselves relate to this.
The social model of disability has shifted the emphasis somewhat onto
disabling social forces and structures. However, this still leaves some important
questions unasked and the problem emerges that the individual is conceptually
banished from the theory. We saw also, however, a number of perspectives emerging
around disability in general and learning difficulties in particular which recognise the
nature of impairment as brought into being in specific forms of knowledge, and which
note the importance of Foucault's work in countering such problems. This research,
then, aims to add to this growing awareness, and to take it forward by applying
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Foucault's ideas to a study of how people experience power in care accommodation,
how they take on or resist subjective positions and what they are deemed to be in
relation to institutions, other people, and themselves.
In the following chapter, we will clarify the methodological approach through
which we will address the research question, and how analytic techniques we have set
out will be applied.
Chapter 6: Methodology
This chapter will deal with the issues surrounding the collection and analysis
of data. The broad analytic approach that this research takes towards its data has
already been outlined in Chapters Two and Three. The method of collecting the data
themselves is rather more straightforward, using, as we have said, fairly conventional
semi-structured interviews to explore, with people who live in community care
residential accommodation, their experiences of and interactions with their care
environment. More will be said on this in due course.
In this chapter, then, first we will detail what interviewing involves, the
reasons for its use as a method for data collection, the particular approach to
interviewing that this research takes. Secondly, we will consider the process of
analysis itself — how we move from an interview transcript to an analytical reading.
We shall then move on to detail the method itself — how these concerns were actually
applied in the research process. Finally, we shall consider the research approach in
relation to ethical issues, and their relationship to research goals.
Before considering the methodology, however, it will be helpful first to restate
the research question in light of the developments outlined in the previous chapters.
The research question emerged from a concern with power in institutional settings,
specifically in institutions for people with learning difficulties. The research questions
we began with, then, were:
• What forms of power do individuals living in community care accommodation for
adults with learning difficulties experience as acting upon them?
• How do they relate to themselves as subjects in relation to it?
• How does this constitute problems for them in their lives?
We have argued that Foucault's work is important in engaging with these
questions. It allows us to move beyond the limited, conventional notions of power
which are commonly held, and to connect a concern with power to a concern with
forms of subjectivity and self-relationship. This opens up considerations of how
people exist as objects of knowledge, how "learning difficulty" itself emerges in
people's accounts as a particular object of knowledge, how particular interventions
come into being around this, and how individuals are incited to recognise themselves
in particular ways. Allied to this are concerns with the direction of people's conduct —
how systems of knowledge and the formation of problems lead to particular strategies,
operations and effects of power (in terms of, for instance, discipline, punishment,
reward, institutional structures, relative positions of authority, justifications for
particular interventions, and so on) and of resistance. Finally, this links to questions of
the individual's relationship to these issues, how they go about "telling the truth"
about themselves or resist particular "truths", how they relate to themselves and to
their position in an institution, how they problematise and act upon their own conduct
or resist such problematisation and the actions that others perform upon them, the
systems of knowledge and forms of discourse employed in doing this, and the
problems that they experience with these issues.
The investigation to be undertaken in addressing this research question
explores, via semi-structured interviews with the research participants, their thoughts
and experiences around their lives in care accommodation. The analysis, then,
examines the versions of the social world produced in the accounts, looking for the
ways that people are affected by and interact with forms of power and subjectivity,
and how they actively relate to themselves as certain types of being. The interviews
will be conducted with people who have had recent experience of living in community
care residential homes for people with learning difficulties. This type of research is
important because it attempts to draw out a reading of the problems that residents of
care homes themselves might be experiencing with respect to power and subjectivity,
and engages with what they talk about as affecting their lives, rather than making a
reading of these issues over and above them, and detached from their concerns.
The key questions that remain are how people are approached to take part in
the research, how the data are to be collected, how the analysis is to be performed,
how ethical issues are to be dealt with, and what is hoped to be gained from the
research. We will begin addressing these questions by considering the key issues
around the collection of data in qualitative interviewing.
6.1 Data collection and discourse analysis
Given the nature of the research question and its concern with individual's
accounts of their situation and the exploration of the issues surrounding this situation
with them, interviewing the relevant people is the most appropriate method for
collecting data. Other forms of data collection (such as participant observation) are
possible, but exploring the salient points with people who experience life in care is an
important activity in forming an understanding of what the important issues for them
are, rather than making such decisions from a more detached perspective. This also
forces attention onto questions of how people themselves interact with these issues,
avoiding the impression that they are mere passive by-products of discursive forces.
However, our concerns do not end here. There are a number of ways of conducting
interviews, each appropriate to particular paradigmatic traditions and amenable to
particular forms of analytic interpretation. Two extreme positions are, on the one
hand, structured quantitative interviews, and, on the other hand, approaches which are
supposedly totally unstructured (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997; Fontana & Frey, 1998).
Structured interviews tend to have a function similar to formal, quantitative
questionnaires but with perhaps a little more leeway to vary the exact wording of
questions (Jones, 1985). They thus limit the flexibility needed to explore the
complexity of the themes raised by the research, and impose a rigid framework both
on the interaction between researcher and participant and on the potential research
findings (Mishler, 1986; Smith, 1995). Structured interviews, therefore, are most
appropriate to research projects which are hypothesis-driven and aim at collecting
information that can support or disprove this hypothesis. At the other, extreme,
Douglas (1985) argues that interviews should be creative, totally free of concerns
about how they should be carried out, and geared towards allowing the situation
develop naturally so that participants can express themselves freely and completely.
Others, though, point out that claims to a totally unstructured approach are
disingenuous since they cannot acknowledge prior expectations and agendas which
always underlie and structure any research project (Banister et al., 1994; Fontana &
Frey, 1998). Between these two extreme positions, however, there is 'an abyss of
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practice and therefore theory about the purpose and nature of the qualitative interview'
(Jones, 1985; p.45).
Also important to consider is the nature of the relationship between the
researcher and the subjects of the research's inquiries. Issues here include who sets the
agenda and decides the goals of the research — and how rigidly these are fixed in place
— and how issues of power dynamics are dealt with in research situations. There are
both epistemological and ethical components to this set of considerations. We will
deal firstly with the epistemological considerations that centre on the conception of
the interview as a means of obtaining information about the lives of research
"subjects".
Traditional forms of social science research interview are based upon the ideal
that researchers can, by asking the right questions in the right way, access the required
information about the lives of "their subjects" (Mishler, 1986). In this view, those
whose lives are investigated are seen as passive subjects or vessels containing facts or
details of their experience to which the researcher desires access. Traditionally, the
interaction between the researcher and his or her "subjects" is seen as a problematic
source of error, misdirection or interference with the information that is desired.
Interviews are seen as tools for extracting the required information; tools which need
to be carefully controlled so as to maintain the flow of valid and reliable information
from the "subject" to the researcher with the minimum of distortion (Holstein &
Gubritun, 1997). Such a view is not consonant with the philosophical position which
has been laid out in this thesis. As Mishler (1986, 1999) comments, interviewing is a
form of discourse between researcher and participant(s) in which they jointly construct
meaning, and interview responses (of both interviewer and participant) exist in
relation to the specific contextual situation of the interview. Holstein and Gubrium
(1997) similarly argue that an interview is a social encounter in which meaning is
constructed, and that far from merely being a means of obtaining information, it is a
site for its production. They thus contend that 'both parties to the interview are
necessarily and ineluctably active... Respondents are not so much repositories of
knowledge... as they are constructors of knowledge in collaboration with interviewers'
(ibid.; p.114; original emphasis). Interviewing is thus an 'active' process, in which the
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researcher must be aware of both his or her own and his or her participants'
'constitutive contributions to the production of interview data' (ibid.; p.114).
Heron (1996) and Reason (1994a, 1994b) have outlined how the inherent
separation of those being researched from the researcher and from the research
process in traditional interviewing is not only alienating to these research "subjects",
but is based upon the erroneous assumption that the social sciences have the potential
to access the 'one pure truth' (Reason, 1994b) about people's lives and experiences
which lies hidden within them. Heron (1996) points out that going into research with
rigidly defined categories and theoretical constructs which are used to carry out
research on people with the aim of obtaining the "right sort" of responses, and then
fitting them to these categories is both academically naive and ethically unacceptable.
As Jones (1985) comments:
if the topics of relevance and significance to the researchers have no relevance or
significance to their respondents, then the researchers should think seriously about the
quality of the data they are getting.
(p.47)
This point is even more salient when, as with this research, a central concern is with
what the participants are themselves experience as problematic in their lives. We
cannot know in advance what the significant and structuring effects of power,
knowledge and subjectivity will be in any given situation. If we could, this sort of
interviewing would be redundant in any case. Hence, as Reason (1994a) suggests, this
research is centred around the ideal of the participants exploring the topics which are
of significance to their lives with the researcher rather than about the researcher
forcing a pre-determined interview rationale onto their interaction.
With this in mind, an interview approach is indicated that acknowledges that
the framework set out in advance by the researcher may not represent issues which are
of most importance to the participants, and which is therefore flexible enough to allow
exploration of themes and topics of significance to the respondents. However, the
interviewer him/herself has an active role in the production of the interview data. It
should not be forgotten that there is still a research agenda, and research questions to
be addressed, and that the interviews take place in this context. Therefore, whilst the
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importance of allowing for the exploration of themes which may not have been in the
researcher's plans before the interviews began is acknowledged, this should not be
taken as implying the opposite, namely that participants should be encouraged to
'ramble in any direction they choose' (Jones, 1985: 47).
In relation to arguments such as these, Denzin and Lincoln (1998) argue that
the qualitative researcher is best seen as a bricoleur who adapts tools and practices to
suit each specific research situation rather than having them set out in advance. Also,
in psychology, a number of discourse theorists have commented that there can be no
set methods for conducting interviews or analysing the texts produced, and even that
doing so is more akin to riding a bicycle than following a set of detailed instructions
(e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Burman & Parker, 1993; Parker, 1992; 1999). Potter
and Wetherell (1987) for instance remark that there is thus 'no method to discourse
analysis in the way we traditionally think of experimental methods' (p.175). Similarly,
Parker (1999a) argues that 'any retreat to set "methods" will end up restricting our
understanding of the complexity and multiplicity of meaning' (p.2) and that therefore
we need not a 'discourse analytic machine which we could use... to shred all varieties
of text', but 'ways of reading' which may prove useful for a particular set of texts, and
which can be modified where required. In sum, discourse analysis is more concerned
with interpretation rather than rigid "steps" to analysis.
Because of this methodological flexibility, guidelines for "how to do"
discourse analysis invariably go little further than identifying the manner in which
discourse is conceived and approached in a particular study, and providing basic
examples of how "themes" or "discourses" emerge from the reading of texts (e.g.
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Parker, 1992; Smith et al., 1999). Discourse analysis is thus
seen as an intuitive activity shaped by the conceptions of discourse, knowledge,
individuals, society, power, and so on held by the researcher. It is thus important to be
self-reflexive towards the interpretations made, and the process that gave rise to them.
It would be an error to argue that data could merely "speak for themselves". The role
of the researcher in producing particular readings is thus also an important issue for
critical reflection (Fontana & Frey, 1998). Consequently, it is not a straightforward
task to set out the method for the production of our analyses. This will be attempted as
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far as possible, however, in order that this sort of study might be replicable by other
analysts. This is not the same as laying out a rigid methodology that discourse analysis
must follow, but detailing the approach taken by this research so that it is clear (or as
clear as possible) how our analyses emerge.
With these points in mind, we move on to detail the way that this specific
study proceeds in addressing its research question.
6.2 Method
As has been said, this research conducts semi-structured interviews with
people with recent experience of living in community care residential homes for
people with learning difficulties. Here, "community care residential homes" are, as
seen in Chapter Four, those homes existing specifically for housing people with
learning difficulties which are located in community settings (all of the homes in
question were in what could be described as "suburban" settings), house a group of
residents (homes ranged in size from four residents in one case to slightly over twenty
in another), and have staff on the premises twenty-four hours per day. "Recent
experience" is defined to include those living in such accommodation at the time of
the interview, and those who had left up to a year before the interview took place.
Twenty-two interviews were conducted, the first in June 1998 and the last in
June 2000. The interviewer was a male research student, aged twenty-two at the time
of the first interview, and twenty-four at the time of the last. The length of the
interviews depended upon the wishes of the participants, how much information they
seemed willing to share, at what length they discussed relevant issues, how many
questions they themselves wanted to ask, and how the conversation was flowing. The
shortest interview lasted around ten minutes and the longest around one hundred
minutes, with the majority lasting somewhere between twenty-five and forty-five
minutes. Depending on the wishes of the participants, interviews took place either at
their place of accommodation, at the day centre which they attended, in unused rooms
at a community centre, or, in one case, at the end of a self-advocacy meeting in the
presence of an advocacy worker. Interviews were usually conducted on a one-to-one
basis with no others present, except in a few cases in which participants requested
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otherwise. In one case, two support workers were present, in another a care worker
was present for a part of the interview, and in another, a group of participants
requested to be interviewed together rather than individually and to have their
advocacy group worker present also.
The interview sample included seventeen men and seven women. The age
range was from early-twenties to mid-sixties, with the majority of participants in an
age range between mid-thirties and mid-fifties. All participants were living in special
accommodation for people with learning difficulties, or had left such accommodation
in the last two years. The majority were still living in residential care homes, two in
sheltered accommodation, and three were, at the time of the interview, living
independently. All except one of the sample was based in the Midlands of England —
in either Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire or Derbyshire — and one was based in an
outlying borough of Greater London. The only criterion for including people in the
sample was that they had recent experience of living in community care residential
accommodation for people deemed to have learning difficulties. Of course, an
(initially unforeseen) auxiliary criterion was that they also had to be capable of verbal
communication in order to be able to take part in an oral interview. By chance, all of
the participants approached were white. The difficulty involved in finding, and
negotiating access to suitable people dictated that it was a convenience sample, based
around those people I could locate, negotiate access to, and agree an interview time
with who fitted the sample's criteria. This difficulty is illustrated by the fact that I was
turned down flat in my request to be allowed to meet and talk to residents by seven
homes in the East and West Midlands area, I was repeatedly stood up for meetings
with staff at three others, and much of the contact information I received from support
groups and city and county councils was either inaccurate or out-of-date. However, at
no time were any restrictions placed upon me by the staff of the homes through whom
access was, of necessity, initially negotiated. For reference, Appendix I lists the age,
gender and accommodation situation of each of the participants — none of whose real
name has been used, of course.
Contact was made with participants either through staff at their place of
accommodation, staff at their local Mencap office, their advocacy workers, or, in two
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cases, through friends of theirs who spoken to in other interviews who offered to get
into contact with them for me. I introduced myself to them as a researcher from a local
university who was interested in talking to people about their experiences of living in
community care accommodation. In all cases, the effort was made to talk informally
with the participants before the interviewing began. In most cases, this was achieved
by having a separate first meeting which would not consist of an interview, at which
researcher, participants and, where appropriate, care workers, could talk about the
research project, one another's situation and interests, any problems that participants
might have with the interviews, and so on. These meetings aimed to ensure that
participants understood what the interviews would entail, that they had the chance to
ask any questions they wanted to about the research, that they willingly consented to
having their responses recorded on tape, that they understood that their accounts
would be treated in confidence, that they were not under any pressure to consent to be
interviewed even where care staff had made the introduction between us, and that we
could arrange a time for the interview convenient for the participants (rather than a
time which a care worker thought might be convenient). In some cases, a preliminary
meeting was not possible, either because of the commitments of the participants, or
the times when I could get to see them. In these cases, time was made for a pre-
interview talk during which all of the above points could be covered. Also,
immediately before the interviews began, participants were assured that they would be
under no pressure to answer any questions or to discuss any issues about which they
felt uncomfortable, that they were free to stop the interview at any time should they
wish, and that they would have the chance to request the audio tape be erased at any
time if they were unhappy with the interview. The assurance was given, also, that the
tapes would be transcribed so as to protect the anonymity of the participants, and that
at no time would anyone else have access to any factors that could identify them. The
attempt was made at all times, from initial contact and throughout the course of the
interviews to remain aware of, and sensitive to, ethical issues. Also, the offer was
made to make available copies of the transcripts to participants after they were typed-
up. However, only three participants wished to have a copy. The interview transcripts
are not included in this thesis because, although participants are not identified by their
real names, a good deal of the information given is of a sensitive and strongly personal
nature, and would not be appropriate for inclusion in a publicly-available document.
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Two participants specifically expressed reservations about the nature of what they
were saying in the interview because, as one commented, 'some of it's not very nice,'
although when assured after the interview that the transcripts would not be made
publicly available, and anonymity would be preserved in any case, they said that that
they were happy for me to use the interviews. All of the transcripts will therefore be
made available for academic examination purposes only.
The interviews themselves were conducted around a set of broad topics which
aimed to encourage the participants to talk about their lives in care in relation to the
concerns of the research question. These key topics concern how the participants
relate to the institution(s) in which they live or used to live, how they think about their
own care, their designation as having learning difficulties, their own conception of
their care needs, how they relate to the staff and other people in the homes, how their
conduct is directed and to what ends, the reasons for them being in a certain
institution, and so on. In line with the points made above, however, there was a high
degree of flexibility in the interviews. The aim, then, was not to obtain a final and
succinct answer to a fixed set of questions, but, in recognition of the interactional
nature of the interview situation (Mishler, 1986, 1999; Holstein & Gubrium, 1997), to
explore the topics with the participants. Some areas, therefore, may have led to
tangential discussions about other fecund issues, whilst others may have been
relatively barren areas for exploration. The interviews were conducted in such a
manner that this process of exploration could proceed fruitfully, whilst still being
directed around areas which were, firstly, of significance to the participants and,
secondly (and equally importantly), pertinent to the research question.
The key themes considered important for discussion are listed in Appendix
as a set of stock questions. As has been stressed, these were not treated as a script to
be repeated verbatim in interviews, but as little more than an aide-memoire for the
interviewer to suggest possible fruitful topics for discussion or to reinitiate discussion
should the interview run out of direction or stall. Room was left, also, for the
discussion of areas raised by the participants or for manoeuvring around the topics in
order to initiate productive discourse.
Once completed, the interviews were transcribed by the researcher in full from
the audio cassettes. Since we are interested in this research in the discursive level of
language and its connection with systems of power, knowledge and self-definition
rather than with, say, the analysis of the structure of conversations, a fairly simple set
of transcription conventions have been used. For reference, these can be found in
Appendix DI The analysis and interpretation of the interviews is inductive in nature,
since, although a definite research question is in place, along with a set of beliefs
about the nature of discourse, power, knowledge and subjectivity, the research
revolves around investigating a set of phenomena in an exploratory manner rather
testing a pre-existing hypothesis. The analysis thus proceeds through close readings of
the transcript texts, with the aim of drawing out of them points pertinent to the
problems being studied and then piecing these points together into an account which
addresses the research question.
Although we have said that it is notoriously difficult to describe discourse
analysis in terms of a step-by-step approach, it is possible to draw out a number of
points that guide and structure the analysis, which will provide insights into how the
readings are made. We saw in Chapter Three that Foucault's three domains of critical
analysis influence us to ask a number of questions of the texts we are examining, and
these allow us to draw out an analysis which will address our research questions.
Firstly, in relation to the domain of truth, we aim to draw out how certain aspects of
people (aspects of their personalities, characteristics, abilities, needs, and so on) exist
as things about which judgements and decisions can be made. This will entail
highlighting in the transcripts instances where these aspects of individuals' physical or
psychological make-up are referred to, and examining the types of judgements that
they make available (do people become "subnormal", "gifted", "criminal", "perverse",
and so on).
Secondly, we aim to link this to questions of power. This involves examining
how people are situated in differential relationships with others. Each time a specific
relationship with others is mentioned, it will be highlighted and its characteristics
noted — the relative rights to speak and to make certain decisions implied in it, the
forms of action which are appropriate for one person in relation to the other, the ways
that people act to direct one another's conduct.
Thirdly, in relation to ethics, we will examine the discourses and concepts of
selfhood that people use in relating to themselves and others. That is, identifying the
discourses which people draw upon in actively recognising themselves as certain types
of being, in referring to themselves as individuals, and through which they recognise
ideals by which they direct their own conduct, and assign a moral force to their lives,
their actions, and the ways that their conduct is directed in power relationships. These
will also be highlighted in the transcripts, and examined for how they fit in with the
other aspects of the accounts that we are drawing out.
These aspects of analysis tie in with Foucault's domains of inquiry into
subjectivity — truth, power and ethics. The inquiries into truth and power connect to
the first of our research questions, about the forms of power that participants
experience as acting upon them. The aspect of analysis based around the domain of
ethics ties into the second research question, that asking how participants relate to
themselves as subjects. A consideration of all of these issues allows us also to address
the third question: How do these issues constitute problems for participants?
The analysis proceeded, as Smith et al. (1999) suggest, through careful,
repeated readings of the transcripts based around the analytical framework set out
above. As these readings were made, notes were written in the margins of the
transcripts regarding aspects of the account that appeared to relate to the research
questions. As further accounts were read and re-read, and other aspects began
emerging for consideration, these notes were returned to, and re-examined against the
transcript text in the context of these emerging ideas. These notes were written into a
summary for each of the interviews organised around the key issues they contained
pertinent to the questions asked of them. These issues were then organised under
theme titles — brief descriptions that summarise the essential qualities of what
participants said about the issues relevant to the research questions. The interview
summaries and the theme titles they contain were then checked back against the
transcripts to ensure that they were fair representations of what was said rather then
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the imposition of pre-existing ideas. In order further to minimise the danger of
imposing purely idiosyncratic interpretations upon the interviews, four of the
interview transcripts were examined jointly by the researcher and two of the project
supervisors, and the emerging analytical findings were discussed.
It should also be noted here that this analysis is not exhaustive in the sense of
analysing everything that was said in the interviews. It is unavoidable that the focus of
the research will leave much of potential interest unexplored. Even some points that
might be thought to relate to issues of power or subjectivity will not be picked up on.
This is because the research aims to look specifically at questions of power and
subjectivity with respect to the situation of living in a care home. There will, of
course, be other possible instances of power relationships and other aspects of
subjectivity that are relevant to people's lives — extra-institutional issues of power that
exist beyond this specific situation. These will likewise not be drawn out, as the
research focuses on these issues specifically as they exist with respect to the relevant
institutions.
6.3 Ethics, interviewing and research goals
We need to consider how our research ties in not only with epistemological
concerns, but also with ethical ones. A careful balance must be struck which ensures
that the research can address its research agenda without presenting an unwanted
intrusion into people's lives, treating them as little more than passive "subjects",
producing information which supports an oppressive status quo (Stalker, 1998), or, we
could add, making grand pronouncements on their behalf of what they need to do or
what needs to be done on their behalf. Swain, Heyman and Gilman (1998) argue that
this cannot be achieved merely by a superficial appeal to an existing code of ethics,
since no code, whether based around ideals of furthering knowledge or more
pragmatic goals such as action research can fully cover all the ethical issues which
crop up in research. They thus contend that ethical considerations can never be said to
have been "solved" once and for all, and that the only way to deal with them is
through a 'continuous process of decision-making' (Swain et al., 1998) throughout the
research process from the initial proposal through to the final write-up.
There are two areas to consider here. Firstly, how the research treats those who
have agreed to participate in it (including attention to the implications of participants'
status as people with learning difficulties upon ethical considerations), and secondly
how it will be used, how its conclusions will affect the situation of the participants,
and others in similar situations. We shall deal with these questions separately,
beginning with the former.
First to consider here are issues of informed consent, and ensuring
confidentiality. It is important to ensure that participants understand what the research
is about, why they are being asked to participate in it, what will be done with the tapes
and transcripts of the interviews, who will see their accounts, and that, given these
questions, they willingly consent to being involved — only then can they be said to
give informed consent. It is likewise important for the researcher to safeguard the
confidentiality of his or her participants, and for the participants to feel comfortable
that this is being done. It must also be made clear in advance that participants should
feel free to refuse to discuss issues they are uncomfortable with, or even to end the
interview if they so wish. The researcher should then proceed with a genuine
sensitivity to the wishes of the participants so that s/he can remain alert for instances
in which participants are uneasy about raising any of their own concerns, or times
when they may feel uncomfortable, coerced or pressurised to discuss a particular issue
or to continue the interview beyond a time with which they are comfortable.
These issues take on an added significance when conducting research with
people with learning difficulties (see, for instance, Minkes, 1995; Rolph, 1998;
Kiernan, 1999; Chappell, 2000). As Stalker (1998) points out, there has been little
consideration given to the implications of including people with learning difficulties
in research, and that there may be barriers to their full participation created by pre-
existing attitudes and social structures. Kiernan (1999), for instance, argues that, when
conducting research with disadvantaged groups such as people with learning
difficulties, the traditional role of researcher as "expert" is amplified, and this can lead
participants having a strong impression that something specific is required of them,
thus distorting their accounts of their situation. Similarly, Chappell (2000) comments
that there is an increased danger in these situations of the researcher assuming a
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dominant role in the research process, and McCarthy (1998) points out that such one-
sidedness in the interview situation may discourage participants from themselves
taking an active part in the research. As we saw above, these issues were taken on
board in this research situation, and the attempt was made to address them as fully as
possible, with attention paid to the possible difficulties raised by imbalances of power
in the interviewing process.
This brings us onto the consideration of the effects conducting research has on
the participants. It is important not only that research should not harm participants in
any way, but also that they do not experience it as an oppressive or uncomfortable
process. Sieber (1993) argues, however, that it is also important to go beyond these
concerns and consider politics, which she defines as 'the methods and strategies used
to gain a position of power and control' (p.14) in the research process. Significant for
this project, Murphy and Clare (1997) comment that, whilst it is recognised as no
longer acceptable to assume that people with learning difficulties are incapable of
making informed decisions about their own lives, it is still common for them to be
faced with relatively powerful "experts" in a number of situations which can thus be
intimidating for them and lead them to acquiesce, to comply with particular requests
or instructions, or to be misled by those assuming an expert role. Similarly, others
have pointed out that academic and social research tends to be structured in such a
way that researchers enter the situation with the mantle of an "expert", presumed to
possess the requisite knowledge and skills to carry out effective research, and the
person being researched is thus positioned as an object of that investigation, with no
control over the research process, and subject to oppressive categories such as "idiots"
or "mentally retarded" which position them as viable subjects for a particular research
project (Oliver, 1992; Clough & Barton, 1995; Swain, 1995; Riddell, Wilkinson &
Baron, 1998; Stalker, 1998).
Research must thus be seen as a social process, and one that its subjects can
experience as oppressive (Clough & Barton, 1995). As Mishler (1986) points out, 'in
the mainstream tradition the interviewer-interviewee relationship is marked by a
striking asymmetry of power' (p.117) characterised by researchers being attentive to
their own problems with interviewing, namely with making arguments for the
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reliability and validity of their research, and neglecting the problems of their
participants, which centre around the effort to make sense of what is happening.
Traditional styles of interviewing, he argues, hinder this process by presenting
participants with 'a predetermined scheme' of topics, definitions, and categories for
response and evaluation' which are determined by researchers, who then 'determine
the adequacy and appropriateness' of the responses given.
This has the effect, Mishler (1986) argues, of robbing participants of 'their
right to "name" their world' (p.122), and hence represents an unacceptable research
situation. There is also, of course, the related issue that the findings put forward by a
researcher who imposes a rigid categorical framework on the responses of his or her
participants will themselves represent another technology of power with respect to the
participants' situation, in that they will comprise knowledge "discovered" about them
which can be used in deciding how their situation should be dealt with by relatively
powerful others. This issue of speaking above others and for others is one which, as
has been stated, Foucault's work (e.g. 1977e, 1988f, 1991a, 1989k) leads us to
recognise as a "dangerous" one.
We have seen that writers such as Heron (1996) and Reason (1994a, 1994b)
find the traditional process of doing research on passive "subjects" problematic, but
this has been discussed in the light of epistemological questions. Clearly, though,
there is also an ethical component to this work. Indeed, Reason (1994b) argues that
concern for power and powerlessness in research situations is of much more important
consideration than epistemological or methodological concerns. Reason (1994a,
1994b) and Heron (1996), among others, have thus argued for a style of research that
is co-operative, in which participants are involved in the research as "co-researchers".
In contrast to other approaches, this aims to do 'research with other people, who are
invited to be full co-inquirers with the initiating researcher and become involved in
operational decision-making' (Heron, 1996: 9). In this form of inquiry, 'co-
researchers' are involved in the research from the initial process of finding an area for
inquiry, through deciding the set of procedures that should be used to investigate it
and the application of these procedures, right up to the drawing of conclusions
(Reason, 1994a, 1994b; Heron, 1996).
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These arguments reinforce the reasons for our using a flexible semi-structured
interview approach. Since it is recognised as problematic for a researcher to assume
that a prior set of categories or questions can cover all that is relevant about a
particular issue for research participants, or for them rigidly to control the research
process, a high degree of flexibility is required so that the participants themselves can
raise issues they want to discuss, and so that the researcher can intuitively guide the
interviews towards issues which are important to participants rather than those which
they may seem reluctant to go into (whilst also aiming to remain relevant to the
research question). This flexibility also extends to allowing participants to control the
interview situation in terms of ending the interview if they want to, encouraging them
to raise any queries they might have about the research, ensuring that they do not feel
pressured into addressing issues about which they are uncomfortable, and allowing the
interview to take, as far as possible, the form of a conversation in which both sides
feel comfortable and in which the traditional role of the researcher as relatively
powerful expert is dissolved (Fontana & Frey, 1998).
Although in this research participants were not involved in operational
decision-making, nor with identifying the research question or the tools used to
address it, the effort has been made (as we saw above) to undertake the interviewing
process in a "co-operative" spirit, with less emphasis placed upon the prior
assumptions of the researcher, and more upon the ideal of allowing the interview to
proceed through exploring with participants topics which are of significance to them,
rather than simply repeating a pre-determined set of interview questions.
This leads us to consider what the effects of the research will (hopefully) be.
Here the concept of "emancipatory research" has been proposed by a number of
researchers in disability studies (e.g. Zarb, 1992, 1997; Oliver, 1997; Barton, 1998).
Similarly to "co-operative inquiry", central questions here revolve around issues of
who initiates and controls research and decides how it will be carried out, the
opportunities for those being researched to criticise and influence the research
direction, what is to be done with the products of the research, and so on (Zarb, 1992,
1997; Rodgers, 1999). The ideal situation, as with "co-operative" research, is one in
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which those groups thought worthy of being researched (such as people with learning
difficulties) themselves control the research process, decide who should be involved
with it and how it should be carried out, and use its conclusions for themselves (Zarb,
1992). This research can not make grand "emancipatory" claims in this respect.
However, if we break down the concept of "emancipation", we can begin to address
this issue more closely. First, then, we have the question of emancipation as it refers
to the idea that through the very process of taking part in the research, the participants
might experience new possibilities for action, and gain resources for their resistances
(Mishler, 1986). There is clearly at least the potential for this in an interview situation
which proceeds with the ideal of being centred around the issues which are significant
to research participants themselves, and of exploring the significance of these issues
with them. On the strength of comments made by participants, staff members, and
advocacy group leaders at the end of a number of interviews, it could be said that this
is not an unrealistic hope.
Also, there is the issue of "emancipation" as a research goal in the sense of the
research's ability to 'explain a social order in such a way that it becomes itself the
catalyst which leads to the transformation of this social order' (Fay, 1993; p.33). This,
of course, fits back into the ideals outlined for a "critical psychology" in Chapter
Three. On this score, Oliver (1997) argues that the real issue of relevance is not
whether a particular set of prospective criteria has been fulfilled, but the role a piece
of research has in actually aiding a process of emancipation:
Inevitably this means that research can only be judged emancipatory after the event; one
cannot "do" emancipatory research.., one can only engage as a researcher with those
seeking to emancipate themselves.
(p.25)
This ideal of engaging with people who are "seeking to emancipate themselves" is one
which, as has been made clear already, this research addresses. Arguments about the
effects that the research will have on the "transformation" of a social order, however,
are more difficult to address. Oliver's argument, as summarised above, echoes
arguments already raised that research should be judged by its effects (Parker, 1989a)
and that its truth is 'in the future' (Foucault, 1989m). It also bears similarity to
Foucault's argument (e.g. 1977e, 1980b, 1989k, 19891, 1989m, 1991a) that research
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serves an ethical purpose if it provides openings for new ways of thinking about
current situations, if it allows others to join in debating an issue in a new way, or if it
provides "tools" or "gadgets" which people can use in their struggles. Whilst this
holds out the hope for a productive use of the research findings, it is an area which is
somewhat more difficult to justify confidently, since the research findings have not
been put to any use at the time of writing up this thesis.
Rather than setting out dogmatic assertions of what should be done, the hope
is that this research will bring to light issues with which people struggle but which
they may not have had the chance to discuss or to attempt to resolve, and to highlight
aspects of power, knowledge and forms of practice which act to their detriment, and
with which they grapple in their lives. This echoes Foucault's (1991a) desire for
effective criticism to 'shut the mouths of prophets and legislators: all those who speak
for others and above others' (p.159; original emphasis). The question of what is to be
done is thus recognised as one which should not — must not — be definitely and finally
answered in an academic research project. So, as has been stated, this thesis aims,
through its analyses, to problematise a whole new set of considerations. This is not the
same as making definite judgements about certain aspects of people's lives as "bad",
but, through highlighting them, through unmasking power and people's experiences of
problems with it, to make that which previously seemed to go without saying, to be
beyond the scope of critique, become subject to critical thought in those very places in
which it exists. Indeed, these issues have already been discussed in the context of the
ideals of a "critical" psychology which is concerned with how people are regulated
across society in systems of power (Parker, 1999b). The solutions to these problems,
however, are recognised as ones for people with learning difficulties themselves (cf.
Foucault, 1989k, 1991a). It is to be hoped, then, that this research will prove useful in
feeding back into the debates which people with learning difficulties are starting to
experience and to partake in, and, through problematising these issues, to further the
cause of them being given the opportunities to find their own solutions to them.
6.4 Issues of validity
It is traditional in research in both the natural and social sciences to give
consideration to the ways in the findings made are both internally and externally valid
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and reliable. Here "internal validity" considers how the research findings actually
correspond to the reality they are attempting to measure, how they conform to an
independent reality which is "out there", waiting to be studied. "External validity"
relates to criteria by which research findings are considered to be generalisable (for
instance, through the use of the "correct" sampling procedures), the extent to which
other researchers are capable of replicating the findings, hence making the research
reliable, free of any distortion brought in by the researcher, and therefore objective
(Heron, 1996). Clearly, given the points we have made in this thesis regarding the
problematisation of objective knowledge and the recognition of the findings of
psychology as textually constituted mean that these points do not relate simply to this
sort of research (Banister et al., 1994; Yardley, 2000). As we have seen, research is no
longer, in the viewpoints upon which this thesis draws, considered as merely neutrally
discovering or describing the objects of its enquiry. Rather, we must recognise that the
assumptions made about the subjects of research, the topic to be investigated, and
appropriate methodological approaches directly affect the entire research process,
including what conclusions will be available.
Banister et al. (1994) thus point out that we must be sensitive to issues of
indexicality, inconcludability and reflexivity. Indexicality relates to the fact that even
if an approach could be exactly replicated, 'the change in the research, informants, and
meanings of the research tool over time' (ibid.; p.11) would make it nevertheless a
different piece of work. Inconcludability deals with the fact that there is unavoidably a
gap between anything that we try to represent and the representation itself, that
research findings can never represent a set of facts independent of the external world.
Reflexivity engages with the issue that our theories and our way of approaching a
problem unavoidably affect the explanations we give. These points, which are
'methodological horrors' (ibid.) to more traditional research can be transformed into
'methodological virtues' if we remain open to them, and are self-reflexive about what
has been done in research, the methods used, and the availability of possible
alternative interpretations. By moving away from conventional notions of validity and
reliability, and actually focusing on, and remaining open to, the contingency and
specificity of our readings, we can approach these "problems" in a constructive way.
Being aware of the importance of exploring issues around the research with the people
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involved, and giving them the space to express their thoughts in the research situation,
as we have aimed to do here through approaching research with people as a process of
negotiating meanings rather than imposing a rigid structure for gaining and classifying
responses, is thus an important aspect of good qualitative research.
The aim, then, is not to achieve the validity of a force of truth by claiming a
demonstrable degree of fit with some form of reality which exists in its absolute
uniformity prior to its delimitation as an object for thought. Our concern, rather, is
with how particular aspects of people and of the world are brought into being in
specific systems of knowledge, and how this makes available particular power
relationships, subject positions, and technologies for relating to oneself. We then take
the perspective that these forces are real for the people who talk about them, and that
we should explore this area with them. We are, though, still making here a reading of
this situation made available by a particular theoretical position — as Parker (1999b)
points out, it must be recognised that social and psychological reality is 'always
already interpreted,' that it is always guided by 'implicit theories of self and the
world' (p.33), and one cannot escape this merely by believing oneself to be accessing
either an immediate, pre-theorised, felt experience of research participants or an
absolute reality.
The position presented in this thesis must not be the final word on this area.
We are not making untenable assertions to be speaking from a position which can
claim to be the only possible "truth". However, this does not mean that we cannot
make any judgements or conclusions based on our readings (centred in this case
around what people appear to struggle with and what they find problematic), merely
that these should be seen as openings in a position that is to be developed, in which
those concerned can join in, rather than the final word, the absolute answer or the one
"solution" to "what is to be done". We are not seeking to make overbearing final
pronouncements, but to open up a particular issue in such a way as to begin to develop
a position which will end up being useful to people in working through their
problems.
With these points in mind, we can now move on to the analyses of the
accounts produced in the interviews, and to discussion of the points they raise.
Chapter 7: Analysis of Interviews — Forms of Power/Knowledge
7.1 Introduction
A number of things must be asked of the accounts produced in the research
interviews in addressing our research questions. The questions that drive our inquiry,
we should remember, ask what forms of power individuals living in community care
accommodation experience, how they relate to themselves as subjects in relation to
this, and how this constitutes problems for them.
These questions tie in with Foucault's three domains of critical analysis —
truth, power and ethics. An analytic approach which attends to the issues raised by
Foucault's work, and which draws upon developments in psychological discourse
analysis, has therefore been outlined. The analysis focuses on issues raised by these
three aspects of Foucault's work. This involves searching out the objects of
knowledge that exist in the accounts (aspects of individuals that are made knowable,
and the judgements about them that they make available); the forms of power
discussed (the existence of imperatives or prohibitions on conduct, the nature of
relationships with specific others, and so on); and the discourses and concepts (the
ethical technologies) that people draw on in relating to and governing themselves and
assigning meaning and value to their own conduct. The final task is then to consider
how these issues are discussed in participants' accounts, and what this reveals about
power relationships, subjectivity, and participants' orientation to these issues,
including any problems they might experience around them.
A number of themes were drawn out of the interviews. These are issues
relating to the questions that our research seeks to address which occurred repeatedly
in participants' interviews. They emerged from a reading of the interviews which paid
attention to highlighting aspects of participants' discussions which related to the
research questions. The focus in producing these readings, then, was shaped by the
analytic approach that has been outlined. This is an approach that aims to highlight
those aspects of accounts pertinent to the research questions — i.e. looking for how
people are objectified, how they are situated in power relationships and subjective
identities, and how they relate to themselves as certain types of being. The themes that
emerged from reading the interviews with this focus are summarised in Table 1,
below.
Table 1: List of themes read from interviews
Themes Examples (Name and
interview number)
Occurred in interview
numbers*:
Assessment of abilities by
others
'the doctors [...] called you
backwards, because you were
backwards' (Anne; II).
II, IV, VI, VII, XIV, XVII,
XIX
Negative implications of
applied labels
'I was called 'mentally
handicapped.' And I didn't
know what that meant, and I
asked somebody, and they said
'because you're thick.' And it's
not' (Wendy, XIV).
II, XII, XLII, XIV, XVI, XIX
Decisions about living
arrangements made by others
'A Doctor S	 sent me here'
(Mike, VI).
I, V, VI, VII, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX
Lack of information about
assessment/why care
accommodation is deemed
necessary
'I went to Mencap and they
called you "learning
disabilities," [...] But I don't
know why' (Trevor, XVII).
IV, VI, VII, VIII, XIV, XVII,
XVIII, XIX
Limitations on behaviour 'You can't do what you want in
this place.' (Mark, IV).
I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, XI, XII,
XIII, XIV, XV, XVII, XVIII
Imperatives on behaviour:
having to perform certain
tasks/behave in certain ways
'You're supposed to be a good
boy and be quiet' (Paul, XIII)
I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII,
XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI,
XVII, XVIII, XIX
Reprimands and punishments 'They stop you going out to the
pub if you're naughty.' (Ernie,
VIII)
I, III, VI, VIII, XI, )CII, XIII,
XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII
Lack of choice, means to
express opinions, and/or input
into the organisation of one's
life
'You never have any choice
when you're in a residential
home.' (Liz, I)
I, IV, VI, VIII, XI, XII, XIII,
XN, XV, XVII, XVIII, XIX
Assertion of rights to choice,
equality and self-expression
'I see myself that I ought to be
treated like you do. Because
we're in a wheelchair it doesn't
mean you can't get what people
like yourself.' (Steve, XII).
I, II, VI, XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV, XVI, XVII, XIX
Ability to think and act
independently/speak up for
oneself
'I'm a very independent woman,
and I, I like people to respect
that' (Mary, XVI).
I, II, VI, VII, XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XIX
Dependence on the home/need
to be cared for
'If I had my own flat, [...] I
think people would take
advantage of me' (Peter, XI).
II, VI, XI, XVI, XVII
Disagreement with/resistance
to aspects of life in care
'I didn't like the decision of
going to bed at such-and-such a
time [...] people were being
bullies' (Ron, XV).
I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII,
XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI,
XVII, XVIII, XIX
* Although twenty-two interviews were conducted in total, only seventeen were used in the
analysis. As mentioned in Chapter Six, three interviews (numbers IX, XX and XXII) were,
because of participants' profound speech impairments and high levels of background noise,
beyond the ability of the researcher to transcribe in full; one (number X) was very short in
length, having been terminated because of the participant's apparent reluctance to take part;
and one, a group interview (number XXI), failed to cover the relevant topics.
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This theme table provides the means to connect the analytic points that will be
made in addressing our research questions to the corpus of interview data as a whole.
It demonstrates the robustness of the findings drawn from the data. That is, it can be
seen that the themes drawn out as relevant to this research consistently recur across a
number of interviews — they are not merely isolated or unique occurrences. Nearly all
of the themes occur in more than two-thirds of the interviews transcribed. In those
instances where this is not the case, attention will be paid to the reasons behind this,
and explanations given at appropriate times in the analysis.
As has been said, these themes emerged from a reading of the transcripts based
around Foucault's three domains of critical ontology. That is, looking for how people
are objectified, how they are situated in power relationships, and how they recognise
themselves as subjects in ethical terms. Of course, the themes presented in the tables
are not pre-existing in terms of being "out there", ready for the data to be slotted into.
Rather, they emerged from a reading of the transcripts influenced by specific research
questions and a specific analytic focus. Therefore, the list of themes drawn out is not
exhaustive in the sense of covering everything that could be read from the interviews.
Indeed, in the process of reading through the interview transcripts, some other
possible themes were identified. For instance, other themes could have been titled
'narratives of achievement,' in which participants relate past examples of their ability
to cope with certain situations or to undertake certain tasks such as cooking, shopping
or cleaning; 'comparison to others,' in which they contrast themselves favourably to
others in terms of being more able, intelligent or aware; or 'monetary concerns,' in
which they talk about limitations placed upon them by their lack of money. As was
mentioned in Chapter Six, while themes such as these might be argued to be relevant
to understanding the situation of people living in community care, they are not
immediately relevant to the questions this research seeks to address. For instance, the
theme of complaints about lack of money connects to questions of power at a societal
level, and to the situation of people with learning difficulties in general, but it is not
an issue of immediate relevance to questions of how people become defined as
subjects of care homes, or of the inter-personal power relationships they experience
within them, which is what this research is interested in. So, a number of potential
themes like these are not included in the analysis because they do not connect directly
to questions of objectification, power and subjectivity within care institutions. The
themes that are examined in this chapter and the one that follows, then, are ones that
connect directly to these questions, although this is not to say, of course, that such an
analysis exhausts all the possible issues that could be drawn out. Also, of course, a
different analytic approach that searched out different things from the interviews
would yield other possible themes which this inquiry has not drawn out due to its
specific focus.
The emergence of these categories, then, is driven by the data themselves and
the questions that we are asking of them. In relation to this, the themes can be further
sub-divided into three categories, each connecting to one of the three domains of
objectification, power and ethics. In presenting these themes, we must be wary of
merely imposing a structure on the analysis that reflects a Foucauldian agenda. This
structure to the analysis, however, is intended to enable the exploration of the issues
relevant to the research questions that drive this thesis, and it has been carefully
checked back against the transcripts many times to ensure that the analyses arising
from it are not misrepresentative. Approaching the analysis in this way will allow us
more easily to construct a coherent account of the emerging issues (see Table 2, next
page).
In order to address our research questions, however, we need to move beyond
a simple elaboration of the themes that emerge from a reading of the transcripts. We
also need to consider how these themes imply specific positions in power
relationships that participants occupy, the subject positions that are at stake, and the
ways that participants actively orient towards these positions. As has been said, we
must consider not only these themes by themselves, but also how participants talk
about them, the language that they use in doing so, the discursive positions that they
draw upon, and the power relations, subject positions and ethical activity thus implied.
An illustrative, and central, point here lies in the ways that participants reference
themselves in relation to their situation in care.
Table 2: Or anisation of themes read from interviews
Themes relating to objectification
Assessment of abilities by others
Negative implications of applied labels
Decisions about living arrangements made by
others
Lack of information about assessment/why care
accommodation is deemed necessary
Themes relating to power
Limitations on behaviour
Imperatives on behaviour: having to perform
certain tasks/behave in certain ways
Reprimands and punishments
Lack of choice, means to express opinions,
and/or input into the organisation of one's life
Themes relating to ethics
Assertion of rights to choice and self-expression
Ability to think and act independently/speak up
for oneself
Dependence on the home/needing to be cared for
Disagreement with/ resistance to aspects of life
in care
There was a strong tendency in the interviews for the participants to discuss
limitations placed upon their conduct, imperatives that they recognise as acting upon
their behaviour, ways that they lack choice in their lives, and/or reprimands and
punishments connected to these issues (i.e. the themes relating to questions of power),
through the use of the pronoun "you". That is, they talk about things that you cannot
do, ways that you are expected to behave, decisions that are made for you by other
people, and ways that you can be punished in your situation. Here, the pronoun "you"
is clearly used to reference some sort of generic care subject. It is obviously not meant
to index merely each participant him/herself, nor just particular other residents of their
homes. Equally, it does not include reference to people who are not in care homes in a
specific position. It does not include, for instance, the interviewer or the staff in the
home, but only a particular category of people to which the participants themselves
belong. "You", when used in this sort of context, indicates a particular form of subject
-173-
existing in particular relationships to other people, to forms of subjectivity, to moral
imperatives, and so on. It refers here, then, to anyone in a particular position with
respect to particular institutions — to a generalised subject of particular forms of power
relationships. By delimiting what "you" can and cannot do in specific situations, then,
participants are describing aspects of power relationships to which anyone who is a
resident in a care home is subject. It is not "r or "we" who are talked about as
existing within a particular set of rules and as subject to particular forms of authority,
but "you". "You", in effect, is replacing the seldom-used third-person pronoun "one",
and refers to anyone who is a member of a certain category of people. It acts in these
cases as an explicit framing of a form of subject positioning framed by the situation of
living in care, and inherent in it is the implication that things may be different
elsewhere.
In every interview except one, participants used this way of talking about
limitation, imperatives, lack of choice or voice, or punishments. The one exception
(Interview XVI, Mary) seems to occur because of the very positive way that the
participant in question discusses her home — this will be encountered in the following
chapter. This is not to say that the other participants never use the first person in
describing limitations, imperatives, (lack of) choice, or punishments, but that
alongside the occasional use of the first-person there is, throughout the interviews, the
formulation of these issues in terms of a general subject position, referenced through
the pronoun "you". The mistake should not be made of believing that this is presented
as a rigid discursive rule that could be used in a predictive manner, but it is significant
because it is a concrete exposition of participants' recognition of a specific position
with a set of rules, prohibitions, imperatives, and existing in a specific relationship to
certain other people.
There is more, then, to be considered with respect to the use of pronouns than
merely syntactic or grammatical factors. In one of the few studies into the significance
of pronoun use which attempts to connect it to 'macro-social factors,' Miilhaiisler and
Harre (1990) point out that it is important to recognise the processes by which
'reference is made to spatial, temporal, social or personal aspects of a situation' (p.13)
and to examine how the use of pronouns reflects how the individual is tied to
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particular types of agency and responsibility. As was pointed out in Chapter Three,
however, Malhansler and Flame's approach is flawed by its lack of attention to factors
beyond indexical aspects of language use — that is, beyond considerations of how
particular pronoun systems act to focus attention on particular aspects of interpersonal
relationships and thus linguistically create particular forms of individual agency,
responsibility and social roles. It is important to connect the questions raised by this
use of pronouns in participants' accounts to issues of power, knowledge and
subjectivity which exist at a wider, discursive, level than that determined by the
indexicality of individual linguistic units. The importance of this can only be fully
understood if it is tied into questions about power and subjectivity. It is just such an
understanding that our analyses aim to provide in relation to the different ways that
participants discuss their situation in care accommodation.
The significance of issues such as this — of the themes that emerge from our
reading of the interviews, and the ways that participants discuss them — will be
elaborated in this and the following chapter through an extensive discussion of the
major salient issues, illustrated by key examples from the transcripts. There are, it is to
be admitted, potential problems with this approach, not least that treating the
transcripts as means of illustrating general points that occur across a number of
accounts inevitably loses something of their individual specificity — especially since
the space available allows the use of only a few key examples for each set of issues.
However, this is a necessary step in order fully to draw out the significance of what is
said in the interviews. The use of fairly long illustrative examples from the transcripts
to analyse key areas of interest will allow us to show how the themes that have been
drawn out are discussed by participants in the context in which they occur — to
illustrate how they are talked about, and thus to shed light on participants' orientations
to their situation. This would not be possible, for example, through the use of a greater
number of shorter, and thus more decontextualised excerpts from the interviews.
This approach, then, makes it possible to connect the analyses made to the
breadth of what was said by different participants, to demonstrate the robustness of
the findings that are presented, and also, through in-depth examination of key
examples, to go into the detail necessary to gain an appreciation of the significance the
-175-
issues discussed have for the participants in terms of their experiences of power and
subjectivity. Although there will, unavoidably, be areas of individual specificity which
will be overlooked by this approach, care will be taken to ensure that the
generalisations made concerning the themes and the ways that they are discussed —
and the examples used to illustrate this — represent fairly the interviews that they are
claimed to apply to, with any significant individual differences discussed. This will
allow us to address our research questions by building up a picture of the forms of
power that participants experience, how they relate to them, and the problems they
face relating to them.
This chapter will deal with issues relating to our first research question, that
asking what forms of power people in care experience. This will involve consideration
of the themes concerning objectification and power, and individuals' orientations
towards them. The other two research questions, those focusing on how participants
relate to themselves as subjects and what problems they might experience with issues
of power and subjectivity, will involve examining participants' overall orientations to
their situation in care, considering also how they draw upon ethical issues and actively
take up positions in relation to their environment and the power relations and subject
positions associated with it. Since this is a large area to consider, it will be dealt with
in a separate chapter.
In this chapter, then, we will deal firstly with participants' discussions of the
themes relating to our concerns with objectification and knowledge. In a number of
interviews, it can be seen that participants are aware of processes of objectification
which make available specific ways of thinking about them, and of decisions being
made by others about their needs and thus where they are to live, although they
themselves are seemingly not aware of how or why these assessments take place. We
will then move on to consider power, where the issues are a little more complex, and
centre, firstly, around conceptual divisions and differential relationships between
participants and the staff, such that participants are answerable to staff for their
actions and conduct, and amenable to punishments and reprimands from them; and,
secondly, around the existence of a subject position connected to these relationships in
which participants are led to recognise themselves as subject to a set of prohibitions
and imperatives on their conduct.
7.2 Objectification
As has been outlined, this area of analysis (which ties in with Foucault's first
domain of analysis, truth) is concerned with how the research participants are made
into "objects" of observation and assessment — objects of which power can take hold.
The themes drawn out of the interviews as relevant to this area were 'assessment of
abilities by others,' 'negative implications of applied labels,' 'decisions about living
arrangements made by others,' and 'lack of information about assessment/why care is
deemed necessary.' As can be seen from Table 1, this set of themes was the least
commonly occurring of those drawn out. Only the theme 'decisions about living
arrangements made by others' (twelve instances) was identified in more than half of
the interviews. This is perhaps to be expected given the relatively sensitive nature of
conversation about labelling and assessment. Only in eight or less interviews did
participants discuss issues relating to the other themes in this set — i.e. talk about the
situation of being deemed to have learning difficulties. Other participants either
ignored attempts to steer the interviews onto the relevant areas (lapsing into long
silences before the conversation resumed in another direction), responded that they
did not know anything about them, or quickly changed the subject. However, it is
perhaps significant to note that fourteen of the seventeen total interviews contained at
least one of these themes.
Assessment of abilities by others and negative implications of applied labels
Amongst those participants who talked about issues relating to being labelled
as "having learning difficulties", two recurring themes were noted. These were
awareness of forms of observation and assessment by which a specific, but usually
vaguely-referenced, group of people make assessments of their abilities, and that of
negative implications of being labelled as having some form of learning difficulty
(such as being assumed to be mentally deficient, incapable of independent thought, or
having unpleasant lay-labels applied). These two themes occurred in seven and six
interviews respectively, and can be seen clearly in the following interview extract.
This is from an interview with a woman who was living in a variety of residential
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homes from a young age until one year previous to the interview, when she began
living on her own. It is from a part of the conversation about the homes she had lived
in.
Extract 1: Interview XIV - Wendy
I: So, how many different places have you been in?
Wendy: I've been A_, W , um, (1) B P_, er, (1) I've been in B O_, um, C_.
I: Were they, um, residential homes?
Wendy: Yes.
I: You've been in a few different places then? Urn, what do you think are the main differences
between them?
Wendy: Well, there isn't so many differences is there? I mean, they're all, (1) they're all like (1)
the only place that I've, er, liked living, that was the because they gave you, er, your own
choices.
I: Where are you now?
Wendy: I'm living independently.
I: So, how long have you been doing that for?
Wendy: A year now.
I: You prefer that, do you?
Wendy: Yes.
I: Urn, do you remember when you first heard the term 'learning difficulties'? Do you remember
when you first heard it, when someone first said it to you?
Wendy: Well, er, I was called 'mentally handicapped.' And I didn't know what that meant, and I
asked somebody, and they said 'because you're thick.' And it's not, it's not because you're
thick, it's just because you've just got a learning disability. (1) I mean, I've had all these tests,
and they've just found out that I've got dyspraxia (1) which is a word blindness. (1) It's not
because I'm thick, it's because, it's because I've, it's a bit like dyslexia, but it's not dyslexic. It
affects your co-ordination and whatever.
I: Right. And you found that out quite recently?
Wendy: Mmin.
I: What, urn, before you moved out of the residential -
Wendy: Yes.
In this extract, then, there are aspects of herself which Wendy talks about as
knowable by particular people and subject to certain judgements. These aspects of her
make-up are concerned specifically with her mental "abilities" or "disabilities".
Wendy's comments also demonstrate the significance of becoming known as
"mentally handicapped". It can be seen that membership of this category is dependent
upon observation and assessment by individuals deemed to be qualified to know
individuals in terms of normality and deviance with respect to mental capacities. This
group is referenced through the vague pronoun "they", which Wendy uses in talking
about how she became defined in different ways. This happened in most of the
interviews in which this theme occurred. In only two out of the seven cases in which
this theme emerged (Liz, Interview II; Mark, Interview IV), where the referent
'doctor(s)' was used, did any participants make any more specific reference. This
theme, then, as shown by Wendy's comments, begins to hint at how participants are
rendered "knowable" by specific forms of observation and measurement such that
they can be objectified as "handicapped" in some way. It is clearly implicit, of course,
that people only exist as members of such a category according to the outcomes of
processes of observation and the judgements of the relevant groups.
The second theme, that concerning negative implications of being deemed to
have learning difficulties, is also illustrated in the extract from Wendy's interview,
Being labelled "mentally handicapped" clearly has negative connotations of which she
is aware, such as being assumed to be "thick" — and other participants also talked
about ways that they are aware of being negatively thought of or treated connected to
these labels. It is clear from what Wendy says that once she has been labelled as
"mentally handicapped", this enables other people (not just those "qualified" to make
such a diagnosis) to make judgements about her, and to apply other labels, such as
"thick" (which is clearly not a "professional" label) to her. The process of being
objectified as having some form of mental "disability", then, means that negative
judgements and lay-labels can follow.
It is also significant to note that Wendy disputes the application of these labels,
and focuses on alternatives to them by talking about a specific learning disability.
Being someone who has 'a [specific] learning disability' such as dyspraxia, then, is
presented as a different case to that of being "mentally handicapped". As Wendy
makes clear, it is not the same as being "thick" and it is clearly not constructed as a
"problem" in the same way in that it does not require the same forms of intervention
to deal with it. Significantly, she does not dispute the label of "dyspraxia" as she does
the others — indeed, she expressly uses it as in preference to them. Being known as
having dyspraxia, then, as Wendy makes clear, does not leave her open to negative lay
judgements or labels, and it is not a problem which requires her to live in special
accommodation or to receive the same level of care and supervision as would being
"mentally handicapped". Although, as others did, Wendy comments that she did not
know what being labelled 'mentally handicapped' meant (this will be seen below), her
position is unique amongst the participants here in that she is aware of an alternative
label being made available to her which does not carry the same negative implications.
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Whilst others were aware of negative implications of these judgements and labels,
Wendy is effectively involved in a kind of negotiation with the different labels
available to her. She is, though, aware of the issues surrounding the problem of being
objectified in particular ways and being created as a member of a problematic
category of people.
This extract, then, illustrates what emerged in a number of accounts —
participants' awareness of being somehow assessed and objectified in terms of their
abilities, and of the existence of negative ways of thinking about them connected to
this — such as being thought of, or labelled, as "thick".
Decisions about living arrangements made by others
Although, as commented, relatively few interviews (although still almost half)
contained the above themes, a greater number showed participants' awareness of
decisions about their living arrangements being made by others. The following extract
illustrates this theme. It is from an interview with someone who had moved from a
residential home into his own home shortly before the interview took place.
Extract 2: Interview XV - Ron
I: Urn, to start, urn, perhaps you could talk about how you came to, er, how you ended up in care
in the first place, a hospital or a hostel or whatever?
Ron: Well, I used to live at home, right, and (1) when I was at home, I used to live with my mum
and dad, and I used to (2) at the time, we were moving from B to Road, and on B_
Road, we (1), I was at a club one night [...] We went to the club and my dad told me, he said,
'Oh, we've got some bad news', and they told me, they said my minn'd just went in an
ambulance, and she was going to hospital. In the ambulance, she was, (1) by the time she got to
the hospital, she'd died. [...] and (1) then we were moving house, and then my dad died, and then
my auntie died, and then somebody came to tell us, urn, 'Mr. G you're going to have to be put
in, er, B home.' So I went to 	 some years ago, and (1) urn, (4)
I: Did you have any choice about where you went or what happened?
Ron: Well, [...] I'd just found out that my mother had died of a heart attack. Then I went to B
for a trial period then they made the decision that, (1) when was it? (1) Er, that I was supposed to
stay in there permanently.
E- • .1
I: Where are you living now?
Ron: I live in	 You see, what's happened is, a year ago I was walking up the centre of town
and this guy with, um, (1) got me against the wall and he took my keys (1) I turned to P
and we had a meeting and (1) then, I saw some 13_ branch officers and they talked to me, and
afterwards I said, 'Oh, I'll take the house on, living in
	 So, it's alright.
I: Is that like a residential home?
Ron: No, I live on my own.
Although Ron mentions specifically neither those aspects of himself which are
objects of knowledge and judgement, nor the existence of processes of assessment and
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labelling, these issues are implicit in his account (and in others like it, in which this
theme emerged whilst the previous two did not). It can be seen how the 'trial period'
in the care home which Ron underwent on the death of his guardians is connected to
the decision that he was not capable of living on his own, and that he therefore
required special accommodation in which he was to be permanently placed. There is
again a vaguely-referenced group of people who are responsible for making decisions
about his accommodation needs. Implicit in this decision also, of course, is that it
involves Ron being conceptually divided from "normal" people — those who do not
require the specific interventions to which he is subject. People, about whom such
decisions regarding accommodation and care needs are made, are clearly a
conceptually distinct category of people, with implicit "problems" which need to be
dealt with in special institutional apparatuses in which they are situated.
Lack of information about assessment/why care accommodation is deemed necessoy
The following extract again illustrates the theme of decisions about living
arrangements being made by others, and also the fourth theme connected to
objectification: that of participants lacking information about the assessments that
they are subject to, or why decisions about their care needs are made. This extract is
from an interview with a woman in her fifties living in a community care home.
Extract 3: Interview VII - Jean
Jean: I'd like to see if it was possible to get a flat. At some time.
I: A flat of your own?
Jean: A flat of my own, yes.
[..-]
I: So, um, why do you think it is that you live here as opposed to anywhere else?
Jean: Er, (2) I don't know why I live here. (1) I still have to go to the hospital at 	 every year,
to see how I'm going on. (2)
I: Urn, so why do you think you've been sent to live here yourself?
Jean: Sent to live here? No, I haven't. I haven't got any idea. (2)
I: Urn, do you think you'd have no problems managing on your own?
Jean: No, I wouldn't have any problems. I know that Er, (4) I really wanted to go back to my
house, but they said I couldn't go back. (2)
I: Why was that?
Jean: Er, (2) they said I didn't take care of myself.
I: How did you feel about that?
Jean: Er, (1) I thought that I looked after myself. (2) Yes.
I: So, what do you think made people say that? Did they give you some reasons?
Jean: No, they didn't. (2)
I: Do you have any idea why, er, what it was?
Jean: No. (6)
Again, in this account, it is possible to see the process of observation and
assessment of particular abilities, as Jean talks about going to the hospital every year
for assessment. It is her abilities to live on her own and to look after herself that Jean
talks about as being subject to assessment. Also, connected to this assessment of her
abilities is the judgement that, being unable to look after herself, she must live in a
special institution. In fact, Jean explicitly expresses a wish that is in direct conflict
with the situation she has been placed in as a result of this assessment, and she
actively disagrees with the judgements of her abilities which have been made.
However, the fact that she is brought into being through processes of observation and
assessment as a person with particular problems, means that she becomes subject to
forms of intervention designed to manage such problems regardless of her own
assessments of her abilities.
What also emerges here is the fact that Jean claims not to know why she was
sent to live in her care home, nor why she is deemed incapable of looking after
herself. This is the fourth theme connected to objectification that has been drawn out —
'lack of information about assessment/why care is deemed necessary.' As can be seen
from Table 1 this is a theme which occurs only in a relatively small number of the
interviews (although again still almost half). As with the first two themes discussed,
this is perhaps to be expected. Again, this is a somewhat sensitive issue, and many
participants either changed the subject or responded to questions on this area with
silence. Significantly, no participants responded that they did know why they were
subject to assessment or why decisions about their living in care were made, and none
indicated that they had any knowledge about how they were assessed, or how
decisions about them were made. Amongst those who did talk about this, what
emerged from their interviews, as can be seen in Jean's account above, was that,
whilst they may be aware of processes of assessment and observation to which they
are subject, or of decisions about their need for special accommodation being made by
other people, they do not seem to know why or how such decisions and assessments
exist.
As has been said, although some of the individual themes connected to
objectification appeared in only a relatively small number of interviews, fourteen of
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the seventeen interviews analysed contained at least one of them. Overall, then, this
first set of themes begins to indicate how participants exist as things which can be
assessed, about which knowledge can be gathered, and by which judgements about
them can be made. This process centres around participants' perceived abilities to take
care of themselves, and their needs for special accommodation. However, participants
who talk about these issues do not seem to be aware of the intricacies of this process
by which they are objectified and assessed, merely of the fact that it takes place, and
the consequences attached to it. So, for instance, Wendy commented that although she
was deemed to be "mentally handicapped", she did not know what this meant, and
Jean said that she had no idea why she was sent to live in her residential home in the
first place. Even in those cases where participants did not explicitly say that they did
not know much about these processes, none indicated that they actually did have
knowledge of them. For instance, Ron just mentions the decision that was made after
the death of his guardians, and after a 'trial period,' that he was to stay permanently in
a residential home.
Despite the vagueness with which the participants talk about this, though, and
the lack of knowledge they seem to have about it, it is clear, amongst those who
discuss this area at least, that they are aware of their somehow being assessed
according to criteria centred around their abilities to take care of themselves and/or of
being subject to other people's decisions about their living arrangements. In a number
of cases, also, participants talk about implications of these decisions and assessments
in terms of being negatively perceived or labelled. For instance, Wendy specifically
talks about other, connected, judgements which also become available in relation to
her — being susceptible to lay-labels such as 'thick.' Implicit, but not explicitly
articulated, in these accounts is the presence of a specific system of knowledge which
takes as its objects those characteristics and abilities of individuals relating to their
abilities to take care of themselves or live independently, and of their needs for an
institutional system of care. This thus creates people as members of a specific
category implicitly divided from "normal" others — those who do not need
institutional care and supervision.
Perhaps it will be objected that these points are somewhat mundane or even
incorrect, that it is obvious that people's situation as being placed in special
accommodation is dependent upon their being identified as members of a specific
category, that it is merely a matter of identifying someone as having learning
difficulties, determining the severity of this "condition" and treating it accordingly.
However, the points of which a Foucauldian approach makes us aware include that of
realising that, whilst it would not be correct to say that learning difficulty is
constructed to the extent that there is "nothing" behind it, the manner in which it is
understood and conceived as a particular problem amenable to particular forms of
social and institutional intervention is dependent upon its construction in specific
systems of knowledge. These systems of knowledge are, it should be emphasised, not
"natural" ways of looking at the world that reflect problems which are "real" in the
sense of being pre-conceptual. They are, rather, dependent on particular historically
and culturally specific ways of thinking, of dissecting, arranging and understanding
the world in a way that actually constructs objects of thought, which brings things into
being as objects upon which thought can operate. "Learning difficulties" or "mental
handicap" thus refers to something that is brought into being as an object for thought
in these systems of knowledge. The significance of this can be seen in the accounts
presented here as well. For instance, both Wendy and Ron have been effectively re-
classified, and the judgements about them changed. Ron reports being told, on his
initial assessment after his parents' death, that he was to stay permanently in
residential care, but years later, after a meeting with the appropriate people, he was to
move into his own home. Wendy was initially (and puzzlingly, for her) categorised as
someone with "mental handicap", but a later assessment "discovered" a different
"condition", dyspraxia, which, as she demonstrates, carries with it different
judgements (no longer being called "thick") and does not require care in residential
accommodation. Therefore, it is an important step in our examination to make the
point that learning difficulties as it is understood is not dependent upon an essential
characteristic or deficiency existing within people which has only to be discovered,
but is constructed as an object of thought, as a particular problem, in systems of
knowledge, and, as we have seen, is connected to a set of judgements which can be
made about individuals as deemed to require special institutional care and
supervision.
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This, then, represents the first of the aspects of our analysis. We can begin to
see already issues of how the forms of knowledge highlighted are connected to forms
of power, to forms of action, direction and intervention into people's lives. That is, we
have seen that a number of the accounts indicate that participants are subject to a set
of decisions regarding their lives made by a specific group (usually vaguely referenced
as "they"). This is a relationship of power, in which a group of people can be
observed, assessed, judged, and acted upon according to knowledge of them which is
gathered by specific others. This is made clearer when it is considered that, although
the participants are aware of certain observations and judgements being made about
them with certain consequences, they do not seem to be aware of the reasoning behind
this, of why judgements about them are made, how they are assessed and labelled, and
so on. This leads us onto the second aspect of the analysis, that which centres
specifically around questions of power and subjectification in people's accounts.
7.2 Power and subjectification
Inherent in the analyses made above was a concern with how participants, by
virtue of their being objectified, assessed by experts, and constructed as members of a
particular category, become divided from "normal" others, both conceptually and in
terms of the judgements, interventions and institutional apparatuses which exist
around them. Our next area of consideration is around power and subjectification. As
we said when outlining our analytic approach in Chapter Six, this involves attending
to two inter-related points in the accounts we are examining. The first of these
involves picking out the relationships which are talked about in the accounts and
examining their characteristics — the rights to make certain decisions implied in them,
the forms of action that one individual or group can legitimately perform upon
another, the ways that people act to direct one another's conduct, and so on. The
second, and connected, point is that of uncovering the subject positions in the
accounts. This involves examining how people reference themselves and others in the
accounts, and examining how, and according to what rationality, they are positioned
in relation to particular rights, obligations, duties, prohibitions, appropriate forms of
action, rewards, punishments and particular forms of identity which they are obliged
to recognise, and how they are amenable to certain forms of action and certain
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interventions into their lives and to certain prohibitions and imperatives which they
recognise themselves and others as subject to.
Four themes were identified in the accounts which bear upon this area of
analysis: 'limitations on behaviour,' 'imperatives on behaviour: having to perform
certain tasks/behave in certain ways,' 'lack of choice, means to express opinions,
and/or input into the organisation of one's life,' and 'reprimands and punishments.'
As is evident from Table 1, this group of themes occur far more frequently in the
interviews than the group of themes connected to objectification. Every interview
contained at least one of these themes, and almost half (eight) contained all of them.
Limitations on behaviour
The first theme, 'limitations on behaviour,' involved participants talking about
things which they, as care residents, could not do, prohibitions to which they are
subject, such as not being able to go out when they choose, to make their own meals,
to smoke or drink when they want to, to stay up to watch television, or just generally
lacking freedom and being subject to rules. This theme is illustrated in the following
extract, from an interview with a woman in her sixties living in a residential home:
Extract 4: Interview II- Anne
Anne: There's nothing. It's just, there's nothing you can do. I wish I could do a bit more. I really
do wish I could do a bit more. But, you can't (1) I should love to go and cook. When there's a
staff short in the kitchen I love to go in the kitchen, but you cannot do that. Because of a
different, it's a different kitchen. It's all, it's a modem gas stove in there you can't possibly do
that, 'cause that's what they get paid for. They get paid for that. It's like the officer in charge
says 'We get paid for, we employ them so they get paid for things like that.' That's what this
home's for, for me to learn. (4).
[..-]
Anne: I love J I really can spoil J_. I can spoil them all, but you cannot do that. It's
someone's birthday the weekend, and I feel, if I like anyone, I feel as though I want to go out
and buy them something, but you cannot do that. I did well, I've done at the time, but you cannot
do that; it's not your place, it's the staffs place to go out and buy things. For instance, you can't
buy a cake, a birthday cake or things like that.
[---]
Anne: Sometimes if, sometimes there's anything I want thrown, I have to have the staffs
permission, yes. (1) Because I know this ain't my home to do things like that. You see, you
cannot, cannot, (1) you cannot throw anything out what's good without the staffs permission.
You've got to ask the staff. Whoever's in charge, you've got to ask them if it's okay for you to
throw things out, and otherwise, (1) you see, I want a, / want a calendar putting up like I said
before, I've got to ask P_'s permission, because there's so many pictures in my room (1) so
many pictures, er, a swan what I did, there's so many things that really filled my room up, that I
thought that if I had a calendar, it would you know, (1) brighten the room up a bit. (2) [...] /
don't know 'til I ask, 'til I ask the person who's in the (1) who's in charge of the home; I've got
to ask permission. (1) In your own home it's different I mean, you can do as you like in your
own home, but you cannot do as you like in this home. So, only as far as you can go. If you want
anything, you have to ask for it. (1) If you want to go out anywhere, you have to ask to go out.
Same with my hair; I have to ask permission if! want to have my hair cut And they make an
appointment for me to have my hair cut. Next Friday, I believe. I'm going to have my hair cut
next Friday. I can't say 'Oh, I'm going out to have my hair cut.' It don't work that way; you have
to ask. In these sorts of homes you have to ask permission to do things like this.
In this extract Anne makes it clear that the situation of being a resident of a
care home carries with it a set of limitations to which residents, as distinct from the
staff, are subject. Anne expresses a wish to do more things around the home, but then
talks about residents' relationship to the home as reasons why she cannot do them,
why there are limitations on her behaviour. She makes it clear, for instance, that only
the staff of the home may buy presents for any of the residents, and that other
residents may not, and that residents must have permission to throw things out, to
hang calendars in their rooms, or even to go out or to have their hair cut. Anne makes
explicit here what is only implicit in other accounts, that she occupies a 'place' in the
home, as distinct from the staff's 'place,' which imposes limitations on her conduct.
Inherent in this 'place' is a specific relationship which residents have with the staff,
and with the institutional environment. There is a division in the forms of behaviour
appropriate, and on the rights to make certain decisions and to act in certain ways in
these relationships. Anne firmly delimits what the place of residents such as herself is,
and the bounds of what she may legitimately do. It is because of her position with
respect to the home that she is subject to these limitations. This involves a clear
demarcation between staff and residents, in that the staff are presented as those who
administer the lives of residents, and the residents, in turn, are subject to this sort of
administration.
This is clearly a power relationship in which the definition of someone as
requiring care is consonant with particular ways of them having their conduct directed
and their lives administered by specific others who are conceptually distinct from
them and in positions of authority with respect to them. Certain people in these
relationships are in a subordinate position to certain others, and this imposes
limitations upon what they can legitimately do. Anne makes this clear by, at the end of
this first part of the extract, emphasising that she is in the home 'to learn,' the
implication being that this sort of relationship to her environment places her in a
position of being subject to particular rules, to a particular relationship to the staff in
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which they can set limitations on what she can do, and in which she must seek
permission to do particular things. It is perhaps easy to imagine that there might be
reasons for some of these rules (for instance, accidents could happen in the kitchen,
they may damage the decor whilst putting up a calendar). It is not our place, however,
to judge the legitimacy of each rule, however, but to highlight how these sorts of
things have a place in, and constitute, a general economy of power.
The manner in which the pronoun "you" is used is central in Anne's
discussion of these power relationships, and is indicative of her position as a certain
type of subject. The phrases 'you cannot do that,' 'you can't possibly do that,' and 'it's
not your place' are strongly stressed throughout the extract. As discussed in the
introduction to this chapter, "you" is used in this sort of context in all but one of the
interviews. There is one other exception with this theme. One participant's interview
(Interview VIE, Jean) contained this theme but not this way of talking about it. When
asked whether there are things that she can't do but would like to, this participant
merely responded 'cooking and cleaning [...] the staff do it'. Whilst this still indicates
a power relationship in which other people are in a position to do things that Jean
herself would like to do, and thus to deny her the opportunity to do them, she does not
talk about this directly. With this exception, all other participants who discussed these
issues talked about things that, in their position, "you" cannot do, and/or ways that
"you" are limited.
As has been said, this way of talking is significant because it is a clear
indication of a particular form of subject existing in power relationships with other
people, and of the recognition of appropriate ways to act within these relationships. It
refers, then, to anyone in a particular position, to a generalised subject of particular
forms of power relationships. By delimiting what "you" can and cannot do in specific
situations, then, participants describe aspects of power relationships to which anyone
who is a resident in a home like theirs is subject. Hence, Anne contends, 'you cannot
possibly do' things such as cook in the kitchen, buy presents for residents, or throw
things away without permission, and other participants talk in a similar way about
being subject to rule, about not being able to do as they want, to go out, to stay up late,
to drink or smoke when they want, and so on.
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This use of pronominal forms ascribes the reasons for participants' place in
certain power relationships, to their membership of a specific category of people —
those who live in homes like theirs — as Anne explicitly states. If we substitute "you"
for a first-person pronoun — "r or "we" — this effect no longer holds. "You", as a
substitute for "one" in its broadest sense, can be said to refer to 'people in general'
(Freyne, 1990), but in more specific cases, it is used to mean 'any reasonable being in
the same position' (Rees, 1988; cited in Freyne, 1990). In this way, participants'
accounts of these issues are tied not to individual responsibility, but to a particular
situation in which "any reasonable being" would be impelled to react in particular
ways, and to accept certain limitations, prohibitions and forms of authority — with the
consonant implication that things might be different in other situations. It cannot be,
for example, that just one person or group is subject to an arbitrary and unjust
authority which places limits upon their activities, but, rather, that these limits placed
upon "you" exist for anyone in "your" position. "You" thus references a specific
subject position connected to particular rules and limitations which stretch beyond the
situation of one person or group, and are thus naturalised when they are talked about —
that is, made to appear to some degree unchallengeable and beyond the individual's
control. In talking about these sorts of issues, then, participants tend to reference a
subject position which is determined by their definition as a particular type of person.
Membership of this category of people has consonant with it a set of relationships to
others and to oneself in which one's conduct is directed in particular ways.
It might be objected that rather too much is being made here of what is, in fact,
an insignificant issue. It must be realised, however, that the act of referencing one's
specific situation with an indefinite pronoun has implications for individual
responsibility in relation to this situation. In effect, the individual's role is
c defocalized' (Miilhaiisler & Harre, 1990), and instead there is presented an indication
of what 'any reasonable being' (Freyne, 1990) would undergo in the same situation —
the situation of being a member of a specific category of people. Indeed, this category
only exists in relationship to particular forms of power/knowledge and subjectivity. It
would not be possible to talk about one's position in terms of the prohibitions to
which one is subject in this way were it not for the existence of specific forms of
-189-
power relationship and subjectivity existing around this category which marks them
out from others — and thus there is implicit within this talk the realisation that things
might be different for other people in other situations.
This point is emphasised in the example above by the way that Anne uses the
pronoun "r in her account when she is talking about things that she would like to do
(such as helping in the kitchen or putting up a calendar in her room), but then switches
to using "you" again when she outlines the prohibitions and imperatives to which she
and her co-residents are subject. Again, this is something that is consistent throughout
the accounts. For example, Anne says, 'I love J I can really spoil I can spoil
them all, but you cannot do that,' or 'When there's a staff short, I love to go in the
kitchen, but you cannot do that [...] you can't possibly do that.' There is a tension here
between the individual with certain desires and wishes, and the group to which the
individual belongs and which is subject to specific prohibitions. Anne is not merely
talking about these categories in an abstract sense; she is detailing what it is like for
her as a member of such a category. She is showing how she is subject to a set of rules
and limitations just like evoyone else in her position. She is effectively saying, 'it is
not just me who has to do these things, but this is what you [anyone] have to do in this
position.'
The way that this theme is discussed in participants' accounts, then, indicates a
division between "you" as a care resident, subject to specific rules and prohibitions
relating to "your" constitution as a care subject, and the staff as a conceptually distinct
group of people divided in terms of power relationships from "you" and having a form
of authority over "you". This results in the sort of position in which people become
aware that it is not "your" place to do certain things. As has been said, participants, in
talking this way, essentially recognise themselves as members of a category of people
(indexed by the pronoun "you") who occupy a particular subject position.
This subject position involves, as has been pointed out, a division from
relatively powerful others who are in positions of authority, but it is also connected to
particular ideals which people recognise as acting upon their own conduct in terms of
what they cannot legitimately do. This involves the recognition of a particular set of
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limitations which go along with one's ("your") position as a specific subject. It should
be reiterated here also that, as can be seen in Anne's extract, participants are not
merely talking about these categories in an abstract sense, but about what it is like for
them to be members of these categories. This needs to be understood not only as it
relates to participants recognising themselves as subjects occupying a particular place
in power relationships in which their conduct is subject to prohibitions which are laid
out by others, but also from the perspective of their understanding and acting upon
their own conduct in line with particular ideals of what is and is not appropriate or
allowed.
Imperatives on behaviour
To continue the investigation of this area, we now turn our attention to the
second theme identified in connection with issues of power that participants
experience — 'imperatives on behaviour: having to perform certain tasks/behave in
certain ways.' The following extract, from an interview with a woman in her mid-
thirties living in a residential home, illustrates this theme:
Extract 5: Interview XIX - Paula
I: Right. So what was the typical day stuff you were telling me about? You said that you went to
that place 'di three-thirty, er -
Paula: It's from nine o'clock to three o'clock (3) and then I come back home (1) do my house
jobs and then relax (1) in the evening.
I: Right. What sort of house jobs?
Paula: Er, (1) you have to get the kitchen clean, the sitting room clean, (1) and the landing and
bathroom.
I: Does someone check if you've done them?
Paula: Um (2) I can't think what else you have to do (1) oh yes, clean our bedrooms and do our
washing, do our own ironing and general tidy up.
I: And that's, er, do you have to do that before you can relax in the evening?
Paula: Yes.
I: Does someone, does someone come and check that you've done it?
Paula: Urn, sometimes they do, sometimes they don't.
I: So if you haven't done it before you can relax?
Paula: Urn, (/) well, if you don't want to do it, you don't have to do it, (2) but you do have to do
it [laughs].
This theme is closely related to the previous one, being another illustration of
ways that the conduct of participants is directed within particular power relationships.
This theme occurred in all of the accounts examined, and involved participants talking
about having to get up, go to bed or eat when they are told to, having certain chores to
do, having to go to certain places at certain times (such as college or day centres), or
generally having to 'be good,' 'behave' (e.g. Interview DI, Larry; Interview VIII, Val)
or 'do what you're told' (Interview XII, Steve; Interview XVII, Trevor).
In this extract, Paula talks about things that she has to do in the home, tasks
that she is expected to perform: in this case cleaning the home when she gets in from
her day centre. So, she says, when she comes in, she has to clean the house before she
can relax in the evening, and the staff of her home will sometimes check to make sure
that this is done. As noted with the previous theme, this implies a division in terms of
power between residents of the home and the staff who run it. Again, this discussion
indicates a power relationship in which being a resident of the home is consonant with
the direction of one's conduct by the staff, and it implies a position of authority that
the staff have with respect to residents. So, certain tasks or expectations of behaviour
are imposed on the residents by staff which they then recognise themselves as having
to perform, and the staff are also in a position to ensure satisfactory conduct or
performance of these tasks. Again, it might be noted that reasons might exist for this
set of imperatives — for instance, with reference to this example, there is the potential
problem of living in unsanitary conditions if the house is not kept clean, and ensuring
that cleaning is done by residents might be seen as a means of fostering independence.
However, it should be reiterated that it is not our place to judge the legitimacy or
otherwise of each aspect of power relationships that participants discuss, merely to
bring them to light and to explore their implications.
It should also be noted that Paula uses the pronoun "you" here in referencing a
generic subject of particular power relationships — 'you have to get the kitchen clean,'
'you do have to do it.' In a similar move to that noted in Anne's account, it is not "I"
who has to do particular things, but "you", and this contrasts to Paula's talk about
herself (`I come back home [...] you have to get the kitchen clean'). This way of
referencing their situation through specific pronominal forms occurred with respect to
this theme in all of the participants' interviews apart from the one noted in the
introduction (Interview XVI, Mary). With this one exception, all participants
discussed things that "you", as a person in their situation, have to do, things that "you"
are told to do, and/or ways that "you" have to be "good" or "behave". So, in the
example being examined here, Paula references imperatives that act upon her conduct
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through a generalised subject position. In doing this, she is effectively recognising
herself as a subject who exists in a particular relationship to specific others with
authority over her — the staff of the home who check to see that she has performed her
jobs satisfactorily. Within this relationship there is a division in that there are things
that "you", as a resident of the home, have to do, and other people, the staff, who are
in a position to ensure that these things are done. The description of what "you" have
to do in this account, then, is an indication of how Paula is a member of a specific
category of people who exist in power relationships with relatively powerful others, of
the ways in which she is aware of her conduct being observed and directed within
these power relationships, and of imperatives that she recognises herself as subject to.
Again, there is implicitly a specific "place" in the home that Paula recognises herself
as occupying, and therefore there are things that she recognises that, in her position,
"you" have to do certain things as set out by the staff.
There is again a clear division in terms of power, then, between those who are
defined as subjects of care, whose conduct is directed and administered, and those
whose place it is to perform this administration. Again, as was the case with all but
one of the participants, Paula references her situation as having to behave in certain
ways in terms of a general category of people occupying a particular position in
relationships with relatively powerful others who impose imperatives upon their
conduct, and in which she recognises her conduct as subject to these imperatives. This
represents a model of behaviour which she recognises as acting upon her conduct, a
way of conducting herself that she is led to follow. That is, she recognises that, in her
position, "you" have to keep the house clean, and the staff will check to see that "you"
have done this. Similarly, other participants recognised that, in their homes, "you"
have to be good, behave, go to the day centre, and so on. Again also, there is implicit
in this type of talk the idea that these situations and imperatives are specific to people
in this position — it does not apply to the staff in the same way, for instance, nor to
people not in these sorts of homes — and that things might therefore be different in
other situations.
Lack of choice/means to express opinions/ input in the organisation of one's life
The next theme to emerge from the analysis of the interviews was that of
participants lacking choice in their homes, the means to express themselves, and/or to
have an input into the organisation of their homes and their lives. This theme again
connects closely to the other themes concerning power that have been encountered so
far. That is, it is clear that the issue of choice, self-expression and input into the
running of one's life will be affected by power relationships in which one's conduct is
directed, limited, and made subject to specific imperatives laid down by others. This
theme also emerged clearly in its own right in twelve participants' accounts (see Table
One). What emerged in these accounts was that there are ways that the participants in
question lack choice, that people do not listen to them, that they do not have the
opportunity to express their own opinions, and/or that a number of decisions that
affect them are made by other people without their input (such as when they are to
have a bath, how the home is to be decorated, how much beer they can drink in a day,
or who they are to share a room with).
This theme was discussed in two distinct ways by the participants. In six of the
twelve interviews, it was discussed explicitly as a function of participants' positions in
their homes (i.e. in terms of ways that "you" lack choice, or of decisions that are made
for "you" by others in the homes), and in the other six, it emerged through participants
talking about things that they would like to have more choice or say in. The former
case is illustrated in the following extract, from an interview with a woman in her
fifties who had moved out of a residential home and into her own home shortly before
the interview took place.
Extract 6: Interview I - Liz
I: Could you reflect on the experiences you had in care? How people decided what needs you
had and how they were to be met? What sort of role did you have in it?
Liz: Not a lot, really. There were a lot of us in care so it was very difficult to get everyone's
needs met, but obviously, they did the best they could. Urn, (1) I suppose that they could have
done more to prepare you for independent living, which is what I wanted to do. So (2) but when I
first went there you were more or less told you were got up at seven, you had breakfast at eight,
nine to twelve, you (1) and so on. There was never a choice. And if you wanted to go out
afterwards, you had to ask permission. You never have any choice when you're in a residential
home.
The discussion in this extract is typical of the way that this theme emerged in
the six interviews where it was explicitly stated (Interviews I, XII, X111, XIV, XV,
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XVII). There is an explicit connection here between "you" being told what you must
do or what "you" can do (in this case, being told when to get up, eat breakfast, or
having to ask for permission to go out) and the assessment that "you" lack choice in
the home. It is clear from the outset in this extract that Liz conceptualises herself as
not having had much of a role in her care or the decisions made about her life in the
home that she lived in — her first response to being asked what sort of role she had in
these decisions, is 'not a lot, really.' She then goes on to talk about things that she was
told she had to do and ends her response by summarising, 'you never have any choice
when you're in a residential home.'
Again, this is a formulation of the relevant issues in terms of a general position
of being a care resident. The participants who talked in this way are relating what it is
like to be a member of this category of people in terms of being subject to prohibitions
and imperatives, and thus lacking choice or input with respect to their own lives.
Along with the situation of being positioned in power relationships in which other
people are able to set out prohibitions and/or imperatives on their conduct, these
participants also comment that there are thus ways that "you" lack choice or a say in
the home, or that there are certain decisions that "you" cannot make, but are made for
"you" by the staff. This points up another aspect of the division in terms of power
relationships between participants and the staff in their homes which have emerged in
the themes examined thus far. Here, a number of participants' accounts indicate how
they recognise themselves as subject to the decisions of other people, and as lacking
an input into decisions which affect them in their homes, explicitly connected to their
position as residents of these homes and their situation as subject to the authority and
decisions of the staff. Again, this exposition of these issues of participants lacking
choice in their lives, by tying in to their situation as specific subjects, implicitly
demonstrates their awareness that this is a specific characteristic of their situation, and
that things might therefore be different elsewhere. Indeed, in these six interviews, this
is made explicit, as the participants clearly link their lack of choice or input into
decisions to the homes that they live in, as can be seen in the example above when Liz
says that 'you never have any choice when you're in a residential home.'
This theme also emerged in a less clearly stated manner in six other interviews
(Interviews IV, VI, VIII, XI, XVIII and XIX). In these accounts, participants
responded to questions about how much say or choice they thought they had in their
homes by talking about things that they would like more choice in without framing
their responses explicitly as statements about how people in their position lack choice
or input into their lives. This is typified by the following extract, from an interview
with a man in his early twenties living in a residential home.
Extract 7: Interview IV - Mark
I: Are there any things about living in a home that you think perhaps you don't get much say in?
Mark: Yeah.
I: Could you tell me about that a bit?
Mark: Well, you see B_, who just went past?
I: Yeah.
Mark: Well, I have to share a bedroom with him, (1) and I said to one of the staff that he's
poorly. (1) He is, he's poorly. They took him down the doctors. He wakes me up at four o'clock
in the morning, three o'clock in the morning, (1) and I don't want that.
I: I see, so you feel like you want your own room.
Mark: Oh yeah.
I: Have you ever put this forward to anyone?
Mark: No. (1) If he does it again, I might put it forward.
I: What do you think will happen.
Mark: I haven't said nothing yet. I might if he does it again. I need my sleep. When I'm doing
work, I need my sleep.
I: So, you feel like you can't really say these things?
Mark Yeah (3)
In this extract, the issue of choice arises more implicitly than in the previous
one. Here, Mark responds to the question about things he doesn't get a say in by
talking about an example of something that was decided for him that he would like to
be changed — the fact that he does not have his own bedroom. He mentions that this is
especially problematic for him because it deprives him of sleep but that he has not
said anything about it to anyone in the home, and he confirms that he feels like he
can't really say these things. This was typical of the six interviews that discussed
choice and expression of opinions in this way. In all of them, participants respond to
similar inquiries about choice by talking about things that they would like to have had
some more input in — for example, deciding when they can have a beer, how the home
was done out, or just making a general assertion that they would like more say the
running of their homes in general, or more opportunity to express themselves.
So, although these accounts do not make the explicit connection between
one's position in specific power relationships in residential homes and lack of choice
or self-expression, this is clearly another indication of participants' situation in these
sorts of relationships. Despite it not being explicitly framed in these accounts, there
are clear indications of differential relationships in which there is a distinction in
terms of power between the participants and those who run their homes. It is implicit
in these accounts that there is a division between people who are in a position to make
decisions about the running of the homes or the lives of the residents, and the
residents themselves, who thus lack choice or the means to express their opinions with
respect to these decisions. Although in these cases it was not as explicitly stated, it is
clear that the participants who talked in this way are still aware of ways that their
position in their homes limits their choices and the amount of expression they have in
the running of their lives and makes them subject to the decisions or judgements of
other people.
In both of the ways that this theme emerged, then, there is an indication that
participants are aware of being in a position in their homes in which they do not have
a choice about a number of things or are not able express themselves with relation to
how the homes are run. Implicitly or explicitly, depending upon the accounts, this
awareness is related to participants' situation in differential power relationships in the
home in which other people set out imperatives and prohibitions on their behaviour or
make decisions for them, and they themselves are aware of being in a position in
which they have decisions made for them and their lives organised in specific ways.
Punishments and reprimands
The final theme to be discussed concerning power was that of punishments
and reprimands. In twelve of the interviews that were analysed, participants talked
about being subject to reprimands or punishments in their homes if they do not behave
appropriately. These ranged from getting a telling-off, being sent to their room, being
stopped from going out, or having certain forms of care withdrawn to being given
drugs or injections to quieten them down. The following extract, from an interview
with a male participant in his early fifties living in a residential home illustrates this.
Extract 8: Interview III - Larry
1: So, urn, I suppose that when you're in a residential home, you have to behave in a certain
way?
Larry: Yeah (1)
I: So, could you tell me something about that?
Larry: Yeah, you have to be good here. If you don't, you get in trouble (1) you always get in
trouble (1)
[...]
I: How do you think things have changed now?
Larry: Well, I'm thinking now. You see the television now?
I: Yeah.
Larry: Well, you know the lead? They say I'm cutting the leads off, and I'm not.
I: I see (1)
Larry: It's always me in here. No-one else. (2) They know it's not me doing it. (3)
Again, this discussion relates back to previous themes, with the ideal of "being
good" clearly involving conducting oneself in line with a particular set of imperatives
that act upon Larry's conduct. In such cases, notions of "being good" indicate how the
behaviour of participants is directed and observed by members of staff at their homes,
and how residents of these sorts of homes are subjects of this authority. Again here,
Larry talks about how "you" have to behave and "you" always get into trouble. This
correlates to a subject position in which his conduct becomes subject to judgements
according to standards of "good" and "bad". Again, it is a situation which
demonstrates a definite division in roles and subject positions between residents of the
home and the staff. On the one hand, there are those whose lives are observed and
judged according to particular standards. On the other, there are those who are subject
to such judgements. 'What also emerges here is that particular sanctions can be handed
down in respect of them. There are indications here of imperatives and prohibitions
("be good", do not break the rules) existing in relation to individuals' places in the
homes and connected to their relationships with the staff. Also an aspect of the power
relationship between residents and staff revealed by this theme is the power to impose
punishments, such that Larry comments that he can 'get into trouble' for not behaving.
Getting 'into trouble' clearly implies that other people (clearly the staff of the home,
although Larry only references them as 'they') are in a position to make judgements
about his conduct and to reprimand or punish him in accordance with this.
Note the air of resentful victimisation in Larry's account, where he laments
'it's always me here.' It is easy to imagine a reading that would interpret this from a
pathological basis, and position Larry as being petulant or childish because of his
"disability". However, this would overlook the important point that what he says here
indicates a specific situation in which other people are in a position to observe and
judge his behaviour, and to impose punishments in relation to it. It is immaterial here
whether or not Larry is actually engaging in the behaviour which he is denying, and
whether or not we would view sanctions based upon such behaviour as appropriate.
The aim of the analysis here is to draw out the basis upon which power relationships
exist in this situation and to highlight their characteristics. Whether (and how) this
process then relates to critical judgements about these relationships is a point which
we shall deal with later, in the final chapter. The fact that in this extract Larry is
protesting about and struggling with the ways in which he comes to be a subject of
these power relationships is itself significant in this respect. More will be said about
this issue of struggle and the way that participants might experience problems with the
ways that they are positioned in their home in the next chapter.
In previous themes, then, there have been seen effects of particular power
relationships in which there is a division in participants' homes between those whose
lives are to be administered and supervised (the residents), and those whose role it is
to perform this administration and supervision (the staff). Finally, we have seen how
people tend to talk about their situation in terms of a general subject position from
which they relate to themselves, their environment and their conduct. This extract, and
the others in which this theme emerged, also shows how participants are positioned as
members of a group which is subject to particular types of sanction. These points
about reprimands and the threat of particular sanctions being brought to bear upon
participants bring up another important issue connected with the sort of power
relationships that we are interested in — the existence of some form of disciplinary
apparatus in the homes.
The way that Larry talks about punishments or discipline in his account,
however, are rather vague, being about 'getting into trouble.' Other participants were
more specific in their discussion of these factors, relating the types of discipline that
they are subject to — be it being told off, or having certain sanctions imposed upon
them. The following extract, from an interview with a man who has been living in a
residential home for a number of years, makes this clear.
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Extract 9: Interview XVIII - Ernie
I: Urn, do you feel that when you're in care, you're expected to behave in=
Ernie: =Oh yeah, you do, yeah. You have to, yeah.
I: What sort of ways?
Ernie: You're not to clout anybody or anything like that. Or swear or anything like that.
I: Anything else you can think of?
Ernie: You're not to hurt anybody neither. Oh yes, you have to behave yourself.
I: I suppose you don't always behave yourself, er, how is that put to you, the way you're
supposed to behave?
Ernie: They stop you going out to the pub if you're naughty.
I: Is that the same for everyone, is it?
Ernie: Yeah, it is, yeah. D._	 couldn't go out to his mum and dad's for the weekend because
he couldn't behave himself. I get my beers, my beer night knocked off.
I: How do you feel about that?
Ernie: Not very nice.
Here, Ernie talks about specific penalties that can be applied to him if he
doesn't conform to the rules that are imposed on his behaviour in the home. The
existence of forms of punishment or specific sanctions for non-compliance with the
rules imposed by the homes is again another aspect of the power relationships to
which people in his home are subject. This shows the means by which power relations
can have a hold on individuals, in terms of forms of discipline connected to the ideals
by which their lives are brought into being as amenable to particular forms of
administration and subject to particular imperatives and prohibitions.
In this example, behaviour which does not fit in with the ways that people in
Ernie's position are supposed to behave results in punishments being imposed. In this
case, these punishments centre around placing further temporary prohibitions on
people's actions, such that activities such as going to the pub or visiting one's parents
are actions which can be proscribed at the discretion of the staff as a form of
punishment. The transgressions which Ernie mentions specifically — hitting other
residents or swearing — may not themselves seem particularly controversial; it is not
difficult to see why such things would be proscribed. Again, however, the point here is
that, regardless of the specific infractions mentioned, Ernie's comments illustrate how
a particular group of people — those deemed to have learning difficulties and living in
residential homes — occupy a specific place in power relationships with relatively
powerful others, and it adds to our analysis an illustration of the connection to these
power relationships of forms of discipline. It is not our place here to judge the
legitimacy or otherwise of specific rules or prohibitions, but to highlight the particular
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forms and operations of power in a specific situation, to connect the points made in
participants accounts to the existence of a general economy of power and to forms of
subjectivity. We shall see more about individuals' own interactions and struggles with
these issues in the next chapter.
In the above two extracts, there is again the use of the pronoun "you" when
Larry and Ernie are talking about how they and their co-residents are subject to
punishments for proscribed forms of behaviour, with Ernie only switching to the first-
person when he is detailing the ways in which he personally is punished. Once again,
then, there is this tendency to defocalise personal agency and focus instead on the
position of a general subject when talking about discipline which was evident in every
interview except one (Mary's, as mentioned before) which contained this theme. It is
possible to speculate here that the position of being an individual who is subject to the
authority of others in his/her daily life such that s/he can have punishments imposed
upon him/her is one with which people do not want to identify personally, and that the
accounts therefore focus attention on a general subject, on how "any reasonable
being" in this situation would react rather than (until the end, when Ernie makes
explicit comparison with another's situation) focusing on one's own personal position.
Whether this is consciously done or not, as with previous themes, the fact that
it is possible to reference a general subject in these sorts of situations tells us more
about the position of people like Larry and Ernie in specific power relationships — they
are conceptually divided from people with authority over them, and become subjects
of a form of authority which imposes certain restrictions and imperatives on their
conduct, and, as these extracts show, this also creates them as punishable beings. It is
clear, of course, that not everybody is subject to forms of punishment like the ones
Ernie talks about. The ways in which people become subjects of particular forms of
disciplinary intervention are dependent upon their place in particular systems of
power/knowledge, they are dependent upon people being brought into being as
punishable in particular ways. In the examples here, it can be seen that the ways that
participants are created as punishable subjects is related to their position with care
institutions, and the ways in which they are divided in these institutions from
members of staff who have a form of authority over them and whose role it is to
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administer their lives. It is through this situation that people become susceptible to the
forms of punishment that Larry and Ernie talk about. It may initially seem unusual to
find that groups of adults are subject to this form of observation and the punishments
that go with it, but this situation fits in with the ways in which a particular group of
people exists within specific systems of power and knowledge.
These points about discipline and punishment are further illustrated in the
following example, another extract from Ron's interview.
Extract 10: Interview XV — Ron
Ron: They punish you. You went to bed. I didn't like the decision of going to bed at (1) such-
and-such a time, and I think people like ourselves and other people, they shouldn't, um, (1)
people were being bullies and (1) and making threats and telling what time to go to bed.
[---]
And I thought some of the bad decisions that they made were (1) er, (2) it's, er, if you're naughty
in the pub or you can't (1) you can't go out when you want and, er, you're not allowed to (1)
you're not allowed to do whatever you want. (1) And you're in the poor book, and they shout at
you if you're not in time for things (1) I should have said to Mrs. P 'I'm not taking them,'
because it just a (1) just as I got in at about ten o'clock, Mr. P is on in the morning, and he got
me into trouble. and he was picking bottles up and smashing them and I said (1) I got
angry with him, and I said, 'I'm,' and I said to him , 'S you shouldn't have done that.' And I
said, 'It wasn't my fault, it was S_' But they wouldn't, they wouldn't listen to me. (1) They
would not listen. J M was a friend of mine, and I thought at times he was the worst (1)
worst body, and I didn't like him, and (1) and, (1) he kicked me, and (1) I didn't like them
saying, 'Oh, you shouldn't do this, you shouldn't do that, you're in the poor book.' If you did
`owt wrong, you had to (2) they told you what time to have a bath, er, (1) what else did they tell
you? Who washes your hair (2) I didn't like that decision. They were washing your hair, they
washed your clothes
E..-]
I didn't like the punishments. I didn't like being put in the poor book. Because I was half an hour
late coming in for tea.
In this extract, it is again clear how people living in homes like Ron's are
subject to forms of power that supervise their lives, that impose imperatives upon
their movements and their conduct such that they are expected to be in certain places
at certain times, and to submit to a regime around which their lives are run. In this
case, deviations from this bring punishments such as being sent to bed, being shouted
at, or having one's name put in the 'poor book.' Again, there is the formulation of this
situation as being consonant with "your" position in the home. Again there is the
indication of a set of power relationships which come into being between "you" as a
resident of the home and specific authority figures. This leads to people being created
not only as subjects of particular forms of intervention into their lives, but also, as
mentioned with respect to the previous two examples, as punishable beings. It is
within these sorts of power relationships which the situations that Ron talks about — of
the staff 'being bullies' and imposing unfair or unmerited punishments upon residents
— are able to exist. The structure of the power relationships between these two groups
of people shapes the kinds of interactions they can have and the types of action
available to each group. So, the staff react to the residents as individuals to be
supervised and controlled, and punished if they are 'naughty.' It can be seen from
Ron's comments that these aspects of supervision and control extend into almost
every aspect of their lives from their physical movements in particular spaces at
specified times (bed times, dinner times, bath times, and so on) to deciding who will
wash their hair and their clothes. Deviation from any of these routines then becomes a
punishable act.
There is another important set of points to make regarding the situation of
participants that comes to light in the last two extracts. Comments such as 'I should
have said to Mrs. P_, "I'm not taking them",' or 'I didn't like that decision,' by Ron
and, indeed the whole tone of his extract, indicate that he is aware of the limiting
nature of the power relationships in which he and his co-residents are situated. This
brings us onto another issue that has not yet been examined — resistance in the face of
power relationships. It is one of the effects of the forms of power/knowledge that we
have been examining that people are led to form particular relationships to their
environment, specific others, and to their own lives and conduct — to understand
themselves in terms of what they can and can't do, and ways that they can be punished
in their homes. However, this does not equate to some form of determinism in which
systems of power/knowledge rigidly determine how people act and understand
themselves such that they are mere puppets of deterministic forces.
Foucault's later works were concerned specifically with the manner in which
people, through particular ethical technologies, actively relate to themselves in various
ways. As has been stressed throughout this thesis, it is not a logical consequence of
the realisation that there is a dynamic inter-relationship between power, knowledge
and the formation of subjectivities that people have only a passive role in a
deterministic web of discursive constructions which shapes their subjectivity. These
systems of knowledge, rather, constitute the background against which certain
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relationships of power and relationships to oneself take place, they create the
conditions in which certain relationships become possible, but they do not determine
the actual nature of these relationships. There is, as we begin to see in this chapter, a
complex interplay of forces at work in the manner that people relate to themselves in
the context of the institutions in which they live, the power relationships in which they
are situated, and the ways that they are positioned as specific types of subjects. Also to
be considered are individuals' resistances to the forms of power/knowledge which
operate upon them and position them as subjects. This is illustrated in Ron's
comments seen above, and other examples exist in Wendy's and Jean's comments
about decisions made about their abilities and needs. Wendy was engaged in a form of
negotiation with the forms of knowledge available about her in terms of resisting the
judgements made available by her being assessed as "mentally handicapped" in favour
of her assessment as having dyspraxia, and Jean explicitly disagreed with the
judgements made available by the assessment that she is not able to take care of
herself.
It is this set of concerns around how people relate to themselves and actively
interact with forms of power and specific institutions which is significant in
addressing the second and third of our research questions — those seeking to discover
how people come to relate to themselves as subjects, and what problems they might
experience with the forms of power and subjectivity that go with their position as
residents of community care homes. We shall turn our attention to these issues in the
next chapter. First, however, it will be helpful to recap the main points we have made,
and to summarise what the analysis shows so far with respect to forms of
power/knowledge in participants accounts.
7.3 Conclusion
This chapter has aimed to address the first of the research questions posed by
this thesis — what forms of power do people living in community care homes
experience? This corresponded to the first two aspects of our analysis —
objectification, and power and subjectivity — and to Foucault's critical analytical
domains of truth and power respectively. The addressing of this question involved
firstly, examining the aspects of people that exist as objects of knowledge about which
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assessments and judgements can be made, and secondly, examining the relationships
that people talk about in their accounts and the manner in which they reference
themselves as certain types of subjects.
The first themes drawn out by the analysis in this chapter were that a number
of participants' accounts showed awareness of the assessment of their abilities being
carried out by other people, and/or of negative implications, such as being thought of
as less able than other people or "thick", that go along with being deemed to have
learning difficulties. More accounts showed that other participants, whilst not
explicitly talking about the assessment of their abilities, were aware of decisions about
where they were to live — i.e. in care accommodation — being made by other people
(usually referenced only as 'they' or `them'). Additionally, there seemed to be a lack
of awareness of exactly how or why these assessments and decisions were made.
None of the participants indicated that they knew much about this issue, and a number
of them explicitly said in their accounts that they did not know the reasons behind the
assessments that were carried out, the labels that were applied to them, or the
decisions that were made about their living needs.
Although not all of these themes emerged in a high proportion of the accounts
(the first two emerged in only seven and six interviews respectively), a considerable
majority of the interviews analysed (fifteen out of seventeen) contained at least one of
them, and, despite the sensitive nature of these issues, only two interviews did not
discuss them at all. The existence of this set of themes as a whole indicates a
processes of objectification through which people can become rendered knowable as
specific types of individual with needs for care and institutional living. It is also
important to realise that implied within these themes (considered singly or severally)
is the existence of a specific system of knowledge which takes as its object a
conception of the abilities of participants to take care of themselves or live
independently, or of their needs for care. There is an indication here that people can
thus be created as members of a specific category implicitly divided from others —
those who do not need institutional care or are not labelled as "having learning
difficulties". This form of objectification is also revealed in its links to power in terms
of a specific group of people (usually referred to merely as 'they,' or sometimes as
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'doctors' or 'social services') being empowered to observe and assess the abilities of
participants, and to make judgements and decisions about their lives; and the lack of
participants' own involvement in these processes is also explicitly highlighted in a
number of accounts.
The next area of analysis relating to the first research question focused
explicitly on power relations and forms of subjectivity. The themes identified here
concerned limitations and prohibitions on behaviour, imperatives on behaviour, lack
of choice or input into the decisions made in the home, and reprimands and
punishments. These themes occurred very frequently in the interviews — every account
contained at least two of them, and every participant discussed the second one,
imperatives to which they are subject in their homes. These themes revealed firstly
that many participants were aware of limitations acting on their conduct. They
discussed things which they cannot do in their homes, such as going out when they
want to, buying presents for other residents, and so on. Also, every participant talked
about imperatives on their conduct — having to be certain places at certain times,
having to perform certain tasks, or having to "behave" or "be good". In all but one
case, participants talked about these limitations and/or imperatives in terms of a
general position of being a resident of their homes — i.e. they talked about what "you"
cannot do or have to do in their situation. This indicates the existence of a subject
position applicable to participants, as well as a division in terms of power in the
relationships between participants and the staff who run their homes. The staff, then,
are in a position of authority with respect to the participants from which they can set
out prohibitions on their behaviour, or impose imperatives on their conduct. Also, it is
indicated in what they say that participants are aware of occupying a specific subject
position from which they are obliged to behave in certain ways, to conduct their own
behaviour in line with ideals set out by those in positions of authority.
Connected to these issues was the theme of lack of choice or input into the
decisions made in the home. Six of the twelve participants who discussed this related
it to their situation as residents of the homes — i.e. talking about ways that "you" lack
choice or means to self-expression in those homes. In the other six accounts, this was
strongly implied, as participants talked about things that they would like more say in,
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but were aware of not being able to exert any choice over. Finally, there was the
theme of reprimands and punishments which occurred in twelve accounts. Here,
participants talked about ways that they could be sanctioned or punished in their
homes for behaviour that did not fit in with that laid down by the staff. Such sanctions
included being told off, having one's name put in a disciplinary book, being sent to
bed, being prevented from going out, and so on. Again, in all but one case, this was
presented as connected to the general position of being a resident in these sorts of
homes rather than to participant's individual situation — it was "you" who were told
off, sent to "your" room, and so on. This was another illustration of the possible
nature of power relationships in the context of community residential homes. Here,
there was evidence of participants, as residents of these homes, being created as
punishable beings, as subject to the authority of staff in terms of being assessed in
their conduct and having sanctions applied to them in respect of it.
Overall, in relation to the question of forms of power that participants
experience, then, these themes indicate a division in terms of power between people
deemed to have learning difficulties on the one hand, and those who assess their
abilities or care needs or those who run their residential homes on the other. Initially,
we saw evidence in many of the accounts that specific, usually vaguely-referenced
individuals assess participants' abilities and care needs and/or make decisions about
their accommodation arrangements. Also, within these forms of special
accommodation, there is a division in which participants become subject to forms of
authority which observe, limit and direct their conduct in their homes, organise their
lives such that they perceive themselves as lacking choice, and punish deviant
conduct. These points demonstrate the existence of power relationships in which the
participants occupy a subordinate position to the staff of their homes such that they
can have limitations placed on what they may legitimately do, be required to behave in
certain ways or perform certain tasks, and be reprimanded or punished in various
ways.
These issues affect not only the relationships individuals have with others and
the forms of authority and discipline to which they become subject, but also the ways
in which they are led to understand themselves as subjects of forms of authority,
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specific prohibitions and imperatives — as people who occupy a specific subject
position. That is, participants talked in ways that illustrated their awareness of being
obliged to direct their own conduct in line with the prohibitions and ideals, in
discussing ways that "you" have to behave, or things that "you" cannot do in their
situation.
All of this is not to say that power should be expected to operate in exactly the
same way in every care home, nor that everybody will react to the forms of
subjectivity it imposes in the same way. Rather than claiming to uncover a rigid and
unchanging nature to the workings of power (as some form of essential monolithic
structure) that is uniform in all forms of care accommodation, the point of the analysis
so far has been to highlight the basic forms that power relationships and modes of
subjectivity can take in these situations, to draw attention to what is possible in
relation to operations of power in care institutions. Power is not being presented as a
monolithic, deterministic force in which people are absolutely trapped and in which
their conduct is absolutely determined. There is room for variation in the exact form
that certain relationships take, and for people practising forms of resistance to specific
operations of power. This has been hinted at already in, for example, the way that
Wendy disputes some of the labels applied to her, the way that Jean challenges the
decision that she cannot look after herself, and the way that Ron contests his
relationships to the people who run his home and the related limitations that acted
upon his conduct.
Thus far, then, we have dealt with the first two aspects of our analysis — those
concerned with truth and power — and addressed specifically the first of our research
questions by highlight the forms that power takes in participants' lives. The next
chapter connects these points to the last aspect of the analysis, centred around
Foucault's domain of ethics, and thus addresses our remaining two research questions,
which are concerned with how participants relate to themselves as particular types of
individuals and assign meaning and value to their own conduct, and with highlighting
any problems that they might experience in interacting with issues of power and
subjectivity.
Chapter 8: Analysis of Interviews: Ethics, Subjectivity and Resistance
The previous chapter demonstrated the existence of power relationships that
direct participants' conduct in line with ideals of supervising and managing their lives,
and that people are led to form relationships to themselves as beings who are subject
to this supervision and management. However, it would be a mistake to imagine that
these factors control people's conduct absolutely or determine the exact form of self-
relationships that they form. The question then arises that if power does not determine
the ways that people conduct themselves, or lead people rigidly to form definite
relationships to themselves and their environment, then we are perhaps lead to ask
what exactly are the effects of power/knowledge and subjectivity significant to this
investigation?
It was mentioned in Chapter Two that Foucault emphasised that power is not a
deterministic force, and that systems of knowledge by which people are objectified do
not merely constrain some form of basic agency, but actually create the field of
possibility against which that agency takes place, and bring into being particular styles
of relationships between people, particular interventions and institutional structures to
which they become amenable, and so on. We cannot adequately examine these issues
without considering how individuals themselves experience and interact with them.
This brings us on to the last aspect of this analysis (which corresponds to Foucault's
critical domain of ethics): examining the ways that people relate to themselves and
direct their own conduct. This involves considering not only how people are tied by
forces of subjectification to a particular identity and made subject to certain forms of
intervention and action into their lives, but also how they draw upon particular
discourses and concepts in relating to these interventions, assigning a moral force to
their lives and those of others, and attaching meaning and value to their conduct.
This involves drawing out the discourses that participants articulate in relating
to themselves and their conduct, to moral imperatives, and to forms of power that act
upon them. We must examine not only how they talk about themselves being
positioned as subjects in power relationships and attached to certain prohibitions and
imperatives through their differential relationships with others, but also how they
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recognise themselves as certain types of being. We need to uncover the concepts of
self-hood that people draw upon — what type of individual they relate to themselves
as, with what rights, imperatives, obligations, duties, abilities, and so on. Connected to
this is the question of how these discourses and concepts of self-hood fit in with how
people assign meaning and value to their lives and their conduct, direct their conduct
in line with certain goals and ideals, and relate to the ways that their conduct is
directed in power relationships. We must also consider how people might experience
problems with forms of power, knowledge and subjectification which act upon them.
This will complete our analysis, allowing us to form a picture of how participants
experience power in community care homes, how they relate to themselves as
subjects, and how these issues might constitute problems for them.
As can be seen from Table 2 in the previous chapter, four themes were
identified in the interviews that relate specifically to this aspect of the analysis.
However, this chapter will not proceed, as the previous one did, with a theme-by-
theme analysis. The questions addressed in this chapter concern the overall orientation
that participants take towards their situation, how they relate to it, and what problems
it poses for them. Therefore, rather than dealing with the themes themselves one-by-
one, this chapter will be organised in terms of the general positions that people take
towards their lives in care. The previous chapter moved beyond a traditional thematic
analysis in recognising the importance of looking closely at how participants talked
about the issues from which the themes were drawn, and attending to the language
they use in doing so. This chapter will move further beyond a consideration of the
basic themes that emerged from the analysis to consider how people are, at a wider
level, relating to themselves as certain types of being, to their environment and other
people within it, and to forms of power and subjectification that act upon them. These
considerations are too complex to be elaborated merely by searching out and
discussing common themes that might be identified across the accounts.
In this chapter, then, the accounts analysed are divided into three groups —
those which express clear dissatisfaction with aspects of their lives in care, those
which express support for such accommodation or identification with its aims, and
those which take a somewhat ambivalent line somewhere between the two. This
division can be seen in Table 3, below. These categories have emerged from a
particular reading of the accounts, and they are used here to enable us more easily to
explore the issues with which this chapter is concerned. They did not exist prior to the
data, such that the accounts were interpreted so as to fit them into a ready-made
analytic template, nor are they claimed to represent an unproblematic, "natural"
organisation of the interviews. Rather, they emerged from a process of exploring the
research question in the account transcripts, and exist here as a means of lending
coherence and comprehensibility to the analysis, and to provide a useful framework
around which to present it. The attempt will be made also to attend to the individual
specificity of the accounts, and to deal with the differences that might have emerged
between accounts that are subsumed under the same analytical category.
Table 3: Oppositional, Ambivalent and Positive Accounts
Interview numbers
Oppositional accounts I, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVII
Ambivalent accounts la, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XVIII
Positive accounts II, XI, XVI, XIX
Attention will be focused first upon the accounts of those participants who
exhibit a strong degree of dissatisfaction with their situation. Evidence here indicates
that, in understanding and relating to themselves, people draw upon other concepts
than those which differentiate them from the "normal" and construct them as potential
subjects for care and supervision. This leads to consideration of how people resist the
ways in which they are defined and their conduct is directed in particular power
relationships. Next, we look at accounts exhibiting a somewhat ambivalent position to
participants' situation. Finally, we move on to participants who, in their accounts,
identify with and support the way that they are positioned in their lives in care and
take a positive attitude towards it. Through an exploration of each of these (imposed)
categories of accounts, we will begin to build up a picture of the interactions people
have with the forms of power/knowledge which position them as subjects and direct
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their conduct, and begin to see how these forces and individuals' active formation of
self-relationships is played out, and thus obtain a clearer picture of how people are
affected by power and subjectivity in the situation we are studying.
8.1 Oppositional Accounts
As can be seen from Table 1 and Table 3, each of the accounts classed as
"oppositional" contained three of the themes identified as relating to ethics: assertion
of rights, ability to speak up for oneself, and disagreement with aspects of life in care
(one of these accounts also contained the theme of dependence on the home, as will be
seen later). However, as has been indicated, there is more to consider about how
participants relate to themselves and to the forms of power and subjectivity that act
upon them than indicated by the identification of these themes, and different accounts
contained subtly different ways of relating to the relevant issues. This chapter is
organised not around a broad thematic analysis, as the previous one was. Because of
the focus on individuals' own overall orientations to issues of power and subjectivity,
and how they take up positions in relation to them, the analysis here involved looking
specifically for differences in the ways that individuals (even those subsumed under
the same category describing their orientation to their lives in care) relate to and
discuss their situation. In this respect, three different ways of relating to and
discussing their situation were noted amongst participants identified as "oppositional"
in their orientation to their lives in care. Accordingly, the analysis of these accounts
will be further subdivided into three subsections, each dealing with one particular
"oppositional" way of discussing these issues that emerged in one or more of the
interviews. The first of these (represented in one interview) is a clear claim for the
participant's rights to equality of treatment and self-expression, and a presentation of
criticisms of some of the ways that these rights are often not upheld for people in care.
The (three) interviews in the second subsection put forward a clear outline of rights
existing as general ethical ideals that lead people to relate to themselves as self-
expressing subjects and to behave accordingly. Finally, the accounts in the third
subsection (comprising two interviews) implicitly contained similar ethical ideals to
those in the second subsection, but these were not explicitly stated. These participants,
rather, were more concerned to illustrate negative aspects of their lives in care — things
that they found unacceptable, or unfair.
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Claiming one rights - Interview XII (Steve)
This first extract to be considered here is from an interview with a male in his
mid-sixties who had recently moved out of a large care home into a small, supported-
living home with three other residents.
Extract 1: Interview XII - Steve
I: Yeah. so, urn, I was told when I phoned here that this was a place for people with learning
difficulties. Is that right?
Steve: Yes.
I: Urn, do you remember when you first heard the term 'learning difficulties'? When someone
first said it to you.
Steve: Ah, yes (1) I didn't know about this 'til I come here, because everything's been changed.
In the olden days, you got put down as 'mental' and 'daft,' and all sorts. But I think things have
changed which I didn't know about 'til I got here. And the government bought all (1) the
government brought all this out.
I: Mmm.
Steve: And it's getting better for people like me. It's getting a lot better. Where in the olden (1)
in the olden days, it was horrible what you were called, like mental, daft, all that.
I: But, you knew (1) did you think =
Steve: = No, not in them days, but when I got here, yes, I did, because people told me.
I: So, you never heard anything else before?
Steve: All you heard was that you were mental, daft, and everything else.
I: So, did that affect you, did it make you think, (1) how did you think about that? Did it make
you think that =
Steve: = No, because (1) when I got here, the people told me about what it was (1) what it is
now. I was told everything about, everything about, you know, being brought here. Now, if
people call you a name, it's evil. (1) It wasn't evil to call anybody.
I: So, how, how did you feel to hear these new words? To =
Steve: = What, do they make it better?
I: Yeah.
Steve: I was pleased. (1) Because I feel that I ought to be treated like you.
I: What? I'm sorry, could you =
Steve: = I see myself that I ought to be treated like you do. Because we're in wheelchair it
doesn't mean we can't get what people like yourself. And that's one of things I'm (1) that's one
of the things I don't like, you know, showing people up.
I: I know a there are, er (1) a lot of people speak up, speak up now =
Steve: = Yes, but what (1) I mean, you've come here to talk to me.
I: Mmm.
Steve: But I would ask you, how are you going to talk to people who can't talk?
I: Minim Yeah, well, you can only really talk like this with people who can =
Steve: = Yes, and and but if you go to talk to a person who (1) who can't talk, you've got to (1)
you're putting words in that person's mouth. It's not (1) it's coming from you, and not from him,
or her. To me that's wrong.
I: Yes, yeah. So, what sort of things do you think it's important to say? Um, for people, er, in
these (1) in these, er, self-advocacy groups, what do you think are the important things for them
to say?
Steve: It's important not that it's you that says it, it's important that they say it, what you want to
know. (3) I mean, you can't say (1) you can't say anything when people don't know what you're
on about. (2) I mean, you've come here, and I can talk. But if you'd come here to see somebody
who can't talk you've got to pick someone easier. (2) And, you know, like M_, or A_, of
or that wouldn't help you, but in my case I know all about that, but if people didn't know
that I could talk and you'd come here, you'd have a big problem, wouldn't you. (3) But I don't
know how you could do that by yourself. I mean, you talk to me now, but you there are some
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people who've got a lot of problems. (2) It's going to help you to get what you want to do if you
not only talk to me, you've got to talk to people who, you know, (1) who've got problems more
than what I have.
I: Yes, yeah, you think people need to learn to listen?
Steve: Yes. I mean, I know what you want now and I know that I can listen, but some people
can't listen.
I: Yeah, yeah.
• Steve: And to me, (1) that's one of the things that ought to be looked at.
I: Yeah. (2)
Steve: There're a lot of them. I'm sure you, I'm sure that before you finish, I think you've got to
go around (1) and find about a bit more, more about what you want to do. You can't only put
down what I think, you've got to get a lot of people. Is that what you want?
I: Yes.
Steve: I mean, I can tell you about S but some people might tell you about somewhere else.
I: Yes, well, I think you're right, that it is important. Perhaps a lot of people don't realise that it's
important to listen?
Steve: Yes, but that's (1) can they listen, that's the trouble. I mean, you will get some people
what can't (2)
I: Is that something that you think self-advocacy groups can do? To teach people how to listen?
Steve: Well, yes. There's only two ways you can do that. You can get a person who, who (1) you
can get a person who can talk and tell that person what they want to know. I think, I've been
going to these meetings, and I've seen what I didn't like. People, you know, putting words into
people's mouths. I think that's wrong.
This extract starts off in a similar vein to that which was seen in the very first
extract, from Wendy's interview. Again, there is a concern to resist particular forms of
objectification which make available negative lay-labelling. Steve shows that he is
aware that certain ways of thinking about "learning difficulties" make available
negative lay labels (labels that are not "professional", such as "mental" or "daft")
which can become applied to him. He makes a distinction between 'the olden days'
(or 'them days'), when it 'wasn't evil' to use negative labels, and 'now,' when it is no
longer acceptable. He talks about this change as an improvement from what was
'horrible,' and talks about this issue in relation to his rights to be treated normally. So,
after discussing how the ways in which people can be talked about has changed, Steve
expresses support for the newer developments because, he says, he feels he ought to
be treated like anyone else (using the example of myself as someone who is not
conceptually differentiated from others in the way that people in his situation are).
This extract, then, illustrates the themes of assertion of rights to choice, equality and
self-expression (when he asserts that people like himself should be treated equally
with others), ability to think and independently (when he talks about being able to
speak about his situation, and voice disagreement with what he saw at advocacy
meetings, for instance), and disagreement with aspects of life in care (when he talks
about what happened in his home, 'in them days' in terms of being called names).
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However, as has been said, what is more important than highlighting the existence of
these themes is to consider how, overall, Steve orients to his position of having lived
in care, and being defined as a subject of care.
Steve draws upon a set of discourses which is somewhat at odds with what
was seen in the previous chapter regarding how people relate to themselves as subjects
conceptually divided from "normal" others, subject to care intervention into their lives
and to imperatives and prohibitions which act upon them. He draws upon a discourse
which constructs people with learning difficulties as individuals meriting the same
treatment as anyone else. It is this ethical technology — a form of knowledge through
which people understand themselves and form relationships to their own lives and
their own conduct — which is informing the position which Steve is taking here.
The theme of assertion to rights of equality, voice and so on emerges in this
account as Steve sets up a contrast between a particular form of subjectification on the
one hand and his own beliefs about himself and his rights (and those of people in
similar situations) on the other. As we have seen before, Steve talks about
membership of a specific objectified category of people (what happens to "you" when
you are in his position) and begins to mention negative effects of being so objectified
(being called "mental" or "daft", not being listened to). He then explicitly contrasts
this with a statement of his own beliefs in relation to this position CI ought to be
treated like you'). There is a contrast here between a form of subjectification in which
people are treated negatively as a result of being objectified as "having learning
difficulties", and Steve's own beliefs in relation to this, concerned with rights to
equality of treatment and being heard. This mirrors the contrast between the 'olden
days' and more recent times. 'In them days,' Steve says, 'all you heard was that you
were mental, daft, and everything else,' and he talks about his own more recent
experience ("r) of finding out about newer developments, and his own beliefs and
opinions in relation to these issues. The old days, then, were 'horrible' for Steve, but
things are 'getting better.' He connects this to a statement of the way he believes
people in his situation should be treated: 'I see myself that I ought to be treated like
you do. Because we're in wheelchair it doesn't mean we can't get what people like
yourself.' It was observed in the previous chapter that participants relate to themselves
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as care subjects who recognise prohibitions and imperatives which their subjectivity
imposes upon them and which set them apart from others. Here, Steve contests the
idea that people deemed to have learning difficulties should receive treatment any
different to that received by others, and presents a morally desirable alternative — that
people 'ought' to have equal treatment. This alternative relies upon a particular
conception of person-hood which places importance on the individual's rights to
equality and fair treatment, and makes possible judgements about power and
individual action based upon these ideals.
The contrasts in the account, between 'the olden days' and recent times,
between negative labelling and the assertion of rights of equal treatment, and between
the setting out of a specific form of subjectification and Steve's own contrasting
beliefs, represent a form of struggle in which Steve is engaging — the struggle to relate
to himself, and to be seen by others, as a person with rights to normal treatment, and
not to be treated any differently because of any disabilities he might be perceived to
have. There are conflicts between Steve's contentions about the need for equality of
treatment and his experience of being labelled and treated in a negative way.
He expands upon these ideals and, interestingly, connects them to the specific
situation of interviewing people. In fact, he subverts the structure of a traditional
interview situation, and begins intently questioning the interviewer. His concerns in
doing this connect with his assertions about the need for equal treatment for people
who are deemed to have particular "disabilities". After voicing his opinion that he
should not be treated any differently to other people, he turns the tables on the
interviewer to some extent by challenging the ideal of carrying out these sorts of
interviews. His concerns here centre around issues of voice and the right to be heard —
another aspect of the concept of person-hood upon which he draws in his account. We
discussed in Chapter Five the way that voice is a common yet problematic concept in
evaluating issues of power in care settings. Here, however, it is used as a resource for
resisting negative forms of objectification and power relationships based upon them.
Steve turns issues of power around by positioning them as dependent upon the ability
of people to hear the voices of people with 'a lot of problems,' and as related to the
tendency of people to respond to this by 'putting words into people's mouths.' He
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even identifies this as a problem which occurs with self-advocacy groups. This also
leads to a potential problem which Steve sees with this research: that if it does not
involve collecting the voices of a wide range of people from different circumstances,
then it will not make any valid findings: 'before you finish, I think you've got to go
around and find out a bit more, more about what you want to do. You can't only put
down what I think, you've got to get a lot of people.'
There are two important, inter-related points to what has been discussed so far
regarding Steve's account: the struggle to be identified as an individual with rights to
equal treatment with others, and the act of drawing upon particular ethical
technologies in forming a relationship to himself as such an individual, and thus
contesting negative forms of objectification and resisting particular imposed
subjectivities and operations of power. This illustrates that the manner in which
participants relate to themselves cannot be understood merely by reference to one
particular set of discourses relating to one particular mode of objectification or form
of power. Steve is clearly not passively "constructed" by one specific discourse,
operation of power or mode of subjectification. On the contrary, his account indicates
that the social world that he is immersed in is complex and contradictory, and that he
plays an active role in his self-relationships. The different discourses that bring people
into being as objects of thought and as particular subjects can be seen in the conflicts
and contrasts in Steve's account. He is aware of different discourses which construct
both him as an individual with a specific pathology which leads to him being treated
differently from others and not being listened to and as an individual with rights to
equality of treatment and self-expression.
Steve highlights a number of problems that go along with the objectification of
people in his position as individuals who are somehow different from "normal" others
and treated as such, and he struggles to resist these discourses and the forms of power
that go with them. He talks about his experience of these forms of knowledge and
power acting upon him to his detriment in the past ('the olden days') — although he
does this indirectly, through the third-person — and then goes on to draw upon a
"liberal" set of ethical ideals to make a case for the treatment of people who, like
himself, have been deemed to have learning difficulties to be treated equally with
everyone else.
This is an ongoing process of struggle, though, rather than something which
can be solved once and for all. Resisting negative forms of objectification is not the
same as existing outside of systems of power/knowledge. Steve is playing through this
struggle in his account, both implicitly and explicitly. This can be seen, for instance,
in the way that he sets up contrasts when talking about his life between 'the olden
days' and more recent times, which is mirrored by a shift in pronominal forms that
indicates a concern for establishing a form of self-relationship as a capable individual
with rights to self-expression. Again, he takes the position of either deflecting from
his own agency by referencing a general subject ("you", in contrast to him switching
to "r when expressing his opposition to this) or focusing his attention on people who
are less capable of self-expression than himself (those who have 'more problems'),
and implicitly reasserting his own abilities by contrast. Thus, the theme of ability to
speak up for oneself emerges here also, as Steve says that he is capable of speaking up
about his situation and his rights, whilst some other people with 'more problems'
might not be able to. This struggle around power and subjectivity can be seen
explicitly in the extract as a whole: it would not be necessary for Steve to spend so
much time contesting negative forms of objectification if he were not affected by
them. People do not generally spend time voicing their resistance to these sorts of
issues if they do not perceive themselves to be affected by them in some way. Steve
experiences particular forms of power and subjectification as troublesome, as having a
high cost for him, and he thus draws upon other ideals of self-understanding available
to him in acting to resist them.
The type of resistance that Steve is performing in this extract is quite general
in that it centres upon the manner in which people are objectified by discourses which
circulate at a cultural level rather than the specific ways in which power operates upon
him in the home that he lived in. This resistance is very relevant to the situation being
examined in this chapter, though, as it relates closely to the relationship that Steve
forms to himself as subject of care and to the power relations in the homes in which
he has lived — in terms of the rights he has to equal treatment, the unacceptability of
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certain operations of power, the opposition to subject positions which situate him as a
passive subject, and so on. Elsewhere in Steve's account, and in other participants'
accounts, there were illustrations of processes of struggle with a wider variety of
forces of power and subjectification that act upon participants in their homes (forces
which were seen in evidence in the previous chapter).
Rights as ethical ideals - Interviews I, XIII and XIV (Liz, Paul and Wendy)
A similar ethical position to that which Steve shows in his account is present
in three other accounts of the six that show an oppositional orientation to care homes.
These three accounts (Interview numbers I, Liz; XIII, Paul; and XIV, Wendy) were
slightly different to Steve's, however, in that they contained an explicit assertion of
rights presented in terms of a general ethical position — that is, talking about rights that
"you" are entitled to — and this connects to a set of ethical imperatives which provide
ideals for understanding and relating to the care environment — illustrated by the
assertion that "you" have to speak "your" mind or stand up for "yourself' in a care
home. In these accounts, such ethical technologies are presented in direct opposition
to forms of power and subjectification that position people as care subjects, direct
their conduct, situate them in a subordinate position in power relationships with staff,
and so on. The following extract, from an interview with a man who has been living in
care accommodation of different sorts for almost his entire life, is illustrative of how
these issues occur in these three accounts.
Extract 2: Interview XIII - Paul
I: Can you tell me a bit about how you came to be in care in the first place?
Paul: I was put in care when I was eighteen months old.
I: What sort of place was that?
Paul: It was the	 [a large, long-stay hospital in the midlands of England].
I: Oh, the F, right. So, you were there from the age of eighteen months until =
Paul: = ten. Then at ten years, I went to S_, then G Y_.
I: What's that, is that -
Paul: That was just the same as the F.
I: And now, you're =
Paul: = Well, I'm starting to know things better. (1) I think I started to know things better when
I started to have a voice when I was ten years old.
I: Right. When you got a voice?
Paul: You know, I could voice my opinions.
I: Yeah. What sort of things did you say?
Paul: Oh, some horrible things.
I: Oh, did you?
Paul: Well, yeah, I, I r speak my mind. I can't help it. If they (1) the managers don't like you to
speak your mind. (1) It's not heard of where they're concerned. You know.
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I: What sort of thing happened about that?
Paul: Well, you got a fair deal. You know, you got a fair deal, (1) you'd get them to help you,
you know. (1) You know what I mean?
I: Yes.
Paul: They, they, they helped you when (1) you lose a lot, you don't (1) you don't win anything.
(1) You don't win anything. Now, get this, we just upgraded our house about a year ago, two
years ago now, (1) and they didn't even put a bath in suitable for me.
I: Really?
Paul: And I'm having to go T._ on	 Rd. for a bath.
I: Oh, just to have a bath?
Paul: We're getting it done now, but I've been still fighting for it, innit? It's not even put in yet.
I: Do you have to do a lot of fighting?
Paul: You do, yes. You have to fight for what you believe (1) what you believe is right, but (1)
you're (1) you're just a bad boy, aren't you, because you're not being quiet.
I: Yeah. So, you think you're supposed to be, er, supposed to be a good boy all the time, then?
Paul: You're supposed to be a good boy and be quiet, aren't you?
I: Minim So, what sort of things, I mean, what's being good, like =
Paul: = Eh?
I: I mean, um, =
Paul: = I know, but you're supposed to just take what they give you, and say no. But I still don't
do it. I won't do it, because I believe there should be a voice. (1) We've got a voice and we
should be able to use it.
I: When you do, do you think people listen very well?
Paul: No, they don't listen. (1) They don't listen because it involves money.
I: Right. You think that's the main thing, do you, money?
Paul: Eh?
I: That's the main thing, you think?
Paul: Well, that (1) er, that's, some people are ignorant. (1) Some people are ignorant. They just
don't want to listen to you, (1) just do what they think is right, but they're, they're never right.
They're always wrong.
I: So, do you think in a lot of ways you didn't have much choice in, you know, what to do and =
Paul: = In the olden days, no, you didn't. (1) But, you've, now you've got a voice, you've got a
voice to hear you. You've got to voice your opinions.
[...]
I: Er, (1) you know, urn, what you were saying about, you know, speaking your mind and that,
do you ever have it like, er, does anyone ever give you any reasons like, why things are the way
are, you know, why they've got worse?
Paul: Well, they say it's the government, but I don't believe it's all the government. (1) There's
a lot of red tape. (2) But managers don't come and see you, do they? Managers just sit in the
office with a pen and paper, that's all they do, and they get good money for that. They never
come round and see any of the people, you never see a manager around.
I: Urn, so, (2) so, what sort of, er, thinking about um, choice a bit, urn (1) where do you think
like, you have choice and your choice might be limited in certain areas. What do you think about
that?
Paul: Well, if you've got any complaints, you can put them to your manager, can't you? You've
got no choice, you've got your home manager, that's all. (1) But she, er, her hands are tied. She
only can say to you, she can only, er, she can only, er, say what she thinks, (1) but her hands are
tied, and her neck's on the line, isn't it? (2) You get where I'm coming from?
[.-.]
I: So, er, what happens, when you voice your complaints and that, what sorts of things happen?
Paul: The complaints procedure. You go through a complaints procedure, and you have to see
your manager and everybody.
I: What sorts of things happen then?
Paul: They don't really. You never win. I've never won one yet. You keep trying, but you don't
win. You don't win any, because they always seem to have the answer before you get there. (1)
Really, it's not worth it sometimes, and you think 'why do you bother?' But you have to, to show
them you're not afraid, so, (1) you're not afraid to show them.
I: Do you think if you didn't it would be worse?
Paul: Yes.
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I: Is that something that's changed?
Paul: Change has got worse. Change is not as easy now as it used to be.
I: Er, I mean, how do you reckon, er, I know a lot of people who've been in places like the
er, the big hospitals, who were, you know, very unhappy with, er, with those places because of
the treatment they got. I mean, is that =
Paul: = It's not the treatment you get. You, you get told, you get told that you raise your voice
too much. You know, not, er I've not had bad tr-, I've not been treated badly, (1) but I just think
it's not what it used to be.
I: Mnun. So, what, what sort of things would you change if you could pick some things which
you could =
Paul: = If I had my way, I'd pick all my own staff. I mean, that's another thing: we're not
allowed to pick our staff (1) and it's the staff that's looking after you. That's not care, to me,
that's dictation.
I: Do you think you're dictated to in a lot of ways?
Paul: Oh yes. (2) Oh a lot. Although they don't dictate to me as much, because I won't take it,
(1) and I don't. Believe me, I don't, I will not take it.
I: So, in that way, speaking up makes a difference?
Paul: Yeah, but I just think we should be involved in picking our staff. (1) Because the thing
with the staff is they don't want, they just come for the money. (2) That's my opinion. (2) That's
why the care's not so good now.
[...]
I: But is there one major thing that you think people should be more aware of about people
living =
Paul: = Yeah, well, it could happen to anybody, couldn't it? It's not a thing, it's, it's an illness.
It's an illness, isn't it? It's got to be an illness, so you can't really (1) you can't really label
anybody, because that could be you. It could happen to anybody. You know, that's what people
have got to be aware of.
Paul references two contradictory positions to which he relates in different
ways. On the one hand, he says, "you" must speak your mind, make your voice and
opinions heard, stick up for yourself, and 'fight for what you believe' in the face of
limitations imposed by relatively powerful others and institutional interventions. Also,
on the other hand, "you" are supposed to be 'a good boy,' quietly fit in with the
running of the institution, and take what is given to you without comment. Again, this
extract contains evidence of three of the themes identified as connected to ethics — as
do Liz's and Wendy's accounts also. These themes are the same ones that emerged in
Steve's interview — assertion of rights to choice, equality and self-expression (e.g.
'there should be a voice'), ability to think and act independently (e.g. 'I speak my
mind'), and disagreement with aspects of life in care (e.g. 'they're always wrong').
Again, however, what is most important to consider is how these issues fit into an
overall orientation that the three participants mentioned above take towards their
situation of living in care — and this is subtly different to Steve's account.
In the example provided by Extract 2, it can be seen that Paul is referencing
not only a subject position in which "you" must behave and be a good care subject,
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but also a specific ethical discourse with which he actively identifies. He does this
also through the third-person as a generic position connected to imperatives such as
speaking "your" mind, and refusing to take certain limitations. This was common to
the three accounts that were identified above as discussing these issues in this way.
This is how the theme of assertion of rights to equality, voice and self-expression
emerged in these three accounts — as a general ethical position through which
everyone ("you") has these rights, and as tied to imperatives to claim these rights for
"yourself'. There is a moral force imparted to these imperatives, since they are things
that "you" (or any reasonable being, not just Paul himself) are obliged to recognise
and act upon. Paul draws upon this position as an impetus for challenging the ways
that people in his home are subjectified, as a device for making moral judgements
about power that operates upon him, and showing why these things should be
challenged. The same phenomenon is also evident in Liz's and Wendy's interviews —
in each of these three interviews, the participants state that "you" must speak your
mind and to stick up for yourself. There are certain ways in which being a care subject
problematically clashes with this.
The theme of ability to think independently and speak up for oneself also
emerged in these accounts, as the set of issues connected to rights were discussed
broadly in the context of 'voice.' Paul, Liz and Wendy emphasise their ability to voice
their own opinions. Thus, Paul says that he has said 'some horrible things' in making
himself heard because he 'can't help' speaking his mind. In line with the ethical
position he references, he presents himself as an individual who has his own opinions
and is able to voice them. This process of speaking up is presented as in some way in
defiance of what is expected of people in his situation. So, Paul says, 'I speak my
mind. I can't help it. [...] The managers don't like you to speak your mind.' Here, as
has been seen many times now, Paul shifts in his use of pronouns, from referencing
himself specifically (in the first-person) when stating how he speaks his mind, to
referencing a general subject (in the third-person) when talking about how this is in
conflict with what is expected by the managers of his home, with the impositions of a
particular subject position. A little later in the extract, also, he expands upon this and
comments that 'You have to fight for what you believe, what you believe is right, but
you're, you're just a bad boy, aren't you, because you're not being quiet' and 'you're
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supposed to be a good boy and be quiet, aren't you?' The shifting of pronominal
forms in this way, and the framing of ways that "you" have to fight or struggle in care,
was also something that was noted in Liz's and Wendy's interviews as well as Paul's.
These three participants recognise, then, certain imperatives and prohibitions
to which an individual, as a member of a specific category of people (those who live
in care accommodation), becomes subject. These prohibitions and imperatives clash
with a set of ethical ideals of having rights to voice and equality, and with a set of
ethical imperatives which oblige people to claim these rights for themselves. Paul, Liz
and Wendy draw upon these ethical technologies in resisting the way they are
positioned as care subjects — to a degree. For example, Paul says that if "you" speak
up for yourself (as opposed to merely passively accepting limiting aspects of the care
environment), 'you got a fair deal,' and then comments 'but you're supposed to just
take what they give you, and say no. But I still don't do it. I won't do it, because I
believe there should be a voice. We've got a voice and we should be able to use it.'
Like Steve, Paul places the responsibility for the position in which people in care
accommodation find themselves upon the shoulders of those who refuse to listen,
those who are 'ignorant' and 'just do what they think is right.'
Again, there is here the explicit comparison of what is expected of participants
as subjects of care with the ways that they actually behave and what they believe is
right, relating to points that are made about voice and people being listened to. Notice
the shift in pronominal forms in Paul's account as he does this, from a general third-
person detailing the imperatives of a particular subject position ('you're supposed to
just take what they give you') to the first-person to show how he himself rejects and
resists these impositions ('but I won't do it'). Paul uses the first-person in his account
in connection to showing how he acts in relation to his alignment with the position of
"liberal" subjectivity. Again, this point was common to the other interviews identified
as similar to Paul's in this respect (i.e. Liz and Wendy). Each of these three
participants referenced both a subjectified position and a "liberal" ethical position in
the third-person. That is, they talk about these as general positions existing beyond
themselves and connected to wide-reaching imperatives and prohibitions. They also
juxtapose this with the use of the first-person to show how they themselves act in line
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with the one form and in resistance to the other. So, Paul comments that "you" have
to speak your mind, so "I" do, but "you're" supposed to be quiet and to take what's
given, but "I" won't do it. The significance of this can be seen further if the opposite
case is imagined for an instant: "You have to speak your mind and show them you're
not afraid, but I won't do that, because then you're being bad". This hypothetical
counter-example illustrates how these questions of self-referencing highlight
important issues about how Paul relates to these positions and the relationships,
actions, interventions, and self-understandings they make available.
It is not totally correct, however, to talk about the position of being a care
subject and the position informed by what we have called "liberal" ethical
technologies — those that relate to ideals of equality, voice, autonomy, self-expression,
rights, and so on — as though they were totally separable and totally foreign to each
other, each having a definite and knowable effect in constructing people as subjects of
particular sorts. What we are observing here, rather is participants drawing upon a
particular set of ideals relating to self-understanding and self-conduct which clash
with certain aspects of being positioned as a subject of care and supervision. It is,
perhaps, more accurate to say that there are elements of being constituted as a "liberal
subject" which make available certain ethical technologies that allow people to
understand themselves as beings with certain rights and abilities. Similarly, there are
elements of being constituted as a "care subject" which position people in particular
relationships, and with particular forms of subjectivity, which clash with this
somewhat. Although our terminology may be somewhat contentious here, it will be
more convenient if we refer to these positions as they occur in people's accounts as
"liberal subjectivity" and "care subjectivity", as long as the points raised here are
borne in mind when such reference is made. The participants seen so far in this
chapter, then, draw upon ideals relating to self-conduct in resisting what they
experience as problematic about the forms of power and subjectification which
operate upon them.
Related to this is the way that Paul puts forward a definition of learning
difficulties as 'an illness' which 'could happen to anybody,' and therefore should not
carry negative labels or lead to different treatment. All through his account, Paul
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challenges both the definition of people with learning difficulties as needing special
treatment and the position of a "good" care subject, defined as someone who allows
their lives to be managed by staff members without complaint — 'you're supposed to
be a good boy and be quiet [...] you're supposed to just take what they give you.' He
presents the imperatives of speaking up for oneself and making one's voice heard that
are consonant with a liberal ethical position (although this term is used advisedly and
not totally unproblematically), illustrates how this clashes with being a subject of care,
and aligns himself with the former and resists and challenges the forms of
objectification and power relationships connected to the latter.
This type of resistance does not mean that participants can escape from forces
of power and subjectification such that they no longer have any effects. On the
contrary, this is a process of struggle, in which they engage with the ways that they are
positioned as particular types of subjects and with the commensurate ways that power
acts to direct their conduct and position them in differential relationships. This is
evident in what Paul says about having to fight a lot, and in the way that he identifies
with a certain set of imperatives around ideals of speaking up for "yourself' and
making "your" voice heard, and shows how this clashes with the position of being a
care subject. This is also seen in a number of other ways in the extract from Paul's
interview. For instance, after saying that speaking up gets "you" a 'fair deal,' he
contradicts this by remarking that 'you lose a lot, you don't, you don't win anything.'
Similarly, he complains about the attitude taken by managers of the home, stating that
they 'just sit in the office with a pen and paper [...] they never come around and see
any of the people,' and he comments that if someone has any complaints, 'you can put
them to your manager [...] You've got no choice, you've got your home manager,
that's all. [...] but you don't win. You don't win any because they always seem to have
the answer before you get there.' Paul talks about the position of being a care subject
here not only in terms of a position connected to imperatives and prohibitions which
can be resisted, but in terms of what "you" have to put up with when "you" are in this
situation, ways in which "you" do not succeed in resisting particular forms of power.
Again, this also emerged in Liz's and Wendy's interviews. Whilst saying that "you"
have to 'show' people what "you" are capable of, or 'battle' for "your" rights, they
also made comments about things that "you" had to put with — e.g. 'you had to go
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with the flow,' 'you knew if you said anything, you would just get told [...] it was just
the norm.'
Despite their resistance to many aspects of their positions in care and the
subjectification this entails, then, these participants are still subject to many of the
aspects of power we have discussed. Most prominent here is being placed in power
relationships in which they are conceptually divided from relatively powerful others
who make decisions about the environment in which they live, and upon whom they
are reliant if they want to voice their opinions or to see any changes in any aspect of
their environment. There is thus a complex and contested set of issues surrounding
subjectivity, forms of self-understanding, and relationships of power.
To summarise, in three of the six accounts that showed an oppositional
orientation towards life in care (as illustrated in Paul's account), there was the
juxtaposition of two contradictory positions relating to subjectivity and ethics —
"liberal subjectivity" and subjectification to a care regime — both referenced as general
positions connected to particular imperatives and limitations (i.e. talked about it terms
of what "you" are obliged to do or the ways that "you" are expected to behave or
"should" behave in each instance). Alongside this was participants' identification of
themselves as people who speak up for themselves and make their voices and
opinions heard. This is presented explicitly as being in defiance of what is expected of
individuals in the position of being a care subject. So, Paul presents how "you" (as a
subject of a care home) are expected to behave and then counters this by making it
clear that he ("r) refuses to do so. He draws upon "liberal" ethical ideals in doing
this: 'you're expected to just take what they give you and say no. But I still don't do it.
I won't do it, because I believe there should be a voice'.
This is an ongoing struggle. Although Paul refuses to believe that he should be
a 'good boy,' and despite his assertions that he has a voice which must be heard, and
that the staff don't 'dictate' as much to him as to others because he 'will not take it,'
there are still limitations acting upon him which clash with these ideals. Paul's
account is torn between talking about challenges and forms of resistance in the face of
subjectification and power relationships on the one hand, and about the negative
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effects that this power and subjectification have on the other. This is perhaps to be
expected — as has been commented, there would be little point discussing one's
objections to particular forms of power in this context if they did not affect one's life
in some way. So, although he challenges the way that people with learning difficulties
are objectified and subjectified in forms of power/knowledge, and illustrates his
resistance to this, Paul still comments that there are things that "you", as a member of
a particular group of people (those living in care) have to do or put up with — 'you
don't win,' 'you 'ye got no choice,' etc. This situation cannot be understood by
reference just to power or resistance alone, but only as a dynamic interaction of forces
of power, subjectification, ethics (the active process of forming relationships to
oneself as a certain type of being) and resistance.
Negative aspects of life in care — Interviews XV and XVII (Roger and Trevor)
Another, somewhat different, example of someone taking up a position centred
around challenges to the operations of power that they experience is seen in the next
extract, from an interview with a man in his late forties who has lived in a residential
home for most of his life.
Extract 3: Interview XVII — Trevor
I: What do you think has changed?
Trevor: Nothing much. (?) I'm in my forties, late forties now, forty-six, forty-seven, I can't
remember how much I am now, but (1) I mean, I'm getting really on now, I mean, (1) I can't get
a choice to get married, I can't get a choice to have a girlfriend, I can't get a choice of where I
live, I can't get a choice of where I work, I can't get a choice of going to the day centre, I can't
meet people in the day centres. I can't meet anybody (2).
I: So you don't get much say in things?
Trevor: You don't get much say in your life at all, no. (?) It's all very good to [mocking tone]
"be in a nice home," but then you get bored, you get fed up, you get nervous, you get
breakdowns and all sorts. Yeah.
I: So do you think you'd prefer to live independently?
Trevor: I'd like to live independently if I could, but I can't do much on my own now, because
I'm getting really old now. (I've known as much) since I was a kid, wanting things, but I'm
getting very old now.
[-.]
I: Do people try and have, have a say, to have choices and =
Trevor: = No, nobody has a say, because nobody says anything, because they make you feel
disabled, mentally handicapped, and stuff like that, and learning disabilities, stuff like that, it
means they don't get a say in where they want to live or nothing. I mean a lot of them are dying
in places, I mean, I mean, you don't get a choice or whether you're buried or cremated or what
you want done when you're dead. Nothing. You don't get a choice in anything these days.
I: So, urn, do you not feel that anyone would listen if you did complain?
Trevor: I don't know if anybody would listen or not, I mean I wouldn't know.
I: So what about the staff? Do you think if you, if you said anything to them it would change
anything?
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Trevor: Pardon?
I: Do you think if you said anything to the staff it would change anything?
Trevor: I don't know, because you don't know what to say to staff (when they tell you, er,
there've been) wedding books, funeral books and all sorts, I mean, they just throw them away,
they don't keep them very often. That's the trouble, they just throw them away, and you can't
afford to get, get buried because it's too expensive. I mean, how was I supposed to know that?
They've got all my money. I mean, you've got no next-of-kin or nothing when you're in them
homes. [...] I mean, I mean, it's alright living in a residential home, I mean you get looked after
and that, but you don't learn anything, you, you, (1) they open doors for you and that, and you
don't know what to do half the time. All you do is go to college and come back, have your
meals, and you're, you're not doing anything really, I mean, not really, it's not much, (1) I mean
if you want to, you're not really (using) your mind much. When you got, I mean, I can't make
my bed, I can't wash my clothes, I mean that's what you can't do because it's all done for you.
You can't do anything like that, and I get really depressed and all nervous because (1) my
washing's not done or my bed's not made or whatever. (1) It's really depressing. (2) If you just
change to make your bed, you can't because you've been in homes too many times, and you
can't wash your clothes because you didn't like to, you don't know how to work the washing
machine, I mean you don't know how to do anything these days, I mean it's terrible.
[...]
I: What about, urn, rules in the home, rules about behaviour and that?
Trevor: Oh, I don't know about rules and (1) I don't know about rules because there's people
with depression and (1) I mean a lot of people suffer from depression. I mean, one person got hit
because they got depressed and (1) they were, I mean it's nervous, something with the mind, I
mean I don't blame themselves, I think it's something wrong with the management with drugs
and injections and things going on. All their lives, it's not doing them any good at all.
I: So who decides things like that?
Trevor: The staff do, they decide if you've got to take drugs or not. You've got to either take
them or they put your name down in the book. Then you could be in the hospital or go to the
doctors or the psychiatrists or whatever. And that's not fair.
I: So what do you think about the way staff"
Trevor: = Terrible. It's terrible when you have to take drugs all the time and injections and
stuff, because (she just want to give me) injections, I said, 'What are the injections for?' 'To
make you better.' I said, 'You're not making me better at all. I've been ill since 1970, I'm not
better at all.'
I: So why do you think they do things like that?
Trevor: I don't know, it's just their way of doings things. (2) They don't seem to care much now
like they used to. The social workers are bad enough not opening their mouths all the time and
sticking up for residential nurses and stuff like that. (All my treatment's been) injections for
things and I don't understand because I don't, er, I take drugs, I take tablets, I take medication, I
take all sorts, and they're making me terrible depressed. Yeah.
I: So, urn (1) do you think that's (1) something to do with the way people treat people with
learning difficulties?
Trevor: Yeah. That's how they treat them, yes.
I: So, you think, urn, do you think people with learning difficulties are treated badly?
Trevor: Most of them are, yeah. Most people with learning difficulties are treated badly. It's
alright sometimes, but they, er, not with drugs because they make you take them, and when
you've took them, you get really depressed and nervous and you have breakdowns and you feel
suicidal and (1) you don't know what to do with yourself half the time. (1) You can't sleep at
nights, you're having more nightmares. I mean every time they put (?) you get more nightmares.
[---]
I: What do you think about the, er, that you've changed the way you think about things since
you've come here?
Trevor: They've changed because now I can stick up for my rights. (1) But I was told to stick up
for my own rights, and I find that difficult.
Trevor takes up an oppositional position with respect to the way that his life is
managed in his home. However, it is noticeably different in tone and scope to what
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was seen in the previous accounts. Trevor does not explicitly draw upon specific
discourses and concepts of person-hood in his oppositional attitude. Rather, these are
implicit in his account. Where the participants seen so far in this chapter explicitly set
out an oppositional position upon which to draw in relating to themselves as capable
beings and challenging the forms of power that take hold of them, Trevor's account is
centred more around showing how particular effects of power and subjectification are
intolerable for people in his position.
When asked whether he has much say in how his life is organised, Trevor
responds by lamenting at length the things in which he has no choice — the drugs he
takes, how he is to meet people, where he lives and works, trips to the day centre, and
so on. Thus, the theme of disagreement with many aspects of his life in care is central
to Trevor's account. In contrast to what we have seen before, Trevor frequently talks
in the first person about how he lacks choice in many aspects of his life. The
significance of this will be discussed later. First, we should consider how he responds
to these questions by mocking the idea that being 'in a nice home' is an over-riding
concern. His comments show that this does not mean much if "you" (and here he has
shifted to using the third-person to reference a general subject position) do not have
much say in "your" life — it does not prevent "you" from getting 'bored,' 'fed up' or
'nervous' for instance. One other account (Interview XV, Roger) was similar to
Trevor's in these respects.
He connects this lack of choice not only to the way that people's lives are
managed, but also to effects of their environment and their treatment which make
them 'feel disabled.' Not only do people not get a say in where they are to live, for
instance, but 'nobody says anything' because they are made to 'feel disabled' or
'mentally handicapped.' This represents the theme of dependence on the home, as
Trevor comments that, although he would like to live independently, there are things
that he believes he cannot do for himself. His was the only "oppositional" account to
contain this theme (Roger's account, despite being similar to Trevor's in many
respects, is different here, as Roger was able eventually to move out of his home and
into independent living). Trevor talks about this as a sort of learned helplessness, in
which the way that his life is managed means that he lacks the skill, knowledge or
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confidence to do certain things for himself. Thus, he says that "you" can't get buried
because of the cost, and says 'how was I supposed to know that? They've got all my
money.' Just as having other people whose role it is to manage his money means that
Trevor has difficulty knowing what he can and can't afford, he also shows how the
organised, managed, regimented lifestyle to which he and his co-residents are subject
means that this affects very wide areas of people's lives. He comments, 'all you do is
go to college and come back, have your meals, and you're, you're not doing anything
really.' Trevor makes clear that what might be called quality of care is not the issue he
is contesting: 'I mean, it's alright living in a residential home, I mean you get looked
after and that.' What he is getting at, essentially, are the problems inherent in a group
of people occupying a position in an institution in which their lives are managed by
specific others, in which they are situated in power relationships which place them in
a passive position with respect to the running of their own lives and their
environment. He illustrates this with examples of things he himself worries about,
such as his washing or making his bed.
These complaints and disagreements with his home are extended when Trevor
talks about the programmes of medication given to residents. He comments that he
believes that the 'drugs and injections' given to people do them 'no good at all,' and
that this represents 'something wrong with the management.' The passive position
which people who live in Trevor's home occupy is emphasised here again, as he talks
about how the staff decide whether or not "you" have 'got to take drugs,' and how
failure to comply with these decisions means that 'you could be in the hospital or go
to the doctors or the psychiatrists or whatever.' Once again, there is a definite division
in terms of power relationships between those who run the home and whose role it is
to supervise, manage and look after the residents, and the residents themselves, who
are positioned in this relationship as passive subjects of these forms of supervision
and management and as subject to corrective measures (such as being sent to a
hospital) in relation to them.
Trevor actively contests the ways that people in his position are subjectified in
these power relationships and the treatment they receive as a result of them. As well
as arguing that there is something wrong with the management of the home and that
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the drugs which are administered do not do people any good, he complains that this
treatment is 'not fair,' that it is, in fact, 'terrible.' His objections to this particular
aspect of institutional living are further illustrated when he recounts an instance of his
explicitly challenging it: 'I said, "What are the injections for?" "To make you better."
I said, "You're not making me better at all. I've been ill since 1970, I'm not better at
all".' This theme is continued as Trevor complains that social workers only stick up
for residential nurses rather than speaking up for residents, that his drug treatment is
making him depressed, and that people with learning difficulties are not treated
'alright' with respect to the administration of drugs because 'they' make 'you' take
them. This illustrates again how people living in care accommodation are positioned
with respect to forms of power and modes of subjectification: choices are limited and
responsibility for particular decisions is deferred for people in Trevor's situation.
Again, this is generally (but not exclusively) referenced in terms of a general subject
position (i.e. around what "you" have to do, what decisions are made for "you" and so
on). Specifically, there is an emphasis on the passive position of care residents with
respect to decisions that are made about their lives and the ways that their lives are
managed. The process of being constructed as a subject of these institutional
interventions is commensurate with a set of power relationships in which there is a
conceptual division between residents and staff in terms of who has the right to make
particular decisions, who can organise, supervise, and, if necessary, take corrective
action towards, whose life, and so on.
Trevor takes up an oppositional stance towards these issues, and contests them
throughout his interview. There are, however, a number of differences between this
and the previous interviews. In both Trevor's and Roger's accounts, the theme of
assertion of rights to equality, choice, and so on emerges differently to what has been
seen so far. This assertion of rights does not emerge in these two accounts explicitly in
terms of statements about how people should be treated (as was seen in Steve's
account), or through the presentation of general "liberal" ethical position setting rights
that "you" have and connected to imperatives to claim these rights. Rather, it emerged
indirectly, through an outline of what happened to the participants in question in their
homes, and their arguing that this is unfair or wrong. Where previously participants
explicitly drew upon ethical technologies relating to a position that we have called
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"liberal" subjectivity, here there is no such appeal. Trevor and Roger, do not make
explicit reference to they he should be treated, nor appeals to specific rights which can
be contrasted to what they have experienced. Similarly, there is not the same type of
explicit illustration of themselves as a capable and independent subject as in the other
interviews. There is not the same concern to contrast what is expected of "you" as a
care subject with the ways in which they themselves behave(d), for instance.
However, their discourse does, of necessity, implicitly draw upon certain ethical
ideals, certain concepts about how people should be treated, and what it is legitimate
to do to them. A set of ideals based, around the concept of people as having a right to
'fair' treatment, to make their own choices, and to be listened to, is implicit in what
they says — otherwise he could not make claims about things being 'not fair' in these
respects. As can be seen in Trevor's account, though, they seem more concerned to
show how being in care affects their lives. Although there is, as has been pointed out,
a general tendency to talk about his situation by referencing a generic subject of care
through the third-person, Trevor also goes into detail about the ways in which he
himself is limited and constrained by particular forms of power relationships. For
instance, he remarks 'I'm still on drugs and injections now, I don't have any choices
about that either,' 'I can't get a choice about where I live, I can't get a choice of where
I work, I can't get a choice of going to the day centre,' or 'I can't make my bed, I can't
wash my clothes'. This way of talking about life in care emerged in both Trevor's and
Roger's accounts.
At this juncture, it may be helpful to digress a little to examine the impact of
this phenomenon upon the general analytical findings emerging from this research. It
might be objected here that Trevor's interview represents disconfirming evidence for
findings about the use of pronominal forms highlighted in previous interview extracts,
and that it therefore undermines the analyses drawn out so far. However, this would
be to misunderstand the points that have been made. The point has not been to elevate
the use of differing pronominal forms to the level of a psychological or discursive rule
that could be used in a predictive manner to anticipate how an individual would be
expected to talk in a particular instance. Nor have we been concerned to situate this
set of phenomena as a fundamental theoretical basis for discovering the existence of
power relationships and forms of subjectivity such that we could not discuss these
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issues without the presence of a particular, definite pattern of pronoun use — i.e.
always using the third-person to discuss how one is limited, constrained or subject to
certain imperatives, and, similarly, always then shifting to the first-person to discuss
one's actual behaviour or beliefs. On the contrary, we are not laying claim to the
discovery of a rigid, predictive set of rules surrounding a set of psychological
phenomena. Attention has been paid to the variations in pronominal use not because
this is a fundamental underpinning to an overall theory, but because it is an aspect of
people's discourse which is useful in highlighting how they are relating to issues
relevant to this research. It is a too/ for analysing these issues within the context of a
wider set of issues surrounding power and subjectivity that can be seen in people's
accounts. As such, it has the potential to show different things happening in different
accounts. Each account, then, should be analysed independently (although, of course,
this is not to say that a number of similar findings will not be noted in different
accounts), rather than in relation to a general psychological, rule-based theory. The
examination of how people use pronominal forms in discussing issues of power and
subjectivity is a useful tool in carrying out this analysis, in examining how people
relate in particular ways to forms of power relationships, ethical technologies, and
their own identity and subjectivity. It is in this way that the findings outlined so far
have been drawn out, and it is in this way that Trevor's extract must also be treated.
Having made these points, then, we return to Trevor's interview to see how this
analytical tool is useful in analysing the relationships he describes to forms of power
and subjectivity which affect him.
Although there is, on the whole, a tendency for Trevor to talk about the
constraints and limitations which act upon him in terms of a general subject position
(i.e. talked about in the third-person), he also explicitly discusses these issues as they
affect him (in the first-person). This is connected to the specific ways that Trevor
interacts with problems of power and subjectivity. Previously, we have seen how
people struggle to relate to themselves as capable and independent beings who,
despite institutional and disciplinary pressures, defy being positioned as subjects of a
care regime, and challenge the power relationships and moral imperatives that inhere
with such a position. This struggle is reflected in the way that they talk about these
issues, including how they reference themselves (including their use of pronominal
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forms). This concern is not so central to Trevor's discourse — although it cannot be
completely ruled out. Trevor is more concerned to show how the forms of power he
describes are intolerable — or, in his own words, 'terrible' — for people in his situation.
Rather than drawing upon alternative forms of ethical technology or
oppositional forms of subjectivity to outline how people should be treated or to locate
imperatives for resisting particular operations of power, Trevor and Roger talk about
the negative effects of these power relationships, showing how this is (or was, in
Roger's case) intolerable for them. There are numerous examples of this to be seen in
Trevor's account. For instance, he talks about how people are made to feel disabled
and that they therefore don't get a say in where they live, he discusses how this leads
to a passive position in which their lives are organised and managed and they become
unable to do things for themselves, and he complains that they are made to take drugs
and medicines without being consulted. There is a tendency for him to discuss these
issues with reference to a generic subject of care — by saying that this is what happens
to "you" when you are in this situation. Indeed, his account would be saying
something rather different if he did not connect the points he is making about power
to the membership of a specific subjectified group. However, he also expands upon
these issues with specific examples from his own personal experience, and references
these as such. Although he comments that 'you don't get a choice,' or 'you're not
really doing anything,' he also illustrates at length how these issues affect his own life,
limiting what he personally can do (for instance, 'I don't have any choices about
that'). As has been said, a very similar occurrence was noted in Roger's interview, in
which he talked about ways that "you" were treated in care (e.g. 'they punish you.
You went to bed'), went on to provide a number of examples from his own
experience, in the first person, that illustrate how this was intolerable for him (e.g. 'I
had to get on my hands and knees and beg them not to send me to W Hospital, and
[...] they kept aggravating me and were going to burn my season-ticket and, urn, they
were tormenting me'), and contested these aspects of power (e.g. 'people were being
bullies and [...] telling what time to go to bed').
Although Trevor clearly opposes much of what goes on in terms of power
relationships, and illustrates how he has spoken up about this (when confronting a
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staff member about his medication regime), there is also a resigned air to the
interview, as he laments the ways that his life is made 'terrible' by these issues.
Contrary to the other interviews seen previously, Trevor and Roger do not explicitly
struggle to relate to themselves, and to present themselves, as independent, capable,
self-expressing beings. Although their comments are implicitly based upon an ideal of
how people should be treated (it would not be possible to comment that certain things
are 'not fair' without some such inherent notion), and although this is a clear
indictment of the ways that they are subjectified, they do not make explicit appeals to
these issues in order to align themselves with a "liberal" form of self-understanding.
Indeed, it seems that Trevor is struggling with these issues, but that he believes that he
is losing the struggle (this is not quite the same in Roger's account, as he had moved
out of his home shortly before the interview was conducted). This can be seen not
only in the ways that Trevor references his own life as subject to numerous intolerable
constraints, or talks about his abilities to look after himself as being atrophied through
the action of such constraints, but also when, for instance, he comments that 'now I
can stick up for my rights,' but then amends this to 'but I was told to stick up for my
rights, and I find that difficult.' So, although he challenges the manner in which he is
subjected and in which power has a hold of him, he seems more resigned to this than
he is concerned to align himself with an alternative self-conception upon which to
base challenges.
These points represent a notably different position to those seen before in the
other "oppositional" interviews. Although the forms of power relationships and the
modes of subjectification in Trevor's and Roger's accounts are similar to those in
other accounts, and although they both clearly oppose and challenge these issues, the
way that they interact with them and relate to themselves are different. This is a useful
reminder that we should not be seduced into believing that we can come up with some
sort of grand unified theory of people's interactions with power and subjectivity, that
we must attend to the specificity of individuals' accounts rather than making appeals
to the generalisability of our findings merely through identifying themes common to a
number of interviews.
Summary
To surnmarise briefly, so far in this chapter we have seen participants drawing
upon systems of knowledge and ethical technologies which are oppositional to forms
of power and subjectification that construct them as conceptually divided from other
people and place them in a subject position in which their lives are managed and
supervised, and in which they become amenable to forms of power which direct their
conduct in line with this. These oppositional discourses or forms of ethical technology
centre around concerns for equality of treatment, choice, voice, and the right to take
an active role in running one's life. Participants drew, explicitly and implicitly, upon
these positions in challenging forms of subjectification consonant with being
constructed as having learning difficulties, and in locating imperatives for challenging
and resisting particular aspects of power.
These issues were discussed in different ways by different participants. First,
Steve put forward the contention that people with learning difficulties like himself
should receive equal treatment with everyone else, emphasised that he could speak up
about his situation, and challenged what he perceived as a lack of attention paid to the
opinions of people with learning difficulties. The next example, which was
representative of the position taken in two other accounts, showed a somewhat
different articulation of these issues. In these three accounts, participants explicitly
framed the ideal of "liberal subjectivity" as a general position imparting rights to
people in general — that is, they talked about rights that "you" have, ways that "you"
should be treated. Connected to this liberal ethical position was a set of imperatives
leading participants to talk about how "you" should claim these rights for "yourself',
voice "your" opinions, ways that "you" have to behave to be treated fairly, and so on.
Finally, Trevor's account (and Roger's, although it was not examined in depth here)
only implicitly contained these sorts of ideals. Here, many aspects of life in care were
challenged, but this was done through the participants illustrating how living in care is
unpleasant or intolerable, talking at length about negative experiences that they
personally have had, and showing how this is unfair and should not be tolerated. So,
although these interviews all contained the same three themes of asserting rights,
showing participants ability to think independently or speak up about their situation,
and challenging aspects of life in care, there are difference in the ways that the
participants seen so far take up positions relative to these themes.
What can be said to be common to the accounts analysed here is a tension
between participants being positioned as a care subject in specific power relationships,
and their desire to be treated equally with others, have their opinions listened to, and
have an input into the running of their lives. Participants have been observed to
struggle with the ways that they are positioned as care subject, and to draw upon
discourses and ideals that challenge them. Despite the challenges and forms of
resistance that they show, participants do not escape from actions of power and forces
of subjectification which position them in these troublesome ways. Rather, they are
engaged in a process of struggle with these issues, in which neither power nor
resistance wins out. What is important to note here is that participants' subjectivity is
not determined by forms of power that operate upon, nor by forces that act to align
them with a subjective identity as a care subject. Rather, it arises through participants'
interaction and struggle with these forces. There has been evidence of problems that
participants experience with how they are positioned in care, and with the forms of
power that act to direct their conduct and situate them in specific relationships with
the staff of their homes.
These are important findings because, as has been argued, judgements about
specific forms of power and subjectification must proceed from evidence of what the
people involved themselves find problematic and struggle with. The tensions and
struggles seen in this chapter are critical in this respect. This issue will not be taken
any further here, but it should be borne in mind as an important point as we continue
our examination of participants' accounts. Another important realisation has been that
there is not one specific way that people interact with the forces we are examining. It
is not possible to predict exactly how power and subjectification will act to direct
people's conduct, nor how people relate to and understand themselves as subjects. Nor
is it possible to predict exactly what form people's struggles will take in the face of
specific forms of power. The consideration of individuals' interactions with these
forces is important for this reason also.
With these points in mind, we move on to the next section of the chapter,
which examines the accounts of people who, while taking issue with a number of
aspects of their accommodation, their interactions with others and their
subjectification, do not take up an explicitly oppositional position — those who have
an ambivalent attitude in this respect.
8.2 Ambivalent accounts
It will be noticed from Tables 1 and 3 that, whilst each of the interviews
identified as "ambivalent" showed disagreement with certain aspects of life in care,
the other three themes connected to ethics were generally not represented in these
accounts. The main exception to this occurred in an interview with a man in his fifties
who has been living in a residential home for twenty years. This account contained
each of the ethical themes, yet was markedly different from the accounts seen in the
previous section, showing a much less overtly oppositional attitude to his care home.
This account will be examined first, and then we will move on to consider the other
"ambivalent" accounts.
Interview VI (Mike)
Extract 4: Interview VI - Mike
I: What sort of a say do think you have in things here?
Mike: Well, we can have a say in what happens. We have residential meetings now and then.
We used to have a meeting regular at one time, and they ask us questions and er, we discuss
what we're going to do, like where we're going to go on holiday, or if someone messes on the
toilet floor, we're told about it, and they have to clean it up as soon as possible. Well, we discuss
all sorts of things, you know, items and (4)
[.-.]
I: Do you feel you have a lot of choice about what you do, what you can and can't do?
Mike: Well, in a home you are limited, a lot because it's not, er, we don't own the house you
see, (1) so you're a bit restricted like, I mean we can't go around breaking windows or breaking
furniture or, er, you're not supposed to do anything like that. Er, (2) er, (3)
I: Any other things you =
Mike: = Well, I mean, we've been told that, er (1), you're supposed to behave like, you know.
(1) Behave alright to one another and (4)
I: So what happens if that doesn't happen?
Mike: Well, we get a telling off. You get a telling off if you don't behave.
[-..]
I: How do you feel about your activities?
Mike: Activities?
I: Your choice of activities?
Mike: Well, (1) what's missing at the moment is er, (1) er, we could do with a quiz or something
er, (1) but they're not able to do that at the moment. You know they'll get the residents together
and say what happens and er, (1) give us a quiz or something, or (1) ask us some questions about
things, you know. To sort of keep us interested like.
I: Have you talked to people about this or =
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Mike: = Well, we did, we used to have that a few years ago (1). An Indian women used to come
in with us and give us a quiz. They ended living in London (3).
I: These sorts of things ---
Mike: = But I think that's what's missing at the moment, and we seem to be hanging around the
television and watching that. (1)
I: Do you er = [a staff member enters]
Staff: = Oh, I'm sorry, can I just get (that Hoover)?
I: That's okay. So, =
Mike: = I think that we need to be talked to you know er, =
Staff: Alright, I won't disturb you again [staff member leaves]
I: Okay.
Mike: I think what's lacking in this home at the moment is the self-expression.
I: How do you feel you about that? Do you mean people not getting the chance to express
themselves?
Mike: Well, I think they'd like to express themselves in a sensible and intelligent way, you
know.
I: Do you think that people think you aren't capable of that?
Mike: (2) Pardon?
I: Do you think maybe people just think you're not capable of that without =
Mike: = Oh, we are capable of expressing ourselves.
I: Do you think that every, er, other people realise that?
Mike: No, I don't think they do realise that. (1)
I: Why do think that is?
Mike: Because they're occupied with their job. The job in hand. (2) That's part of their own job.
Staff, the staff come here, and they've got a job to do, you see. (1) Whether it's cleaning the
house or painting the house or cooking the dinner cooking the meals (1)
I: Have you ever spoken to anyone about this?
Mike: I have mentioned it, yes. I have mentioned it to, er, the staff. Yeah.
I: And what sort of thing happens about that?
Mike: Well, they just say 'Oh, well we'll try and do that for you.' (5)
I: Have you ever thought much about whether you'd like to live in your own home?
Mike: Well, actually, I don't think I would manage to live on my own, I don't think I'd manage. I
couldn't manage it on my own. Er, to work it out you'd have to do urn (1) you see, I need help
from other people (6) In fact, I don't think I'm too independent. (1) Because I rely some or, on
other people. I rely on other people to help me get through the days. (3)
Once again, there are conflicts between different positions in this account. In
some ways this is similar, and in others quite different to what has been seen before.
Notice, first, how, when asked about how much 'say' residents of his home have,
Mike responds that they 'can have a say in what happens,' and then talks about the
meetings that the home holds — using the specific example of them discussing their
holiday destinations. Regardless of the significance we would attach to them,
however, it is clear that Mike presents this as having 'a say' in how things are run.
When the discussion moves onto 'choice' about what they do, Mike responds
that 'you are a bit limited' in his situation because he and his co-residents do not own
the home. Again, the conflict between Mike commenting that he can have a say in
what happens in the home and him saying that he and his co-residents are 'a bit
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limited' is reflected in the way that he references himself and his co-residents through
pronominal forms — whilst it is 'we' who have a say in the home, it is 'you' who are a
bit limited. Also, interesting to note is how this works in his discussion of how these
'limitations' come about. Mike offers an explanation for this, when he says 'we don't
own the house, you see, so you're a bit restricted, like.' Again, there is a tendency to
discuss limitations and constraints in terms of a general subject position as opposed to
the self-referencing first-person, even to the extent of suddenly switching to the third-
person in the same sentence (actually the second person pronoun "you" functioning
like the third-person). As was commented in the last chapter, the areas specifically
mentioned here (breaking furniture or windows) are ones where it is easy to see why
there would be rules and restrictions. However, it is not our place to judge the
legitimacy of each of these areas, but to present a picture of the overall forms of
power and subjectification that exist (of which these are only one part), and to attempt
to understand how people relate to, experience and interact with them.
Mike does not seem concerned to show how what he talks about here is
intolerable, or even to challenge it. Also, unlike the other accounts examined, neither
does he critique this subject position by explicitly drawing upon opposing concepts
and ethical technologies. This can be seen in his attempt to explain why the home's
residents are restricted, to provide a reason for things being this way — because 'we
don't own the house, you see.' Although, he does not appear to be contesting this, or
even to be highlighting it as a problem, he is aware of it as a facet of the general
position of being a care subject that limits his conduct — it restricts "you".
Mike's discourse is quite striking here in its use of pronominal forms. For
instance, he shifts from saying that "you're" limited, to explaining this with "we"
'don't own the home,' and then back again to "you're" 'a bit restricted.' This sudden
shifting can also be seen in Mike's next response, when he begins by outlining what
he has heard from the staff in the first-person 'we've been told,' and then again
switches to the third-person to outline the prohibitions which act upon him, 'you're
supposed to behave.' Notice, also, how he begins his next response by saying 'we get
a telling off' and immediately rephrases this to 'you get a telling off if you don't
behave.' As has been discussed, this shifting has the effect of directing attention away
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from questions of Mike's own agency in these matters, and onto the imperatives and
prohibitions which apply to a general subject (i.e. anyone) in this situation. This not
only outlines a particular form of subjectification which aims to situate people in the
home in particular positions tied to particular responsibilities and constraints, but also,
through referencing this position specifically, defocalises attention on Mike's role in
this, on how he is himself subordinated. On its own, this may not tell us much, but in
the context of the whole extract, it begins to alert us to questions of the tension and
struggles in which Mike is engaged in relating to himself as a subject of a particular
kind.
These responses illustrate how Mike experiences specific relationships of
power and subject positions, and how he relates to these issues and to himself. The
ideal of "behaving oneself' clearly involves conducting oneself in line with a
particular set of rules, indicating that the behaviour of residents is subject to direction,
observation, and correction by members of staff who hold a particular form of
authority. This also involves a division between residents of home on the one hand,
whose behaviour is subject both to rules and regulations relating to their subject
position or "place" in the home (as Mike points out when he says that they don't own
the home so they are restricted) and to observation and judgement by the relevant
authority figures, and, on the other hand, those people in positions of relative authority
with respect to them. These power relations are structured such that the lives of
residents are subject to the judgements and decisions of the staff. Clearly, this
situation conflicts somewhat with the idea of people having control over their lives
which might be inferred from having 'a say' in how the home is run. This is reflected
in the way that Mike references himself and others in relation to these issues through
shifting pronominal forms. These aspects of power and subjectivity are reflected
further in the dialogue that follows.
When Mike talks about the activities which are available in his home, he does
so from a passive position — he talks about 'what's missing' in terms of what staff
could be doing, but aren't, to entertain residents. This is a very passive position . on
Mike's part — it involves him and his co-residents waiting to have activities given to
them by the staff to the extent that if this does not happen, they are left 'hanging
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around the television.' It is not difficult to see how the position that the residents in
Mike's home occupy (as can be ascertained from his account) — in which they are
subject to rules and prohibitions on their conduct and to reprimands relating to them,
and in which they occupy a subordinate position with respect to the staff such that
they are subject to sanctions from them — might be connected to this situation. There
seems to be a correlation between the passive, subordinate position which the
residents occupy in the home and the way in which Mike is talking about them
passively waiting for activities in his account.
Given this, it might appear strange that the next piece of dialogue revolves
around issues of self-expression. Here, the themes of disagreement with aspects of life
in care, assertion of rights to self-expression, and ability to speak up for oneself all
emerge, as Mike formulates a complaint about the home, arguing that 'what's lacking
in this home is the self-expression,' that he and his co-residents 'would like to express
themselves in a sensible and intelligent way.' He emphasises that 'we are capable of
expressing ourselves,' and comments that the staff of the home do not realise this
because they are too 'occupied with their job.' Again, then, there is implicit in this
account a form of ethical technology centring around the conception of oneself as a
self-expressing being, with rights to be heard and to have an input into the running of
one's life. Mike is clearly aware of individual self-expression as being a desirable
ideal, and one which presents moral alternatives for how homes should be run — that
is, in a way that allows residents to express themselves 'in a sensible and intelligent
way.' Mike's complaints about the lack of self-expression in the home draw upon this
position, and show a conflict between the position of relating to oneself as a self-
expressing individual having a say in the running of one's life, and as a care subject
who is situated in power relationships in which this self-expression is lacking.
However, despite this assertion of his rights and abilities to self-expression,
which he feels is lacking in his home, Mike does not take an overtly oppositional
position with respect to it. Unlike the positions taken in the previous accounts seen in
this chapter, Mike does not present his comments about these issues as part of an
overall oppositional attitude or series of complaints about his home. In fact, he
explains why the limitations he talks about exist (because the residents don't own the
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home, and the staff are pre-occupied with the job they have to do), and this is reflected
in his comment that he needs people like the staff to help him get through his life. The
conflicting subject positions in Mike's account, then, are not resolved into an overall
oppositional orientation to his life in care, despite the tensions that are evident in
them.
Overall in Mike's account, there is a conflict between the passive position of a
care subject, and the ideal of him being a self-expressing individual who has his voice
heard, and has an active say in what happens in his environment. He first comments
that he can have 'a say' in how things are run in his home. Then he talks about having
to 'behave,' and getting a 'telling off,' although he does not formulate this explicitly
as a complaint, merely presents it as something that happens to "you" as a care subject
— and here it appears also that he is beginning to manage this tension somewhat in the
way that he references this in relation to a general subject position. Next, his
comments about activities show how he is, at least on this level, taking up a passive
position with respect to the home and the staff, and waiting for activities to be given
to him. Finally, he talks about how the home lacks the opportunity for residents to
express themselves in the way that they are capable of. There is a tension here
between the position of a passive care subject, restricted by prohibitions and having a
passive relationship to his/her environment, on the one hand, and one who has
unrecognised rights and abilities of self-expression on the other, and Mike relates to
himself through both of these in his account. This is not formulated in the same way
as in previous accounts. He does not make explicit complaints about his home, the
staff, or his position with respect to them, nor does he seem to be engaged in a
struggle over his identity and his position in the home, but nevertheless there is this
tension present in the way he relates to himself and his environment, and the way he is
presenting himself in the interview. Just as this is not escape from power, though,
neither, it should be noted, is it submission to it.
Other ambivalent accounts
As has been commented, Mike's account was unique amongst those identified
as "ambivalent" towards care homes. In the other accounts subsumed under this
category, the themes of assertion of rights, ability to speak up or take care of oneself,
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or dependence on the home did not emerge (the one exception to this was seen in the
previous chapter, in Jean's account, where she contended that she is able to take care
of herself despite her being deemed to require care accommodation). In these
accounts, participants voiced disagreement with aspects of their lives in care and/or
showed how they themselves resist them, but this was not connected in their accounts
to a conception of a "liberal" subject with rights and abilities to self-expression,
independence of thought, and so on that has been seen so far.
The following extracts illustrate well how this group of accounts deal with
these issues. The first is from an interview with a man in his fifties living in a care
home, the second from an interview with a woman also in her fifties and living in a
care home:
Extract 5: Interview V - George
I: Do you feel that there are (1) urn, things that you can't =
George: = I can go out anytime I like (1).
I: Okay. So, er, are there (1) do you think that there are things, when you've been here, that you
haven't had quite as much say in as you'd like to?
George: Oh, I've done quite well, I think. I've been on holiday. (1) Fishing in F_ for the
second time. And (2)
I: So, how do you feel about the choice of things you can do?
George: I'm not too bothered about that. I've had a good life. It's a nice place. Nice food. I like
it. (2) I got a bit fat, put on weight. About a stone. (2) I mean, you can't be noisy, or, er, you've
got to, you know, be quiet in the corridors and that. (1) And, you can't smoke in your room, (1)
but we do.
i--]
I: So, how does it compare being in a residential home, urn, to what it was when you were living
George: Not too bad, really. I do, er, I can go out anytime I want, and, urn (5).
I: What sort of things do you do?
George: Well, you can do a lot more in your own place. In these places, it's very different. (4)
I've got my own room and that (1).
I: So, when you've lived in your own home, you felt like you could do what you wanted to?
George: Yeah.
I: What sort of things?
George: Well, I don't mind cooking. I like cooking. I like to do the cooking.
I: Do you do any cooking here?
George: No. (4) I don't. (5) I've cooked myself nice meals, but not here. I can cook well, but (3)
I: So you feel like you'd like to do some cooking here?
George: Yes. (3)
I: Have you asked about?
George: Oh no. No, no, no (2).
Extract 6: Interview VIII - Val.
I: So, er, do you know why it is that you're in this home? Has anyone ever told you?
Val: Well (1) I can't remember.
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I: Okay. Um (1), so, um (1)
Val: Oh, I went to residents' meetings. I went (2)
I: Right, what sort of meetings?
Val: Talking and working group. So, (2) I packed in going. I can't do both, talking and working
group and college. So, I told the staff I didn't want to go to the tallcing and working group. So,
urn, I've packed it in, I have.
I: So what was that about? What sort of things?
Val: Oh talking, you know. Talking about here (1) the home, you know.
I: What sort of thing did you say?
Val: I didn't have no, er, (1) well, they were talking, I didn't.
I: Right. Who was talking? The staff, do you mean?
Val: Well, yes. So I've packed it in now. I told them (2).
I: So there was never anything you felt you needed to say?
Val: No, I didn't say [laughs] I didn't [laughs] I didn't say anything. I (1) the staff just kept
talking [laughs] It was stupid. I didn't say no, er, you know.
I: Why was that, do you think?
Val: Oh, (2) something about the home. About the home and the centres, you know.
I: So why didn't you say anything?
Val: I never said a word.
I: Why was that?
Val: Oh, I don't (1) I've packed it in.
[--.]
I: So, what sort of things happen? Can you think of any other ways you have to behave?
Val: Yes. You've got to behave yourself. If you (1) if you don't behave, you're sent to your
room.
I: How do you feel about that?
Val: Me? I'm alright. Well, er, most of the time, you know. If you've got in a bad mood, you
know, a bad mood, ignore it.
In both of these accounts there is not the same protracted struggle to align
oneself with a particular ethical position or form of subjectivity, to contest explicitly
the bases of particular forms of power, seen in the "oppositional" accounts, nor even
the less strongly stated ideal that residents be recognised as having the ability of self-
expression that was seen in Mike's account. There are, however, some, more subtle,
tensions that can be drawn out around similar issues.
In George's interview, when asked about things that he doesn't have much say
in, what his choices are in the home, or how it compares to living independently, he
responds by talking about things that he can do, such as going out when he wants to,
or going on holiday. Indeed, he says, in relation to these issues, 'I think I've done
quite well,' and 'I've had a good life. It's a nice place.' After making this last
comment, though, and talking about the 'nice food' in the home, he pauses briefly
before moving onto talking about rules and prohibitions, 'I mean, you can't be noisy
or anything, or, er, you've got to, you know, be quiet in the corridors and that. And,
you can't smoke in your room.' Again, then, there is this shift into the position of
referencing a general subject rather than himself when discussing these limitations,
which is in contrast to the way that he talks about what he ("I") can do. Interestingly,
George follows this by shifting suddenly back into the first-person to remark, tut we
do' when illustrating how the residents in his home act in defiance of one of the
limitations placed upon them in the home (not being allowed to smoke in their
rooms). Here, there is a contrast set up between George outlining what he can do,
things in which he has a degree of freedom, and those areas where he is constrained by
rules. This is made more striking by his sudden contrasting use of pronominal forms
when comparing the rules to which any resident of the home is subject and the way in
which people actually behave — 'you can't smoke in your room, but we do.' This is a
rather defiant gesture, the contrasting of what is expected of those in a particular
position with an explicit example of how those very people, in actuality, break these
rules.
Some similar tensions can be noted throughout the extract. For instance,
George, at one point, begins to talk about how "you" can do 'a lot more' in 'your own
place' than you can in 'these places,' but then breaks off this line of comment, and
reiterates that he has his own room. These expressions of particular freedoms, or
positive aspects of his life (such as going out when he wants to, having his own room,
or going on holiday), seem important to him. He makes references to them a number
of times in this quite short extract. Also, he returns to this type of expression
immediately after stating that, whilst "you" can do 'a lot more in your own place,' in
this home it is 'very different.' Despite the fact that his comments here begin by
expressing limitations upon the actions of residents of the home, George then
reiterates a positive aspect of his life in the home, the fact that he has his own room,
rather than going into more detail about how this difference between "your" own place
and the home is manifested, as might be expected. He appears to be struggling to
relate to himself here as an individual with a certain amount of freedom, as someone
who is not unduly constrained or limited by his position as a care resident — as might
also be inferred from the fact that the only time he mentions such a limitation
specifically, he immediately follows it with a comment about how he and his co-
residents resist it. Connected to this aspect of self-presentation, in which there appears
to be a performative aspect to George only hesitantly talking about things he cannot
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do because of his position in the home and his showing how he defies certain rules,
there are questions of ethical self-relationships also to be addressed. Although, he
makes no reference to it specifically, what is informing this aspect of self-presentation
is a position as an individual who is not constrained by power, who exercises a degree
of freedom and shows defiance in the face of limiting prohibitions. This position
conflicts with the glimpses we do get of George being subject to certain workings of
power, to specific rules and prohibitions which act upon him.
Something similar can be seen in the extract from Val's interview. The extract
opens with her talking about how she made the decision to stop going to her 'talking
and working group' because she thought her college work was more important and, in
any case, the staff, rather than the residents, were doing all the talking. Then, at the
end of the extract, after outlining how "you" are expected to behave in the home, she
goes on to say, 'Me? I'm alright,' suggesting that she aligns herself with the
imperatives and prohibitions attached to this position. As was commented with
reference to Wendy's interview in the previous chapter, Val's classifying herself as
'alright' because she conducts herself in line with what is expected of a resident of the
home suggests an identification with the position of a care subject — of someone
whose life is managed and supervised in particular ways — and she follows this with a
general rule for surviving in the home, illustrating how people must conduct
themselves in order to live there — 'If you've got in a bad mood, you know, a bad
mood, ignore it.' The earlier illustration of her defiant attitude towards her talking and
working group, in which she comments, 'I've packed it in now. I told them,' or her
comment that she thought that 'it was stupid,' does not seem to fit with the situation
of someone who takes on a subordinated subject position in identifying with the
home's ideals. This is not explicitly drawn out into a definite challenge to the
structure of the home, but it is suggestive of a similar tension in the manner in which
Val relates to herself and to her environment as observed in George's interview —
between identifying with a subordinated subject position on the one hand, and
seeming keen to illustrate that she makes her own decisions in relation to the home's
activities on the other, and even judges particular set activities to be 'stupid.'
In the extracts examined in this section, then, there is again evidence of
participants experiencing tensions in terms of their position as a subject existing in
relationship to specific forms of power, and their relationships to, and presentation of,
themselves as a subject who resists aspects of power in the homes that limit their
conduct, or place them in passive positions. Mike specifically says that relationships
are desirable in which the residents can express themselves 'in a sensible and
intelligent way.' In each extract in this "ambivalent" group, there is evidence of
participants being placed in power relationships with others who have authority over
them and the right to impose punishments or deal out reprimands to them, and that
they are led to form relationships to themselves as subjects of this power. However
there are tensions in the accounts around these issues, and conflicts between the
position of being subject who is not overly constrained by rules, who demonstrates
resistance or disagreement in the face of them, and the position of being a subject for
whom other people set rules which they must follow.
The interview extracts in this section do not show the same orientation
towards issues of power and subjectivity as in the previous section, in which it was
possible to observe a clear "oppositional" orientation to the way in which these forces
operate in the homes in question. It is, however, clear that the tensions evident in the
accounts in this group show that people are not just positioned by specific forces
which act upon them, but that they are also taking up positions in relation to them,
and that these positions cannot be predicted merely from the forms that power
relationships take. There are different ways that participants experience power and
subjectification, and different ways in which they react to them. These reactions range
from the explicit challenges drawing upon alternative ethical technologies observed in
Paul's and Steve's interviews and the seemingly hopeless struggle in the face of an
intolerable situation in Trevor's, to more subtle tensions in the last three extracts
based around relating to oneself both as a subject of forms of power centred around
the management of their lives and as someone who resists rules that limit their
conduct or their self-expression. It should be reiterated, then, that people are not
merely passively positioned by operations of power or by discursive forces which
objectify them, but that they actively take up positions in relation to these forces, and
resist them in different ways. The operation of forces of power and subjectification do
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not come from a monolithic social world, such that individuals could be said to exist
in relation to just one set of discourses which acts upon them in one definite and
determinable way (such as positioning them as passive care subjects). Rather, a
variety of practices of subjectification, power and ethical technologies are at stake
which have diverse origins and effects, and this diversity is reflected in the tensions
that individuals experience in the ways that they seek to know, understand and relate
to themselves and the forms of power that take a hold of them.
With these points in mind, we move on to our final set of accounts — those in
which participants exhibit a clearly positive attitude towards the accommodation in
which they live and the ways that they interact with it.
8.3 Positive accounts
This final group of accounts comprises four interviews. These can be
considered as one group, rather than being subdivided into two or more subgroups as
was done previously in this chapter. This is not to say that these interviews do not
have important points of individual specificity. However, the effort was made to look
for points of individual difference which would be significant for the discussion (as
they were in the previous sections), but none was found. In dealing with this last
group of accounts, first we shall return to a participant seen in the previous chapter —
Anne.
Extract 7: Interview II - Anne
Anne: They're lovely residential homes, they're really lovely people, they'll help you as much as
they can. They ask you what you want. You have a drink at night-time, and they come and ask
you what sort of er, you like, do you want a cup of tea or coffee or drinking chocolate. It's your
choice. It's your home, so it's your choice what you'd like. That's what said, when I first
came here, R said, 'It's your home, Anne' and she said 'You can, you've got more about you,
you can talk, you can say what you want. You can tell them how you like things. What you do
like, what you don't like, you can tell them about them. You know, you've got it upstairs, you,'
which I have, like I said.
[..-]
Anne: We don't do anything at all. We just sit. We just sit about like this. There's nothing. It's
just, there's nothing you can do. I wish I could do a bit more. I really do wish I could do a bit
more. But, you can't. (1) I should love to go and cook. When there's a staff short in the kitchen I
love to go in the kitchen, but you cannot do that. Because of a different, it's a different kitchen.
It's all, it's a modem gas stove in there you can't possibly do that, 'cause that's what they get
paid for. They get paid for that. It's like the officer in charge says 'We get paid for, we employ
them so they get paid for things like that.' That's what this home's for, for me to learn. (4).
[...]
-249-
Anne: Bowling, I used to go bowling a lot. Slcittling and all things like that, but (1) I, (1) if I say
I don't like a thing I'll tell them I don't. If I'm in the right. If I'm not in the right, I clam down. I
was like when I was younger, I had a temper, but I've learnt in the years not to, (1) to control
that temper, not to make a spectacle of yourself. Just to learn, living in a home, you have to learn
to cope with people and you have to learn to get on with people.
[...]
I: Are there any things which you feel you don't have much say in? Any aspects of your life in
care which you might like to change?
Anne: Well, (2) no, (1) I feel very confident. I don't feel (1), I'm not (2) I'm not a person what
don't like anything. I like to put my hand in anything, anything (1) anything you, er, put in front
of me I like to do, but I'll tell you if it's too difficult. I shall tell you, I'll say 'I don't like that' I
shall tell you straight I don't like it. (3)
[...]
I: I suppose you have good and bad days as well?
Anne: Oh yes, I have bad days. We have off days. We're always, (1) well not always seem to
argue, but ill (1) if they give me a cup of coffee and there's too much milk in it I won't drink it.
They'll say 'Come on, drink it, that's your tea, er, that's your coffee there.' And I'll say, 'I'm not
drinking that, there's too much milk in it.' You have to (1) and I'm determined not to drink that
milk because I don't like milk in my coffee. You have to take it back because I stand my ground.
I say 'I don't like it' if I don't like it, then I don't like it, that's it. (1) I speak my mind. [...] And
, I love J_ , I really can spoil I can spoil them all, but you can not do that. It's
someone's birthday the weekend, and I feel, (1) if I like anyone, I feel as though I want to go out
and buy them something, but you can not do that. I did (1) well, I've done at the time, but you
can not do that; it's not your place, it's the staff's place to go out and buy things. For instance,
you can't buy a cake, a birthday cake or things like that.
[-.]
Anne: If you hadn't have come, I should have been down er, my bedroom doing something,
getting my drawers out, cleaning- , you know, tidying all my clothes up, making that look tidy. I
have to do something. Sorting my tapes out. What's good, what's bad, what has to be thrown
away, what doesn't have to be thrown away. I can do all that without the staff; I don't have to
have anyone behind me to do anything like that. (1) Sometimes if, sometimes there's anything I
want thrown, I have to have the staff's permission, yes. Because I know this ain't my home to do
things like that. You see, you can not, can not, you can not thrown anything out what's good
without the staff's permission. You've got to ask the staff. Whoever's in charge, you've got to
ask them if it okay for you to throw things out. [...] I don't know 'til I ask (1) 'till ask the person
who's in (1) the (1) who's in charge of the home; I've got to ask permission. (1) In your own
home it's different; I mean, you can do as you like in your own home, but you can not do as you
like in this home. So, only as far as you can go. (1) If you want anything, you have to ask for it.
(1) If you want to go out anywhere, you have to ask to go out [...] In these sorts of homes you
have to ask permission to do things like this, else it would (3)
I: Does it make =
Anne: = no, no I agree, because I like, I like to be told. (1) I like to be spoke to as if I'm a
human being. I like to be spoke to as though (1) I can take anything in. I take any sort of
punishment and any sort of er, anything what you give me, or answers, or er, (1) questions or
answers or what you give me, I can always (1) take it, but if I'm in the right, I stand up for
myself, but I'm (down) if I'm not. If I'm not in the right, I just stop (1) I don't say anymore, I
don't argue with anyone if I'm in the right, if I'm in the wrong, sorry, if I'm in the wrong.
[...]
Anne: I like these people; I wouldn't part with, (1) I wouldn't part, you know, I wouldn't go
anywhere else away from these people in other words, because I like, they can not talk for
themselves like I can, I've got more about me, I can tell a doctor what's wrong with me. Well
they can't say anything, but I can. (1) All the years I was growing up, I've al-, I've always been
able to speak for myself.
Overall, Anne's attitude towards her home is clearly positive — 'They're lovely
residential homes, they're really lovely people, they'll help you as much as they can.'
However, there are some contrasts between Anne's presentation of herself as an
individual with the right to be spoken to 'as if [she's] a human being' and the ability
to speak for herself, and her identification with the position of a subject of the home.
Numerous times, Anne clearly stresses that she speaks her mind, again implicitly
referencing the ethical ideal of a self-expressing individual: for instance, `R___ said,
"It's your home [...] you can talk [...] you've got it upstairs, you," which I have,' 'I
shall tell you straight if I don't like it,' 'I say "I don't like it" if I don't like it [...] that's
it,' or, 'if I'm in the right, I stand up for myself,' and so on. Similarly, she emphasises
how the residents of the home are able to exercise choices, such as when she says,
'they ask you what you want [...] tea or coffee or drinking chocolate. It's your choice.
It's your home, so it's your choice.' Here, the position of a care subject is presented in
a positive light — "you" are asked what "you" want — and not just in terms of
limitations. However, although this is presented as an illustration of how the residents
make their own choices, it is around a very small aspect of their lives, and does not
equate to what would be thought of as having much input into how their lives are run.
As Dyson (1987a) points out, this is an artificially imposed choice between a small
number of presented options (coffee, tea, or hot chocolate; milk or no milk) which
excludes any options beyond this imposed set. This is mirrored in Anne's contention
that she sticks up for herself in the home based around, again, the drinks she is given:
'I'm determined not to drink that milk because I don't like milk in my coffee. You
have to take it back because I stand my ground.'
Some other aspects of the way in which Anne relates to these issues are seen in
her comments about things that "you" cannot do — such as cooking, throwing away
one's possessions, putting decorations in one's room, buying presents for other
residents, or going out. This would seem to contrast with the position she sets out of
speaking her mind and standing her ground. However, not only does she not challenge
this subordinated subject position and its consonant limitations, she actually identifies
with it. She is not merely talking about what "you" cannot do, but is elaborating upon
this, and voicing support for it. When talking, for example, about why she cannot do
any cooking despite the fact that she is capable of doing so and would like to, she
expands upon this to comment that 'you can't possibly do that [...] 'cause that's what
they get paid for. They get paid for that [...] That's what this home's for, for me to
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learn.' Similarly, when talking about why she cannot buy presents for other residents,
she comments, 'you cannot do that; it's not your place, it's the staff's place,' or in
reference to needing permission to throw things away, she says, 'no, I agree, because I
like, I like to be told.' Again, it might be commented that reasons can be imagined for
the existence of some of these rules (for instance, homes would be liable for injuries
incurred in the kitchen, residents putting decorations in their rooms might potentially
cause damage, and so on). Again, however, we should reiterate that it is not our
business to decide which rule is legitimate and which is not with respect to each
specific area here, but to uncover how these rules fit in with issues of power and
subjectivity, and to highlight this in the accounts.
As was commented in the previous chapter, Anne seems to identify with a
position of a care subject in which she recognises particular imperatives and
prohibitions as acting upon her. Indeed, she relates to herself as someone for whom it
is only natural that such constraints and imperatives exist — there are things that "you"
cannot 'possibly' do because of "your" 'place' in the home. She identifies with the
ideal of governing her own conduct in line with this. That is, she assigns meaning and
value to her conduct as it fits in with this conception, such that certain behaviour
comes under the rubric of things that "you" cannot 'possibly' do.
All of this ties in with Anne's positive attitude towards the home, so although
"you" are subject to certain constraints, this is only right, and also "you" are treated
well in any case — for instance, "they" ask "you" what you want for an evening drink.
So, Anne presents the position of being a subject of the home in a positive light,
focusing on how well "you" are treated and those areas in which "you" have choices,
and where she does point out limitations in terms of what "you" cannot do, she does
so from a position of identification with the imperatives and prohibitions in question.
Anne talks about being a subject of the home, then, not only in terms of the
imperatives and prohibitions attached to such a position, but also as a positive
situation, in which subjects exercise choice.
The presence of these two positions, that of being a strong-willed, self-
expressing individual who speaks one's mind on the one hand, and one who
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recognises oneself as a subject of a regime which imposes limitations upon one's
actions on the other, might be expected lead to conflicts in Anne's account, or to
instances where she would challenge the regime in which she is caught up. Indeed, she
does make a complaint when she comments that she would like to do more around the
home, as residents just sit around not doing anything. However, she does not present
this within an overall challenge or oppositional attitude, and actually seems
voluntarily to place limits upon the bounds her expression takes and govern her own
conduct accordingly. So, although she comments that she would like to do more
things, such as cooking, she seems to support the reasons for her not being able to do
this, explaining why this is so, and commenting that it is simply something that "you"
cannot 'possibly' do. Although this may conflict with things that she would like to do,
Anne does not present this as being problematic or unacceptable, but, instead,
identifies positively with these restrictions on her behaviour. This is connected to the
fact that she talks about the situation of being a care subject not only in terms of what
is prohibited, but also positively, in terms of what "you" can choose — although the
examples she uses represent a limited, imposed set of options. In contrast to accounts
examined above, then, Anne's identification with this form of subjectivity informs her
conception of what forms of self-expression and action are appropriate, as opposed to
her desire to express herself clashing with imposed limitations. Her conception of
herself as a subject upon whom specific imperatives operate, and who occupies a
definite 'place' in the home means that she accepts the fact that she is subject to
specific constraints and prohibitions, and she does not present this as conflicting with
her ability to express herself and stand up for her rights.
This account, then, differs from those previously examined. The themes of
making complaints and showing resistance to aspects of care, asserting rights and
abilities to self-expression, choice and so on are clearly evident in this account (as
they were in the first, oppositional group of accounts). However, overall Anne does
not attempt to present challenges to the way in which power operates in her home.
This is something that is common to all the accounts identified as "positive". Whilst
the participants in this group draw upon ideals of rights and abilities to self-
expression, choice, and so on in their accounts, they also positively identify with
forms of power and subjectification in their homes that constitute acceptable and
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inappropriate actions for them, direct their conduct, and so on. Thus, Anne situates her
conception of her rights and abilities of self-expression within certain limits (it might
be argued, of course, that everyone does, to an extent) determined by her position in
the home and by her understanding of herself as a care subject.
However, there are still some areas of contradiction in the account. On the one
hand, for instance, Anne reports how she was told 'it's your home,' and comments
herself that 'it's your home, so it's your choice,' and then, later on, she contradicts this
when she says 'I know this ain't my home to do things like that,' and 'you can do as
you like in your own home, but you cannot do as you like in this home.' These two
conceptions exist alongside one another, and are drawn upon at different times by
Anne in expressing her relationship to the home. This is connected to Anne's
relationship to herself as a self-expressing, choosing individual and a care subject
upon whom imperatives and limitations act. Thus, she conceptualises it as "your"
home in certain respects, when making (limited) choices or decisions, but as 'not your
home' in others, in respect of things 'you cannot possibly' do. It is "your" home in the
sense of making certain, limited choices, but it is equally not "your" home in the sense
that "you" occupy a particular place within it which limits what "you" can do. Anne
effectively places limits upon areas of her life in which it is appropriate to express
herself and governs her own conduct in line with her identification with the position
of being a care subject.
Anne's account differs from earlier ones in terms of what it reveals about her
relationship to issues of power and subjectivity in her home. Again there is the same
presentation of herself as a self-expressing, choosing subject, and the same assertion
of rights to self-expression, that has been observed previously. However, in Anne's
case (as in all of the "positive" accounts) she also actively relates to herself as a care
subject who recognises imperatives and limits relating to a specific "place" in the
home acting upon her. Effectively, this subject position and its consonant power
relationships define the limits within which such choice and self-expression can be
legitimately exercised.
The following extract, from an interview with a man in his late twenties who
has been living in a residential cue home for six years also illustrates something
similar.
Extract 8: Interview XI— Peter
I: Is this the only care home you've lived in?
Peter: Yeah. It's the number one care home for me. (1) What I like about this place is if you're
doing a good job they give you some extra money (1) because the money you're on here isn't
really that good: £14.65, but it's not the money. When I live here, I don't think about the money
because it's a really good home.
[•••]
I: Er, what do think is different then about having your own place?
Peter: If I had my own flat, I think I'd be (1) I think people would take advantage of me, try and
rip me off, things like that, you know. It's not a question of the money, it's a question of being
on your own. I think if I'd got a flat to myself, I think I would feel that much (1) I'd feel
vulnerable. I'm not saying people that like (1) I'm not (1) you could do it [gestures at
interviewer], but say like a certain person like me, or anybody who lives in this place, I don't
think any of us could do that, because the thing with people outside, like cowboys, is that they
might take advantage of you and say like I was living in my own flat, after six months I'd
probably be in debt or something. So, I'm glad these places are open. I'm glad this place is still
going after six years.
	 •
[---]
I: What do you reckon you'd like about it? I mean, when you're older.
Peter: Doing things. Cooking, cleaning. I can cook a bit and I can clean a bit. I do my own room
here, so (3) that's what I'd like to do.
I: So, in care, there's things you can't do, then?
Peter: Yeah. (1) Er, I do my own room. With M I can do (1) a sort of deal with her, so that I
asked M that if I can have my room done my own colours, I will clean my own room up every
week, and that's what I do. Every week, every Sunday, or Saturday, when I've got time.
[•• .]
I: Yeah. (1) What about like, um (2), do you actually have to behave in certain ways, like, or =
Peter: = Well, (1) er, if you (1) I think it's the same as all care homes. If you (1) if you're bad in
a way, the staff d give you a bollocking, they'd write it in the book and then M gives you another
bollocicing in the morning, so you get two bollockings.
[•••]
I: Right, um, one of the things (1) urn, when I heard about this place, from the council, er, that
it's a home for people with learning difficulties. What I wondered was when you first heard that
term.
Peter: Well, I've got learning difficulties, but you see, what my learning difficulty is, is I can't
(2) I can (1) it's not really lack of anything (1) it's just looking at long words and trying to spell
them. Like my girlfriend's helping me in that way, she's trying to (1) I'm trying to get on courses
to do something like that, like next Tuesday, I'm starting a computer course. (3) Thing just (1)
things like that.
I: So, who told you, was it doctors, or (2) or social workers -
Peter: - What, when I come here?
I: I mean, who first told you about, when you first heard that, about learning difficulties, when
you first heard -
Peter: - Er, M_ gets some kind of paperwork or something, and she puts it on the board, and if
we want to go somewhere to learn about it, hie, I can't really, I'm not very good at maths, and
(1) I'm not brilliant at maths, and it's my spelling and my English and trying to do things (1),
like I've said to M_ in the past, 'can I learn to cook?' But I haven't had (1) I haven't had the
chance the chance to do it
[- • -]
I: Can you, like, think um, anything at all (2) that you'd like (1) that you think you'd hie to
perhaps have more say in?
Peter: I would like to see (1) to see if, like, if you could just, er, (1) we used to have (1) no, I
wouldn't (1) we used to have meetings, but we don't seem to have as many meetings lately. we
used to have (1) I don't know, once a (1) once every four months, we'd have a meeting about
every so often, like a residents' meeting, and ask, (1) see what M_'s suggested to come out (1)
but the way the house has been done, no-one's really said anything, it's just been done (1).
[...]
I: Urn, just going back to what you said about cooking and cleaning and that, er, perhaps it's
something you'd like to do, have you ever, like, urn, mentioned that to anyone?
Peter: Well, (2) I can cook when I'm not here. I cook sometimes at the day centre. Tuesdays
and Thursdays, I cook at the day centre, and I clean my room here, we can't (1) you see, we're
only allowed to do (1) only certain jobs in the house, like M ._ gets us a small little job. Say, like
if one of the staff went (1) say if the night-warden was bad, (1) would probably do the night
work, and I'd probably say to M_, 'Is it alright if I stay up?' and she'll say 'Yeah,' and I'll say
'Well, can I help you a bit,' and she'll say 'yeah, fine,' and I'll probably help her for a while and
go to bed about 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning. But when (1) say if T.'s doing something or (1)
say if the night-warden, called T , say if he went off, he was bad, and M_ came in for Monday
and Tuesday, I always ask M if I can stay up and help her. She says 'okay.' I clean, I (1) I
clean in here, I've cleaned all the toilets before, cleaning and (4) [...] That's the difference
between a hostel and (1) in a hostel, you can do what you want, drink beer, bring beer in. Here,
you, (1) if you want a beer, M__'11 get us, if there's something on the tele or if there's something
on the Sky, she'll get us a can of lager for the football, or (1) if it's the Christmas party or if it's
Christmas Day, we'll have some beers in the fridge. She wouldn't get any beer in just for the
sake of doing it. If there's something going on like a football match with City, she'll get a beer
in, but if there's nothing going on, she won't get a beer in.
I: Right (1) what about bringing your own?
Peter: No, you can't bring your own beer in here. But, what we could do if we want a drink,
there's a pub next door, and we go in there. That's the difference between this place and (1)
because most of them here are on tablets. That lad who just come in, J , he's on about 14
tablets a day, so he's not ready yet, he's still bad. You can tell by his voice, speaking. (1) Yeah.
[...] Well, (1) just mainly that people put these residential homes down (1) and like people put
them down, but they've never been in one, so (1) I don't think they should put these places
down.
As can be seen from this extract, Peter also identifies positively with the home
he lives in and his place within it. Again, his account brings to light specific power
relationships and subject positions. Peter is situated in a specific position with respect
to the people who run his home such that he needs the permission of staff to stay up
late, to have his room painted, to have beer in the house, and so on. These might not
seem like particularly significant limitations (and, again, it is easy to imagine reasons
why these rules might hold) but they again indicate the relative positions of the people
in question: one group is subject to the decisions and judgements of the other such
that they are in the position of making 'a deal' which involves them performing
certain tasks in return for certain privileges, they can receive a `bollocking' if they are
deemed to be 'bad,' the home can be done out without their being consulted, and so
on. This is similar to what has been observed a number of times, in its basis around a
division between specific groups of people in the home and the positions that they
occupy with respect to power relationships which structure their interactional conduct
and determine what forms of action are appropriate for them.
As with Anne's interview, it is also possible to see how Peter, rather than
challenging this situation or showing how he resists it, actively supports it. Apart from
commenting that his home is 'the number one care home for me,' or that he doesn't
believe that people 'should put these places down,' it is significant to note that he also
talks, for instance, about having his room painted in return for keeping it clean, not in
terms of a power issue that is to be challenged, but in a positive way, of him 'do[ing] a
deal' with the home manager. Similarly, he talks about the limits on the jobs he is
allowed to do in the home by illustrating how the manager will let him stay up to help
her on occasion, and when he talks about the rule prohibiting alcohol, he explains the
reasons for its existence. Despite the fact that each of these issues reflects the
existence of specific power relationships in the home, in which Peter and his co-
residents are subject to particular rules set out in the home, and to their being
supervised and disciplined by staff, he does not present this situation as problematic.
In fact, he seems positively to support it, and to recognise connected ideals by which
to govern his own conduct — by actively recognising limits on his conduct and specific
ways he should act, and identifying with them and supporting them.
Also significant here is where Peter talks about what he believes would be the
consequences of him living independently, and hence reasons why he feels he is
dependent on the home. He responds to the question about independent living by
talking about problems he believes he would encounter. He draws a distinction
between 'a certain person' like himself and other people who would not face similar
problems. It is interesting to compare this to his discussion of the label "learning
difficulties" and what it means for him. When talking about this, Peter comments that
he has 'got learning difficulties,' but he goes on to say that his 'learning difficulty' is
not a 'lack of anything,' but is just in the area of 'looking at long words and trying to
spell them' and not being 'brilliant at maths.' If this last comment was taken on its
own, it might be seen as evidence that Peter does not see anything particularly
significant about his "condition", that, whilst aware of having "learning difficulties",
this is not something which sets him apart significantly from others. However, it is
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clear from his talk about the problems he imagines he would face living independently
that Peter identifies with a particular subject position in which he is conceptually
divided from "normal" others. This position affects how he perceives his ability to
live independently, and is connected to his identity with a particular position in the
home. Although Peter does not reference learning difficulties specifically here, what
he says indicates that he is aware of a discourse that sets him apart in some way from
others — 'you could do it,' he comments, but not 'a certain person like me, or anybody
who lives in this place.' Peter, then, identifies himself as a member of a category of
people who could not cope with independent living, and so need to live in special
accommodation where they are protected from certain risks such as being 'ripped off.'
This fits in with his positive identification with the home itself, such that, just as he
recognises himself as a subject who requires special accommodation, he also
recognises a place in that accommodation which he occupies, and supports the reasons
for it — as with Anne, he actively relates to himself as a subject occupying a particular
"place" relative to certain others which places limits on his conduct and his
interactions.
What Peter's account also has in common with Anne's (and with the others in
this group) is that he talks about issues of power not in terms of limitations to be
challenged, but as justifiable, and he emphasises the choices and activity that he
exercises within them — as can be seen from his talk about having to keep his room
clean as his having done 'a deal' with the home manager through which he could
choose the colours of his room. However, despite this positive identification, there is
also an indication in Peter's of how the power relationships that he is situated within
can be problematic. This can be seen where he comments that there are less residents
meetings in the home now, and that the residents had no input into how the home was
done out.
The following extract also brings to light some interesting issues surrounding
power and subjectivity that emerged in the "positive" group of accounts. It is from an
interview with a woman in her fifties who has been living in a residential home for
twenty years.
Extract 9: Interview XVI - Mary
I: Urn, what, what do you think about it, generally, as a place?
Mary: I think it's a lovely place. I look after the other residents in the house, I've got S_ that's
dumb and deaf, and I've got, urn, A_ that has fits, and the other one doesn't talk very much, (1)
so I have to look after them.
I: Um, do you, do you get on well with the staff there?
Mary: Yes.
I: What sort of job do they do?
Mary: They help, they help if you've got problems
[•••]
I: So, urn, (2) do you, er, how do you feel about the sort of activities and facilities that, er =
Mary: = Oh, it's very nice, got my own bedroom, and my fiancé comes every Friday and stays
the weekend, so (1) so that makes all the difference.
[---]
I: Urn, so, (1) living where you are at the moment, urn, what sort of activities are there =
Mary: = Urn, they, er, I go into town, I go, er, to see my fiancé, and, er, (1) I'm independent,
believe it or not.
[•••]
I: Is there anything that maybe you think you could have more choice in? That you'd like to have
choice in certain things?
Mary: The choice is I, I work at B_ M_ in A_ and it's not a very nice place. It's nice, but the
job I'm doing I don't get much money, so I'd like a proper job so I can get more money.
I: So how, how did you end up working there?
Mary: I've been there for ye-, for nearly twenty years, and it's (?) and newspapers, where you
put them, (1) the papers in the bin, and, er, we don't get much money.
I: So, urn, have you ever spoken to anyone about that?
Mary: I haven't thought about telling them (never), (1) no.
I: Do you feel that that's the sort of thing you can talk about with =
Mary: = Yes.
I: Right, um, so you don't have any, kind of, complaints about that?
Mary: No. No, no.
I: Urn, what about, I mean do you feel like you have much say in the way the home's run?
Mary: Oh yes. Yes.
I: Yes, you do? What sort of things do you have a say in?
Mary: We have a meeting every, er, once a week (1). We had one last night.
I: Right. What sort of things do you, er, (1)
Mary: Oh, er, the par-, er, we went out for dinner on Tuesday night, for dinner, and we told, told
the staff that we enjoyed it, and they write it down. it goes in the minutes. (1) And then we do
one next week.
I: So if there's anything you want, say you want to change then =
Mary: = Yes.
I: Is there anything you'd like to change if you had the chance?
Mary: No. No.
[...]
I: So, are there any places that you're supposed to go?
Mary: I go to B_ 1\4_, but I, I don't, I like it, but it's (1) I don't like it at all. I (1) I wish (1)
there (1) there's a lot of people work there and they're all disabled, and (1) it's just (1) it's
horrible to think about going back. I, when I get there, I try and enjoy it and ignore the rest.
I: Do, do you feel like you have to go there?
Mary: Oh yes, they send, the staff send us.
I: What would, what do you think would happen if you didn't go?
Mary: I don't know.
[•••]
I: So, do you think that there are ways that you have to behave?
Mary: Yes. Yes. And we've got one called S_, and he's (1) he's quite a nuisance, but I can
communicate with him.
I: So who makes the rules like that?
Mary: It's not, it's (1) it's (2) the meetings, they help us to help ourselves. It cares for us and
makes sure we're all alright, but S can't talk, so (1) I have to communicate with hint
I: So, um, (1) what happens if people don't behave?
Mary: They're told off.
I: Mnun. Do you ever get told off?
Mary: No. I seem to be perfect. I am [laughs].
I: Urn, have you ever thought about, urn (1) what would be different if you lived independently?
Mary: Well, with me being ill, (1) with, urn, cancer, I think then that they would like me to stay
on there. They'd say I couldn't be cared for and looked after properly.
[...]
I: Urn, do you remember when you first heard the term learning difficulties?
Mary: I was five when I, I knew I'd got learning difficulties.
I: What did that mean to you? How did you feel about it?
Mary: I, inn, (2) I was, er, I didn't know I'd got learning difficulties at all. I'm a very
independent woman, and I, I like people to respect that, because I, I'm classified as disabled but
I'm not, I've just got learning difficulties and people don't understand learning difficulties, they
think it means handicapped, and (1) say horrible things about you, and that sort of thing, and
they don't respect you, and (1) I think that's sad.
[-..]
I: Do you think, um, (1) there's anything that you feel you need to say about, about, you know,
people with learning difficulties, or about people in care homes that, you know, you think =
Mary: = I think people in care are well, er, well, we are looked twenty-four hours a day and the
people that look after us are doing wonderful jobs. I don't know about people in er, in other
homes, but they do a wonderful job for me and I respect that.
In this extract, Mary talks about her independence and those areas in which she
enjoys particular freedoms, and areas in which her conduct is directed in specific
power relationships. As with the other accounts in this group, Mary takes a very
positive attitude towards her home, and she does not conceive of it as a restrictive
environment. She says, for instance, 'I think it's a lovely place,' 'the people that look
after us are doing wonderful jobs,' and comments that she has a say in the running of
the home and that there is nothing she would like to change in any case. This fits in
with her comments about the importance of her being recognised as an independent
person, such as when she says, 'I'm independent, believe it or not', 'I'm a very
independent woman, and I, I like people to respect that.' This aspect of the account
represents the themes of assertion of rights to expression and choice and the ability to
speak for oneself, and it centres around Mary's presentation of herself as an
independent individual, someone who exercises her ability to have a say in the
running of her home. This is also illustrated in her comments regarding her status as
"having learning difficulties", in which she says, 'I'm classified as disabled but I'm
not, I've just got learning difficulties and people don't understand learning difficulties,
they think it means handicapped, and say horrible things about you, and that sort of
thing, and they don't respect you, and I think that's sad.' Mary recognises the label
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"learning difficulties" as in some way applicable to her, but along with this
recognition go some important qualifications that contest particular conceptions of
what this can mean. As with all of the accounts in this group, there is again, then,
evidence of assertion of rights and abilities to voice, choice and independence. Mary
stresses that "having learning difficulties" is not the same as being 'handicapped,' that
it should not mean that people 'say horrible things about you,' nor that "you" should
not be respected because of it. This is a definition consistent with her conception of
herself as an independent being capable of having a say in the running of her life.
Again, however, there are also indications in her account of ways that Mary is
positioned in power relationships that set her apart from "normal" others and from the
staff who run the home. For instance, although she comments that there is nothing that
she would like to change about the home, she does voice disagreement with one
specific aspect of her life there, as she comments that she has to work somewhere
which, she says, is 'not a very nice place,' where she does not get much money, and
she even remarks that she finds it 'horrible to think about going back.' When asked
about this, she comments that 'the staff send us.' There is, then, a division between
the staff, who have the ability to direct the movement of the residents, and the
residents themselves, whose lives can be directed such that they are 'sent' somewhere
by the staff whether they want to go or not. Not only is a relationship of power, but it
is one that is acting upon Mary to her detriment in placing her in a situation with
which she is unhappy. The situation of residents of the home in a position in which
they become amenable to the decisions and judgements of the staff is further
illustrated in Mary's responses to questions about rules concerning behaviour. As
Mary says, if residents do not behave, they are 'told off'.' Again this illustrates the
relative positions in power relationships of the staff and residents of the home, such
that one group is in a position to observe and direct the behaviour of the other and to
issue reprimands relating to it. A similar phenomenon can be seen when Mary says
that she could not live independently because 'They'd [the staff] say I couldn't be
cared for and looked after properly.' Again, a division exists such that one group of
people are in a position to make decisions about the abilities of another to care for
themselves and to translate this into a decision about where they should live. This
clashes somewhat with Mary's assertion that she is independent and has a say in the
running of the home.
On the one hand, then, Mary relates to herself as an independent person, as
someone who has a say in the running of her home, but who is satisfied with the home
so that there is nothing that she would want to change. However, it is also possible to
see ways in which she occupies a position in the home such that her behaviour is
subject to judgements according to certain ideals of correctness, and her life is
directed in particular ways. The clash between these two aspects of the account is
made more stark by what Mary says about her strong dislike of one way that this
situation affects her — her being sent to work at a day centre. The position of being an
independent woman with the ability to change aspects of the home she is unhappy
with is clearly not consistent with this position. However, Mary does not carry this
forward into complaints about the home, nor does she talk about ways that she
opposes or resists these operations of power. On the contrary, she supports the staff of
the home and the institution itself, remarking that the staff are doing a 'wonderful job'
that she respects that, and that she is 'perfect' in conducting her behaviour in
alignment with what is imposed in these relationships.
As with the other accounts in this "positive" group, Mary relates to herself
both as an independent individual with the rights and ability to speak for herself and
to exercise choice in her life, and as a subject occupying a place in her home which
situates her in power relationships that direct her conduct and impose prohibitions
upon her. Also consistent with the other accounts from this group is the fact that this
does not exist as a conflict in her account. Despite there being some contradictions
between the two positions and some points of dissatisfaction on her part, Mary accepts
the position that she occupies in the home without seeing it as conflicting with her
self-identity as an independent person. She recognises herself as an independent
subject within the limits set out by her position in the home. This is something that
was common to all of the account in this final group (those identified as "positive").
In the "oppositional" accounts seen at the beginning of this chapter,
participants, implicitly and explicitly, drew upon "liberal" ethical ideals (of self-
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expression, choice, independence, and so on) in resisting and challenging aspects of
care subjectivity that position them as relatively passive individuals subject to
limitations, imperatives and punishments. However, although containing the same
themes of assertion of rights, ability to speak for oneself, and disagreement with some
aspects of life in care, the "positive" group of accounts is rather different in this
respect. In these accounts, rather than drawing upon "liberal" ethical ideals to
challenge or resist their positioning in power relationships in their homes, participants
actively identify with their position as subjects of care. They talk about their situation
in care as representing legitimate limits within which their rights and abilities to
express themselves and exercise choice exist. However, there are still problems that
exist with these positions, as is evidenced by participants talking about certain aspects
of their situation in care which they disagree with or which put them in positions in
which they occasionally lack input into the running of their homes or their lives. For
example, Anne comments that she would like to do more in her home, such as
cooking (although she also accepts the fact that, because of her position, this is
something she cannot do), Peter mentions the fact that the residents in his home were
not consulted about the home being done out, and Mary is clearly unhappy with being
sent to work at her day centre by the staff in her home.
8.4 Conclusion
In the previous chapter, we saw that people with learning difficulties living in
special forms of accommodation are, by virtue of their objectification as in some way
lacking the ability to manage their own lives, placed in power relationships that
revolve around the supervision and management of their lives, and that they are led to
recognise themselves as subjects of this supervision and management and tied to a set
of imperatives, prohibitions and a specific "place" in their home relating to this. This
corresponds to a conceptual division between the residents of homes and the staff who
run them. The residents become subject to the authority of the staff in respect of
prohibitions which can be laid down, judgements about the appropriateness of certain
behaviour, their requiring permission for particular . activities, and their creation as
punishable beings in this context. It was also seen that residents are aware of a subject
position they are led to take on. That is, they recognise a "place" in the home that they
occupy which imposes particular imperatives upon them and encourages them to
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recognise themselves as subject to the authority of the staff and to prohibitions and
directions acting on their conduct.
In this chapter, these analyses were taken further, focusing on the third aspect
of our inquiry (that corresponding to Foucault's domain of ethics) concerned with
how people themselves relate to and interact with forces of power and
subjectification, and the concepts they draw upon in understanding themselves as
certain types of being, evaluating what is appropriate behaviour, governing their own
conduct, and relating to the ways that their conduct is directed in power relationships.
The first point noted was that people are not merely passively constructed by
one specific discourse relating to their objectification as "having learning difficulties",
but that there are other discourses and ethical technologies of which they are aware,
and they take an active role in the formation of their self-relationships around these
issues. A number of different ways were seen of people interacting with these issues.
It was seen initially, in "oppositional" accounts, how it is possible for people
in these circumstances to draw upon certain ethical technologies surrounding "liberal"
subjectivity in resisting the subject position of a person requiring special treatment
and management of their lives. In the first two subgroups of accounts examined,
participants drew out ways in which being positioned as a care subject clashes with
the ideals of being a self-expressing, independent individual with rights to equality,
self-expression and autonomy, and used this as an impetus to resist forms of power
and subjectification connected to their status as individuals deemed to have a
"disability" requires supervision and management in institutional care. They
responded to these tensions by aligning themselves with the one form of subjectivity,
recognising ideals by which to govern their conduct based around speaking up for
oneself, and, at the same time, resisting the other by struggling to form, in the face of
these issues, a relationship to themselves as independent, self-expressing individuals.
In contrast, the other subgroup of participants who displayed an "oppositional"
orientation to their position in care homes reacted by showing how their situation is in
many ways intolerable, that it is 'terrible', and illustrated ways that it negatively
affects their lives. In doing this they did not explicitly draw upon a "liberal" ethical
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position in resisting their subjectification, but left this implicitly stated by showing
how ways that they lacks choice or are positioned in power relationships which direct
their conduct in undesirable ways are 'not fair.'
In other accounts — those identified as "ambivalent" in their orientation
towards care — different aspects of interaction with these issues were seen. Here,
similar tensions were present — between being a subject of care in a subordinate
position in power relationships on the one hand, and challenging and resisting certain
aspects of their situation in care on the other (complaining about lack of self-
expression, for instance, or talking about ways that they act in defiance of rules, or
make critical judgements about the running of their homes). However, these were not
resolved into defmite challenges to the structure of power in the home, nor was there
the concern for the participants to align themselves with a "normal" subject position.
These participants, rather than resolving these potential dilemmas through explicitly
challenging their situation, adopted unstable positions somewhere between the
conflicting forces and technologies which operate upon them. So, they presented
themselves both as individuals capable of voicing their own opinions or recognising
unacceptable operations of power that limit their conduct and as subjects in a
subordinate position in specific power relationships in their homes. Each of these
positions surfaced at different times and in different ways in their accounts. In some
ways, participants talked about their lives in terms of their ability to make their own
decisions or to recognise aspects of power acting upon them that should be resisted,
and yet at other times they seemed to be positioned in such a way as to recognise
themselves as subject to the direction of their lives and conduct in line with a position
as a subject of care. Although this situation is not as clear in its orientation as in the
preceding accounts, there are elements of resistance in that the participants are not
passively positioned by the forms of power/knowledge and subjectification which act
upon them. Just as people are clearly not escaping from these issues such that they are
no longer affected by them, nor explicitly challenging them, neither are they totally
passive in the face of them or aligning unproblematically with the position of being a
subject of care.
Finally, the last group of accounts — those showing a "positive" attitude to
their homes - showed another reaction to this interplay of forces. Here, the participants
took a different approach to understanding their own agency and the forces acting
upon their conduct and positioning them in particular ways. They drew upon ideals of
self-hood centring around their ability to express themselves, stand up for their rights,
and be 'independent' just as a number of "oppositional" accounts did. Also, there
were again areas in which their talk showed that they are situated within power
relationships in which they are dependent on permission from staff to do certain
things, in which a number of things are prohibited for them, and in which they are
subject to the decisions, judgements, and disciplinary actions of staff. However, this
did not manifest itself in the same kinds of tension seen earlier. Here, the participants
talked about themselves as independent subjects within the bounds of a particular
subject position which they occupy, and they thus recognised ideals by which to
govern their own conduct in line with this position. The ways that they are acted upon
by power and subjectification are not contrasted with the ways in which they relate to
themselves as independent, self-expressing agents, but, rather they form rational limits
upon the forms that their independent agency can take. However, despite their
generally positive orientation towards their position, and their acceptance of a subject
position that defines limits for their self-expression and making of choices, there was
still evidence of some problems that participants experienced regarding the power
relationships in their homes — such as lacking input into the running of the home in
some ways or not being able to undertake some desired activities.
In many ways, it has been commented, it is "normal" to recognise limitations
acting upon one's conduct which one does not imagine contradict one's position as a
self-expressing, self-determining subject (although this is not to say, of course, that
everyone is subject to precisely the same operations of power and forms of
subjectification). What this analysis has shown, however, is the specific ways that
these issues are experienced by people living in community care accommodation, and
the specific problems that they experience with them. One of the key findings of this
chapter has been that participants are aware of the action of forms power and subject
positions, and of the effects this has upon them, and that this constitutes various
problems for them with which they engage in different ways. Such problems are
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explicitly voiced in the "oppositional" accounts: problems based around issues of self-
expression, of having their opinions heard, of controlling their own care, and around
the prohibitions and imperatives imposed upon them as care subjects and their
position as subject to the judgements and decisions of others. Similar problems are
apparent in the other accounts examined also, although they are not so explicitly
voiced nor so straightforwardly presented. Again, these problems are based around
issues of understanding oneself as a person with the abilities and rights to express
oneself and exercise a degree of self-determination, and the tensions between this and
participants' constitution in power relationships in which they are subject to the
decisions and authority of others, and to having their conduct directed in line with a
set of prohibitions and imperatives connected to this situation.
What remains to be considered is, in light of these realisations, what should be
done, what should be concluded about the issues that have been investigating, what
impact the research findings might have on this area. These questions will be
addressed in the next, and final, chapter, in which we will consider how the analyses
fit in with or conflict with other work in similar areas, and what the consequences of
this are in terms of planning future work and proposing changes to care systems. We
must evaluate what kinds of challenge are made through these findings to the
situations in which people live in care accommodation, and what "solutions" could be
constructed given the issues raised by participants' accounts. In addressing these
issues, the implications raised by the findings of this research will themselves become
clearer.
Chapter 9: Discussion of Findings and Conclusion 
This thesis set out to examine how people experience power in community
care homes for people with learning difficulties. The focus for the research was
influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, who radically re-positioned how power
and subjectivity are thought about. His work can perhaps best be understood as
comprising three domains of critical analysis which constitute a 'critical ontology of
ourselves' (Foucault, 1997a): truth, which examines how people are constituted as
objects of knowledge; power, which explores how they are constituted as subjects
acting on others and acted upon in particular regulated ways by others; and ethics,
concerned with how people constitute themselves as moral agents (Foucault, 19970
and govern themselves in line with this.
These three domains of analysis are irreducible to one another, and together
comprise a critical study of how human beings are constituted as subjects. Our
research questions draw upon each these aspects of inquiry, being:
• What forms of power do individuals living in community care accommodation for
adults with learning difficulties experience as acting upon them?
• HON% do they relate to themselves as subjects in relation to this?
• How does this constitute problems for them in their lives?
These questions were addressed throu gh a discourse analysis of a series of semi-
structured interviews with adults who have recent experience of living in community
care residential homes for learning difficulties. These interviews explored with the
research participants their experiences and thoughts about life in these institutions.
Also important to consider is how Foucault's work is relevant to psychology,
and how psychology can accommodate a Foucauldian perspective such that an
approach suitable for addressing the research questions can be worked out ss 'thin it.
This research undertook a form of psychological discourse analysis centred arou
those areas hat influenced the asking of the research question; Foucault's three
domains of analysis (truth, power and ethics). We examined how participants'
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accounts refer to aspects of themselves which exist as objects of knowledge, as things
about which knowledge can be collected and judgements made, and we drew out the
social structures and institutions connected to people's objectification in these forms
of knowledge. Secondly, we focused on power and subjectification, examining the
relationships in which people are situated, and highlighting their characteristics vis-à-
vis power. Thirdly, we looked at how people relate to themselves and their
environment, the discourses and concepts of self-hood drawn upon in recognising
themselves as certain types of being and assigning a moral force to their actions.
In undertaking this analysis, a number of themes (aspects of participants'
discourse relating to the research questions that recurred across a number of accounts)
were drawn out. These themes were drawn out from parts of participants' discourse
that embodied a particular aspect of power relationships, objectification, or self-
relationship that could be summarised under a specific thematic heading (such as
prohibitions acting on behaviour, assertion of rights to self-expression, and so on).
The themes that were drawn out were ones that were useful for organising discussion
of the three different aspects of the analysis, that could lend coherence to the analysis
that was being built up. However, the analysis was not centred only around a set of
thematic headings that were common across accounts. It also attended to the ways that
participants discussed the issues from which the thematic headings were drawn — the
language that they used in talking about them, and how they fitted into the overall talk
of participants, their overall orientation to issues of power, subjectivity and self-
conception.
These are important points to address. Despite an emerging recognition of the
importance of Foucault's work in the area of disability studies in general and learning
difficulties in particular, there has been no research which effectively draws upon it to
attempt to understand individuals' experiences of power and subjectification in
community care accommodation. As Walmsley (2001) points out, much of the
research that focuses its attention upon community care services does so from a
perspective influenced, explicitly or implicitly, by normalisation theory. However
normalisation theory is conceptually problematic and limited in what it can reveal. An
analysis such as that undertaken by this research has the potential to highlight issues
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concerning power and subjectivity in community care which have not been adequately
examined.
With this in mind, we turn our attention to the findings of the analysis, and the
impact they have on our understanding the situation of people living in community
care residential accommodation. This chapter undertakes this task, and is divided into
four parts. The first part will summarise the findings and present the overall picture
which emerges from them. The second will evaluate the importance of the findings as
they constitute an addition to existing knowledge. The third part will critically
evaluate the findings. The fourth will deal with future directions suggested by the
findings both in terms of further research and forms of practice connected to
community care. Our first task is to present a summary of the findings that have
emerged from the research.
9.1 Research findings
The first aspect of the analysis centred around uncovering forms of knowledge
by which people are objectified, and drawing out the institutions and social structures
connected to this objectification and the decisions about people it makes available.
With respect to this, themes that were identified in participants' accounts were:
awareness of forms of observation and assessment acting upon them, decisions about
living arrangements made by others, negative consequences of assessment and
labelling, and lack of information about assessments or why care accommodation in
deemed necessary. Firstly, it was noted that seven accounts showed evidence of
participants being aware of certain of their abilities and characteristics — those relating
to their intellectual abilities or their ability to live independently — being assessed by a
specific (usually vaguely referenced) group. Connected to this, six participants also
discussed negative consequences of becoming assessed or labelled as "people with
learning difficulties". These consequences of labelling centred around negative ways
that people can be thought about or treated once they are deemed to have some form
of learning difficulty — such as unpleasant lay-labels (such as "thick") becoming
applicable to them.
Also connected to the issues of assessment and labelling (although this was
not often explicitly linked in participants' accounts) was the theme of decisions about
living arrangements being made by other people. This manifested in twelve accounts,
as participants talked about the decisions about their being moved into care being
made by other people, or about their having to stay in care homes rather than be
allowed to live independently. These others were generally referenced only vaguely as
'they,' or, in two accounts, as 'social services.' These participants were aware that it is
as a result of the decisions of these other people that they came to live in community
care homes — and this is implicitly connected to forms of assessment that define
people as requiring care (e.g. 'I went to B for a trial period, then they made the
decision [...] that I was supposed to stay there permanently').
However, participants did not seem to be aware of the reasons for, or the
intricacies of, these forms of assessment. Eight participants explicitly said that they
did not know how such assessments were made, why labels for them thus became
available, nor why decisions about their lives were taken in connection with them.
One participant remarked 'I was called "mentally handicapped," and I didn't know
what that meant,' and others claimed to have no idea why decisions about their
needing to live in care accommodation were taken, stating that no-one gave any
reasons for it. As well as this theme explicitly emerging in eight accounts, no
participants gave an indication that they did know much about the assessments that
they were subject to, nor the reasons that they are deemed to require care
accommodation.
This part of the analysis, then, began to show the existence of processes of
observation and assessment through which people are objectified as a particular sort
of being (someone with learning difficulties), and a set of consequences connected to
this — of being labelled as "having learning difficulties", of having unpleasant lay-
labels and ways of thinking applied to them, and being placed in special institutions
where the needs they are deemed to have can be met. These processes of
objectification are linked to issues of power. The ways of thinking about people that
are made available through this objectification situate them in relationships in which
others make decisions about their lives, and make them amenable to forms of
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institutional intervention (living in care homes) consonant with their objectification.
This can be seen in the way that participants who discussed these issues talked about
being subject to the judgements and decisions of a specific group of people, a group
usually referenced only vaguely as "they" in the accounts. For example, 'they made
the decision [...] that I was supposed to stay there permanently,' 'they said I couldn't
go back [...] they said I didn't take care of myself'. This group (referenced usually as
'they,' or sometimes as 'doctors' or 'social services') has the power to label other
people, to make decisions about where they live, and to make assessments about their
needs (e.g. needing to stay in care permanently), although the participants themselves
did not show any awareness of how or why such assessments and judgements are
made, and eight specifically stated that they were not aware of this.
These issues lead into the second aspect of the analysis, which centred
specifically around power and subjectification. This involved examining the nature of
the relationships (rights to speak, to make decisions, to perform certain types of
action, and so on) and the forms of subjectification (individuals' relationships to
rights, privileges, duties, obligations, prohibitions, and so on) referred to by
participants. The key issue arising from this aspect of the analysis was that differential
relationships were observed between the participants and the staff who run their
homes. This was revealed through the emergence of four themes relating to power in
participants' accounts: prohibitions on behaviour, imperatives on behaviour, lack of
choice or input into the running of the home, and punishments and reprimands. All
participants discussed prohibitions that they are subject to (things that they cannot do,
things that they require permission from staff in order to do) and/or imperatives acting
upon their behaviour (things that they have to do, places they have to go, ways they
have to behave). These included such things as not being allowed to cook in the home,
to buy presents for other residents, to go outside without permission, or having certain
house jobs to perform, having to be good or quiet, having to go to a day centre, and so
on.
These are power relationships in which care residents are divided from the
staff who run their homes in terms of what they can legitimately do, what rights they
have, and what decisions can be made with respect to them. This relationship is
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structured such that the residents' conduct is governed by rules, and the staff are in a
position of power in terms of granting or withholding permission for them to perform
a wide range of actions, arranging aspects of their lives, and making judgements about
the appropriateness of their behaviour. All participants were aware of being in some
way subject to the decisions of staff, and to a set of rules and prohibitions based
around their status as residents of care: their conduct is subject to a set of prohibitions
and limitations, they must behave themselves in a manner deemed appropriate (i.e.
being "good"), perform chores that are laid out for them by the staff, and so on.
It is possible to imagine reasons for the existence of many of these rules and
imperatives — for example, residents might hurt themselves in the kitchen, they might
damage the decor of their rooms, the home would be legally liable if they were
involved in an accident outside, there is a danger of people living in unsanitary
conditions or behaving disruptively, and so on. As Becker (1967) points out, there will
undoubtedly be constraints acting upon people who are 'super-ordinate' as well as
those who are 'subordinate' in hierarchical relationships, and thus those who run these
homes themselves may be obliged to act in particular ways with respect to residents.
This does not mean, however, that we should abandon the task of listening to what
'subordinates' have to say — in this case, of uncovering and opening up to debate the
existence of specific power relationships. It is not our task to make judgements that
one form or action of power is "legitimate" and another is not, but to bring to light the
types of power relationships evidenced in participants' accounts. In this case, we can
see care residents being situated in power relationships in which they are subject to a
set of rules limiting their conduct and imposing imperatives on the behaviour which
comprise a 'place' that they occupy in the home, in which they are dependent upon the
permission of the staff to do things such as go out, have their hair cut, or throw away
rubbish, and in which they are subject to judgements by staff about the acceptability of
their conduct.
The third theme identified in accounts relating to power was that lack of
choice, means to express oneself, or input into the running of the home. Eight
accounts contained comments by participants indicating that they lack input into how
their homes are run (they do no get to choose how the home is decorated, they are not
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given the choice of having their own bedroom, they do not have the opportunity to
express their opinions about the home to staff, and so on). This is another aspect of
the power relationships that people living in care homes are subject to. Again,
residents are divided from staff in terms of who can make decisions about the running
of the home, who can make their voice and opinions heard, who has choice about how
their life is run, and so on.
Also, participants were aware of being constituted in these power relationships
as punishable beings. Twelve of the participants talked about what happens if 'you're
naughty' or 'bad': 'they stop you going to the pub,' 'you got the injection in the leg,'
'you got a telling off [...] and if they didn't want to do anything for you, they
wouldn't do it,' and 'they punish you. You went to bed [...] you're in the poor book.'
Again, it might be commented that some of the things talked about as being 'naughty'
are things that one might expect to be proscribed (e.g. hitting people and swearing).
Again, however, we should point out that our task here is to uncover the ways in
which power and subjectification operate in these instances rather than attempting to
justify or condemn every aspect of power as soon as it is uncovered. Here, there is
evidence of the connection to the power relationships we have been seeing of forms of
punishment that can be handed down by staff members if residents do not behave
appropriately.
Connected to these power relationships is a form of subjectification, a specific
subject position that participants recognise. In understanding this, we need to examine
more closely how participants talks about their situation. This illustrates the
importance of moving beyond a thematic analysis to consider how participants discuss
the issues from which themes are drawn, the language they use in doing so. A key
finding of the research here is around the pronominal forms that people use in
referencing themselves in relation to issues of power in their homes. All of the
participants except one tended to use the third person (actually "you" functioning like
the third-person "one") whenever they were discussing limitations, imperatives, and
punishments that they were subject to. There were frequent shifts in use of pronominal
forms noted, from the first-person to discuss participants' own actions or beliefs and
the third-person to discuss aspects of power that act upon them — sometimes in the
-274-
same sentence. For instance, 'I really do wish I could do a bit more. But, you can't.'
This use of pronominal forms in participants' accounts indicates a specific "place"
that they occupy in terms of a generic subject position — a place related to what 'you,'
as a resident of the home, can and cannot do, what 'you' are supposed to do, and what
'your' place in the home is. These things are referenced as existing in a wider context
than merely applying to individual participants or their co-residents specifically, and
are talked about as applying to 'you' (or, we could substitute, "anyone") when 'you'
are in the situation of living in a care home. When these issues are discussed in this
way, attention is focused not on the specific situation of the individual participant
him/herself, but on the position of a generic subject of care, of anyone in their
position. Thus, participants recognise a set of things which "you" 'cannot possibly do'
when "you" are subject of care, ways that "you" are supposed to behave ('you've got
to be good all the time,' 'you have to be good here'), the 'place' that "you" occupy,
chores that 'you do have to do,' and ways that "you" are punished 'if you're naughty.'
These imperatives, prohibitions, punishments — in short, power relations — are things
that participants recognise themselves as subject to by virtue of their membership of a
specific category of people — people living in care homes. Being in this situation, then,
is recognised as being consonant with power relationships in which one's conduct is
directed (certain things happened to "you" if "you" are bad; "you" are made to do
certain things), and also with the recognition of ways that "you" are supposed to
behave, to direct "your" own conduct in line with a specific set of ideals (when "you"
are in this situation, "you" may not do/have to do certain things).
These points indicate, then, how people who live in care homes can be situated
in power relationships in which they are subject to the decisions and supervision of
staff, and in which they recognise themselves as subjects obliged to conduct
themselves in line with this supervision, and amenable to observation, judgement (in
terms of being 'good' or having one's conduct monitored) and punishment by the staff
in this respect. There is a form of subjectification at work in which being objectified
as a member of a specific category of people (those who live in care homes) is
consonant with an obligation to recognise oneself as subject to prohibitions and
limitations which affect people in that situation, with occupying a defined and
subordinate place in the home in which certain forms of action are appropriate, and in
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which one is subject to the decisions of staff about what one must do and what one
cannot do. Participants recognised things which "you" cannot do as a care resident by
virtue of membership of that category — things which 'you cannot possibly do' — and
recognised themselves as existing in relationships with the staff in which they must
seek permission to do a number of things, and in which the staff make decisions about
the appropriateness of their behaviour (i.e. 'you have to be good') and impose
punishments upon them.
All of the participants challenged their position in these power relationships in
some way, however. They said for instance, that `[reprimands] went in one ear and out
the other, 'cause I used to think it was stupid,' or making complaints about their
homes, complaining for instance that 'people were being bullies [...] I didn't like the
punishments.' These remarks begin to show that they are not merely passively
positioned by power, nor do they unproblematically relate to themselves as care
subjects, as subjects who align themselves with the "place" in the home that is set out
for them. Rather, participants actively took up a position in relation to these forces,
and issued challenges to them. This brings us onto the last aspect of the analysis: that
which examines how people relate to themselves as certain types of being, and how
they assign meaning and value to their own lives and to the ways that they are
positioned and directed in power relationships, and to begin to identify areas which
people may be struggling with.
The accounts examined in this respect were separated into three categories —
those openly oppositional to their situation, those supportive of it, and those
exhibiting a somewhat ambivalent attitude. Four themes relating to the ways that
participants relate to themselves and their environment were identified in the accounts
(the assertion of rights to choice, equality and self-expression; ability to think and act
independently, and speak up for oneself; dependence on the home; and disagreement
with, or resistance to, aspects of life in care). However, it is important in dealing with
this aspect of the analysis to move beyond a consideration of these themes themselves,
and to look at how participants relate to issues of power in their homes, to other
people in them, and to themselves as particular types of subjects. It is around these
considerations, rather than around a thematic analysis that this part of the research is
organised.
The first thing noted was that six participants (those said to be "oppositional"
in their accounts) issued definite challenges to various aspects of their situation in
care. Challenges were put to the negative conceptions and lay-labels (often discarded
professional terms such as 'mental') which have been applied to learning difficulties,
and to the ways that they are positioned as care subjects. Comments were made that
"you", as a subject of care in the homes, are 'supposed to be a good boy and be quiet,'
that people 'just don't want to listen to you,' that they 'put words into people's
mouths,' and that 'you don't get much say in your life at all.' Participants also
challenged the passive position they have in relationships with staff such that the staff
manage their money and their everyday affairs, decide where they live, when they go
to the day centre, what drugs they must take, and the making of decisions affecting
residents' environment and their lives being made without their being consulted.
Opposed to this position were discourses and concepts of self-hood that set out
different ideals by which people in care should be treated, and through which they
relate to themselves — ideals based upon equality of treatment, choice, and self-
expression. These were presented in various ways in the accounts identified as
"oppositional". Firstly, they were put forward as an expression of the ideal of people
with learning difficulties having equal rights with others and meriting equal treatment
('it doesn't mean we can't get what people like yourself,' 'I ought to be treated like
you'). They were also framed as a position upon which participants either explicitly or
implicitly drew in making moral judgements about their care or the general treatment
they receive, especially in relation to areas in which they perceive their not being
listened to ('to me, that's wrong,' 'that's not care, to me, that's dictation,' 'that's not
fair,' 'we've got a voice and we should be able to use it,'). In three of the six
"oppositional" accounts, these ethical ideals were translated into an impetus for
locating imperatives on conduct with which participants aligned their own behaviour
in resisting and challenging power relations (e.g. 'you have to fight for what you
believe,' 'you have to voice your opinions'). In talking in this way, participants here
showed that they are aware of having experienced negative consequences of being
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created as a "person with learning difficulties" and a care subject, and they draw, in
various ways, upon a conception of self-hood that places a central importance on
rights, voice and equality to challenge this, to present morally desirable alternatives,
and to relate to themselves, and present themselves in the interviews, as individuals
capable of speaking their minds and voicing their opinions.
In two of the "oppositional" accounts, this set of ethical ideals emerged
implicitly rather than explicitly. These two accounts did not explicitly frame ethical
statements about the rights they should have, nor locate a set of behavioural
imperatives (for instance, saying that "you" must speak "your" mind) with which they
align their behaviour and resist workings of power that limit their conduct or self-
expression, as the other "oppositional" accounts did. Rather, they focused on detailing
the negative effects of being situated in power relationships in a residential home as a
care subject, showing how this has had intolerable effects upon their own lives, and
then explicitly commenting that this is unfair or unacceptable. The comments made in
these accounts about the unacceptable aspects of life in care centre around areas in
which the participants in question have lacked choice or the means to express
themselves in relation to how their home and their lives are organised, in which their
lives have been subject to the decisions of others in terms of where they may go and
what they may do, and in which they have been punished for failing to comply with
such directives. Implicitly, of course, presenting of these types of situation as
unacceptable, and commenting that they are 'not fair' draws upon similar "liberal"
ethical ideals as those explicitly stated in the other four "oppositional" accounts —
ideals that oppose what they outline, and are based around self-expression, self-
determination, and the freedom to make choices about what to do or where to go.
To put it simply, in this first set of accounts, there were present, both explicitly
and implicitly, two conflicting positions of subjectivity — that of a care subject
existing in a subordinate position in power relationships with staff and subject to the
staff's decisions and to management of their lives, and, on the other hand, what might
be called a "liberal" position through which they relate to themselves as self-
expressing subjects with the ability and the right to voice their opinions, receive equal
treatment with others, and make decisions about their own lives. These participants
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drew upon the latter position in challenging and resisting the first — to a degree. The
challenges made, however, do not mean that people escape from these negative
effects. They are, rather, indicative of a struggle to contest operations of power that
they find problematic, and to relate to themselves as beings with "normal" rights and
abilities. For instance, despite the challenges put forward, participants also made
comments such as, 'you never win [...] but you have to show them you're not afraid,'
'now I can stick up for my rights [...] but I find that difficult'.
The next group of seven accounts examined were more ambivalent in their
orientation towards the care homes. These accounts were not resolved into definite
challenges or an explicit identification with either position. There were indications
again that the participants were aware of the existence of power relationships in which
their conduct is subject to rules and prohibitions, and of themselves being subject to
the decisions, judgements and discipline of those who run their homes, of ways that
"you", as a care subject, must behave: 'in a home you are a bit limited [...] you're
supposed to behave [...] you get a telling off if you don't behave,' 'you can't be noisy
[...] you can do a lot more in your own place,' 'you've got to behave yourself [...] if
you don't behave, you're sent to your room.' Also, alongside these comments, were
others that indicated participants' resistance or challenges to certain aspects of their
situation.
Although only one of the "ambivalent" participants explicitly discussed the
idea that care residents should be recognised as capable of expressing their opinions,
the resistances that were presented in this group of accounts suggested that
participants, whilst being aware of power relations acting upon them, present
themselves as individuals not unduly constrained by rules, as people capable of
challenging and resisting power where it constrains their conduct or limits their self-
expression. For example, participants made such comments as 'what's lacking in this
home [...] is the self-expression [...] we are capable of expressing ourselves [...] I
don't think they realise that,' 'you can't smoke in your room, but we do,' 'I've packed
it in now [talking and working group]. I told them [...] The staff just kept talking
[laughs]. It was stupid.' However, these accounts were not resolved into overtly
oppositional positions. On the contrary, the participants in question seemed also to
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identify with their position in care by explaining why limitations were in place
('because we don't own the home, you see'), by emphasising positive aspects of the
homes in terms of what they can do (Tye had a good life. It's a nice place [...] I can
go out anytime I want'), or by taking on a passive position with respect to activities
and waiting for staff to give them out to residents, or by showing how they align their
behaviour with what is expected (`Me? I'm alright. Well, most of the time, you know.
If you've got in a bad mood [...] ignore it').
These participants were again aware of a set of consequences of being a
subject of care. Consonant with this position are judgements made about them (e.g.
that they can't express themselves intelligently), a set of rules and prohibitions which
act upon them, certain forms of behaviour (being 'good' and 'quiet' especially) that
are expected of them, and power relationships in which their conduct is observed,
assessed and, if necessary, disciplined. These participants related to themselves both
as care subjects whose lives and conduct are supervised, managed and disciplined by
staff, and as beings who recognise the importance of having 'a say' in their lives, who
are capable of making judgements about their situation and actively resisting aspects
of power which operate upon them. Whilst they did not take up an expressly
oppositional position, and even identified with or supported their position, their
comments did indicate that they were also, in different ways, aware of the importance
of having 'a say,' and of problems relating to their situation in terms of lacking
recognition of their self-expression, having decisions made for them in consultations
with staff, or being subject to rules which they are expected to follow.
The final group of participants' accounts presented a clearly positive
orientation towards the care environment and their place within it. Again, these four
participants were aware of the existence of the position of a care subject acting upon
them, in which they occupy a defined 'place' with respect to the home and those who
run it such that their conduct is subject to rides and limitations, they require
permission to do a number of things, and the staff make decisions about the home and
participants' place in it, and what can legitimately be done by participants and what is
done to them by staff. For example, comments were made that 'if you want to go out
anywhere, you have to ask to go out,' 'I feel as though I want to go out and buy them
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[other residents] something [...] but you cannot do that; it's not your place, it's the
staffs place,' 'you can't bring your own beer in here,' 'if you're bad in a way, the
staff d give you a bollocking,' and 'the staff send us [to work assignments]:
There was evidence of these participants also drawing upon "liberal" ethical
technologies in relating to themselves. All four of them strongly emphasised their
status as independent individuals capable of expressing their opinions, making their
own choices, and taking an active role in running their lives. For example, participants
commented, 'I stand my ground. I say "I don't like it" if I don't like, then [...] that's
it,' I stand up for myself [...] I've always been able to speak for myself 'I'm a very
independent woman, and I, I like people to respect that,' 'I can do a sort of deal with
her [...] if I can have my room done in my own colours, I will clean my own room up
every Sunday.' These two positions (of being a subject of care and being a "liberal",
self-expressing individual) that existed, in different ways, as tensions in the previous
accounts, were managed differently here. There are aspects of the position of being a
care resident which these "positive" participants experience as problematic in limiting
what they can legitimately do, putting them in situations they find unpleasant or
denying them a say in the running of the home. For example, participants said,
'there's nothing you can do [...] I really do wish I could do a bit more. But, you
can't,' 'we used to have meetings, but we don't seem to have as many meetings lately
[...] the way the house has been done, no-one's really said anything, it's just been
done (1),' or 'I go to B M_, but I, I don't like it [...] it's horrible to think about
going back.'
Despite discussing aspects of power relationships and the place in the home
that they occupy as care subjects that they find problematic, these participants did not
contesting the position of subjectivity related to being a care resident. On the contrary,
they actively related to it, and recognised themselves as individuals to whom this
position, and the limitations and imperatives that go along with, applies. They did not
challenge this position, nor illustrate how they resist it. Rather, they expressed support
for it in a number of ways — by identifying with the reasons for their position CI know
this ain't my home to do things like that [...] I agree, because I like to be told') and
recognising that because of it, there are things that "you" simply 'cannot possibly do';
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explaining why certain limitations exist (`That's the difference between this place [...]
because most of them here are on tablets'); identifying with the aims of the home
(`they help us to help ourselves. It cares for us and makes sure we're all alright," the
people that look after us are doing wonderful jobs'); or relating to themselves as
individuals who require being cared for in such homes ('I'd feel vulnerable [living
independently] [...] you could do it [...] but I don't think any of us could do that').
These participants are not contesting the position of being a care subject, nor the
power relationships connected to it, but are actively recognising themselves as
individuals upon whom these forces of power and subjectification act, and observing
and directing their own conduct in line with them. In short, they are relating to
themselves in an ethical manner as subjects with rights and abilities within limits that
relate to their position as care subjects, despite their recognition of some problematic
aspects of this position for them.
Before moving on to evaluate these findings, it will be helpful to present a
more succinct summary of the above points, and to set out more specifically their
relevance to our research questions. In relation to the research questions set out, we
identified the inter-connected existence of forms of knowledge, power and
subjectification which act upon the research participants and with which they interact.
In relation to the forms of power that they experience, it was seen that participants are
aware of their being observed and assessed by a specific group of people (usually
referenced only vaguely as 'they') and of a set of consequences attached to this
process: of making available negative ways of thinking about them and negative lay-
labels that can be applied to them (such as being thought of as `thick'), and of
empowering the group of people who assess them to make decisions and judgements
about their care needs and thus where they are to live. Although aware of the existence
of this assessment and the general consequences attached to it, the participants were
not aware of the intricacies of it, nor of why it is carried out, and the decisions made
about them are thus difficult for them to understand or challenge.
Also seen in relation to power was the existence of a set of differential
relationships between residents and staff of the homes, such that participants were
aware of a definite "place" that they occupy situated around ideals of them being
supervised and cared for. These power relationships, centring around the conceptual
division of residents from staff, have a number of characteristics — imposing
prohibitions and imperatives on their conduct (e.g. around cooking, being noisy,
buying presents for other residents, having to be in at a certain time, having to perform
set chores, etc.), making them subject to the decisions of staff and reliant on their
permission to do a number of things (such as going outside, having decorations in
their rooms, throwing things away, etc.), having aspects of their lives organised by
staff and lacking a say in this themselves (e.g., their appointments with hairdressers,
their trips outside, their work placements, the renovations and alterations made to the
homes, activities given to them, and so on), and being subject to judgements made
about their conduct (in terms of being 'good') and to reprimands and punishments in
relation to this (such as being 'told off,' being sent to their rooms, being forbidden
from going out, having forms of care withdrawn, and so on).
Consonant with these forms of power/knowledge was a subject position which
participants were aware of being led to recognise as applying to them. They were
aware that, as a subject of care, there are things that "you" cannot do, decisions that
can be made for "you" by staff, ways that "you" are supposed to behave, and forms of
discipline applicable to "you" in respect of this. Participants were led to recognise
themselves as occupying a certain "place" or subject position in their homes, to
recognise particular imperatives and prohibitions as legitimately acting upon them in
accordance with this, and to form particular relationships to themselves in which they
understand and manage their own conduct in line with these factors. They were aware
of an impetus to govern themselves and their own conduct in line with the ideals of
their being supervised and managed in a care environment, and they discussed their
conduct in relation to this.
This ties in to the second research question, asking how participants' relate to
themselves as subjects. However, there is more to consider about their forms of self-
relationship than the form of subjectivity that they are led to take on by virtue of their
membership of the category of people deemed to require care accommodation for
learning difficulties. Also observed in the accounts was a "liberal" position connected
to forms of ethical technology by which participants relate to themselves as
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independent beings able to express their own opinions, and as individuals with rights
to receive equal treatment with others, to exercise their own choices, and to have a
'say' in the running of their lives and the homes in which they live. Attached to this
position is an impetus for ethical conduct in terms of claiming these rights for oneself,
speaking one's mind, and challenging those aspects of power that limit one's self-
expression or one's 'say' in one's life. These positions were managed and oriented
towards in different ways.
One set of participants clearly aligned themselves with this "liberal" position,
and drew upon it explicitly, in challenging and resisting the ways their positioning in
power relationships as care subjects and locating an impetus for making moral
judgements about how they 'should' be treated, or implicitly, in illustrating how their
situation in care is intolerable or unfair. Others took a more ambivalent line, in which
the position of care subjectivity and challenges and resistances to this position
coexisted, without their accounts being resolved into a definite orientation with one or
the other. These participants identified in various ways with the position of care
subjectivity in which their conduct is observed and directed and decisions made for
them, and also demonstrated in their accounts how they resist or disagree with aspects
of power that constrain their conduct or limit their self-expression. They showed that
they are individuals capable of making their own judgements about the operations of
power connected to their subjectification despite the fact that they also recognised
these forms of power acting upon them in their accounts. The final group of
participants explicitly related to themselves as independent, self-expressing
individuals with rights to make their own choices, and they articulated ways that their
position as subjects of care is problematic in relation to this. Nevertheless, they
explicitly identified with this position. They effectively related to themselves as
individuals with rights and abilities of self-expression and choice within the bounds of
a position of care subjectivity.
With respect to participants' relationship to themselves as subjects, these
findings show that they are not merely passively positioned by forces of power and
subjectification such that they unproblematically relate to themselves as care subjects.
On the contrary, they actively take up positions in different ways, drawing upon
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ethical ideals of equality, choice and self-expression in doing so. Participants'
subjectivity does not emerge merely as a result of the operation of forces of power and
subjectification, but arises out of their interaction and confrontation with these forces.
This realisation leads us onto the third of our research questions, concerning
how people experience aspects of power and subjectivity as problematic. The key to
this question also lies in the tensions observed in participants' accounts — tensions
between being positioned as a subject upon whom power relationships act that direct
their conduct in care homes, and the positions that participants themselves take with
respect to this. Participants were aware of a drive to relate to themselves as
independent individuals with rights to equality of treatment with others and choice in
their lives. The problems they articulated as existing for them centred around ways
that these ideals clashed with their position as subjects of care. Participants were
aware of ways that their position in their homes places them in situations in which
they are set apart from "normal" others, in which they do not have 'a say,' in which
their lives are arranged and managed by others, and in which power relationships
affect them such that staff members make decisions about their lives and their conduct
in terms of what is expected of them and what they can legitimately do, and discipline
them accordingly. Participants articulated these problems in different ways, according
to the overall orientation they took towards their situation, but all, in some way,
discussed their experience of these sorts of problems, even where their overall outlook
on their situation in care was positive.
These are issues about people's situation in care environments that have not
hitherto been highlighted. We cannot claim to have uncovered everything that could
be said about power, subjectivity and ethics with relation to people living in
community care. As Foucault points out, power is a ubiquitous feature of human
relationships, and questions of subjectivity and ethics will have wider effects than
those discussed in this thesis. There will certainly be other operations of power and
subjectivity affecting other areas of people's lives, and other factors of self-
relationships and identity that are beyond the focus of this research. Also, of course, it
would be incorrect to believe that power relationships work in one direction only, that
they are forces affecting only those people who are residents of care homes, and not
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the staff or managers. What this research has dealt with have been issues of power,
subjectivity and ethics as they emerge in the accounts people give of their lives in
community care accommodation. This, naturally, tends to centre around fairly explicit
forms of power that clearly direct people's conduct, around aspects of power that they
are somehow aware of operating upon them. This has shown areas of concern, around
the ways that people are situated in differential relationships, recognise the actions of
systems of knowledge that define them as subjects of care and lead them to recognise
their conduct as subject to rules, limitations, imperatives and observation, assessment
and discipline by others.
Given these findings, we must ask what we are to conclude. What judgements
or proposals are made available, and how are the findings significant? It is tempting,
in light of these findings, to search out a normative basis that will allow us to decide
that certain forms of power are "bad" and that we must undertake a specific form of
action in overcoming them. However, Foucault teaches us that there is a danger in
speaking for and above others about their situation, and in formulating programs of
resistance for them. It must be recognised that the problems identified here are ones
for people living in care accommodation, and not for academics or social workers to
"solve" (see Foucault 1991a). Also, it is not possible to banish power per se in any
case, since it is a ubiquitous feature of human relationships. We must not, for
instance, fall into the trap of believing, as a result of our observations, that the
"liberal" position drawn on in the accounts is the absence of power, existing in
contrast to forces that act to suppress this position. As Rose (e.g. 1990, 1996) has
shown, these sorts of positions are themselves culturally specific ones connected to
potentially troublesome issues relating to the government of conduct. It is for these
reasons that an analysis of power and subjectivity beginning from the perspective of
those who experience them is an important one to undertake, and, similarly, drawing
out the problems that people themselves are struggling with is an important step in the
analysis.
What this analysis achieves is to bring to light specific workings of power that
participants experience, and to highlight the problems that they experience in relation
to them. Basically, we have shown that it is possible to take the essence of what
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Foucault did with the texts that he analysed with respect to power and subjectification,
and apply it to an analysis of individuals' accounts of their own situations. An analysis
of how people talk about their situation in care based around Foucault's three domains
of critical ontology can prevent power from remaining hidden in these situations,
highlight how people experience and relate to it, bring to light some of the problems
that they experience with it, and thus begin to problematise its existence. The
problems observed centred around the situation of being created as a subject of
supervision and management in care systems. Accounts showed participants'
awareness of being invested in differential power relationships in which participants'
conducted is observed, limited, directed and disciplined and decisions about their lives
made by other people, and their relation to themselves, in differing ways, as "liberal"
subjects in a way that clashes with this situation. This poses problems for people in
the ways that they relate to themselves, their conduct, and their environment. These
issues cannot be judged merely according to some pre-determined criteria for
assessing "good" care, but only through attending to an ever-present set of dangers in
the ways that people experience and interact with power and subjectivity in care
environments.
We cannot intervene in the participants' situation in the sense of setting out
programmes of action or resistance for them to follow, nor in the sense of prophesying
a "solution" to the issues that they struggle with or intervening into specific situations
on behalf of individual participants. Apart from the dangers involved with a researcher
outlining "solutions" to others' problems, there is an ethical problem with making
interventions into a situation that we are not a part of — upsetting the apple cart, as it
were — and then leaving the people involved to deal with the consequences. We must
not make simple or final judgements about power for others. Important here is
Foucault's (1991a) realisation that the important task in situations like the one
examined in this research is in formulating ways of listening to people, discovering
what their problems are, and "unleashing" these ideas in the hope that they will allow
people involved in care to become aware of them, and bring it about that the situation
of people living in care is no longer taken for granted, that is becomes open to
challenge.

chapters, we saw approaches to assessing care services and setting out ideals for their
organisation, research into care institutions, and work dealing with conceptions of
disability and learning difficulties.
As Walmsley (2001) comments, the dominant model, upon which most
research into care services implicitly or explicitly draws, is the normalisation model.
As was seen in Chapter Four, this model begins from a concern that certain groups,
such as people with learning difficulties, have devalued social roles that reflect
negative ways of thinking about them that are propagated by 'that segment of society
that [...] holds norm-defining power' (Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1989; p.211). This,
it is argued, has the effect of creating negative social roles for these groups, causing
them to be negatively perceived and treated. Normalisation thus proposes encouraging
individuals to pursue positive and socially useful behaviour, promoting positive labels
and roles for them, using socially normal and valued social systems in dealing with
them, and working to combat negative stereotypes and negative treatment of people in
legal systems (Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1989).
A number of theoretical problems with normalisation were raised in Chapter
Five, and these are echoed in the research findings. Although the existence of negative
labels and ways of thinking attached to being objectified as someone with learning
difficulties (and as someone therefore conceptually divided from "normal" others)
were discussed by participants as problematic, there is more to consider in their
accounts than normalisation considers. The issues that participants discussed also
centred around their situation in differential relationships with the staff in their homes,
the ways that they are made into subjects of decisions, observations and judgements,
and punishments and reprimands of staff, and the ways that their lives are supervised
and managed and their conduct subject to prohibitions and limitations.
The problems that emerged from participants' talk about these issues were
connected to the drive to relate to themselves as individuals with rights to input into
the running of their lives, to be treated equally with others, and to be a self-expressing
individual who is not overly constrained by rules or by the decisions of other people.
This drive might be considered to represent a struggle for "normal" treatment which
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mirrors normalisation's concerns. However, the situation that participants describe
cannot be effectively conceived in terms of its correspondence to a pre-determined set
of normalisation criteria, but can only be understood in terms of their situation in
complex relationships of power, and their interactions with forces of subjectification.
The extent to which the power relationships and subject positions that are evident in
participants' accounts can be judged according to standards of "normality" or as
"socially valued" is contentious. For instance, a number of times, the punishments that
participants report could be argued to aim at eliciting "socially valued" behaviour —
e.g. not 'being noisy,' or 'messing about,' going to work, keeping the house clean and
so on. However, these are aspects of a wider set of power relationships and forces of
subjectification with which participants interact. They are connected to ways that
people are positioned as particular types of subject amenable to specific power
relationships that place them a position in which their conduct can be observed and
directed. These issues of power and subjectification and the ways that people struggle
with them and form relationships to themselves and their own conduct cannot be
productively understood merely in terms of how "normal", or otherwise, they are. This
research goes beyond a consideration of how people explicitly make complaints about
their homes, and examines how their situation is structured with respect to power
relationships, and how these power relationships cause problems with which people
struggle in relating to and understanding themselves as "normal" or "learning
disabled" individuals. Normalisation leaves no room for considering the subjected
positions that people experience, the differential relationships they are situated in, nor
their struggles and interactions with these forces. These issues can only be
productively theorised from a perspective that recognises the impact of Foucault's
work on our understanding of truth, power and ethics, and seeks to explore
individuals' own experiences of these issues in a way that goes beyond "surface"
considerations of "normality" or explicit complaints that people make. Power
relationships and subject positions are a ubiquitous part of human life. It is not
possible to argue that merely identifying the presence of power relations makes a
situation "abnormal". What is important is to look at how these issues exist for
people, how they relate to them, and how they struggle with them.
Theories about care systems based around 'quality of life' (QOL) (e.g. Goode,
1994b; Brown, Brown & Bayer, 1994) are similarly incapable of taking account of the
issues raised by this research. QOL includes concerns with the extent to which people
living in care can exert control over their own lives. This is generally assessed via
questionnaires about living and accommodation, leisure activities, health, family and
friends, work, help received and desired, and general life satisfaction. A number of
these issues overlap somewhat with concerns raised by participants in this research.
However, as with normalisation, QOL, has no way to take account of individuals'
situation in power relationships or their positioning as subjects of care.
Participants in this research were engaging with issues which, whilst
connected to issues of their control over their lives, were centrally related to the ways
that they are situated in differential power relationships and led to recognise
themselves as subjects of management, supervision and discipline in these
relationships. These issues cannot be attended to through an approach beginning from
a pre-determined set of criteria to assess individuals' satisfaction with a specific set of
issues relating to their situation. The issues in question emerged in this research
through an interpretative process based around participants' accounts of their
situation. It is significant to note that, although participants engaged with tensions
between this position and the impetus to relate to themselves as self-expressing
individuals with rights to make choices and decisions in the running of their lives, this
was often not phrased or conceptualised by them as a complaint or a problem. A
concern only for explicit complaints about specific issues would thus miss much of
significance.
The specific things that participants make complaints about only represent a
part of the overall picture. It needs to be realised that these issues exist in relation to a
wider set of issues connected to power. For instance, one might take the comment that
care residents are made to go to work in a day centre which they find unpleasant as a
single issue that could be "corrected" by providing alternative choices for work
placements. However, this would not take account of the specific relationships that
give rise to this situation. This research has highlighted how issues such as this one
are connected to care residents being made into subjects in specific power
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relationships in which their conduct can be observed, directed and punished, and in
which a specific group of people are in a position to manage their lives and the homes
that they live in. The power relationships that make it possible for people to be sent to
a particular place by the staff of care homes do not affect only this specific issue, but
actually connect to a whole set of prohibitions, imperatives, obligations, punishments
and so on that affect the lives of people in care. It is important to take account not only
of the specific issues that are commented about, but also the wider set of power
relationships and subject positions that bring these issues into being, that structure the
social world of the research participants. Again, this research is important here
because it goes beyond "surface" manifestations of explicit complaints, and entails a
deeper examination of how the social world that people in care inhabit is structured
with respect to power relations, and of how they struggle with these issues.
The issues we have been dealing with are complex, and, as Foucault (1991a)
commented, an important task is to find ways of listening to what people say so as to
formulate an idea of what the problems facing them are. Many of the points that have
emerged from this research would not be seen if we began from a pre-determined
framework for delimiting specific aspects of care to be treated as significant in terms
of life quality, or relied upon what participants explicitly framed as complaints about
their situation. The reading of these issues as problematic for participants, as things
that they struggle with, emerges from a consideration of the subjected position that
they are led to recognise as acting upon them, and the power relationships in which
they are situated. This research has brought to light, then, a set of issues pertaining to
the situation of people in care vis-à-vis power and subjectification through an
interpretative process carried out on the ways that they talk about their lives and
experiences, rather than a series of questions about pre-determined aspects of their
lives which can then be measured according to pre-existing ideals for standards of
"good" care.
As seen in Chapter Four, similar concerns to those of normalisation and
quality of life have influenced how community care is developed and assessed. Care
service provision has been stated to have the aims of ensuring that people can make
informed choices about their care, that they are given rights to choose their services, to
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leave services which they are unhappy with, and have a voice in developing
empowering practices (e.g. SSI, 1992; Beresford, 1993; Means & Smith, 1998). Allied
to these ideals are advocacy services which also place their emphasis upon ensuring
that people in care have a useful voice in their own affairs (e.g. Campaign for Mental
Handicap, 1984; Crawley, 1990; Sutcliffe & Simons, 1993; etc.). Despite these aims,
there have been arguments that people living in care typically exert less choice over
their lives, and have less independence and less voice in their affairs than their non-
disabled counter-parts (e.g. Booth, Simons & Booth, 1990; Emerson & Hatton, 1994;
Sinson, 1995).
The findings from this research suggest that, as we have said, voice and the
ideal of having choice or a 'say' in their lives is a central issue in participants'
accounts. However, what was also found was that this area of concern was connected
to a wider set of issues to do with their situation in power relationships in which they
are positioned as subjects of the decisions, judgements, assessments, interventions and
discipline of staff, and in which they are led to recognise themselves as occupying a
specific 'place' in their homes and as subject to standards of 'good' behaviour in
terms of this. This is a complex interplay of forces with which participants engage,
and in which the choices and "voice" they have are situated, as evidenced by a number
of participants speaking from the position of a care subject, and relating to themselves
through the imperatives, prohibitions, and differential relationships this entails. This
situation, then, cannot be resolved or understood merely in terms of lack of voice or of
"giving" a voice to people. A wider set of issues, connected to power and subjectivity,
must be recognised, one which is intricately connected to the ways that people can
express themselves, and to the voice that they perceive themselves as having. We can
thus contend that, whilst voice is an important issue to consider, it is important also to
situate this consideration in a framework which takes account of the subjected
position from which this voice emerges, and of the problems people experience with
it.
Also to be considered is research that sets out to study care institutions from a
perspective explicitly connected to power. There is, however, a dearth of research that
has undertaken such a study. Richard Servian's (1996) work in this area recognises the
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importance of a Foucauldian approach for such a study. However, Servian, despite a
stated interest in how people are produced as subjects in care environments, takes a
view of Foucault's work that sees it as taking a wholly deterministic outlook on
power, with people upon whom power operates being the victims of an oppression
that determines their conduct. He ends up, therefore, with no means of understanding
the subjected positions that people speak from, or the ways that they interact with
forces of subjectification and power, and relate to themselves actively. Hence, the
conclusions he is able to draw are based around the idea that 'ideological influences
cast a climate of fear over the ability of all stakeholders to challenge the status quo.'
However, this is a limited conclusion. The research in this thesis has demonstrated
that participants actively interact with issues of power and subjectification, and these
interactions cannot be characterised just by the imposition of a climate of fear 'to
challenge the status quo.' Participants in this research did talk about discipline as a
characteristic of the power relations affecting them. However, this was by no means
the only consideration. Discipline and punishments were not an over-riding factor in
participants' accounts. What was central to many of them was participants'
identification with a subjectified position, with them actively recognising a position
that they occupy with respect to their homes and power relationships, taking this
position on board and identifying with the reasons for doing so. Also, other
participants talked about how they do challenge their situation, ways that they speak
up for themselves and defy aspects of power that affect them.
Overall, then, in relation to work relating to theories and assessments of care
services, this research highlights the importance not only of considering the voice (or
lack of it) that service-users have, but also of attending to how what they say indicates
the existence of forms of power which affect them, forces of subjectification by which
they are led to recognise themselves as subjects, and their active interactions with
these forces and their formation of relationships to themselves and their own conduct.
We have demonstrated that these questions are intimately connected to the way that
people talk about their situation, and in the issues that we perceive them to be
struggling with. This research, then, adds to the growing set of emerging voices
arguing that Foucault's work is potentially important in reconceptualising how we
think about learning difficulties and care services (e.g. Allen, 1996; Chadwick, 1996;
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Hughes & Patterson, 1997; Marks, 1999), and carries them forward in terms of
presenting a framework for listening to people's accounts of their experiences in care,
unmasking the workings of power and subjectification in their situation, and
formulating ideas about what problems they are experiencing and dealing with.
Another area to consider in terms of how this research makes additions to
knowledge is that around how Foucault's work is relevant to psychology, and how
psychology can accommodate a Foucauldian approach. We showed in Chapter Three
that Foucault's work has relevance for developments in psychology which challenge
its status as a natural science-modelled enterprise, and that it has influenced within the
discipline a questioning of its presumptions about its subject matter. Particularly, it
has been influential in deconstructing the idea of individualism in psychology which
holds that each individual is a 'potentially autonomous' (Parker, 1990), unitary,
bounded entity endowed with the cognitive apparatus to perceive and react to the
world without the influence of any other actors, and separable in conceptual terms
from social factors. A number of writers have drawn upon Foucault's work in this
respect, and in showing that the knowledge which is produced by psychology is
additionally problematic in its links to questions of power and subjectification, that it
produces people as particular types of subjects who are amenable to particular kinds
of classification, regulation, judgement and administration through rendering
particular aspects of the psyche knowable in particular ways (e.g. Henriques et al.,
1984; Rose, 1989, 1990; Parker, 1992, 1995; etc.).
A number of positions problematise traditional conceptions of psychology as a
positivist science and take discourse as their primary focus. Foucault's work is an
important influence on how these approaches are understood. In Chapter Three, we
argued that Foucault's insights into the role of systems of knowledge bringing into
being aspects of self-hood and personal characteristics around which power,
subjectification and ethical self-relationships come into being encourage a radical
perspective on this area. The ethogenic approach (e.g. Harre & Secord, 1972) and the
approach that we termed "grammatical indexicality" (e.g. Harre, 1995) were seen to
retain many of the problems of structuralism. They seek to move from individual
accounts to a set of rules that underlies them, and upon which people draw in acting in
-295-
a socially correct manner. Foucault's work, however, allows us to realise that this type
of thinking implicitly assumes the problematic existence of a pre-existing and free-
standing subject with knowledge of these rules. Foucault provides us with the
realisation that neither the subject him/herself, nor ideals of desirable social goals can
be conceived as separable or free-standing, but that they are dynamically constituted
in systems of knowledge linked to power. Forms of discourse analysis that are based
upon the idea of 'interpretative repertoires' (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992) run into
somewhat similar problems. Here, the assumption is that discourse is a tool for
achieving a set of social goals (such as achieving the appearance of facticity, avoiding
or apportioning blame, and so on) in a specific situational context, and that individuals
draw upon a set of linguistic resources (or interpretative repertoires) in pursuit of these
goals. Again the key problems here centre around the constitution of the subject, in
that the individual is conceptually separate from, and prior to, the linguistic resources
s/he uses. Again, there is no form of theorisation about how individual subjectivities
or social goals themselves are discursively constituted and connected to systems of
power/knowledge.
The findings made in this research also highlight these shortcomings. The
observations made regarding participants' situation with respect to power
relationships, the forms of subjectivity and ethical ideals that they engage with, and
the problems they face in their self-relationships could not be accounted for in terms
of a relationship to underlying semantic rules. Such an analysis could not theorise
people's interaction with forces that lead them to relate to themselves as subjects of
supervision, interventions into their lives related to care, decisions that are made about
them, forms of knowledge that define them as care subjects, systems of discipline, or
the tensions in their accounts between this position and the understanding of
themselves. Similarly, although the form of discourse analysis championed by Potter,
Edwards and Wetherell might conceive of the appearance of being a self-expressing
subject as a "social goal" that is pursued in the context of the interview situation, this
would not account for the constitution of the positions with which participants engage,
nor the connection of what they say to their place in differential power relationships.
What was observed was not a simple matter of participants drawing upon a specific
set of linguistic resources that are available to anyone in society, nor following a
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universal semantic vocabulary, but of their awareness that they are positioned as
subjects in a way that influences what is seen as legitimate for them to say and do, and
what can be done to them by others. This would be overlooked in the types of analysis
mentioned above.
This research makes a contribution here in formulating an approach through
which psychology can accommodate a Foucauldian perspective in attending to
individuals' accounts of their situation with respect to examining their interactions
with power, subjectivity, and ethical technologies. This approach draws upon IPA, in
its ideal of exploring with people their thoughts and experiences about aspects of their
lives. However, it moves beyond this in a number of ways. Firstly, whilst, like IPA,
this analysis drew out themes relating to participants' experiences and interactions
with issues of power and subjectivity that recur across interviews, it also recognises
the importance of moving beyond a surface consideration of these themes, and taking
into account also how they are discussed in individual accounts, and examining how
participants talk about them, the language that they use, and the overall positions that
they take in their discourse. The importance of this can be seen in the analyses that
have been made. One important issue to arise out of an examination of the way that
participants talk about the identified themes was that of the pronominal forms that
they use in referencing themselves in relation to both forces of power and ethical
ideals by which to direct their own conduct. Also, it was noted that accounts which
contained the same themes could be very different in terms of their overall orientation,
especially with regards to ethical issues and the overall positions that participants take
towards their situation in care. This analysis also moved beyond IPA's concern with
people's experience, and connected people's reports of their situation to an analysis of
the versions of the social world that they are engaging with, and a consideration of
how this encompasses power relations that affect them, subject positions that act upon
them, and ethical technologies that they draw upon. The analyses made here would
not have been possible without this connection. In this respect, the approach shares
concerns with post-structuralist forms of discourse analysis (e.g. Banister et al., 1994).
However, it also demonstrates the importance of developing an approach that can
work not only from 'prescriptive texts' (Foucault, 1987b), but also from individuals'
accounts of their situation. Important in this respect is not only drawing out the subject
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positions in accounts and their links to power, moral obligations, and so on, but also
to consider Foucault's ethical domain.
This ethical domain of analysis allows us to connect observations about power
and subjectivity with considerations of individuals' activity in relating to themselves
and the forces that act upon them. It is this domain that allows us to take the important
step of formulating a picture of what the problems facing people are, what they
struggle with. As we have said, we cannot make final judgements about power on
behalf of people, nor design programmes for them to follow. What we can do,
however, and what it is important to do, is to attempt to uncover the costs of power,
the problems that people experience with it, and thus to open it up to questioning.
This research has taken a step in this direction. It moves beyond work that approaches
care services in terms merely of normalisation criteria, pre-determined ideals for life
quality, or simple definitions of voice and empowerment, and demonstrates the
importance of examining care services in terms of people's experiences and
interactions with power and subjectivity. This examination brings to light issues
previously unseen. This research has developed an approach for analysing these issues
— an approach based around exploring people's thoughts and experiences with them,
and then attempting to understand their accounts in terms of their embodiment of
systems of power/knowledge that people are aware of acting upon, of the subject
positions that they experience themselves as being led to recognise, the ways that they
actively relate to this situation, and the ways that this constitutes tensions in their
accounts and problems that they interact with. The observations of tensions and
problems in participants' accounts suggest that these are issues that should be attended
to.
9.3 Critical evaluation
As was seen in Chapter Six, this research does not take the same orientation to
ideals of validity and reliability as would a piece of quantitative research. Rather than
imaging that this research has merely neutrally discovered or described the objects of
its enquiry, we must recognise that the assumptions made about the subjects of
research, the topic of investigated, and the methodological approach directly affect the
research process and what has emerged from it. Banister et al. (1994) propose that
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remaining open to these issues, and being self-reflexive about what has been done, the
methods used, and the availability of possible alternative interpretations is the only
way to approach these issues in a constructive way. In this respect, we must attend to
issues of indexicality, inconcludability and reflexivity.
Indexicality
The first aspect to contend with here, indexicality, relates to the specificity of
the research findings. That is, even if the approach taken here were to be exactly
replicated, it would nevertheless unavoidably be a different piece of research, and its
findings would reflect this specificity. The findings made, then, must be recognised as
contingent and specific to the situation in which they arose. However, it has not been
our intention to claim to have unproblematically "discovered" facts that are assumed
to be universal to all people in a specific situation. We are not attempting to put
forward an overall, definite representation of how power works in all care homes, nor
of ways that everyone will engage with it. The findings are not intended to represent a
predictive framework by which we can propose a definite form of action to be taken
on behalf of people. Rather, the point to make is that we have demonstrated the
usefulness of an approach to listening to people's accounts based around Foucault's
three domains of inquiry that can bring to light issues affecting them that would not
otherwise be attended to. Indeed, the participants involved in this research talk about,
experience and engage with the issues raised in the interviews in different ways. This
approach is useful precisely because it can attend to the specificity of what people say
rather than being pre-armed with an assumption of what the issues affecting them will
be. The impetus for change and action in these situations must, we have argued, stem
from the specificity of what people themselves say, and ways that they experience
problems with their situation.
In relation to these points, our presentation of an overall picture of power,
subjectivity and individuals' interactions with them is itself problematic, and the act
of summarising the research into general findings, and using general thematic
headings to discuss much of the research unavoidably loses much of the specificity of
individual accounts. However, such summarising is unavoidable in a large research
project such as this if its findings are to be presented coherently, and its research
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questions addressed. This is not a problem so long as it is borne in mind, that we are
not presenting the findings in such a way as to represent universal "facts". What we
have uncovered is a range of themes about power in community care and participants'
responses to them. This is not claimed to be a complete range, or a generalisable
average of responses, but a description of what was found in the accounts that were
examined.
The presentation of a series of themes that can be identified in a specific
number of interviews is not intended to represent a move towards a positivist stance in
arguing for the generalisability of the findings based upon their statistical occurrence.
The themes were drawn out to provide a conceptual basis for constructing a coherent
— and reasonably concise — analysis. The same is true of the headings under which
participants' overall orientations towards care were discussed ("oppositional",
"ambivalent" and "positive"). Of course, there will still be points of individual
specificity in the accounts that there was not the space to elaborate upon, and which
are unavoidably obscured by any approach that attempts to analyse a reasonably large
number of in-depth accounts. However, it has been recognised that it is important
when drawing out common themes or orientations to care to remain open to the
specificity of individual accounts, and the analysis accordingly moved beyond a
consideration of the thematic headings themselves to take account also of how they
occurred in individual interviews, and to draw out significant points of difference in
individual interviews. This is something that, as has been said, was attended to when
conducting the analyses.
The number of occurrences of the themes, the pattern of the use of specific
pronominal forms, and the overall positions of orientation towards care were noted in
order to illustrate how they were represented overall in the accounts. The fact that
most of the themes (and particularly the ones connected to power), the pattern of
pronominal form use noted, and the positions that participants took towards their
homes recurred across a significant number of accounts suggests that the findings that
have been drawn out are significant with respect to participants' situations. This also
adds some validity to the research in terms of ruling out the possibility that the
findings are just "one-offs", unique to one particular account, and are representative,
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to varying degrees, of the overall sample of participants interviewed. This is not the
same, however, as imagining that this allows us to calculate the statistical probability
of themes occurring in wider population, or attempting to generalise the findings
beyond the accounts obtained. Along with the process of co-validation that was
undertaken, as described in Chapter Six, however, it does suggest a degree of validity
to the findings obtained from the accounts analysed. The themes that have been
presented, then, are useful in terms of providing a means of constructing a coherent
analysis that can cover points that arose across different accounts, but this is not
imagined to equate to making statistically generalisable discoveries, nor to imply that
all points of potential interest or individual specificity from each interview are
covered.
The findings of the research, then, are not taken to be unproblematically
generalisable or replicable. However, the approach that we have taken in arriving at
them and the types of questions asked in relation to people's situation are potentially
transferable to other pieces of research. It would not, as we have pointed out, be
possible to reproduce this research exactly. What is important is that this research has
drawn out ideas of what is possible (rather than universal) with respect to power in
care systems. These ideas suggest that the study of power using a Foucauldian
discourse analytic approach is a worthwhile one that can shed new light on the
situation of people living in care. The outlining of the analytic framework and the
description of the general analytic technique provided in Chapter Three and Chapter
Six should allow another discourse analyst to pose the same sort of questions in a
broadly similar inquiry. This is not a matter of statistical generalisation, then, but of
analytic transferability. The finding of new ways of bringing to light issues that people
might experience as problematic and placing these issues on the agenda for discussion
is an important contribution in making a case for the development of this sort of
research into care systems and other areas. The specificity of each account, however,
is also an important point to bear in mind, and one that reminds us of the danger of
arriving at grand solutions about other people's situation through research such as
this.
We must also deal with these issues as they pertain to the interview process
itself. Although the interview situations were approached in an open manner, they
were still, unavoidably, entered into with a pre-existing idea of the area to be
addressed and the research questions to be answered, and with the ideal of the
interview situation remaining relevant to these points. The interviews themselves were
produced in this context, between interviewer and participant. Thus, effects of the
interviewer on leading the interview and of participants forming their own
interpretation of the research, including ideas about what is expected of them, cannot
be ruled out (Mishler, 1986, 1999). However, the potential for these effects can never
be totally ruled out in any piece of social science research. In this research, the
interviews were, as has been said, approached in an open manner, giving the
participants room to bring their own concerns to the fore and to explore issues that are
significant for them. The attempt was made to ensure that the accounts were produced
with the participants rather than against them (see Banister et al., 1994). This was not
one hundred percent successful. Often in the interviews, the interaction between
researcher and participants was quite directed, with the participants responding to
questions or probing comments from the researcher. However, the attempt was made
to include the participants in the process as active participants. The interviews did not
follow a rigid schedule, but were flexible to allow the exploration of issues raised by
the participants themselves. This is indicated particularly by Steve's interview, in
which he turned the tables on what might be considered to be the traditional interview
situation, and began intently questioning the interviewer and articulating his own
concern with the process. So, whilst we can never totally rule out potentially
problematic effects of the interview situation, I believe we can be reasonably satisfied
with the way that they were approached in this research.
Inconcludability
The second aspect of critical evaluation to consider is inconcludability: the fact
that there is unavoidably a gap between anything that we try to represent and the
representation itself, and that research findings can never represent a set of facts
independent of the external world. In traditional, quantitative research this problem is
addressed through studying large samples. However, in line with comments made
above, this unavoidably loses something of the specificity and marginality of
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individual accounts, reducing responses to those that can be represented as
representing an overall position. The sample with which this research worked was
selected to strike a balance between being able to examine individual accounts in
sufficient depth and having enough participants to be aware of the possible range of
responses. This is not to claim that all possible types of response were obtained in this
research, but it did provide evidence of some very different positions in participants'
accounts which might have been missed by a smaller sample. It might be considered
also that a larger sample would have been desirable. The initial intended sample size
was twenty-five interviews, but there was some attrition of the sample for various
reasons that have been stated previously (participants not appearing comfortable in the
interviews, difficulty in arranging follow-up meetings with some prospective
participants, difficulties of transcription, etc.). However, it seems doubtful that even as
many as ten or so extra interviews would have added very much to the research
findings.
Also to be realised in relation to the inconcludability of research is that, since
we cannot make claims that our representations unproblematically represent the
underlying reality behind accounts, neither can we claim that our findings represent a
final or complete reading. Again, however, this does not mean that our findings are
invalid or incorrect, but that we must be reflexive about the assumptions that guided
the making of them. All research must, of necessity, begin from a set of assumptions
that allow certain aspects of its data to be attended to, and a reading thus to be
produced (Parker, 1999b). In this case, the readings emerged from a consideration of
the data guided by Foucault's three critical domains of truth, power and ethics. Whilst
we cannot claim, then, that the findings emerged from the data via some natural,
totally unmediated process, we can argue that the effort was made to ensure that the
findings arose from a reading of the data in light of these considerations rather than
beginning with a set of theories about what would be found and then searching for
confirming evidence for this in the accounts. Despite this effort, we must
acknowledge that other interpretations are available, and that one can never represent
an ultimately complete account.
Particularly important to realise here is that we have not covered everything
about power or subjectivity as it exists in care settings. Power is a ubiquitous part of
human relationships, and we should not imagine that any one piece of research could
arrive at a complete picture of it. There are other aspects of power that we have not
considered. The impression might be gained from this research that power is
something that flows in the direction from care staff to residents. However, this would
not be correct. Participants should not be thought of as powerless, such that they
themselves do not exercise power in some ways. There will doubtless be strategies
which are open to care residents that represent power relationships flowing in the
other direction, as it were, and acting upon the conduct of care staff. Care staff, and
home managers, themselves will, of course, also be caught up in quite complex
operations of power in which they are positioned as subjects with their own
obligations, duties, limitations, and so on. Similarly, we cannot claim to have
uncovered an exhaustive picture of the ways that power affects participants. What we
have uncovered in this research most particularly are operations of power that
participants are "up against", ways that they are aware of their conduct being acted
upon, of obligations, limitations, and ways to conduct themselves and to relate to
themselves that emerge from their situation in care. These will, of course, not be the
only aspects of power and subjectivity that operate upon them, but it is, by virtue of
our having explored their experiences of power in care, what emerged from their
accounts. By making clear, as we have done, the framework that guided our reading of
participants' accounts, however, we maintain the possibility for readers themselves to
add different interpretations of the accounts presented, and to recognise the limitation
of the picture of power that is being presents.
Reflexivity
Finally, we must consider reflexivity. This relates to the acknowledgement that
our theories and ways of approaching a problem unavoidably affect the explanations
we give (Banister et al., 1994). This fits in with arguments made throughout this thesis
that the pretence to neutrality or objectivity in research is disingenuous and
undesirable. It is also necessary, therefore, to acknowledge the overall position that
led to the definition of the specific research questions, and the formation of a specific
problem to be addressed in the research. We must here acknowledge a pre-existing
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commitment to critical inquiry that influenced the choice of Foucault's work as a key
theoretical perspective connected to the study of power.
This consideration ties back into those sorts of considerations discussed with
respect to inconcludability in terms of their possible effects on the production of 'a
particular type of sense' from the research. It is possible that this commitment might
of itself have led to the seeing of problems that participants are assumed to
experience, that the desire to conduct critical inquiry influenced the production of a
reading of the accounts upon which a critique could be based. Equally, we must be
aware of the possibility that taking a Foucauldian framework as the basis for the
formation of the research problem led to the production of findings that merely serve
to reflect a Foucauldian agenda. Again, however, the effort was made to remain aware
of these issues in the reading of accounts, and to ensure that these positions served to
focus attention onto specific things in the accounts rather than leading to expectations
for findings that unduly influenced the reading. As has been said, we have presented
the account extracts from which the analyses emerged, and this allows the reader
him/herself to evaluate the evidence for the readings that are presents. Also, we have
made attempts to make clear the framework that guided analysis, and the position of
the researcher in creating research problems to be addressed. Through this, whilst
making a case for the reading put forward in this thesis, we maintain the possibility of
readers examining and adding their own interpretations (see Banister et al., 1994).
It should be reiterated that these points do not somehow invalidate the research
findings. Rather, remaining aware of these issues, and opening the findings up to a
critical survey is an important activity that has the effect of increasing rather than
decreasing the validity of the research (Banister et al., 1994). In summary, then, this
research must acknowledge the unavoidable presence of pre-existing ideals and
assumptions that shaped its approach. However, the interviews were approached in an
open manner so that participants could discuss issues that they perceived as significant
related to the areas being studied, and that they could express their own concerns.
Also, the effort was made to remain aware in reading the accounts of the effects of
prior assumptions which might encourage a particular reading to be made. Whilst no
piece of research could ever claim to have been one hundred percent successful here
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(indeed, there is no such thing as absolute success in this context), it is important to
retain an awareness of these issues, and to lay them open to scrutiny, rather than
wishing them away and hiding behind a disingenuous pretence to neutrality or
objectivity.
Additionally, it should be realised that these processes are important to bear in
mind with respect to this research since they remind us of the danger of believing that
this sort of analysis could come up with findings that are unproblematically
generalisable and could provide a definite blueprint for action that should be taken on
the behalf of people in care. We are not making this claim, however. On the contrary,
by proposing an approach that can bring to light new issues about care services as
regards power, finding new ways to formulate ideas of what people experience as
problematic, we are seeking to develop a position rather than assume ours to be the
final word. We are arguing, then, that there are important issues to attend to here, and
that, rather than intervening on the behalf of people living in care, we must hope to
empower people involved with care systems to listen to their problems in this way.
The development of this position, then, depends on input from the people involved,
rather than making decisions on their behalf based on an academically-derived
position.
9.4 Future Directions
The first thing to draw attention to in considering what influences this research
might have, is that there are a vast number of points that could have been explored but
were not. It is the nature of any piece of research that it must choose its focus in
addressing its key questions, with the unavoidable consequence that a number of
potentially interesting avenues will be left unexplored. For instance, we have only
examined the accounts of care residents about their situation. This focus is important,
because, as we have said, it is important to examine power from the point-of-view of
those who are its subjects. However, as Becker (1967) points out, and as Foucault's
work also demonstrates, there will also unavoidably be constraints and issues of
power to consider acting upon those who administer care homes. Thus, an analysis
from the position taken in this research of the accounts of carers, home managers, and
policy makers with respect to the situation of people with learning difficulties and
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running a care home also has the potential to produce important findings relating to
this situation.
Also, there are issues relating to the findings that were produced that would
benefit from more in-depth studies. For instance, issues relating to self-identity were
discussed in the accounts in relation to participants' definition as having learning
difficulties, being positioned as subjects of care, and relating to themselves as self-
expressing individuals with specific rights. There are, however, other possible aspects
of identity that have not been looked at that might also shed light on the way that
people perceive their situation. For instance, in Western culture there are issues of
identity connected to the way that people present themselves through their clothes,
hairstyles and personal grooming that might conceivably be very different for people
living in care environments. This could also be examined through an approach like the
one taken here, through exploring these issues in conversation with people living in
care. Also, the interviews in this research centred mostly around the situation of living
in care, and people's perceptions of their homes and the people that run them, and
their relationship to ideas such as "having learning difficulties". Again, there are other
areas that might be considered by similar research that could potentially bring
important points to light, such as their interaction with medical services and other
professionals.
Similarly, in the findings presented here, the use of "liberal" ethical
technologies comes through as an ideal through which participants seem to relate to
themselves, which stands in apparent contrast to the forms of power and subjectivity
imposed in their lives as care subjects. However, we have commented that it would be
erroneous to imagine that such ideals represented the absence of power, or a basic
form of subjectivity that power then suppresses. This is an area of people's perception
of their situation that would therefore also merit further investigation in terms, for
instance, of the obligation that such a position brings, ways that people perceive
themselves as being obliged to govern their conduct in line with this in a wide range
of situations, and to explore in more detail exactly how this interacts with other
aspects of power and subjectivity that they experience. Also, we have concentrated
here on participants' thoughts and experiences in building up a picture of their
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situation. However, there are also actions of power/knowledge that may not come
through in these accounts. Particularly, Foucault points out that power is connected to
the physicality of specific environments, their architectural arrangement, and the
control and circulation of bodies in them. Further research might, therefore, benefit
from the study of these alongside people's accounts, perhaps via a form of participant
observation that could then be used as a stimulus for further discussion about aspects
of their situation not covered here. Additionally, it might be theorised that the concept
of independence and self-determination that seemed to inform the position many
participants were taking with respect to their situation is a culturally specific one. It
might therefore be informative to carry out a study like this one with participants from
different ethnic backgrounds or nationalities.
The approach taken in this thesis could also productively be used to study
other situations than care environments. A key point that we have made is that such an
approach, based around reading people's accounts of their own situation from a
perspective influenced by Foucault's work conceived as three domains of critical
ontology, take the important step of being able to uncover issues of power,
subjectivity and self-relationships as the people involved experience them. We have
basically striven to show that it is possible to take the essence of what Foucault did in
his analysis of historical documents, and uncover the same sorts of issues in
individuals' accounts of their experiences. The range of situations that this could thus
be applied to is limited only by the imagination of those seeking to examine these
situations with the people involved in them. For instance, one could examine accounts
of their situation by people using other forms of care services such as day centres or
placed employment, employees of various companies or public services, prisoners,
asylum seekers, medical patients, people classified as mentally ill, and so on.
Perhaps most important to consider, however, are the future directions to be
taken with regards to the specific findings of this project. It has been commented a
number of times now that we cannot imagine that we have arrived at a complete, final
and unchallengeable account of participants' situations such that we can outline with
any degree of certainty "what is to be done" in terms of a programme for action or
firm proposals for change. What we can claim, however, is to have begun to develop a
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position by making a case that there are important aspects of power and subjectivity
experienced by people living in care accommodation that have not hitherto been
addressed that the approach we have taken can attend to. Whilst we cannot intervene
in terms of somehow empowering people to emancipate themselves, we can aim, by
highlighting these issues, to empower care systems to attend to them, and to
problematise them. This is not the same as challenging them, but of ensuring that they
no longer function as things that are natural or unquestioned. Through this process, it
may be hoped that spaces will be created for the people involved to find room for new
forms of resistance, and the ability to transform their own situation. This provides new
ways for academic researchers to collaborate with people in care, through listening to
their accounts in a specific way, and painting a picture of the forms of power that they
experience. The impetus to transform these situations, then, must come from those in
care situations. This is something that must, of necessity, take place outside the
bounds of academic work. The input of academic research into this area, then, is to
undertake the exploration of these issues with the people involved, to bring to light the
issues uncovered, and thus to problematise the situation in new ways.
9.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the first thing to be said is that this research answers the call for
research to be undertaken that takes Foucault's ideas and uses them to analyse power
and subjectivity from the point-of-view of individuals who are affected by them, and
thus to demonstrate in a practical manner how these ideas can act as foundations for a
new way of understanding and unmasking power and the problems that people
experience in relation to it.
In concluding, we should recap the main findings of the research. Firstly, it
was observed that participants are aware of being rendered knowable as having
learning difficulties through a process of observation and assessment by a vaguely-
referenced group of people. Although they seem not to be aware of how this
assessment is carried out, or how it leads to them being assessed, they were aware of
its taking place, and of a set of consequences attached to it. These consequences
included their having negative lay-labels attached to them, and having decisions made
about their care needs, and thus where they are to live. Once so assessed as "having
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learning difficulties" and requiring accommodation in care homes, participants were
aware also of their being amenable to a set of institutional interventions, and being
situated in relationships with their home and the staff who run it in which their lives
are managed, decisions made for and about them by staff, and their conduct
supervised and judged according to standards of "good" and "bad" behaviour. In line
with this management and supervision, they were aware also of being positioned as
punishable beings, as individuals amenable to reprimands and punishments handed
down from the staff. Alongside these factors which constitute power relationships was
a "place" in the home, a subject position, in which participants are aware of being
obliged to recognise themselves in relation to a set of ideals of behaviour, and a
specific relationship with the institution and the staff. In this position, participants are
led to defer to the judgements and authority of the staff, to seek their permission for a
range of activities, and to recognise the limitations which their "place" in the home
imposes.
However, participants were not merely passively positioned by these forces,
but themselves played an active role in forming self-relationships and taking up a
position towards their environment. They did not just passively talk about themselves
as individuals unreservedly taking up the positions seen above. Rather, they drew
upon different ethical technologies — different ways of relating to themselves as beings
of a particular sort — which emphasised their abilities of self-expression, and their
rights to receive equal treatment with others, and to have their opinions heard. A
number of participants actively contested and challenged the ways in which power
acts upon them in their environment by drawing a contrast between this "liberal"
ethical position and the position of being a care subject. Others took a more
ambivalent line, being aware of both positions in their accounts, but not orienting
themselves explicitly in line with either. Still others identified more explicitly with
their position as subjects of care, and put forward justifications for this position acting
upon them and for their conducting themselves in line with it.
The evidence of tensions and struggles in participants' accounts begin to
suggest that this situation is problematic in the ways in which it acts upon people.
These problems revolve around tensions between the ways that participants are
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positioned in power relationships as care subjects, and the ways that they relate to
themselves in various ways as independent, self-expressing or self-determining
beings. The problems that participants articulated related to the fact that they were
aware of ideals of ethical conduct in terms of a drive to relate to themselves as
independent, self-expressing individuals with rights to equality of treatment with
others and choice in their lives, and that this clashed in a number of ways with their
perceived position as subjects of care. As well as being aware of the drive to relate to
themselves as self-expressing, choosing subjects who are not overly constrained by
power, participants were also aware of ways that their position in their homes places
them in situations in which they do not have 'a say,' in which their lives are arranged
and managed by others, and in which they are situated in power relationships such that
staff members make decisions about their lives and their conduct in terms of what is
expected of them and what they can legitimately do, and discipline them accordingly.
It is the tensions between these positions that lead participants to form complaints
about their situation and to describe aspects of it as 'not fair,"stupid,"not right,' and
so on. Even in the cases of those who identified positively with being positioned as
care subjects, there were still aspects of their situation that they articulated as
problematic or undesirable.
These are important points to realise. They suggest that, despite many positive
comments that could be made about them, community care services are still,
potentially at least, the sites of problematic forms of power with which the people
involved in them struggle. This shows that there is more to consider in understanding
care situations than ideals associated with quality of life or normalisation. There are
potential problems which cannot be addressed without an awareness of how power
has effects in the creation of particular relationships between people, and particular
subject positions. This places new issues on the agenda when considering care
situations, issues that are not conceptualised within current ways of thinking. In
evaluating and setting out ideals for care services, there are a new series of problems
to be dealt with around the issues seen here — around the ways in which people
become objectified in particular ways and how this is linked to their constitution as
certain kinds of subjects in particular power relationships, the ways in which they
relate to themselves and their own conduct, and how they interact and struggle with
these issues.
This is not to say, of course, that everything about all care situations is
negative with respect to the way that they treat care residents. Indeed, it would not be
correct to say that power functions in the same ways in every such situation. The
point, rather, is that there are always these dangers to be aware of, and that, in
understanding, evaluating and administering care environments, these are dangers of
which we must be aware. We must also recognise, however, that the "solutions" to
these problems lie not in the formulation of programmes by academics on behalf of
other people, but in working with them to bring to light these issues, and thus
problematising them — that is, not changing situations for people, but bringing it about
that the issues brought to light in this research are no longer unquestioned, putting
them onto the agenda for consideration.
What we should argue for, then, is not an end to all care homes, nor a definite
model for how they should be changed, nor even what people in such homes must do
to free themselves. The aim is not to present an absolute position laying out exactly
what is to be done. Instead, we have sought to make a convincing case for considering
a new area, for thinking in new ways about how power affects people in care
accommodation, for showing how power in this situation has specific dangers, how it
carries particular costs, and how these can be brought to light through listening to
people's accounts through an analytic framework influence by Foucault's three
domains of critical ontology. The aim is to promote consciousness of the issues we
have outlined surrounding how people in care are placed in particular kinds of power
relationship, and how they interact and struggle with particular kinds of subjectivity.
Through this, it may be hoped that we might, over time, develop a position in which
the people involved in the administration of care homes become aware of the
problems associated with their own position, and in which they are empowered to
listen to these problems by ensuring that they no longer remain hidden.
We have not, then, set out the final word on this issue, but, rather, proposed a
position that is to be developed. The creation of a position in which people who
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administer care no longer see as "natural" or unproblematic the ways in which they
operate, and in which forms of power in institutions are no longer hidden is a positive
goal in itself. Whilst this does not impose a specific "solution" upon people, it is from
just such a position that the possibility of people working through their problems
themselves, of finding new spaces for manoeuvre and resistance emerges. This does
not impose a solution on people, but it does work with the ideal of making space for
them to work them through themselves in a way that the forms of power and
subjectivity we have identified currently make difficult. As we have said, the impetus
for creating new forms of relationships and institutions must also emerge from them
themselves.
These are quite difficult ideas, and they almost certainly will not prove easy to
work with. Also, given that there is always something to be resisted, always power
relationships of one kind or another, the process of working with these problems is a
never-ending one, one which can never be said to be finished. This is not to say,
however, that the challenge of working through them in the ways that we have
outlined is not worth undertaking. Indeed the making of a convincing case for
attending to how these issues structure people's lives and the institutions in which
they live is one of the main achievements of this research. Also important in this
respect has been the development of a framework in which to listen to people's
accounts of their situation in a way that can attend to the issues of power and
subjectivity that affect them, and the problems that they face in relation to them.
Although we have talked in this research primarily about power, it is important
to note also that the analyses that have been made are important because they go
beyond this, to a consideration how people themselves respond to their situation and
how they take an active role in relating to themselves as subjects. We should
remember that, towards the end of his life, Foucault (e.g. 1983) emphasised that he
was far from being just a theoretician of power. He came to view his life's work as
comprising three domains of critical enquiry, and argued that each is important in
understanding how human beings come to exist as subjects (e.g. Foucault, 1993,
19970. He stated that studies of systems of knowledge can reveal how people are
objectified in particular ways, that studies of power can show how such knowledge is
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dynamically linked to the ways in which people's conduct can be observed and
directed, and to specific relationships that form between individuals. However, he also
came to realise the importance of the ethical domain, in which people — according to
certain rules, concepts and ideas — actively come to relate to themselves, to understand
themselves as subjects and to act upon their own conduct in line with this. The
importance of the research set out in this thesis lies in its showing the possibility of
taking the breadth of Foucault's work and applying it to a study of how people talk
about their own situation, to highlight their responses, struggles and problems in
relation to issues of power/knowledge and their own subjectivity. It is to be hoped that
this and future research will carry this forward and feed into practice in new ways, and
that it will influence new ways of understanding and evaluating power in care settings
— and, indeed, in all areas concerned with human subjectivity.
Appendix I — Age, Gender and Accommodation Information for Participants
Interview number
& pseudonym
Age* Gender Accommodation situation at
time of interview
I, Liz Mid-50s F Independent living
II, Anne Early-60s F Residential care home
III, Larry Early-50s M Residential care home
IV, Mark Early-20s M Residential care home
V, George Mid-50s M Residential care home
VI, Mike Early-50s M Residential care home
VII, Jean Early-50s F Residential care home
VIII, Val Mid-50s F Residential care home
IX, Neil** Mid-40s M Residential care home
X, Derek** Late-50s M Residential care home
XI, Peter Late-20s M Residential care home
XII, Steve Mid-60s M Supported living
XIII, Paul Mid-40s M Residential care home
XIV, Wendy Late-30s F Independent living
XV, Ron Early-50s M Independent living
XVI, Mary Late-50s F Residential care home
XVII, Trevor Late-40s M Residential care home
XVIII, Ernie Late-40s M Residential care home
XIX, Paula Mid-30s F Residential care home
X.X, Diane** Early-50s F Supported living
XXI, Beth, Hugh, Alex,
Tony**
Late-20s to
Early 40s
1 F & 3
M's
Residential care home
XXII, Simon** Mid-40s M Residential care home
* Because it was discovered that some participants did not know their exact age, they were only asked
for their general age range, as represented in the table. ** Indicates interviews not used in analysis.
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Appendix II: Key themes for discussion in interviews
Coming to be in care:
"Where have you lived previously"
"Is this your first care home?"
"Where the other homes/places you lived different? How?"
"Did you choose to come here?"
"Could you tell me how you came to live here?"
Life in care:
"What do you think about the homes you've lived in?"
"Do you think you're free to do pretty much what you want to?"
"Are there any things you have to do? Do you have to behave in particular ways? Who
decides that? Do you know why? What happens if you don't?"
"How much say/choice do you think you have in your life?"
"What do you think about the activities that you do here?"
"Are there any things you'd like to do which you don't get the chance to/Is there
anything you would like more say in?"
"Have you spoken to anyone about these things? Why not/what happened?"
"How do feel about what you can/can't do?"
"Do you think living here is very different from living outside of care? What would be
the main differences for you? How do yOu feel about that?"
"What's a typical day for you like?"
"What makes a good day for you, and a bad day?"
Learning difficulties:
"When did you first hear the term learning difficulties?"
"Who mentioned it to you?"
"What does it mean to you?"
"Is there anything you think people should realise about people with learning
difficulties/care homes?"
Appendix III — Transcription Conventions
The following conventions were used in transcribing the research interviews:
(1)	 A pause in speech. The number in the brackets indicates the
length of the pause, in seconds.
- Indicates speech of interviewer and participant overlapping.
[coughs]	 Indicates non-verbal sounds or actions, or explanatory
[a day centre]	 information about what is being talked about.
- Elision. Indicates where material of an intensely personal
nature, or information not relevant to the research, has been
omitted.
You can not -	 Underlining indicates emphasis on a word or syllable.
I wou-, didn't - 	 Dash indicates the breaking off a word mid-way through its
enunciation.
F Road	 Underscore replaces full names of people or places in order to
protect anonymity of participants.
A (nice) place -	 Speech in round brackets is slightly unclear on the cassette.
(?)
	
Indicates a part of an interview that is too unclear to transcribe.
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